The convulsion of sectarian violence across Iraq that followed last week?s bombing of the Shia Askariya shrine underscores a number of concerning issues forecasted in these pages in recent months (see the February 15 WAR Report; the August 24 WAR Report and the 2006 Conflict Zones Forecast). These assessments emphasized that the roiling ethno-religious, communal, sectarian tensions, underpinned and sharpened with power differentials and menacing sectarian militias, represents the greatest potential catalysts for instability and civil war in Iraq. This wave of violence will likely represent a fulcrum event in Iraq?s renaissance and will further entrench sectarian groupings and postures and bring the country closer to persistent sectarian conflict.
The Washington Post has reported that, according to morgue statistics, the total number killed in this spasm of violence is far higher than originally thought, reaching to as many as 1,300. Further reportage suggests a rampage of death squads and vigilante executioners. As the Post describes, ?Hundreds of unclaimed dead lay at the morgue at midday Monday?blood-caked men who had been shot, knifed, garroted or apparently suffocated by the plastic bags still over their heads. Many of the bodies were sprawled with their hands still bound?and many of them had wound up at the morgue after what their families said was their abduction by the Mahdi Army [Group Profile], the Shiite militia of cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.?
The sectarian violence drew into stark relief the true allegiances of the political and sectarian militias, their insidious hold on martial power within Iraq, and their catalytic role as the leading edge of sectarian conflict. A major concern, as noted in these pages, has been the activities of Shia militias that have infiltrated the government security forces and are accused of running death squads against the Sunni community. The Mahdi Army militiamen seem to be primary actors in exacerbating and/or participating in the sectarian violence. To this point, Mahdi Army militiamen continue to occupy Sunni mosques that they raided shortly after the bombing.
The activities of sectarian militias after the bombing underscore the relative weakness and/or lack of interest and resolve of government security forces in pacifying them. Private sectarian and political militias are ostensibly outlawed. That the government and American officials have not moved forcefully to disarm and demobilize them and that the Iraqi government has seemingly accepted, if not tacitly encouraged, their infiltration into the Iraqi security forces, draws into question the ability and the will to create legitimate, national security forces. In response to the perceived threat of Shia militias, the Sunni community is reported to have formed its own communal defense militia, adding a rival actor to an already dangerous sectarian milieu (see this WAR Report).
Thus, the presence and activities of sectarian militias remain arguably the most potent threat to Iraq?s stability. As communal groupings and political blocs are increasingly delineated and categorized along ethno-religious sectarian lines, boundaries, distrust, and conflict is likely to harden.
It becomes critical in counterinsurgency and national stabilities terms that the Sunni political bloc, including Sunni insurgents, be encouraged to invest themselves in the political process as a means of pursuing their interests and that the Shia-led government respond in kind with an effort to enfranchise Sunnis in the national governance landscape.
Thus, it can be considered a promising indicator that the Sunni political bloc has conditionally agreed to return to talks. The formation of this government will provide the opportunity for leaders to begin the cultivation of an Iraqi civic nationalism and pluralist collaborative spirit that erodes the boundaries of parochial sectarianism and the politicization. In addition, it will provide an opportunity to build legitimate national institutions able to break down martial sectarian groupings forcefully, in structure and action, and serve all Iraqis.
The present situation remains tense and buffeted by continued attacks, and it highlights the critical role of community leaders in tempering communal anger with calls for unity and dialogue and tempering militias from the spiral of sectarian reprisals. In this vein, Sadr has called for unity between Iraq?s Shias and Sunnis, and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has similarly called for reconciliation between the communities.
In sum, the swiftness and scope of the rage and bloodletting of this week have produced a collective scarring among Iraqi society that is unlikely to heal soon and is likely to serve as a rallying cause for further sectarian conflict so long as communal power differentials, rivalries, and perceived abuses exist and are exacerbated by the seemingly unfettered hand of sectarian militias.