As violence has subsided throughout Brazil’s state of S?o Paulo, government personnel and citizens are beginning to question the key drivers behind last week’s rampant unrest. Key underlying drivers for civil disobedience in Brazil exist largely due to:
? social inequality,
? political corruption and police brutality, and
? criminal enterprise expansion.
Simply addressing one driver while ignoring the others will fail to prevent future acts of large-scale violence and criminality. However, this is precisely what is occurring in Brazil. As 2006 is a presidential election year in Brazil, incumbent President Luiz In?cio Lula da Silva (see photo below right) and challenger Geraldo Alckmin, an upper class former banker, are choosing to highlight and address limited aspects of instability in the country.
Lula identifies the underlying causes of social unrest in Brazil as a lack of education spending. Yet, since being elected president in 2002, Lula’s administration has downsized the Ministry of Education, reducing it to a mere fraction of its former size. Simultaneously, this downsizing has curtailed primary and secondary education spending, diverting money to bloated and inefficient federal universities from which only a small segment of the affluent Brazilian populace benefit.
Former S?o Paulo state governor and current presidential nominee Geraldo Alckmin has sought to place the blame on the shoulders of Brazil’s upper class. In various speeches given shortly after the cessation of violence, Alckmin warned that the country’s “white minority” were responsible for the deep social inequalities. Although chastising the upper echelons of the Brazilian populace will likely garner Alckmin additional votes among the impoverished majority, it does little to address the causes of social inequality.
Brazil’s income distribution remains the worst in Latin America and second worst in the world, after South Africa . Business Week recently stated that the poorest 20 percent of the population receives just 2.4 percent of national income, while the richest 20 percent enjoys 63.2 percent. But, the distribution of wealth has begun to improve and is less unequal than at any time in the past 30 years. Well-targeted anti-poverty programs bolster declining income inequality. This is attributed largely to a program created by former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and expanded by Lula that pays up to $48 a month to 8.8 million families if they keep their children in school and take them for regular medical examinations. Such programs should prove highly effective in the long-run, as Brazil’s younger generations are provided the education necessary to compete in the international marketplace.
Secondly, police brutality is recognized among the majority of favela inhabitants as a significant cause of social unrest and criminal gang growth. Over the past 15 years, Brazilian authorities have killed nearly 13,000 people allegedly resisting arrest. Of the 170 people killed in last week’s upheaval, the police killed roughly 140. Amnesty International routinely criticizes the methods used by Brazilian police as overly excessive . Authorities carry out extra-judicial killings routinely, with segments of the Brazilian police engaged in criminal enterprises, occasionally in conjunction with criminal gangs such as the First Command of the Capital Gang (PCC). However, both Lula and Alckmin have refused to criticize the Brazilian police forces, with Alckmin voicing his wholehearted support for the methods invoked. To refine the Brazilian security forces adequately, the government should dismantle the structure of the police forces under which each state has both civil and military forces that behave like rivals. Simultaneously, a purging of corrupted officers must occur to demonstrate the government’s renewed commitment to a disciplined, functional police force.
Likewise, mismanagement, underfunding, and corruption is rife within the Brazilian prison system. Overflowing jails act as petri dishes for gang recruitment and narcotics trafficking enterprises. According to S?rgio Mazina of IBCCRIM research institute, “Brazilian prisons are becoming centres of criminality.” Leniency within the prison system was demonstrated by PCC chief Marcos Camacho’s ability to make cellular telephone calls to PCC street fighters to organize the S?o Paulo uprising. Discontinuing the uses of such luxuries is a necessary first step in reclaiming the Brazilian prison systems from the prisoners. However, the Brazilian government must also ensure that prison guards are above reproach and adequately trained, equipped, and paid.
In achieving an end to the week-long hostilities, the Brazilian government is accused of submitting to the demands of Marcos Camacho and his PCC cadre. Acquiescence in the face of hostel anti-government action is legitimizing the use of violence to achieve criminal demands and setting precedents for future violence.
The rampant growth of criminal gangs within Brazil’s favelas symbolizes the disenfranchisement of large segments of the Brazilian populace. Drug trafficking enterprises have flourished in Brazil, as the state has demonstrated a lackadaisical approach to combating narcotics. Enacting reforms within the political and security realms, continuing initiatives that diminish income inequality, and eliminating the financial means of criminal gangs are all necessary to limit future civil uprisings. Combating the PCC requires the Brazilian government to address the underlying drivers for social unrest and criminal gangs and requires the elimination of these drivers to be pursued simultaneously.
For a thorough analysis of the May 12-18 S?o Paulo civil disorder, please see the May 18 Intel Report.