


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U.S. Department of State,
Bureau of Diplomatic Security

Terrorist Tactics



Attempted Assassination
of Pakistani General Hayat



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Produced by DS/DSS/CC and DS/IP/ITA

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Introduction

(U) To better enable the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to identify and assess significant terrorist tactics, innovations, and surveillance techniques, as well as to suggest possible counter measures, DS/IP/ITA inaugurates a new analytical study entitled *Terrorist Tactics*. Whenever possible, the report will be kept at the unclassified level to allow DS security officers to share the information with Mission personnel, the American community abroad, and law enforcement contacts.

(U) The first article in the study analyzes the June 10 attempted assassination of Pakistani Lieutenant General Ahsan Saleem Hayat. In this attack, 12 gunmen executed a well-planned ambush on the general's five-car motorcade. Though the general was unscathed in the attack, poor security practices on the part of the general and his protective detail almost facilitated the terrorist's operational plans. Prior to departing the attack site, the terrorists had left two bombs designed to injure or kill second responders. This tactical sophistication had not been seen previously in Pakistan.

By Andy Corsun, Transnational Issues and Surveillance Detection Division

Attempted Assassination of Pakistani General Hayat

(U) On June 10, at approximately 9:05 a.m., 12 gunmen attempted to assassinate Pakistan V Corps commander Lieutenant General Ahsan Saleem Hayat, while he was en route to work. The general travelled in a five-car motorcade that consisted of a motorcycle escort, a lead Toyota Land Cruiser, the general's unarmored 2004 black Toyota Corolla, a vehicle carrying the general's incoming aide de camp (ADC) who was also the general's son, the follow car, and another Toyota Land Cruiser as the tail car. *(See schematic A.)*

(U) As Hayat's motorcade approached Clifton Bridge, there was a Toyota HI-ACE van that appeared to be broken down at the crest of the bridge with its back window removed. Unbeknownst to the general's security detail -- inside the van were three men. Two of the men were manning a 5.56 mm light machine



The general's ADC was able to regain control of the vehicle by using an 18-inch high median strip on the other side of the bridge to slow down the vehicle.

gun and the third man was armed with an AK-47 assault rifle. The men inside the van let the lead vehicle drive by unhindered. As the general's car -- and the vehicle directly behind his -- approached the van, the gunmen opened fire on the two vehicles. Almost simultaneously, nine other gunmen hiding behind a wall and armed with AK-47 and G-3 assault rifles also fired on the motorcade, concentrating on the third and fourth vehicles. As soon as the general's car drove past the van, the gunmen inside the van redirected their fire to the third and fourth vehicles.




Special thanks for helping in the preparation of this report go out to Jean C. Richter, former RSO Karachi.

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(U) Four of the nine gunmen hiding behind the wall were dressed in police uniforms. At one point during the attack, when most of the generals' bodyguards were either dead or injured, the four "policemen" reportedly jumped over a break in the wall, calmly walked up to the follow-car, and fired directly into the vehicle ensuring that all five soldiers inside were dead. Before walking away from the follow-car, the "policemen" stole the soldiers' MP-5 assault weapons. (See schematic B.)

(U) In the attack, the general's driver was fatally wounded, and his bodyguard was seriously injured. A policeman and a civilian also were killed. The last car in the motorcade stopped short of the attack site, and the two security officers inside the vehicle attempted to return fire. The two military policemen on the lead motorcycle sustained minor injuries when they fell off the bike after sharply turning around in an effort to return to the attack site.

(U) After the general's driver was shot, his outgoing ADC, who was sitting in the rear right seat behind the driver, was able to regain control of the general's vehicle. It appears the outgoing ADC used the 18-inch high concrete median, on the other




Two military policemen were slightly injured after losing control of their lead motorcycle.

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side of the bridge, to slow the forward momentum of the vehicle. Once the general's car stopped, the lead vehicle turned around and picked up the general, his outgoing ADC, and the general's son -- who by this time had gotten out of his car (which was partially hung up on a median) and gone over to his father's vehicle. (See schematic C.)

(U) Following the attack, the three gunmen in the van dressed in Western clothing (jeans and baseball caps) quickly put on Shalwars (tribal dress). The nine other gunmen also got in the van, and they all departed the area, leaving two bags at the crime scene.

(U) At approximately 9:30 a.m., police responded to the attack site and noticed a shopping bag on the west side of the road. A police officer ran over to the bag, looked inside, and saw an improvised explosive device (IED). He immediately grabbed the bag, ran towards a nearby wall, and attempted to toss the bag over the wall into a vacant lot. The bag hit



The damaged wall where the bag with the IED exploded.




The third car carrying the general's son landed on a median. The general's son got out of the vehicle and ran to his father's car.

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the wall, exploded, and collapsed part of the wall. (See schematic C, IED #1.) Concerned there might be a second device, police began to canvass the attack site. It was then they noticed a 50-kilogram agricultural bag located on the southwest corner of the Clifton Bridge service road (see schematic C, IED #2.) Inside the agricultural bag, police found a smaller 15-20 kg bag containing some type of urea mix and a cell phone with an electric blasting cap. As the police were examining the bag, a black mixture began to ooze from it and turn to smoke upon contact with the air. It then caught fire. By this time, police Explosives Ordnance Detection technicians were on the scene. They were able to cut the electric blasting cap wires from the cell phone power source, thus rendering the device safe. Police were also able to retrieve two phone numbers from the cell phone's memory (NFI). Interestingly, an unknown individual attempted to activate the bomb by calling the cell phone number several times. Fortunately, congestion on the cell phone lines prevented the call from going through.

(U) At approximately 11 a.m., the Toyota HI-ACE van was found abandoned on the side of the road approximately 10 kilometers from the attack site. Inside the van, police found fresh blood stains and spent cartridges. The van was reported stolen a day before the attack.



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Lessons Learned

→ (U) Though pre-operational surveillance was conducted on the general, it most likely did not require too much planning on the part of the terrorists. The general travelled the same route at the same time on a daily basis from his home to work. On the day of the attack, the general was running late, but not enough to cause the terrorists to alter their plan.

→ (U) Secondly, there was no indication that the general's security package included an advance car to do route analysis. Had there been an advance car on the day of the attack, it would have stopped and inspected the "broken down" van along the route. Though the general did change vehicles periodically, his vehicle always bore license plates with three large gold stars on a red background with his flag attached to the fender.

→ (U) The general now travels in a fully-armored Mercedes and at a high rate of speed. The RSO reports that "*the use of a cell phone and the correct IED mixture in the attack on the corps commander indicate a technological sophistication previously unseen in Karachi...Even more disconcerting was their exploitation of the rifle attack scene to detonate a small IED followed by a larger IED with improvised shrapnel (half a pair of pliers, bolts, nuts, washers, and variety of metal shreds) specifically targeting first responders.*"

Update

(U) On June 2, the Sindh police announced the arrest of two doctors in connection with the June 10 attack on Hayat. The doctors reportedly provided medical treatment to the militants injured in the attack. The arrest of the two doctors led to the arrest of nine of the alleged attackers. It is not known whether the doctors were part of the group. The suspects belong to a fairly new terrorist group called "Jundullah" (Army of Allah), which has links to al-Qa'ida. All the suspects were arrested in various sections of Karachi where security forces also uncovered a large stockpile of weapons and ammunition used in the attack. More arrests are expected.