The GovExec article is the latest chapter in the feud between former Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Director Michael Brown and Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff . This struggle began in June 2002 when the President announced he was about to form the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that would include the merger of FEMA and 22 other federal agencies. This creation and merger caused then-FEMA Director Joe Allbaugh to resign and his handpicked deputy, Michael Brown, to replace him as FEMA Director and lead the transition.
The initial design of DHS was to have a robust FEMA, leading the preparedness and response effort for a natural disaster or terrorist attack. FEMA would gain control of the anti-terrorism grant programs being dispensed by the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP). ?We intended to put ODP into FEMA, that was the vision,? said Susan Neely, then-Secretary Tom Ridge?s communication advisor. ?But on the Hill, you deal, you make these concessions.? This resulted in FEMA losing power, spaces, and budget, and Brown was viewed as caring more about FEMA than about DHS. He fought being part of DHS from the start, so much so that presidential advisors allegedly told Brown to ?stop banging your head against the wall.” With the arrival of Secretary Chertoff in February 2005, FEMA?s situation did not improve, as Chertoff began a ?Second Stage Review? and continued to strip missions away from FEMA, to include moving writing the National Response Plan and the preparedness grant programs away from FEMA. Brown mounted a memo and email campaign to regain the losses that he suffered under Ridge. Brown sent Chertoff a warning memo that stated, ?FEMA is doomed to failure and loss of mission.? Chertoff was not moved by Brown?s efforts. As Hurricane Katrina bore down on the Gulf Coast, Brown worked on his resignation memo to take effect following the Labor Day weekend.
On August 29, 2005 Hurricane Katrina, made its second landfall along the Central Gulf Coast with its storm surge causing catastrophic damage. The estimated damages exceed $75 billion. Many of Brown?s dire predictions came true, FEMA relations with state and local agencies were a fiasco, and three of his natural disaster operations chiefs were temporary fill-ins.
The response to Hurricane Katrina is portrayed by the media as a disaster and FEMA as a dysfunctional organization. As reported in September 21, 2005 and March 1, 2006 WAR Reports, there are many lessons to be learned from the response to Hurricane Katrina at all levels of government and within the agencies at each level. In applying the recommendations that are derived from these learned lessons, we must remember that Hurricane Katrina was the largest and most powerful storm to hit the US in 100 years. With the 2006 hurricane season approaching and the GWOT continuing, a review of lessons learned is certainly in order and the need to fix what was broken and strengthen the weak areas is well past due. All levels of government need to own the sense of urgency for government and get this done. The article concludes with Brown recommending that Congress closely examine what role DoD should play in disaster preparedness and response with a caution of giving the military too much responsibility. His comments reaffirm that the foundation of a response to an attack or disaster is a local responsibility and must not only be maintained but also must be reinforced and strengthened. However, with all of Michael Brown?s history, he may simply be the wrong person to deliver that message.