The classified defense plans for US nuclear plants being discussed at the Congressional hearing deals with the security of 103 commercial nuclear power reactors in 31 states. Christopher Crane, President and Chief Nuclear Officer of the Exelon Generation Company, stated: ?The industry has spent over $1.2 billion on security since the 9/11 attacks [Terrorist Incident] and money for security was not an issue.?
Civilian reactors built in the US are essentially modified submarine propulsion reactors, made bigger, and safety devices have been added in an ad hoc fashion over the years as safety problems have developed. They were not designed with a view of protection from a terrorist attack or even against malicious acts.
The overall security services at these nuclear sites are a small, very lightly armed civilian force. The obstacles put up against vehicle bombs or other modes of attack are rather lightweight barriers. There is no defense against air or water borne attacks. The guard force is not prepared to deal with an attacking force with heavy weapons or lethal chemical weapons or with multi-phase attacks, such as a sequential attack with two vehicle bombs in succession, as has been seen repeatedly in Saudi Arabia . So, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) defense plans are not capable at present of dealing with a significant threat, let alone a more severe attack, which is certainly within the realm of capability of the al-Qaeda network and others.
Various sources with access to the plans say the defense plan assumes an attack would come from less than a dozen attackers and that they would not be armed with rocket-propelled grenades or employ .50 caliber armor piercing ammunition. Peter Stockton, a former security advisor at the Energy Department, now with a private watchdog group, stated recently that the ?NRC bases security standards on what the NRC believes a private guard force can be expected to handle.? Michael Weber, deputy director of the NRC?s office of security and incident response, indicated, in developing the defense plans, known as Design Basis Threat (DBT), ?it takes into account not only what is the threat but what is reasonable for a private security force to protect against. If a larger threat shows up then the security force that?s on site has to be able to hold that site long enough so the cavalry can respond.? The cavalry in this case would be a local law enforcement SWAT team that may take at least 90 minutes to assemble and respond while a terrorist attack would be over in less than 10 minutes.
During the hearings, Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT) is quoted as saying; ?There?s an assumption that the DBT will protect the plant, and therefore the public.? But, he said he believes that the security requirements were eased ?because we?ve made a decision that it?s not practical to meet what may in fact be a very realistic threat.? Both Shays’s comment about it not being practical to meet a ?very realistic threat? and Exelon President Crane’s words about ?money for security was not an issue? will ring hollow when a terrorist attack leaves the surrounding US landscape uninhabitable for 100 years.