Developing a Group Strategic Threat and Modus Operandi Profile Analytical Framework

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This paper will outline the conceptual contours of developing a Group Strategic Threat and Modus Operandi Profile (GSTMOP) Analytical Framework as an element of John P. Sullivan’s IPO and Transaction Analysis Cycle counterterrorism intelligence frameworks. It will examine the constellations of group variables such as group psychologies, group behaviors and structures, ideology, available weaponry and materiel toward extrapolating how they directly influence group strategic targeting approaches, targeting preferences, and attack modus operandi particular to individual groups. Finally, it will examine terrorist psychology and group behavior dynamics from a networked counterterrorism operational framework.

A key finding of the 9/11 Commission’s examination of the terrorist attacks of September 11th was that the government suffered a ‘failure of imagination’ in not being more prepared to combat the threat of al-Qaeda attacks against the US homeland.⁴ This assessment resonates with past discussions of surprise and warning. It also highlights the impact of a “poverty of expectations,” the dangerous analytic and warning pitfall described by Thomas Schelling where “the danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely.”⁵

Local or regional counterterrorism agencies are faced with combating inherently shadowy terrorist adversaries. These adversaries range from small cells to social networks of operatives who camouflage their activities amongst the backdrop of societies and the transnational fissures and shadows of an increasingly globalizing world. The majority of transactions and signatures that point to indicators of potential terrorist operations are likely to be subtle, fragmented, globally diffuse, and ambiguous.

Security and counterterrorism analysts—such as those serving within the various Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW)⁶ nodes—must guard against a “failure of imagination” and “poverty of expectations.” To do so they must embrace an analytic approach and framework that precisely and advantageously assesses and charts potential and likely operational trajectories and characteristics of terrorist groups likely to operate in their particular region. This includes scenario-based assessment of strategic threat and group modus operandi. In turn, transactions and signatures (i.e., indicators) discerned by intelligence collection
mechanisms and sensors can be sounded against these profiles to aid in the
development of competing hypotheses of terrorist activity to support adaptive
indications and warning frameworks.

As Sun-tzu proclaimed, “One who knows the enemy and knows himself will not
be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy
but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat.
One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in
every engagement.” Thus, an analytic red teaming approach—seeking to
understand and ‘get inside’ the mindset of the group—is useful in developing a
group strategic threat and modus operandi profile (GSTMOP).

Understanding the mindset, capabilities and intentions of groups potentially
operating in specific areas through the analysis of the particular group’s
ideological objectives, group dynamics, modus operandi, and capabilities can aid
analysts in better assessing how the group is likely to operate in or threaten a
particular region. The GSTMOP could provide an assessed ‘threat
consciousness’ or landscape of potential group threats and modus operandi
characteristics against which counterterrorism analysts—ideally utilizing the
Transaction Analysis Cycle concept developed by John P. Sullivan—could
compare intelligence indicators and signatures suggesting terrorist activity. The
GSTMOP analytic framework are meant to serve as contextual, predictive, and
operationally instrumental elements of Intelligence Preparation for Operations
(IPO) and Sullivan’s Transaction Analysis Cycle processes to more
advantageously forecast and discern group operations, signatures, and threats.

This paper will outline the broad contours of an approach for developing group
strategic threat and modus operandi profiles, and identify key variables and
factors to be examined and considered by counterterrorism analysts working as
individuals or within a team. This paper will neither attempt to provide a
comprehensive list of variables nor a complete analytic framework, but rather
serve as a starting point for refining this framework within the homeland security
or counterterrorism analytic context, using the TEW collaborative analytical group
perspective as the primary reference point.

The scope of this paper did not allow for an exhaustive literature review.
However notable analysts who have examined terrorist group motivations,
dynamics, and threats as referenced in this paper include Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly; Bruce Hoffman; Jerrold M. Post, Keven G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw; and Brian M. Jenkins, Bonnie Cordes, Konrad Kellen, Gail Bass, Daniel Relles, William Sater, Mario Juncosa, William Fowler, and Geraldine Petty. In
particular, the paper references and complements the analytic frameworks for
examining terrorist group capabilities, motivations, and threats developed by
RAND analysts Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly, and Bonnie Cordes et al..

As Cragin and Daly note in the conclusion of their study, “...this report examines
the threats posed to U.S. interests worldwide, but it would also be useful to adjust
the framework to focus on threats to the U.S. homeland specifically. Finally, it
should be noted that we focus intentionally on the organizational and operational requirement that affect militant organizations’ capabilities. For the purposes of this analysis, we have set aside a more thorough assessment of intentions and motivations. Yet such an assessment clearly affects any ‘hearts and minds’ campaign the U.S. government might undertake to reduce recruitment or lessen general popular support for terrorists’ goals.”

Thus, this paper seeks to chart the general contours of an analytic framework for homeland security—that is for local or regional counterterrorism analysts—that examines the strategic threat and modus operandi for terrorist groups in his/her area of operations. The paper will also pose questions and factors of consideration—drawing on those posed in the Cordes et al. study and the Post et al. framework—that analysts might examine to better understand a group’s strategic threat, internal dynamics, and likely modus operandi within a particular area of operations.

I. Analytic Red Teaming Approach to GSTMOP Development

In developing a GSTMOP it is advantageous to take an analytic red teaming approach to attempt to get ‘inside the mindset’ of the terrorist group. In-depth and insightful red teaming promises to serve as a useful tool in crafting and refining counterterrorism strategies and operations. Such strategies and means might then better anticipate and combat terrorist adversaries. This improvement would be achieved through an enhanced understanding of the group’s particular driving factors—strategic goals, leadership and decision-making dynamics and processes, operational capabilities and rationales, organizational dynamics and behaviors, adaptive capacities, etc.—and their corollary and derivative operations.

Group operations are guided by group ideology, leadership, and internal and external dynamics. As Bruce Hoffman contends, “…the terrorist act is conceived and executed in a manner that simultaneously reflects the terrorist capabilities, and takes into account the ‘target audience’ at whom the action is directed. The tactics and targets of various terrorist movements, as well as the weapons they favor, are therefore ineluctably shaped by a group’s ideology, its internal organizational dynamics, the personalities of its key members, and a variety of internal and external stimuli.”

Overall, the key to such a red teaming approach is to identify and understand the prevailing and driving factors and dynamics animating the particular group and its operations.

A deeper understanding of each group’s unique ‘mindset’ (ideology, strategic agenda, leadership) and operational behaviors (operational capabilities, modus operandi, targeting preferences) can enable a more precise and advantageous assessment of not simply what the group is capable of attacking, but what the group wants/intends to attack, as well as how the group is likely to conduct operations.
As Cragin and Daly astutely note and examine in developing their analytic framework, the terrorist group is a dynamic actor, constantly evolving, adapting, and reacting to environmental stimuli. Thus, it is envisioned that the GSTMOP would be constantly revised to incorporate current intelligence on the dynamic and inter-relational nature and evolutionary and adaptive capacities and trajectories of the group vis-à-vis the shifting environment conditions, dynamics, and actors affecting the group. Further, this approach seeks to identify and analyze the key group dynamics and characteristics underpinning and driving not only contemporary operations and threats, but also those likely to shape group operations, decisions, and adaptations in future circumstances and contexts.

While the Post, Ruby, Shaw framework referenced earlier was originally developed to recognize and analyze a non-violent radical group’s risk of becoming violent, it represents an excellent foundation for examining the internal and external variables and dynamics—as well as the observable indicators— affecting the behavior of a radical group. These variables, with certain modifications to examine an already violent radical group, are useful in the development of the GSTMOP analytic framework and in assessing those critical group behavioral and environmental variables, dynamics, and indicators for a terrorist group in a particular area of operations. This framework, along with the aforementioned studies by Cragin and Daly, and Cordes et al., provided the conceptual inspiration for the analytic contours and questions utilized in the following sections to begin developing the GSTMOP.

Each terrorist group is unique in typology, particular motivations, ideological objectives, structure, etc., and operates in an equally unique manner depending upon the actors, audiences, and dynamics at play within its environment. Therefore, advantageous counterterrorism intelligence collection and operations must be appropriately tailored to the particular circumstances of the group. Once the contours of the GSTMOP begin to develop, the Transaction Analysis Cycle concept of counterterrorism indications and warning, and analysis can be sounded against that GSTMOP. As Sullivan describes, the “Transaction Analysis Cycle emerged as a way to teach analysts how to interpret activity in order to assess leads and other inputs while developing iterative collection plans to identify patterns and define hypotheses about a potential terrorist ‘kill chain.’”

Sullivan goes on to describe the Transaction Analysis Cycle process and its relationship to an analysis of a group’s capabilities and intentions—a GSTMOP-type profile—in assessing potential terrorist group presence, operations, and overall threat:

Utilizing this framework, analysts can observe activities or transactions conducted by a range of actors looking for indicators or precursors of terrorist or criminal activity of many types. Individual transactions (such as acquiring finances, expertise, acquiring materiel, munitions or capability, recruiting members, conducting reconnaissance, mission rehearsal, conducting an attack, etc.) have signatures that identify them as terrorist or criminal acts, or consistent with the operations of a specific cell or
group. These transactions and signatures (T/S) can then be observed and matched with patterns of activity that can be expressed as trends and potentials (T/P), which can ultimately be assessed in terms of a specific actor’s capabilities and intentions (C/I). At any point, the analytical team can posit a hypothesis on the pattern of activity and then develop a collection plan to seek specific transaction and signatures that confirm or disprove its hypothesis. Analysis can start at any point to support the illumination of specific terrorist trends, potentials, capabilities or intentions. Individual transactions and signatures (such as tactics, techniques and procedures [TTPs] or terrorist statements) can be assessed through a tailored collection plan to assemble a notional terrorist ‘kill chain’ that can be disrupted or an objective that can be protected by selection of appropriate friendly courses of action. Thus the transaction analysis cycle becomes a common framework for assessing patterns, hypotheses and social network links among a range of actors within a broad spatial and temporal context, making co-production of intelligence and situational understanding viable.19

Thus, the development of the GSTMOP framework relies upon an understanding of the group’s modus operandi, particularly the elements and phases of attack operations. These will in turn help the analyst recognize possible indicators—captured as transactions and signatures—of ongoing operations and hypothesize the phase, target, and/or tactics of the operation. If the transactions and signatures resonate with operational arcs and characteristics of the group within the hypothesized GSTMOP and threat scenarios, the Transaction Analysis Cycle should trigger an adaptive reorientation of intelligence collection postures. This would result in an alerting and refocusing of intelligence assets and sensors to ‘stalk’20 the likely transactions and signatures or indicators of the current or potential next phases of the hypothesized terrorist operation identified. The new, ‘stalking’ intelligence would help discern and confirm, or disprove the hypotheses of current terrorist activities.

Many terrorist groups and/or threats involve transnational dimensions, issues, actors, and networks that operate largely outside and in the shadows of many of the strictures, power contours, and jurisdictions of the state-centric international arena. These transnational terrorist, militant, and criminal groups and networks exploit the various state-centric international sinews, fissures, and dynamics both connecting and cleaving nation-states. Consequently the dichotomy between domestic and international security is increasingly blurred as terrorist groups operating in the U.S. will likely have significant transnational connections, inspiration, or threat vectors.

Homeland security analysts must be able to anticipate terrorist threats involving groups of transnational basing, reach, approach, inspiration, and/or command. Therefore, local or regional counterterrorism intelligence analysts must perceive, appreciate, and incorporate international and transnational issues related to terrorist groups that might threaten their locality and national space. These are critically germane to understanding terrorist group mindsets, strategies,
motivations, and operations, and, thus, threat assessments. The truly transnational terrorist threat compels the full appreciation and incorporation of global political and international security developments and information—particularly those related to existing or potentially emergent 'homegrown' terrorist groups—as an integral element of counterterrorism analysis.

As Sullivan notes:

The immediate precursor for an attack may be in the local area, across the nation, in a foreign nation, in cyberspace, in a combination of all. Identifying global distributed threats and achieving an understanding of their impact requires more than simple information sharing. It demands collaborative information fusion and the production of intelligence among cooperative nodes that are distributed among locations where terrorist operate, plan, or seek to attack. For example, terrorists may plan their attack in Europe while obtaining logistical and financial support in South America and the Asian Pacific. They may simultaneously conduct reconnaissance in their target city in North America, recruit and train operatives in Iraq, all the while receiving direction from another location all together.21

At a tactical or defensive level, comparative assessment of a group’s likely strategic and/or intended targets and group capabilities, measured against the landscape of potential area targets and vulnerabilities, will help to refine the threat assessment. This enables public safety and security agencies to more advantageously marshal valuable counterterrorism resources to those targets and threats assessed as most likely.

In this vein, Sullivan suggests that named areas of interest (NAIs) “that may be targeted by terrorists that will be covered by intelligence collection assets and ascertaining the critical infrastructure in the area. This process includes evaluation of local through global factors, since in our interconnected world, aspects of critical infrastructure may reside on a global scale or in several interrelated spatial domains.”22

Thus, in the development of the GSTMOP, the analyst must study, analyze, and incorporate salient information on the particular group’s characteristics and activities abroad. Further, in scanning for indicators and signatures of terrorist group activity in a domestic context, analysts must scan not only local activities, but must also appreciate, analyze, and incorporate group activities in the global dimension. These efforts should also consider international developments potentially affecting the group, as potential indicators of group intentions, operations, and behaviors.

**II. Toward a GSTMOP Assessment: General Factors/Variables for Consideration**
The following section outlines four broad conceptual categories of factors and variables driving group operations for consideration by the homeland security and counterterrorism analyst in developing the GSTMOP. It also suggests relevant questions that might guide the development of the GSTMOP and the surveying and analysis of indicators. It must be emphasized that terrorist groups or networks are social organizations operating in a fluid environment. As a result, the following factors are largely inter-dynamic and overlapping within the group and in relation to the actors and dynamics of its environment. As such the delineation of factors in the following categories are meant to assist with conceptual clarity and research organization. Further, the factors outlined are by no means an exhaustive listing, but rather seek to provide some key questions in assessing the prevailing mindsets, decision-making, group dynamics, etc. driving group operations in the present, as well as adaptations and reactions to changes in their environment of operations in the future.

The overarching analytic approach integrating these lines of inquiry into the trends and potentials, and capabilities and intentions aspects of the Transaction Analysis Cycle center on the comparison of observed indicators and signatures to the hypothesized and assessed GSTMOP contours for each group, and the responsive intelligence collection 'stalking' plans. Therefore, guiding questions for each category include:

- What transactions have been observed to date, and are they consistent with a particular group modus operandi signature—either of a group, a phase of operations, or a component part of an operation’s kill chain?

- What hypotheses of group operations and corollary intelligence collection objectives do these transactions drive?

- How can we prove or disprove multiple alternative competing hypotheses in light of these transactions and signatures?

- Are they actual indicators? If so, of what?

**Ideological-Strategic Mindset**

A more in-depth understanding of the group’s ideological-strategic mindset—its causes, motivations, and goals—will help orient the analyst to the broad categories of potential actors and audiences that might represent the targets of the group’s instrumental and coercive violence as it endeavors to achieve its stated goals. Similarly, this understanding will help to discern those actors and audiences likely of greatest concern and impact to the group in pursuing its goals. The assessed purchase and resonance of the group’s ideology and goals vis-à-vis the populace in the particular area of operation will give an indication as
to the likely degree of sympathy or operational support the group might enjoy, as well as the size and nature of potential recruitment pools.

Further, this category of analysis will give insight into the group mindset and rationale strategically guiding operations, as well as the likely degree of violence and types of operations—including operational preferences and constraints—the group will employ as derived from its ideological creed and agenda.

On this point Hoffman notes:

…all terrorist groups seek targets that are lucrative from their point of view. As such, they employ tactics that are consonant with their overriding political aims. Whereas left-wing terrorist such as Germany’s Red Army Faction (RAF) and Italy’s Red Brigades (RB) have selectively kidnapped and assassinated persons whom they blamed for economic exploitation or political repression to attract publicity and promote a Marxist-Leninist revolution, terrorists motivated by a religious imperative have engaged in more indiscriminate acts of violence, waged against a far wider category of targets: encompassing not merely their declared enemies, but anyone who does not share their religious faith. Ethno-nationalists arguably fall somewhere in between. On the one hand, the violent campaigns waged by groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Irish Republican Army, (IRA), and the Basque separatist group, ETA (Freedom for the Basque Homeland), have frequently been more destructive and have cause far greater casualties that those of their left-wing counterparts. But, on the other hand, their violence has largely been restricted to a specifically defined ‘target set’ (i.e., the members of a specific rival or dominant ethno-nationalist group). Perhaps the least consequential of all these terrorist group categories (in terms of both frequency of incidents and impact on public and governmental attitudes) has been the disparate collection of recycled Nazis, racist ‘political punk rockers,’ and other extreme right-wing elements who have emerged through the years in various Western countries. But even their sporadic and uncoordinated, seemingly mindless violence is neither completely random nor unthinkingly indiscriminate. Indeed, for all these categories, the point is less their innate difference than the fact that their tactical and targeting choices correspond to, and are determined by, their respective ideologies, attendant mechanisms of legitimization and justification and, perhaps most critically, their relationship with the intended audience of their violent acts.”

As Hoffman describes, the group’s typology, ideology, and objectives broadly guide operational decisions in terms of targeting and the degree of violence employed. In addition, understanding the group’s goals and objects will provide insight into what actions by the key actors—including defensive and offensive counterterrorism strategies—might ameliorate or erode the particular environmental conditions, grievances, or interests serving as motivations for the group’s violence. On this point, Post has argued that counterterrorism strategies
must be equally differentiated and tailored to the particular group typology.24

**Factors for Consideration/Questions:**

- What is the group ideological narrative/manifesto?
- What are the group strategic goals? Political? Religious? Societal?
- What goals has the group emphasized? Which has the group debated internally? Which has it emphasized via communiqués and actions?
- What are the ‘root causes’ and core motivations of group militancy? What are the particular grievances of the group?
- How sweeping are the goals? Is the group pursuing revolutionary change or the pursuit of specific goals, and/or redress of specific grievances?
- What strategic/generic target categories has the group articulated, emphasized?

**Key Environmental Actors, Dynamics, and Stimuli**

This category and area of research and analysis is arguably the most important in developing the GSTMOP in that it seeks to reveal and understand how and why the group has, and/or might, instrumentally engaged and responded to the particular actors, audiences, and dynamics within its environment.

In this regard, it is important that the analyst have a sound understanding of the social-psychological dynamics of instrumental political violence and terrorism, and how the violence might be employed to pursue the group goals. Instructive in this understanding is the illuminating description of terrorism and its dynamics and coercive effects offered by Alex P. Schmid:

Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as instrumental targets of violence. These instrumental victims share group or class characteristics which form the basis for their selection for victimization. Through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence other members of that group or class are put in a state of chronic fear (terror). This group or class, whose members’ sense of security is purposively undermined, is the target of terror. The victimization of the target of violence is considered extranormal by most observers from the witnessing audience on the basis of its atrocity; the
time (e.g. peacetime) or place (not a battlefield) of victimization or the disregard for rules of combat accepted in conventional warfare. The norm violation creates an attentive audience beyond the main object of manipulation. The purpose of this indirect method of combat is either to immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary targets of demands (e.g. a government) or targets of attention (e.g. public opinion) to changes of attitude or behaviour favouring the short or long-term interests of the users of this method of combat. 25

An examination of how the group has employed coercive activities in an instrumental capacity—not limited to only violence, but also including political and social engagement—aids in the understanding of both the group’s operational trends and modus operandi, and, importantly, the apparent underlying driving rationale for these instrumental activities. This avenue of research should assist the analyst in developing and better assessment of how, and against which actors and targets, the group will apply instrumental violence in the future.

Factors for Consideration/Questions:

• What is the environmental—societal, political, economic, technological, historical—context?

• What are the prevailing environmental dynamics and/or sentiments?

• Who are the instrumental actors and audiences (see Schmid)—for example, the target of demands or coercion, the perceived constituency, adversaries—that the group must appreciate, engage, coerce, eliminate, etc. in order to achieve its goals? Which are the most important?

• What are the group relationships and dynamics vis-à-vis these actors and audiences?

• What instrumental actions has the group taken to engage—through coercive violence, and/or political and social initiatives—these actors and audiences?

• How has the group been affected by, or responded to the actions of the actors and audiences, and any changes in its environment (political, societal, etc.)?

• What leader, decision-making process or rationale seems to have guided the instrumental activities?

Internal Group Dynamics
This conceptual category and line of research seeks to develop a better understanding of group structure and internal group dynamics and their affect upon operational decision-making and group cohesion. Of particular interest are factors affecting the group leadership, command and control, and operational planning and preparation in an effort to discern the prevailing operational leadership elements and rationales.

**Factors for Consideration/Questions:**

- What is the structure of the group—cellular, hierarchical, ‘homegrown,’ and/or networked? Is it some combination of these structures?

- What is the structure/nature of the group leadership—charismatic leader, committee leadership, quasi-military hierarchy, ‘leaderless’ movement?

- How much control does the leadership exercise over group operations, planning, strategies?

- Is the group operationally entrepreneurial and adaptive, or does it act only when ordered by leadership?

- How cohesive is the group? Are there rogue or dissenting members or elements, and/or the potential for splinter groups/cells?

- How committed, subservient, and ‘professional’ are the members vis-à-vis leadership orders, operations?

- Have unique cultural factors, norms, and/or behaviors significantly affected internal behavior?

**Group Operational Capabilities**

This category and line of investigation is aimed at developing an assessment and understanding of the group’s operational capabilities, sophistication, and preferred modus operandi based both on the group’s demonstrated attacks and operational capacity, and also on an assessment of the group’s potential capabilities. It is an avenue of research that seeks to discern what operations the group is capable of, or constrained from mounting in relation to the group’s strategic agenda and environment of impacting actors and audiences.

**Factors for Consideration/Questions:**

- What have been the group’s preferred target categories, tactics, weapons?
• What are the group’s apparent operational capabilities in terms of:
  o number of fighters and support operatives;
  o militant training and expertise;
  o weapons caches and weapon engineering capacity;
  o external actor or societal operational support or aid?

• What level of operational sophistication and complexity have the attacks demonstrated?

• Have any group operations failed or been interdicted? If so, how and why?

III. Conclusion

As a GSTMOP begins to take shape via the above analysis, it is then up to the analyst or analytical unit to discern the unique cocktail of prevailing, driving factors—and their relative weight and interplay—around which the group operates in given environments, particular situations, and in response to various environmental changes. It is at this stage that the analyst or analytical unit begin to develop a better understanding of the group mindset and capabilities, and can begin to chart potential threat landscapes, modus operandi characteristics, and operational scenarios for the group.

As noted earlier, the GSTMOP is meant to serve as a complementary tool and element within IPO and the Transaction Analysis Cycle frameworks and processes. The next steps required to more fully develop, refine, and apply the GSTMOP framework center on the outlining of a more comprehensive and inter-dynamic listing of the critical factors and variables of group intentions and capabilities, and a more formalized integration of this concept into the IPO and Transaction Analysis Cycle concepts.
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6 Background on Terrorism Early Warning Groups (TEWs) and the TEW concept can be found in John P. Sullivan, “Terrorism Early Warning Groups: Regional Intelligence to Combat Terrorism,” in Russell Howard, James Forest, and Joanne Moore (Eds.), Homeland Security and Terrorism: Readings and Interpretations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), pp. 235-245.


Fram ework for Analyzing Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1985).

14 Cragin and Daly, pp.86-87.

15 Hoffman, p. 63.

16 See Post et al..


19 Sullivan, “Terrorism Early Warning and Co-Production of Counterterrorism Intelligence,” pp. 6-7.

20 Stalking is used to denote the active pursuit of terrorist indicators. Rather than passively collecting intelligence, the Transaction Analysis Cycle demands an active search or hunt for transactions and signatures indicative of terrorist operational sequences. This does not totally replace passive collection efforts, but augments them toward the assembly of the data necessary to prove or disprove alternative competing hypotheses.


22 Sullivan, “Terrorism Early Warning and Co-Production of Counterterrorism Intelligence,” p. 4.

23 Hoffman, pp. 63-64.

24 See Post, “Current Understanding of Terrorist Motivation and Psychology: Implications for a Differentiated Antiterrorist Policy.”


26 See Cragin and Daly.