

**United States Department of State**

# **Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002**

**April 2003**





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*In a speech at the Jimmy Doolittle Flight Facility in Columbia, South Carolina, on 24 October 2002, President George W. Bush promised to prosecute the war on terror with “patience, focus, and determination.”*







## **Introduction**

### **by Ambassador Cofer Black**

### **Coordinator for Counterterrorism**

The evil of terrorism continued to plague the world throughout 2002, from Bali to Grozny to Mombasa. At the same time, the global war against the terrorist threat was waged intensively in all regions with encouraging results.

The year saw the liberation of Afghanistan by Coalition forces, the expulsion of al-Qaida and the oppressive Taliban regime, the destruction of their terrorist training infrastructure, and the installation of a transitional government committed to democracy and economic development.

Al-Qaida terrorists are on the run, and thousands of them have been detained. More than one third of al-Qaida's top leadership has been killed or captured, including some who conspired in the September 11 attacks, the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, and the 1998 bombings of two US Embassies in East Africa.

Moreover, the global antiterrorism coalition that was forged in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the United States remains united.

The world is fighting terrorism on five fronts: diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, financial, and military.

## **Diplomatic**

The progress that has been achieved in the global war on terrorism would not have been possible without intense diplomatic engagement throughout the world. Diplomacy is the backbone of the campaign, building the political will, support, and mechanisms that enable our law-enforcement, intelligence, and military communities to act effectively.

The web of relationships we have cultivated has borne fruit in countless ways, from increasing security at home and abroad to bringing wanted terrorists to justice in the United States and elsewhere.

All our friends have stood with us multilaterally—at the United Nations, in NATO, ANZUS, EU, G-7, G-8, OAS, ASEAN, APEC, OIC, OECD, OSCE—and bilaterally in virtually every corner of the world.



*President George W. Bush and First Lady Laura Bush walk past an honor guard as they proceed into the pit at the site of the World Trade Center in New York, 11 September 2002.*

September 11 is preventing attacks, saving lives, and exposing the hiding places of terrorists.

## Law Enforcement

An impressive global dragnet has tightened around al-Qaida. Since September 11 more than 3,000 al-Qaida operatives or associates have been detained in more than 100 countries, largely as a result of cooperation among law-enforcement agencies.

New counterterrorism relationships with Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Central Asian republics, and others have shown results and hold promise for continued engagement in the future. Collaboration in combating terrorism has deepened with partners such as Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates.

The Coalition's objectives are clear: to eliminate the threat posed by international terrorism and to deter states from supporting or harboring international terrorist groups.

## Intelligence

The gathering of intelligence about al-Qaida's infrastructure in Afghanistan helped enable us to dismantle or scatter much of its membership and organization.

Information gained from captured enemy combatants and imprisoned terrorists is being exploited effectively around the world.

The expansion of intelligence sharing and cooperation among nations since



Entire cells have been wrapped up in nations such as Singapore, Italy, and elsewhere. In all these cells, deadly attacks on US interests or our allies were being planned.

In the United States, the rule of law is being applied relentlessly against terrorists. For example, US Attorney General John Ashcroft called 4 October “a defining day in America’s war on terrorism.” On that day, the United States convicted would-be shoe bomber Richard Reid; sentenced American Taliban John Walker Lindh; and neutralized a suspected al-Qaida terrorist cell in Portland, Oregon. Another alleged al-Qaida cell was uncovered and its members arrested in Lackawanna, New York, during the summer.

Since the previous *Patterns of Global Terrorism* report was issued, the United States designated several additional groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), including the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army, Jemaah Islamiya, and Lashkar I Jhangvi. The Lashkar I Jhangvi is responsible for the kidnapping and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002. The FTO designation carries several legal consequences: it is unlawful for US persons to knowingly provide funds and other material support to designated groups; members of these groups are ineligible for US visas; and US financial institutions must block the funds of the groups.

## **Financial**

More than 166 countries have issued orders freezing more than \$121 million in terrorist-related financial assets.

Nearly all countries around the world have submitted reports to the United Nations on actions they have taken to comply with the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373, which includes obligations to freeze the assets of terrorists and to prohibit anyone in the country from providing financial or other material assistance to terrorists or their supporters.

The Financial Action Task Force—a 29-nation experts’ group dedicated to the establishment of legal and regulatory standards and policies to combat money laundering—is working to deny terrorists access to the world financial system.

The European Union (EU) and the United States have worked closely together to ensure that nearly every terrorist individual or group designated by one party is also designated by the other. The Netherlands took effective action to freeze the financial assets of Jose Maria Sison, leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army terrorist group, and then asked the EU to freeze the assets of Sison and his group; the EU did so. In August, Italy joined the United States in submitting to the UN the names of 25 individuals and companies linked to al-Qaida so that their assets could be frozen worldwide.


# Countering Terrorism by Bringing Terrorists to Justice



1. Would-be shoe bomber Richard Reid, linked to al-Qaida, pleaded guilty in October 2002 to charges of having attempted to blow up a US airliner in December 2001. 2. Malaysian Inspector-General of Police displays photo of four suspected Jemaah Islamiya members arrested in October 2002. 3. Presumed former member of ETA, Asier Ormazabal, extradited from France to Spain in March 2002. 4. Wilbert Elki Meza Majino, alleged leader of Sendero Luminoso, arrested in Lima, Peru, in September 2002. 5. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, senior al-Qaida leader, captured in Yemen, November 2002. 6. Alleged mastermind of 17 November, Alexandros Yitopoulos, captured in Greece, July 2002. 7. Dr. Ahmad Javed Khawaja (L) and his brother Ahmad Naveed Khawaja (R), suspected of al-Qaida links, escorted from antiterrorist court in Lahore, Pakistan, in December 2002. 8. Rizwan Basheer, suspect in suicide car bombing that killed 14, being transported to antiterrorist court in Karachi, Pakistan, in January 2003.



## Countering Terrorism by Bringing Terrorists to Justice



9. Six suspected members of al-Qaida-trained terror cell from Lackawana, New York, appear in US court in September 2002. 10. Raed Hijazi convicted and sentenced to death in February 2002 for planning Millennium attacks in Jordan. 11. Mark Bolkerin Gumbahale, alleged Abu Sayyaf leader, arrested in the Philippines, October 2002. 12. Alleged ETA leaders Juan Antonio Olarra (L) and Ainhua Mugica Goni (R) arrested in France, September 2002. 13. Savvas Xyros, 17 November operative, arrested in Athens, June 2002. 14. Al-Qaida operative Ramzi Binalshibh, captured in Karachi, Pakistan, in September 2002. 15. Suspected Jemaah Islamiya member Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, arrested in the Philippines, January 2002. 16. Abdelghani Mzoudi, alleged supporter of al-Qaida, arrested in Hamburg, Germany, October 2002. 17. Three US citizens arrested in Portland, Oregon, in October 2002, for conspiring to join al-Qaida and the Taliban forces fighting against the United States.





*Allison Vadhan, carrying a picture of her mother Kristin Gould who died on United Airlines flight 93, marches with family members and friends of victims of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, on the one-year anniversary of the event.*

The G-8 nations have committed themselves to a range of measures aimed at seizing terrorist assets. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group, APEC, has adopted an ambitious antiterrorist finance action plan. The United States joined with Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and China in including the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement on the UN's list of organizations affiliated with al-Qaida.

In the United States, the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center, Operation Green Quest, and the Terrorist Financing Task Force are facilitating information sharing between intelligence and law-enforcement agencies and helping other countries to improve their legal and regulatory systems so they can more effectively identify, disrupt, and defeat terrorist financing networks.

More than 250 terrorist groups and entities have been designated under Executive Order 13224, which freezes their US-based assets.

In November, the United States blocked the assets of the Benevolence International Foundation, which for years misused its status as a charity by funneling money to al-Qaida. Its CEO is closely associated with Usama Bin Ladin and has helped his cause financially.

Also in November, the State and Treasury Departments announced a \$5-million rewards program that will pay for information leading to the disruption of any terrorism financing operation.

As a result of all these efforts, it is much harder today for terrorists to raise and move money. Many who formerly provided financial support for terrorism seem to have backed away. Some facilitators have been captured and arrested. The international banking system is no longer safe for terrorists to use.

Future progress will not be measured in millions of dollars worth of frozen assets, as the amount of such funding is finite, but rather in terms of nations' efforts to prevent terrorist financing. Fundamentally, terrorists must now look over their shoulders, wondering whether it is safe to move, raise funds, plan, and conduct operations.



## Military

Operation Enduring Freedom was launched on 7 October 2001. It comprises some 90 nations, nearly half of the world's countries. It is the largest military coalition ever assembled in all of human history. Its successes have also been historic. The bulk of Afghan territory was liberated from Taliban control within a matter of weeks. With our Coalition partners, the United States is helping to train the Afghan National Army so that Afghans can once again provide for their own security and the stability of the country. Schools have been rebuilt, teachers trained, and textbooks supplied. Landmines are being cleared. Hundreds of thousands of refugees have returned.

In Afghanistan and elsewhere, military action continues to be waged against terrorists with a global reach. More than 500 suspected terrorists are being detained at the US facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

## Conclusion

Despite solid progress, the danger persists.

Al-Qaida is still planning attacks. Every al-Qaida operations officer captured so far was involved in some stage of preparation for a terrorist attack at the time of capture. Recent audiotapes by al-Qaida leaders contain exhortations to further violence and threaten the United States and our Coalition allies.

These threats must be regarded with utmost seriousness. Additional attacks are likely.

I have focused on our many accomplishments—diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, financial, and military. As significant as those have been, however, it is important not to think that victory is on the horizon. Far from it. Indeed, the ultimate success of this campaign will hinge in large part on two factors—sustained international political will and effective capacity building.

*First*, we must sustain and enhance the *political will* of states to fight terrorism. The secret of maintaining a coalition is demonstrating daily to its members that the fight is not over and that sustained effort is clearly in their long-term interests. My meetings with government officials in every region of the world have convinced me that we have made tremendous progress on that score.

*Second*, we have to bolster the *capacity* of all states to fight terrorism. Despite our unmatched power, we recognize that the United States will not be able to win without the help of others. The United States cannot investigate every lead, arrest every suspect, gather and analyze all the intelligence, effectively sanction every sponsor of terrorism, prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or find and fight every terrorist cell.

Simply put, this is a global fight that requires a global system to defeat it.

President Bush has stressed from the beginning that “the defeat of terror requires an international coalition of unprecedented scope and cooperation.” So our effort must also be truly *international*.

One of our key goals is to assist countries in meeting their obligations under UNSCR 1373 and to strengthen the UN’s counterterrorism capabilities. Our assistance runs the gamut from seminars in how to write, implement, and enforce anti-money-laundering laws, to specialized tactical training programs in counterterrorism (CT).

A number of powerful tools are at the disposal of governments that want to improve their counterterrorism capabilities. Some of these are available through the US Government; others are a product of the international community. Among them:

- The 12 international counterterrorism conventions, which can serve as the basis for antiterrorist efforts grounded in the rule of law, a key component of our policy.
- The State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, which trains foreign police and security forces in such critical skills as airport security, post-blast investigation, and leadership protection.
- Senior Policy Workshops, which build bilateral CT relationships while promoting interagency CT cooperation within friendly governments.
- Regional cooperation—working together to strengthen border security, improve legislation, and share law-enforcement information.
- Regional conferences (e.g., Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Caucasus)—arranged by the State Department’s counterterrorism office to bring security officials together to share ideas and experiences and to develop common approaches to preempting, disrupting, and defeating international terrorists.
- Legislative seminars to assist nations in evaluating and drafting counterterrorism law in a variety of areas, such as terrorism financing and banking laws, immigration laws, and export controls.

Around the world, we are working to build up the capability of nations’ forces so that they can take the fight to the terrorists from the streets of Sanaa in Yemen to Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, from the island of Basilan in the Philippines to the jungles of Colombia.

Our goal is to assist governments to become full and self-sustaining partners in the fight against terrorism.

As President Bush said at the end of 2002: “In the new year, we will prosecute the war on terror with patience and focus and determination. With the help of a broad coalition, we will make certain that terrorists and their supporters are not safe in any cave or corner of the world.”

## US Policy

*President Bush has laid out the scope of the war on terrorism. Four enduring policy principles guide US counterterrorism strategy:*

**First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals.** *The US Government will make no concessions to individuals or groups holding official or private US citizens hostage. The United States will use every appropriate resource to gain the safe return of US citizens who are held hostage. At the same time, it is US Government policy to deny hostage takers the benefits of ransom, prisoner releases, policy changes, or other acts of concession.*

**Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes.** *The United States will track down terrorists who attack Americans and their interests, no matter how long it takes.*

**Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior.** *There are seven countries that have been designated state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.*

**Fourth, bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the United States and require assistance.** *Under the Antiterrorism Assistance program, the United States provides training and related assistance to law-enforcement and security services of selected friendly foreign governments. Courses cover such areas as airport security, bomb detection, hostage rescue, and crisis management. A recent component of the training targets the financial underpinnings of terrorists and criminal money launderers. Counterterrorist training and technical-assistance teams are working with countries to identify vulnerabilities, enhance capacities, and provide targeted assistance to address the problem of terrorist financing.*

*At the same time special investigative teams are working with countries to identify and then dry up money used to support terrorism. We are also developing workshops to assist countries in drafting strong laws against terrorism, including terrorist financing. During the past 18 years, we have trained more than 35,000 officials from 152 countries in various aspects of counterterrorism.*

*A broad range of counterterrorism training resources from other US Government agencies, including military training by the Department of Defense, is being brought to bear to bolster international capabilities. We will continue to work with the world community and seek cooperation from other partner nations as well.*

*Our Terrorist Interdiction Program helps friendly countries stop terrorists from freely crossing international borders.*

*Our Rewards for Justice program offers rewards of up to \$5 million for information that prevents or favorably resolves acts of international terrorism against US persons or property worldwide. Secretary Powell has authorized a reward of up to \$25 million for information leading to the capture of Usama Bin Ladin and other key al-Qaida leaders.*



## **Note**

Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any political, social, ethnic, religious, or national group is not meant to imply that all members of that group are terrorists. Indeed, terrorists represent a small minority of dedicated, often fanatical, individuals in most such groups. It is those small groups—and their actions—that are the subject of this report.

Furthermore, terrorist acts are part of a larger phenomenon of politically inspired violence, and at times the line between the two can become difficult to draw. To relate terrorist events to the larger context, and to give a feel for the conflicts that spawn violence, this report will discuss terrorist acts as well as other violent incidents that are not necessarily international terrorism.

## **Legislative Requirements**

This report is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(a), which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a)(1) and (2) of the Act. As required by legislation, the report includes detailed assessments of foreign countries where significant terrorist acts occurred, and countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding five years pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (the so-called terrorist-list countries that have repeatedly provided state support for international terrorism). In addition, the report includes all relevant information about the previous year's activities of individuals, terrorist organizations, or umbrella groups known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of any US citizen during the preceding five years and groups known to be financed by state sponsors of terrorism.

In 1996 Congress amended the reporting requirements contained in the above-referenced law. The amended law requires the Department of State to report on the extent to which other countries cooperate with the United States in apprehending, convicting, and punishing terrorists responsible for attacking US citizens or interests. The law also requires that this report describe the extent to which foreign governments are cooperating, or have cooperated during the previous five years, in preventing future acts of terrorism. As permitted in the amended legislation, the Department may submit such information to Congress in a classified annex to this unclassified report.

## Definitions

No one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance. For the purposes of this report, however, we have chosen the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). That statute contains the following definitions:

The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant<sup>1</sup> targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.

The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.

The US Government has employed this definition of terrorism for statistical and analytical purposes since 1983.

Domestic terrorism is probably a more widespread phenomenon than international terrorism. Because international terrorism has a direct impact on US interests, it is the primary focus of this report. However, the report also describes, but does not provide statistics on, significant developments in domestic terrorism.

<sup>1</sup> For purposes of this definition, the term "noncombatant" is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty. For example, in past reports we have listed as terrorist incidents the murders of the following US military personnel: Col. James Rowe, killed in Manila in April 1989; Capt. William Nordeen, US defense attache killed in Athens in June 1988; the two servicemen killed in the Labelle discotheque bombing in West Berlin in April 1986; and the four off-duty US Embassy Marine guards killed in a cafe in El Salvador in June 1985. We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against US bases in Europe, the Philippines, or elsewhere.

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
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## Total International Attacks, 2002






## Total Casualties Caused by International Attacks, 2002

Note scale break


Dead  
Wounded



## Total International Attacks, 2002




### Total Facilities Struck




**Total - 218**

### Type of Event



**Total - 199**

### Total Casualties



**Total - 2,738**

## The Year in Review

International terrorists conducted 199 attacks in 2002, a significant drop (44%) from the 355 attacks recorded during 2001. A total of 725 persons were killed in last year's attacks, far fewer than the 3,295 persons killed the previous year, which included the thousands of fatalities resulting from the September 11 attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania.

A total of 2,013 persons were wounded by terrorists in 2002, down from the 2,283 persons wounded the year before.

The number of anti-US attacks was 77, down 65% from the previous year's total of 219. The main reason for the decrease was the sharp drop in oil pipeline bombings in Colombia (41 last year, compared to 178 in 2001).

Thirty US citizens were killed in terrorist attacks last year:

- On 15 January, terrorists in Bayt Sahur, West Bank, attacked a vehicle carrying two persons, killing one and wounding the other. The individual killed, Avi Boaz, held dual US-Israeli citizenship. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claimed responsibility.
- On 23 January, Daniel Pearl, the *Wall Street Journal's* South Asia bureau chief was kidnapped in Karachi, Pakistan. On 21 February, it was learned that he had been murdered.
- On 31 January, two hikers on the slopes of the Pinatubo volcano in the Philippines were attacked by militants. One of the hikers, US citizen Brian Thomas Smith, was killed.
- On 16 February, a suicide bomber detonated a device at a pizzeria in Karnei Shomron in the West Bank, killing four persons and wounding 27 others. Two US citizens—Keren Shatsky, and Rachel Donna Thaler—were among the dead. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility.
- On 14 March, two US citizens—Jaime Raul and Jorge Alberto Orjuela—were murdered in Cali, Colombia, by motorcycle-riding gunmen.
- On 17 March, grenades were thrown into a Protestant church in Islamabad, Pakistan, killing five persons including two US citizens, Barbara Green and Kristen Wormsley.
- On 27 March, a HAMAS homicide bomber entered the crowded restaurant of a hotel in Netanya, Israel, and detonated a bomb, killing 22 persons, including one US citizen, Hannah Rogen.



*US Embassy staff load the flag-draped casket of Kristen Wormsley, daughter of US diplomat, into a van in Islamabad, Pakistan, 20 March 2002. Kristen and her mother Barbara Green were killed in an attack on the Protestant International Church in Islamabad.*



*Martin and Gracia Burnham, missionaries from Wichita, Kansas, were taken hostage by the Abu Sayyaf Group in May 2001. On 7 June 2002, during a rescue operation by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Mr. Burnham and Philippine Nurse Deborah Yap were killed.*

- On 7 June, US citizen Martin Burnham, who along with his wife, Gracia, had been held hostage for more than a year in the Philippines by the Abu Sayyaf Group, was killed as Philippine military units on a rescue mission engaged the terrorists in a firefight. Gracia Burnham was wounded.
- On 31 July, a bomb planted by HAMAS terrorists exploded at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, killing nine persons and wounding 87 others. Among the dead were five US citizens—Benjamin Blutstein, Marla Bennett, Diane Leslie Carter, Janis Ruth Coulter, and David Gritz.
- On 8 October, in Failaka Island, Kuwait, gunmen attacked US soldiers conducting a live-fire exercise killing one Marine, Lance Cpl. Antonio J. Sledd.
- The worst terrorist attack since September 11 occurred on 12 October at a resort in Bali, Indonesia, when a car bomb exploded in a busy



*A Malaysian man reads a newspaper with the headline "American Held" and photo of US militant Ahmed Ibrahim Bilal at a newsstand in Kuala Lumpur on 8 October 2002.*

- tourist area filled with nightclubs, cafes, and bars. The attack killed over 200 persons from two-dozen nations. Seven US citizens died—Deborah Lea Snodgrass, Karri Casner, Jacob Young, Steven Webster, George "Joe" Milligan, Megan Heffernan, and Robert McCormick.
- One US citizen—Sandy Alan Booker—died in the Moscow theater attack on 23 October as Russian commandos attempted to rescue 800 hostages held for three days by Chechen terrorists.
- On 28 October, a gunman in Amman, Jordan, shot and killed Laurence Foley, a senior administrator of the US Agency for International Development, as he was leaving his home for work.
- On 21 November in Sidon, Lebanon, an office manager/nurse at a church-run health facility, US citizen Bonnie Denise Witherall, was killed by a gunman.
- Three US citizens—Kathleen Gariety, William Koehn, and Martha Myers—were murdered on 30 December by a gunman who stormed a Baptist missionary hospital in Yemen and opened fire.



## Africa Overview

*"Every nation that seeks peace faces a common enemy today in global terror. The recent attacks in Mombasa remind us that Africa is on the front lines of the war against terror. All our citizens know the awful price of terror, and we will not rest until we have defeated terrorism in all its forms."*

*President Bush's address to the African Growth and Opportunity Act Forum, 15 January 2003*

The simultaneous attacks against a commercial airliner and a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, in November that killed 12 Kenyans and three Israeli tourists provides dramatic and tragic evidence that sub-Saharan Africa continues to suffer from terrorism, from both indigenous, insurgent groups that use terrorist tactics and international terrorist groups.

The commitment and support of Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia have been vital in the successful pursuit of US counterterrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula. The desire to cooperate in this global effort against terrorism has extended from Sudan to South Africa and from The Gambia to a number of groups in Somalia.

In 2002, Sub-Saharan African governments almost universally maintained their commitment to fight global terrorism through both unilateral and multilateral efforts.

To this end, in September 2002 the African Union (AU) held a counterterrorism conference in Algiers. (Note: the Organization of African Unity (OAU) became the African Union in 2002.) The September meeting also produced a plan of action to implement the 1999 OAU Convention on Preventing and Combating Terrorism and agreed to establish an African Terrorism Study and Research Center to be based in Algeria. The AU strongly supports UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373, which, among other stipulations,

requires states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts. The AU also strongly supports UN Security Council Resolution 1269, which reaffirms that the suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which states are involved, is an essential contribution to maintaining international peace and security. The 16 members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) met in September to consider the establishment of a regional criminal investigation and intelligence bureau that would give special attention to terrorism, as well as to illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, illicit arms running, and counterfeiting.

The United States engaged African countries in a number of ways to enhance their counterterrorism capabilities. One, the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), is a US Department of State program designed to assist Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania in protecting their borders, tracking movement of persons, combating terrorism, and enhancing regional stability. The PSI will assist these countries in countering known terrorist operations and border incursions as well as the trafficking of persons and illicit materials. Along with US training and material support will be a program to bring military and civilian officials from the four countries together to encourage greater cooperation on counterterrorism and border issues within and among the governments of the region. It also includes training and assistance to improve critical skills for police and security forces, strengthen airport security, and tighten immigration and customs procedures.

A number of African countries have moved to become parties to the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, as UNSCR

1373 calls on states to do. African countries that are parties to all 12 of the conventions and protocols include Botswana, Mali, and Ghana. Many African governments have taken positive steps to combat terrorist financing by freezing assets of individuals and entities designated by the United States pursuant to Executive Order 13224. Many African governments also have taken steps to freeze the assets of persons and entities included on the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list as having links to Usama Bin Ladin and members of al-Qaida and the Taliban, whose assets UN-member states are required to freeze pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Despite attempts to enhance counterterrorism efforts since 11 September 2001, conditions that make many countries in Africa desirable locations for terrorists still persist. These include a shortage of financial and technical resources, areas of instability and prolonged violence, corruption, weak judicial and financial regulatory systems, and porous borders and unregulated coastlines facilitating the movement of persons and illicit goods.

Sudan, one of the seven state sponsors of terrorism, is discussed in the state sponsorship section of this report.

## **Angola**

In April, following the death of Jonas Savimbi, Angola ended its 27-year civil conflict with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), an organization responsible for numerous brutal attacks on civilians. Separatists in Cabinda Province continued their guerrilla campaigns against the Government. In May, there was a grenade attack on a convoy of US oil workers in Cabinda. Although no one claimed responsibility, the attackers were likely Cabindan separatists. The Government has cooperated in increasing security for private oil companies in Cabinda.

Angola is a party to three of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## **Djibouti**

Djibouti, a critical frontline state in the global war on terrorism and a member of the Arab League, has taken a strong stand against international terrorist organizations and individuals. Djibouti hosts Coalition forces from five countries and the only US military base in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Government has closed down terrorist-linked financial institutions and shared security information on possible terrorist activity in the region. The counterterrorism committee under President Guelleh moved to enhance coordination and action on information concerning terrorist organizations.

In October, the United States established the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF—HOA). Based in Djibouti, CJTF—HOA coordinates Coalition counterterrorism operations in six East African countries and Yemen.

Djibouti is a party to three of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## **Ethiopia**

Ethiopia has been consistently helpful in its cooperation in the global war on terrorism. Significant counterterrorism activities included political, financial, media, military, and law-enforcement actions. The Ethiopian Central Bank has been prompt in complying with US requests for name checks and asset freezes as part of the effort to curb terrorist financing. To counter the threat from the Somalia-based Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), Ethiopia has undertaken increased military efforts to control its lengthy border with Somalia. The Ethiopian Government believes the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), an indigenous group, was responsible for a June attack on a railway station in

Dire Dawa and a September bombing of an Addis Ababa hotel. The OLF denied responsibility for the hotel bombing.

Ethiopia is a party to four of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## Kenya

Kenya was hit once again by terrorist attacks on 28 November 2002, when terrorists fired missiles at an Israeli airliner carrying over 200 passengers and drove a car bomb into a hotel popular with Israeli tourists in the coastal city of Mombasa. The missiles barely missed the plane, but 12 Kenyans and three Israelis were murdered by two suicide bombers in the hotel attack. Al-Qaida claimed



*Kenyan police inspect a missile launcher that was used to fire two missiles at a Boeing 757 Israeli airliner bound from Mombasa, Kenya, to Tel Aviv, Israel, 29 November 2002.*



*Israeli army investigators survey the ruins of the Mombasa Paradise Hotel, where a bomb blast occurred on 28 November 2002.*

responsibility for the simultaneous attacks. If true, it represents the second al-Qaida attack on Kenyan soil since the car-bomb explosion at the US Embassy in Nairobi on 7 August 1998, which killed 291 and wounded over 5,000 persons. While Kenya continued to be a key partner and lend high-level support in the global war on terrorism, its counterterrorism capacity continued to be limited by inadequate training and resources. There has been ongoing law-enforcement cooperation and sharing of information between the United States and Kenya concerning suspected terrorists. Kenya also participates in the US Terrorist Interdiction Program and is a party to 11 of the 12 international counterterrorism conventions and protocols.

## Mali

Mali has taken active steps to combat terrorism and has been responsive on terrorist financing issues. In May, the National Assembly ratified the remaining six international counterterrorism conventions, making Mali a party to all 12. The Malian Government has been receptive to the idea of strengthening its borders, and it held discussions in October 2002 with a US delegation concerning the Pan Sahel Initiative. Mali has a border-security agreement with Niger, Algeria, and Mauritania, although a lack of resources hampers its effectiveness.

## **Nigeria**

Nigeria remained committed to the global war against terrorism and has continued diplomatic efforts in both global and regional fora concerning counterterrorism issues. At a White House ceremony in March, the Nigerian ambassador renewed Nigeria's solidarity with the US-led antiterror Coalition. Nigeria has been helping to monitor threats to US citizens living in Nigeria and has cooperated with the United States on tracking and freezing terrorists' assets. Nigeria's relatively large and complex banking sector, combined with widespread corruption, makes combating terrorism financing more difficult, however. There are growing concerns about the rise of radical Islam in Nigeria, home of Africa's largest Muslim population.

Nigeria is a party to four of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## **Rwanda**

Rwanda is a party to eight of the 12 international counterterrorism conventions and protocols, and the government has continued to give full support to US-led efforts to combat terrorism. The Government has been responsive to US requests to eradicate terrorism financing; has begun to track radical Islamist groups; and has increased surveillance of airports, border controls, and hotel registrations in an effort to identify terrorists. Rwanda established an intergovernmental counterterrorism committee and has an antiterrorism section in its police intelligence unit. During 2002, the Government aggressively pursued the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR), an armed rebel force composed of former Rwandan Army soldiers and supporters of the previous government that orchestrated the 1994 genocide. The group, which operates in Rwanda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, employs terrorist tactics. In 1999, ALIR was responsible for the kidnapping and murder of nine persons, including two US tourists in Bwindi Park. The Rwandan National Police have several

suspects in custody and have been very supportive of the ongoing FBI investigation into the murders of the US citizens. In March 2003, the Rwandan Government transferred custody of three of the suspected perpetrators of these murders to the United States. ALIR remained operational, although at a lower level than in 1999.

## **Somalia**

Somalia's lack of a functioning central government; protracted state of instability and violence; and long coastline, porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula makes it a potential location for international terrorists seeking a transit or launching point to conduct operations elsewhere. Regional efforts to bring about a national reconciliation and establish peace and stability in Somalia are ongoing. The US Government does not have official relations with any entity in Somalia. Although the ability of Somali entities to carry out counterterrorism activities is constrained, some have taken limited actions in this direction. The Somali-based al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) has committed terrorist acts in the past, primarily in Ethiopia. AIAI was originally formed in the early 1990s with a goal of creating an Islamic state in Somalia. In recent years, AIAI has become factionalized, and its membership is difficult to define. Certain extremist factions may continue to pose a regional terrorist threat. Somalia is not a party to any of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## **South Africa**

South Africa has taken a number of actions in 2002 in support of the global war on terrorism. President Mbeki has voiced his opinion several times that "no circumstances whatsoever can ever justify resorting to terrorism." South Africa enacted legislation establishing a financial intelligence unit, which targets money laundering. A draft antiterrorism law was approved by the cabinet and



informally submitted to the Parliament. South Africa provided support to the United States by extraditing a member of the Symbionese Liberation Army. There were two acts of domestic terrorism in South Africa in 2002. A series of bombings in Soweto in late October killed one and wounded another, and in mid-November, a pipe bomb exploded at the serious violent crimes police unit in Cape Town, but no injuries occurred. A previously unknown right-wing extremist group, "Warriors of the Boer Nation," claimed responsibility for the Soweto attack. Police were searching for the culprits in the Cape Town case, although People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) is suspected. The activities of PAGAD remained severely curtailed in 2002 by a broadly successful law-enforcement and prosecutorial effort against leading members of the organization. South Africa is a party to five of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## **Tanzania**

Tanzania has been a supportive partner in the global Coalition against terrorism. The Tanzanian Government has cooperated with the United States to bring to justice those responsible for the 1998 bombing of the US Embassy in Dar es Salaam. In 2001, for example, a Tanzanian national—extradited from South Africa to the United States to stand trial for his role in the Embassy bombing—was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. The US and Tanzanian Governments cooperated on a number of bilateral programs to combat terrorism in 2002, including civil aviation security, anti-money-

laundering initiatives, border control, and police training. Tanzania also worked through multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank and the United Nations, to enhance its counterterrorism efforts. New legislation was approved by Tanzania's Parliament in November that criminalizes support for terrorist groups operating in Tanzania or overseas. Tanzania is a party to seven of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## **Uganda**

Uganda continued its firm stance against local and international terrorism in 2002. Uganda is a party to four of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, and in 2002 it worked to complete the process required to become a party to all 12. In May, the government enacted the 2002 Suppression of Terrorism Act, which imposes a mandatory death penalty for terrorists and potential death penalty for their sponsors and supporters. The Act's list of terrorist organizations includes al-Qaida, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and the Allied Democratic Front (ADF). There were many attacks against civilian targets in northern Uganda by the LRA during 2002, resulting in hundreds of deaths. In March, Uganda launched a major military offensive to destroy the LRA in southern Sudan and northern Uganda. The Ugandan military continued its successful operations against the ADF, resulting in a decrease in ADF activities in western Uganda.

## South Asia Overview

*"(Our) relationships with South Asian states have been central to our successful prosecution of the war on terrorism. All have been fully supportive, and their support in this war has been, and will continue to be, absolutely crucial."*

*Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca in Congressional testimony, 18 July 2002*

In 2002, South Asia remained a central battleground in the global war on terrorism. The liberation of Afghanistan from the Taliban regime eliminated al-Qaida's principal base and sanctuary, but remnant cells continued to present a danger throughout Afghanistan. Fleeing terrorists also caused trouble in Pakistan and other states through which they transited. All countries in the South Asia region have strongly supported the Coalition effort against terrorism by al-Qaida and the remnants of the Taliban, and the establishment of the new Transitional Authority in Afghanistan has fostered significant improvements in regional security. Further efforts and continued long-term international assistance will be needed to sustain progress, however.

Pakistan remained a key ally in the antiterrorism effort, offering support to US operations in Afghanistan, implementing close law-enforcement cooperation, and cracking down on domestic extremists. Extremist violence in Kashmir, meanwhile, fueled by infiltration from Pakistan across the Line of Control, threatened to become a flashpoint for a wider India-Pakistan conflict during most of the year.

The cease-fire in Sri Lanka between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Sri Lankan Government held throughout 2002, and the two sides began direct talks, facilitated by Norway, aimed at ending the country's long civil war and its attendant terrorism. At the same time, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal continued to be a bloody conflict characterized by the use of terrorist tactics. (The Government of Nepal and the Maoists adopted a cease-fire in January 2003.)



*A member of the Bangladesh Army inspects a movie theater in Mymensingh, Bangladesh, after a bomb blast that killed 15 persons on 7 December 2002.*

## Afghanistan

In 2002, the Afghan people, supported by a US-led international Coalition, decisively defeated the brutal Taliban regime, which had provided sanctuary to terrorists and extremists from around the world—including North America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The extremists had used Afghanistan as a training ground and base of operations for worldwide terrorism. Senior al-Qaida leaders, including Usama Bin Ladin—



*A member of the International Security Assistance Force near the wreckage of a car after two bomb blasts shook Kabul, Afghanistan, 5 September 2002.*

wanted by the United States for his role in the September 11 attacks as well as the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998—had been based in Afghanistan, protected by the illegitimate Taliban regime.

In July 2002, representatives from all Afghan regions, factions, and ethnic groups met in an emergency “Loya Jirga,” to elect Hamid Karzai as the President of the Traditional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA), which replaced the Afghan Interim Administration established by the December 2001 Bonn Agreement.

The new Afghan Government has pledged its support for the war on terrorism. Al-Qaida, which despite its setbacks still regards Afghanistan as a key battlefield in its war against the United States, will continue its armed opposition to the US presence, however. Al-Qaida has pockets of fighters throughout Afghanistan and probably several more in the neighboring tribal areas of Pakistan. To ensure that former Taliban and al-Qaida holdouts do not reemerge as a significant threat, the TISA must consolidate its support among the country’s rival ethnic and regional factions.

Afghans have already passed several milestones on the road toward building a government in accordance with the Bonn Agreement, and the most critical steps—such as demobilizing rival militias, building a stable Afghan army, drafting a constitution, holding democratic elections, and creating a legal system—were underway at the end of the year.

Afghanistan is a party to three of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## India

New Delhi continued to support the global Coalition against terrorism in 2002 while engaging in its own efforts to address internal and external threats. The Government of India enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act to provide the central and state governments with additional law-enforcement tools in the war on terrorism. An anti-money-laundering bill was passed by Parliament in 2002 and signed into law in January 2003. Once implemented, it will establish a financial intelligence unit to monitor suspected terrorist transactions. In May, India and the United States launched the Indo-US Cyber





*Indian policemen escort Mohammed Afzal (L), Abdul Rehman Geelani (C), and Shaukat Hussain Guru (behind), 18 December 2002, after they were sentenced to death for an attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001.*

Security Forum to safeguard critical infrastructures from cyber attack. The US-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group met twice during 2002.

Like the United States, India faces a significant terrorist threat. Its primary source is the activity of militants opposed to continued Indian rule over the disputed province of Kashmir. In December 2001, terrorists staged a dramatic attack on the Indian Parliament. In January 2003, armed gunmen opened fire on police outside the American Center in Calcutta, killing four Indian policemen assigned to protect the building. The Government of India asserts that Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) was behind a series of high-profile attacks. Among them were the May assault on an army base in Jammu that killed 36, an attack in July in Kashmir that killed 27 civilians, and two attacks on the Ragunath temple in Jammu in which at least 19 were killed. India also accused the LT of masterminding the 26 September attack at the Akshardham temple in Gujarat, which killed 31 persons. The United States has designated Lashkar-e Tayyiba a Foreign Terrorist Organization and has designated it pursuant to Executive Order 13224.

In 2002, India became a party to the 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, making it a party to 11 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## Nepal

The Nepalese Government in 2002 strongly supported US counterterrorism activities and was responsive to multilateral efforts to police international terrorism. Nepal is party to five of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. Nepal's primary focus, however, remained the seven-year Maoist insurgency, which had claimed nearly 7,000 lives by the end of 2002.

The Maoist insurgency poses a continuing threat to US citizens and property in Nepal. Repeated anti-US rhetoric and actions suggest the Maoists view Western support for Kathmandu as a key obstacle to their goal of establishing a doctrinaire communist dictatorship. Furthermore, the Maoists have forged cooperative links with extremist groups across South Asia. In 2002, Maoists claimed responsibility for assassinating two US Embassy guards. In a press statement, they threatened foreign missions, including the US Embassy, to discourage foreign governments from supporting the Government of Nepal. Maoists, targeting US symbols, also bombed locally operated Coca-Cola bottling plants in November 2001 and in January and April 2002. In May, Maoists destroyed a Pepsi Cola truck and its contents.

Limited government finances, weak border controls, and poor security infrastructure have made Nepal a convenient logistics and transit point for some outside militants and international terrorists. The country also possesses a number of relatively soft targets that make it a potentially attractive site for terrorist operations. Security remains weak at many public facilities, including the Kathmandu International Airport, but the United States and others are actively working with the

Government to improve security. The Nepalese Department of Immigration has made recent improvements in its watchlist capability.

## Pakistan

In 2002, Pakistan remained a vital partner in the global Coalition against terrorism, playing a key role in the diplomatic, law-enforcement, and military fight to eliminate al-Qaida. Pakistan granted logistic support and overflight rights to support Operation Enduring Freedom, consulted extensively with the United States and the United Nations on ways to combat terrorist financing, and drafted anti-money-laundering legislation. In January, the Government of Pakistan arrested and transferred to US custody nearly 500 suspected al-Qaida and Taliban terrorists, detained hundreds of extremists, and banned five extremist organizations: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan (TJP), and Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i Mohammadi (TNSM). The United States has designated LT and JEM as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and also has designated them pursuant to Executive Order 13224.

In 2002, Pakistan became a party to the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, making it a party to 10 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Anti-US and anti-Western attacks in Pakistan increased in 2002 over the previous year, primarily due to opposition to the US-led Coalition in the war against terrorism. Significant attacks included the kidnapping and murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl; a grenade attack in March on an Islamabad church that killed five—among them two US citizens; a bus bombing in Karachi in May that killed 14, including 11 French naval engineers; and the bombing in June of the US Consulate in Karachi that killed 12 Pakistanis. In response, police have implemented enhanced security measures at



*Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, the alleged mastermind behind the kidnap and murder of US reporter Daniel Pearl, leaves court in Karachi, Pakistan, on 29 March 2002.*

diplomatic facilities, churches, and other sensitive sites. The Government of Pakistan has arrested, tried, and convicted those involved in the Daniel Pearl murder.

US-Pakistan joint counterterrorism efforts have been extensive. They include cooperative efforts in border security, criminal investigations, as well as several long-term training projects. In 2002, the United States and Pakistan established the Working Group on Counterterrorism and Law-Enforcement Cooperation. The meetings provide a forum for discussing ongoing US-Pakistani efforts, as well as a means for improving capabilities and cooperation. Islamabad has facilitated the transfer of over 400 captured alleged terrorists to US custody, and Pakistan remained ranked third in the world (behind the United States and Switzerland) in seizing terrorist assets. Abuse of the informal money-transfer system known as *hawala* remained a serious problem throughout the region, however.





*A Pakistani police officer displays a Volkswagen packed with explosives that Islamic militants allegedly planned to ram into a diplomatic car in Karachi, 15 December 2002.*

## Sri Lanka

The positive developments in Sri Lanka that began in 2001 continued in 2002. Historically, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has been one of the world's deadliest terror groups—it pioneered the use of suicide vests and has committed far more suicide-bomb attacks than any other terrorist organization. The cease-fire between the LTTE and the Government, established in

December 2001, was formalized in February 2002. Formal peace negotiations began in September 2002 and were continuing into 2003.

The LTTE has publicly accepted the concept of internal autonomy within a federal Sri Lankan state, conceding its longstanding demand for a separate Tamil Eelam state. Its recent public statements give reason to hope that it intends to transform itself from a terrorist organization into a legitimate political entity.

The LTTE, however, has not renounced terrorism; it continues to smuggle in weaponry; and it continues forcible recruitment, including the recruitment of children into its ranks. It is too early to tell whether the Sri Lankan peace process will ultimately bear fruit or whether the LTTE will actually reform itself. Although guarded optimism surrounds the peace process, the United States will continue to designate the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization until it unequivocally renounces terrorism in both word and deed.

Sri Lanka is a party to 10 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## East Asia Overview

*"The fight against terrorism is our fight, it is the fight of all mankind against evil. The terrorist shall not be allowed to get away with this....I ask our people to be vigilant always. The battle shall go on wherever it takes us."*

*Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,  
7 June 2002*

In 2002, the deadliest terrorist attack since the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States occurred in the East Asia region—the bombings in Bali, Indonesia. Although East Asian nations had lent substantial support to the war on terrorism, made progress in arresting and interdicting terrorists, and built and improved their counterterrorism capabilities, many nations redoubled such efforts after the 12 October Bali attack. High-profile arrests continued alongside less visible efforts to improve legal and regulatory regimes to restrict the flows of terrorist money, manpower, and materiel through banks, borders, and brokers in the region.

The Philippines continued its strong support for the war on terrorism in 2002. The Philippines and United States cooperated closely to resolve a hostage crisis involving US citizens in the Philippines and to step up efforts to bring to justice the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorists responsible for the kidnapping. The United States brought indictments against and offered rewards for five ASG leaders and trained and assisted Philippine forces in going after the ASG. The United States also added the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA) to its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and it added CPP/NPA and CPP leader Jose Maria Sison to the list of entities and individuals designated under Executive Order 13224. The Philippines sentenced terrorism suspect Agus Dwikarna to 10 years on explosives charges and continued to

consult and cooperate with other regional nations on counterterrorism issues.

Indonesia made great strides in bringing perpetrators of the Bali bombings to justice and exposing the scale and deadliness of the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya (JI), believed to be responsible for the bombings. The Indonesian police cooperated closely with other regional partners in the Bali investigation and widened the investigation beyond the Bali attacks to look at JI in general, often through cooperation with other nations in the region. Indonesia arrested Abu Bakar Bashir, spiritual leader of JI, on several charges, including attempting to assassinate the President of Indonesia and charges related to a string of bombings in December 2000. The United States continued to work closely with Indonesia to improve its counterterrorism capabilities through training and assistance programs, and in supporting the country's legal and regulatory regimes.

Japan was fully committed to the war on terrorism in 2002 and continued to provide robust assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom, major assistance to rebuild Afghanistan, and other aid to East Asian countries to enhance their counterterrorism capabilities. Japan was an active participant in G-8, EU, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and UN efforts to coordinate counterterrorism activities, and it was a regional leader in adhering to international standards for implementing an effective counterterrorism regime.

Australia was hit hard by the Bali bombings, losing 85 citizens. The tragedy strengthened Australia's already firm resolve to lend robust support to the war on terrorism, including support for the Bali investigation. Australia provided combat forces to Operation Enduring Freedom and was very active in

regional cooperation. Australia implemented broad reforms of its legal and regulatory counterterrorism mechanisms, and it undertook significant bureaucratic reorganization to enhance its counterterrorism capabilities at home and abroad.

Malaysia and Singapore continued to make arrests of JI suspects, disrupting their operations and ability to function. Malaysia approved the concept of a regional counterterrorism center and continued to develop it through the end of the year. The Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia signed an agreement on counterterrorism cooperation, which was later joined by Thailand and Cambodia. Several other nations in the region signed similar cooperative agreements, and cooperation between governments—in particular law-enforcement and intelligence agencies—increased in 2002, making possible additional successes in interdicting or arresting terrorists in the region.

Thailand was also a staunch ally in the war on terror and continued to cooperate closely with the United States and its neighbors on counterterrorism, intelligence, and law enforcement. In 2002, US access to Thai bases and airspace continued to be critical for rapid force projection into the Operation Enduring Freedom theater. Thailand contributed to the UN Afghanistan Reconstruction Fund and agreed to send military engineers to participate in Afghan reconstruction.

Terrorist organizations in the region, however, demonstrated their flexibility and resilience in the face of more effective antiterrorist efforts by East Asian nations. Terrorists shifted their targets and patterns of operation, and much work remains to be done so that the region's counterterrorism regimes can deal effectively with the threat that terrorists continue to pose to East Asian nations—and their partners and allies. Trafficking in drugs, persons, and weapons, for example, as well as organized crime, official corruption, and some inadequacies in legal and regulatory regimes persist as weaknesses that can be exploited by terrorists.

While regional nations did much to expose, arrest, and disrupt JI in 2002, the organization continues to function, and many of its leaders remain at large. JI and other terrorist groups continue to pose significant threats to the region, and only through increasing collaboration and cooperation can those threats be met.

The hard-won lesson of recent years is that such cooperation and communication are perhaps the most important weapons in the counterterrorism arsenal. Through such cooperation, nations can strengthen the security, law-enforcement, intelligence, and financial institutions that constitute the frontline in the war against global terrorism.

North Korea, one of the seven state sponsors of terrorism, is discussed in the state sponsorship section of this report.

## **Australia**

Canberra strengthened its already close working relationship with its international counterparts in the global war on terrorism in 2002. The Australian Defence Force maintained its substantial contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom, including deploying a Special Air Services contingent in Afghanistan, aerial tankers in Kyrgyzstan, and P-3 patrol aircraft in the Persian Gulf region, while two Australian warships participated in the multinational interception force in the Arabian Gulf. The Australian Government strongly condemned all acts of international terrorism during the year, particularly the 12 October Bali bombings, in which 85 Australians died. Australia was instrumental in providing assistance to the Government of Indonesia in the aftermath of the attack.

Canberra signed bilateral counterterrorism memoranda of understanding with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand in 2002, and it is negotiating such a memorandum with the Philippines. Canberra is a party to 11 of the

12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. The Government also enacted laws that create new definitions for terrorism; provide stronger penalties for carrying out, abetting, or financing terrorist acts; and enhance Australian Customs' powers to enforce border security. Federal and state leaders formalized a new intergovernmental agreement on Australia's national counterterrorism arrangements in October. The agreement provides a new and strong framework for cooperation between jurisdictions and creates a national counterterrorism committee to recommend additional federal-state measures to upgrade security. Several states strengthened their own antiterrorism laws as well.

Australia sought to block assets of all individuals and entities included on the UN Security Council Resolution 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list of persons and entities associated with Usama Bin Ladin, members of al-Qaida, and members of the Taliban. It also sought to block assets of individuals and entities designated by the United States pursuant to Executive Order 13224. The Government also proscribed six organizations, including al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiya (JI), under antiterrorism legislation enacted in June 2002. The legislation allows prosecution of members of such organizations or persons who provide financial or logistic support to them.

Australian law-enforcement and intelligence organizations actively investigated possible links between foreign terrorist organizations and individuals and organizations in Australia. In the wake of the bombings in Bali, the Australian Federal Police conducted a joint investigation of the attack with the Indonesian National Police. The Australian Security Intelligence Organization and State Police conducted raids on several houses of persons in Perth and Sydney who were suspected of having links to JI.

In November, Australian authorities in Perth charged an Australian citizen with conspiracy in

connection with an alleged plan to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Canberra and the Israeli Consulate in Sydney. The same month, the Parliament enacted a law creating a crime of extraterritorial murder, manslaughter, or intentional harm to Australians, retroactive to 1 October 2002. The law gives Australia jurisdiction to prosecute those responsible for attacks on Australians overseas, such as the perpetrators of the Bali bombings.

## **Burma**

Rangoon has taken a solid stance against international terrorism. It is party to five of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and has enacted an anti-money-laundering law that could help block terrorism assets. Burmese authorities frequently make public statements supportive of international counterterrorism efforts, and they also have expressed their willingness to cooperate in sharing information on counterterrorism issues.

There were no incidents of international terrorism in Burma during 2002. Several Burmese embassies abroad received letters containing blasting caps and electric batteries, although none exploded. The military government is currently involved in several low-intensity conflicts with ethnic insurgent groups. At least one group is alleged to have ties to South Asian extremist (possibly terrorist) elements.

## **China**

The People's Republic of China continued to cooperate with the United States in the war on terrorism. Chinese officials regularly denounced terrorism, both in public statements and in international fora, and China regularly participated in UN Security Council discussions on terrorism and served as a permanent member of the UN Counterterrorism Committee established under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373. In

2002, China was well represented at international meetings, including the Munich Conference on Security Policy and the Southeast Asia Counterterrorism Conference held in Honolulu. During the 2002 Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting, Beijing again articulated its counterterrorism stance and joined in statements denouncing terrorism.

Beijing continued to undertake measures to improve its counterterrorism posture and domestic security, including careful monitoring of its borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan and some efforts toward disrupting the financial links of terrorist groups. China made some progress in 2002 in strengthening financial-monitoring mechanisms, including prompting China's financial institutions to search for and freeze assets of designated terrorist entities.

Beijing regularly holds expert-level consultations with the United States on the financial aspects of terrorism, conducts semiannual counterterrorism consultations, and shares information through law-enforcement channels concerning persons possibly involved in terrorist activities. Beijing treats individuals and entities designated under US Executive Order 13224 on the same basis as it treats individuals and entities identified by the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee, whose assets UN member states are required to freeze pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

In 2002, there were no acts of terrorism committed in China against US citizens or interests, but there were several reports of bombings in various parts of China. It is unclear whether the attacks were politically motivated acts, terrorism, or criminal attacks.

China continued to express concern that Islamic extremists operating in and around the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region received training, equipment, and inspiration from al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other extremists in Afghanistan. Several press reports claimed that Uighurs trained and fought with Islamic groups in the former Soviet Union, including Chechnya. Uighurs were found

fighting with al-Qaida in Afghanistan, and some Uighurs who were trained by al-Qaida have returned to China. Previous Chinese crackdowns on ethnic Uighurs and others in Xinjiang raised concerns about possible human rights abuses. For example, while the United States designated the East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a terrorist organization under Executive Order 13224 in 2002, it continued to emphasize to the Chinese that the war on terrorism must not be used as a substitute for addressing legitimate social and economic aspirations.

China is a party to nine of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## Indonesia

In the wake of the Bali bombing on 12 October, the Indonesian Government stepped up internal investigations against international terrorist groups, although it had provided limited support for the global Coalition against terrorism before this event. Indonesia participated in a number of regional and international fora focused on terrorism and supported declarations on joint action against terrorism, including the declarations issued at the US-sponsored Southeast Asian Counter-Terrorism Conference, the ASEAN Summit, and a regional conference on combating terrorist financing. Internal administrative and legal weaknesses, however, hampered indigenous counterterrorism efforts.


Jakarta's response to the 12 October terrorist attacks in Bali represented a major and multifaceted counterterrorism effort. Jakarta undertook a number of significant actions, including the quick adoption of antiterrorism decrees (PERPU), the introduction into the legislature of a counterterrorism bill, and an aggressive investigation into the Bali attacks in particular. Jakarta, with international assistance, has taken action against Jemaah Islamiya (JI), an organization now designated by the United States pursuant to Executive Order 13224 and included



## Bali, Indonesia—October 2002



A team from Indonesia's antiterror police unit escort key Bali bombing suspect Imam Samudra for transport from Jakarta to Bali, Indonesia, 6 December 2002.



A flier for a missing youth was posted in a hospital two days after the Bali bombing occurred.



Days after the Bali bombing, thousands of Balinese gathered at the site of the bombing to purify the area with a Hindu religious ceremony.



Australian Prime Minister John Howard (C) tours the site of the 12 October 2002 bomb blasts in Bali, where nearly 200 persons were killed.

on the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list of organizations and individuals, whose assets UN member states are required to freeze. Indonesia supported this designation. Authorities detained JI spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir and arrested members of the JI cell believed responsible for the Bali bombings, including JI leaders Imam Samudra and Ali Ghufron, a.k.a. Mukhlas.

The 12 October Bali terrorist bombings, which killed some 200 persons and maimed hundreds more, has been clearly attributed to the al-Qaida-linked terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiya. The attack in Bali's crowded Kuta tourist district was initiated with a possible suicide bombing inside a tourist bar that funneled panicking victims into the street, exposing the crowd to the full blast of a large car bomb parked next to a neighboring club.

A smaller, nearly simultaneous bombing occurred about 300 yards from the US Consular office in Bali. Those arrested have indicated that the consular agency was the target. Hours before the Bali bombings, a small explosion had occurred at the Philippine Consulate in Sulawesi, which damaged the compound gates and blew out several windows. No casualties were reported in either bombing. Other bombings in 2002 in Indonesia included a botched grenade attack on a US diplomatic residence in Jakarta in September and the bombing on 4 December of a US-based/owned fast-food franchise and a car dealership in Makassar.

In 2002, Indonesia did not discover or freeze any terrorist assets. Indonesia's weak rule of law and poorly regulated financial system have produced roadblocks in uncovering terrorist assets, notwithstanding its willingness to freeze terrorist assets, consistent with the requirements of UNSCR 1373, as well as UNSCRs 1267, 1390, and 1455.

Indonesia is a party to four of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## Japan

Tokyo has stood firm with the United States in combating terrorism. Tokyo twice renewed its Basic Plan, authorizing Japan's Self-Defense Forces to provide logistic support for Operation Enduring Freedom, including refueling US and UK vessels and deploying an Aegis antimissile-equipped destroyer in the Indian Ocean, as well as transporting heavy equipment into Afghanistan.

Japan is party to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. At the request of the United States, it has blocked the assets of individuals and entities designated by the United States under Executive Order 13224.

Japan continued to participate actively in international fora designed to strengthen counterterrorism measures and took a leadership role in rebuilding Afghanistan. While hosting the January Afghanistan Reconstruction Conference, Tokyo announced a \$500-million aid package for Afghanistan. In March, Tokyo hosted the Asia Counterterrorism Conference. Tokyo is coordinating with the United States on efforts to build a homeland security capacity within Asia, and it has invited officials from Asia to receive training in areas of homeland defense, including immigration control, aviation security, customs cooperation, export control, police and law enforcement, and terrorist financing.

In 2002, Japan had no incidents of international terrorism and continued to prosecute the alleged perpetrators of earlier terrorism acts. The Tokyo District Court sentenced two Aum Shinrikyo (Aum) members to death for the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995. Trials were still underway for four other members, and a ruling in the trial of Aum leader Matsumoto was expected in early 2003.

## Laos

The Government of Laos has continued to provide strong support for the global war on terrorism. The Government became a party to four international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism in July 2002, in addition to the three to which it was already a party.

Laos joined other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries in taking strong positions against terrorism and, with other ASEAN nations, became a participant in the United States-ASEAN Joint Declaration for Cooperation on Counterterrorism, which was signed in August 2002.

Responding to requests by the United States and its obligations pursuant to UNSCR 1373, as well as UNSCRs 1267, 1390, and 1455, Laos has continued efforts to identify assets of terrorists and sponsors of terrorism. The Bank of Laos has issued orders blocking assets of organizations and individuals named in lists provided by the United States. The Bank, however, had yet to take steps to report on Government compliance with UNSCR 1373 or to freeze the assets of individuals and entities associated with Usama Bin Ladin, members of al-Qaida, and members of the Taliban included on the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list. Pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UN member states are required to block the assets of persons and individuals on that list.

Laos has no distinct counterterrorism laws; acts of terrorism fall under Laotian criminal law. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, and the National Assembly are currently discussing amendments to its criminal law to identify acts of terrorism as crimes and to strengthen the penalties for those crimes. The Laotian Government has increased security at all public events, and it has tightened airport and immigration security.

## Malaysia

During 2002, the Malaysian Government continued to cooperate with international law-enforcement and intelligence efforts in the global war on terrorism and aggressively pursued domestic counterterrorism measures within its borders.

Malaysia suffered no incidents of international or domestic terrorism in 2002, although Malaysian police authorities continued their investigations of the regional terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and domestic Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia group, resulting in about 40 arrests of individuals suspected of involvement in either group. In late 2001, Malaysian authorities arrested Philippine national Nur Misuari, former Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) leader and ex-governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, for illegal entry and transferred him to the Philippines in January 2002. On 19 November 2001, Misuari had declared war on the Arroyo government, and armed MNLF guerrillas loyal to him attacked an army headquarters in Jolo, Sulu, that left over 100 persons dead and scores wounded. At year's end, Misuari's trial on rebellion charges was ongoing.

Kuala Lumpur sought to freeze assets of entities on the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list, although it has not located terrorist assets to date. Kuala Lumpur requires financial institutions to file suspicious transaction reports on all names of individuals and entities designated under US Executive Order 13224, but it was not yet a party to the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Malaysia is a party to three of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

The Malaysian Government passed legislation in 2002 that will allow the negotiation of mutual legal-assistance treaties with other countries. In addition, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia

signed a counterterrorism agreement on 7 May—later joined by Thailand and Cambodia—that establishes a framework for cooperation and interoperability of the three nations' procedures for handling border and security incidents. Twenty specific projects are detailed in the agreement, to include such measures as setting up hotlines, sharing airline passenger lists, and conducting joint training.

In May, Malaysia signed a joint counterterrorism declaration of cooperation with the United States, and in November the Malaysian cabinet approved establishment of a Malaysian-based regional counterterrorism training center in Kuala Lumpur.

Malaysia joined several ASEAN members in October 2002 in successfully requesting that the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee include JI on its consolidated list of individuals and entities associated with Usama Bin Ladin, the members of al-Qaida, and the members of the Taliban.

## **New Zealand**

New Zealand has contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom. It originally deployed one squadron of Special Forces to Afghanistan. New Zealand is reaffirming its commitment by deploying a frigate and a P-3 Orion to join the Coalition task force in the region. A C-130 Hercules transport aircraft will also become available from mid-2003.

New Zealand has supported regional efforts among other Pacific Island countries to adopt counterterrorism measures and coordinate their regional counterterrorism activities with the United States and Australia. It has a number of ongoing programs in the areas of police, customs, immigration, and judicial training/aid.

New Zealand is also a party to 10 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to international terrorism. Most recently, the Government announced a US \$12.5-million package of new intelligence, police, customs, and

immigration measures to enhance its counterterrorism capability.

## **Philippines**

The Philippines in 2002 continued to work closely with international counterparts in the global war on terrorism and made significant progress in counterterrorism legislation, legal action against suspected terrorists, and hostage-rescue efforts. The Philippines has signed, but not ratified, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Financing. The Philippines is a party to six out of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. The Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia also signed a counterterrorism agreement on 7 May that establishes a framework for cooperation and interoperability of the three nations' procedures for handling border and security incidents. The agreement, which Thailand and Cambodia have now joined, enumerates 20 different projects.

The Philippines passed anti-money-laundering legislation in September 2001 and adopted related regulations in March 2002. The law criminalized money laundering, called for the establishment of a system of covered-transaction reporting, and created the Anti-Money-Laundering Council (AMLC). The 2001 legislation was insufficient to get the Philippines removed from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development's Financial Action Task Force (FATF) list of Non-Cooperating Countries and Territories. Based on FATF recommendations, however, the AMLC prepared a new draft bill that seeks to eliminate weaknesses in the existing legislation by lowering the reporting threshold, eliminating the requirement of a court order to freeze accounts, and revising bank-secrecy provisions. The Philippine Congress had not approved it by the end of the year, however.

On 19 November, as a result of an investigation by the US Embassy's Customs Attache Office, the





*Police investigators search the shell of a bus in Quezon City, north of Manila, Philippines, 19 October 2002, after a bomb exploded killing 2 and injuring 20.*

Philippine Court of Appeals moved to block the assets in bank accounts suspected of being owned or controlled by key Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) members or their family members.

In January 2002, Nur Misuari, former Moro National Liberation Front leader and ex-governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, and an aide were transferred from Malaysia back to the Philippines where they have been detained. In late 2001, Malaysian authorities had arrested Misuari after he and his aides had fled the Philippines following an uprising in November 2001 that claimed the lives of 113 persons. The Philippine Government filed sedition and rebellion charges against Misuari, based on allegations that he



*Undated picture of Lemuel Montulo, left, and his sister Flor, who were kidnapped in the Philippines; Montulo was later beheaded and his head dumped in a public market.*

instigated the attacks, and at year's end his trial was ongoing.

The Philippines made a series of arrests of suspected extremists and terrorists in 2002. On 15 January, Philippine National Police and Bureau of Immigration agents arrested Indonesian citizen Fathur Rahman Al-Ghozi, a.k.a. Abu Saad or Sammi Sali Jamin, in Manila on charges of forging travel documents. Al-Ghozi is a member of the regional terrorist organization, Jemaah Islamiya (JI), which has a close connection to some elements of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the largest Islamic extremist group in the Philippines. Members of the JI used a MILF base for training in the past. The JI operated its own training facility at an MILF camp, although its current status is unclear. Based on information supplied by Al-Ghozi, police and military intelligence agents raided two houses in General



Santos City. They arrested three brothers and seized TNT, detonators, rolls of detonating cord, and M-16 rifles. Al-Ghozi pled guilty to possession of explosives and was sentenced to a 10-12 year jail term and fined. He still faces charges of illegal possession of assault rifles.

Philippine authorities in March arrested three other Indonesian citizens—Agus Dwikarna, Abdul Jamal Balfas, and Tamsil Linrung—in Manila and charged them with unlawful possession of explosive materials. Balfas and Linrung were later handed over to Indonesian authorities. On 12 July, Dwikarna was convicted by a Philippine regional trial court and sentenced to ten years imprisonment.

In 2002, the US Department of Justice issued several terrorist-related indictments against Philippine nationals, and other indictments are pending. On 23 July, the US Deputy Attorney General announced an indictment charging five ASG leaders with taking US citizens hostage, hostage taking resulting in death, and conspiracy resulting in death. This action mirrors an indictment in February 2002 that previously had been kept sealed for fear of endangering the lives of ASG-held hostages.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has undertaken other initiatives to rescue ASG-held hostages. During the first half of 2002, the AFP launched an operation to locate and rescue hostages held by the ASG, including US citizens Gracia and Martin Burnham. On 7 June, AFP forces rescued Mrs. Burnham, but tragically, Mr. Burnham and Philippine nurse Deborah Yap were killed during the operation. Two weeks later, Philippine special warfare troops fired at a vessel carrying ASG leader Aldam Tilao, a.k.a. Abu Sabaya, responsible for taking the hostages. Sabaya's body was never found, but there is strong evidence that he is dead. Four other ASG members were captured during the incident.

In August 2002, the AFP launched Operation End Game, which is aimed at rescuing three

Indonesians, four Filipino Jehovah's Witness members, and one remaining hostage taken in 2000 and still held by the ASG. The operation is also geared to locating and destroying ASG subgroups operating in Jolo and Basilan.

In other activities targeting the ASG, beginning in January 2002, the US military provided a broad range of training to the AFP to improve its ability to fight the ASG. During the training program, 10 US servicemen were killed in an accident when an MH-47 Chinook helicopter crashed into the Sulu Sea. On 2 October, one US serviceman was killed and another wounded in a bombing that targeted US personnel. The ASG is believed to be responsible for the attack.

In May, the US Government launched a Rewards for Justice campaign targeting ASG leaders. Under the program, the US Government offered to pay up to \$5 million for information leading to the arrest or conviction of the following ASG terrorists: Amir Khadafi Abubakar Janjalani, a.k.a. Abu Mukhtar; Jainal Antel Sali, Jr., a.k.a. Abu Solaiman; Aldam Tilao, a.k.a. Abu Sabaya (presumed dead); Isnilon Toton Hapilon, a.k.a. Abu Musab; and Hamsiraji Sali, a.k.a. Jose Ramirez.

The Philippine Government publicly welcomed the US Government's designation in August 2002 of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA), as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The US Government also designated CPP/NPA and its founder Jose Maria Sison pursuant to Executive Order 13224. Authorities in The Netherlands, where Sison is living in self-exile, subsequently froze assets in his bank accounts there and cut off his social benefits. In October, Philippine Foreign Secretary Ople urged the European Union to place a similar designation on a faction of the CPP, the National Democratic Front (NDF). The Philippines continued to campaign for inclusion of all Communist factions, the CPP, NPA, and NDF, on the Sanctions Committee's consolidated list of individuals and entities associated with Usama Bin

Ladin, the members of al-Qaida, and those of the Taliban, whose assets UN member states are required to freeze pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Throughout 2002, the Communist People's Party/New People's Army/New Democratic Front (CPP/NPA/NDF) continued sporadic attacks against Government and commercial sites as well as against public officials and private citizens. In September, the Communist New People's Army (NPA) claimed responsibility for assassinating a mayor, attacking a police station (and killing the police chief), and blowing up a mobile telecommunications-transmission station. The violence in September prompted the AFP to launch a new counterinsurgency drive against NPA fighters. A coordinated campaign by military forces, police units, and civilian volunteers—called Gordian Knot—was aimed at overrunning CPP/NPA/NDF strongholds and capturing terrorist suspects. Nevertheless, the Macapagal-Arroyo administration at the end of 2002 remained open to a negotiated peace settlement with the CPP/NPA/NDF.

## **Singapore**

In 2002, Singapore continued to work closely with international counterparts in the global war on terrorism. In addition to multilateral activities, Singapore continued its cooperation with the United States on import controls and also took domestic legislative and judicial initiatives.


In October, Singapore joined over 40 countries in requesting that the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee add the Jemaah Islamiya (JI) to its consolidated list of individuals and entities associated with Usama Bin Ladin, the members of al-Qaida, and the Taliban. The same month, Singapore joined the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit's counterterrorism declaration. In July, the United States and the ASEAN signed a nonbinding joint declaration for cooperation on counterterrorism. As an ASEAN member, Singapore is a participant in the declaration. In addition, Singapore became a party

to the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Financing in December 2002 and passed legislation that would enable it to become a party to the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives. (In January 2003, Singapore became a party to that Convention. Singapore is now a party to six of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.)


In September, Singapore signed a declaration outlining its participation as a pilot port in the US Container Security Initiative; implementation was continuing at the end of the year. The Singapore Parliament also passed legislation effective 1 January 2003 establishing a new strategic trade-controls framework. The framework establishes controls over items exported from or transshipped/transiting through Singapore that are related to weapons of mass destruction but places the burden of reporting on shippers.

There were no incidents of international or domestic terrorism in Singapore in 2002, but authorities continued their investigation of the local JI network, a regional terrorist organization that has ties to al-Qaida. Since December 2001, Singapore authorities have detained 36 individuals for suspected involvement in the JI. Thirty-one of those individuals were placed under renewable two-year detention orders. Singapore authorities have publicly provided details of the allegations against those arrested, including publishing in January 2003 a white paper on terrorism. The documents indicate that 11 of the detainees were reported to have received training at al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan. Those arrested reportedly were involved in plots to attack Singaporean official and civilian targets as well as citizens of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Israel in Singapore.

## Singapore: Success Against Terrorism in Southeast Asia



*Photos of water pipeline and maps showing route of pipeline, processed from materials recovered from Ab Wahab bin Ahmad.*



*Ab Wahab bin Ahmad*

Twice in eight months, the Government of Singapore rounded up suspected terrorists intent on carrying out deadly attacks. With superb law-enforcement skill and effective cooperation with other nations, Singapore's two successful operations doubtless saved lives and prevented incalculable physical damage.

The first roundup occurred in December 2001, when 13 suspected members of the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya (JI) were detained. They were plotting to attack a variety of targets, including the US Embassy and other embassies, as well as US companies. Investigators also discovered evidence of other plans to strike US Navy vessels, a subway station used by US military personnel, and Singaporean targets.

After months of intense investigations, the second roundup took place in August 2002. Eighteen additional JI suspects were detained by Singapore's Internal Security Department (ISD) and accused of activities in support of the planned attacks on the Ministry of Defense, a US ship, water pipelines, a bar frequented by US service personnel, and other targets. Seventeen of these suspects were JI members; the other was a Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) member. "These latest arrests have seriously disrupted the JI network in Singapore," according to Singapore's Ministry of Home Affairs.


Jemaah Islamiya, a terrorist organization with ties to al-Qaida, has cells throughout Southeast Asia. Indonesian authorities linked it to the bombing in Bali, which took the lives of almost 200 Indonesians and foreign tourists. According to reports released by the Singaporean authorities, several of those arrested in the second roundup had attended al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan and MILF training camps in Mindanao. Before leaving for camps, JI leaders would conduct ideological and physical training sessions to prepare members for their trips.

Singapore officials said that members conducted reconnaissance of selected targets in Singapore, acting on orders from the JI leaders arrested in December. Some of the arrested members were found with evidence of their surveillance activities, including maps, drawings, reconnaissance reports, photographs, and video recordings.

The members had devised elaborate schemes to conduct surveillance. For instance, Ab Wahab bin Ahmad (Wahab) was a magazine deliveryman whose route included the Singapore Ministry of Defense. He allowed Mohd Aslam bin Yar Ali Khan (Aslam), a more senior JI operative, to deliver magazines on his behalf so that Aslam could personally conduct surveillance of the facility. This gave Aslam the opportunity to videotape the perimeter and entrances to the building. Notes and written summaries of the videos were later recovered in a raid on Wahab's home.

The Singapore Government reported that JI members also cased other targets for possible attack, including water pipelines, the Changi Airport, an air-traffic-control radar site, petrochemical facilities, and various Western and other interests in Singapore.

## Singapore: Success Against Terrorism in Southeast Asia (continued)



*Photographs of Bukit Panjang Service Reservoir, among evidence recovered from Ab Wahab bin Ahmad.*



*Suspected Jemaah Islamiya members, arrested in August 2002.*

Of the 18 men detained in August, most were employed in everyday jobs as deliverymen, dispatch clerks, drivers, butchers, and used-car salesmen. Only two were unemployed. About half had served full time in the National Service and were on reserve duty at the time they were arrested. According to the Singapore Government, most of the JI members in custody saw no contradiction between living in a peaceful multiracial society and pledging their allegiance to militant groups that could potentially harm other Singaporeans, including fellow Muslims whom they claimed to represent. During interviews by the ISD, the members revealed that they were so committed to pursuing jihad that they were willing to put fellow Muslims at risk to accomplish their goals.

The JI cell in Singapore was an important fundraiser for regional JI groups. It would impose a tax on its members to raise funds. In the early 1990s, members were required to give two percent of their monthly salaries; this was later increased to five percent. According to Singaporean authorities, half of the funds raised went to the Singapore cell, which used the money to fund its members' expenditures and provide for needy JI families. Money also was sent to members abroad for military training. The other half of the money raised was split between the Indonesian and Malaysian branches of JI.

Home Affairs Minister Wong Kan Seng emphasized the complex organizational structure of JI and noted the need for continued regional cooperation to counter the terrorism threat from the group. Referring to the second roundup of suspects, Mr. Wong said, "This particular group in JI is not confined to Singapore but is connected to the JI organization in Malaysia and Indonesia and some in the Philippines. We also found that some Singaporeans were involved or into training in the Moro Islamic Liberation Front training camps. That is a concern that this network is not found only in Singapore but also in the region." Some members of the Singapore organization are believed to be hiding out in neighboring countries, and it is possible that they may yet carry out their bombing plans.

The Singaporean authorities had arrested 31 JI members by the end of 2002 and provided information instrumental to the detention of others in neighboring countries. On 2 February 2003, Indonesian authorities arrested Singaporean Mas Selamat Kastari, whom Singapore has identified as the chief of the JI's Singapore operations; Indonesian authorities attributed the arrest to a tipoff received from Singapore. With each successive arrest, Singapore is rooting out the terrorist threat in its backyard and making it tougher for JI to operate in the rest of the region.

The Singapore Government notes, however, that the other regional JI cells continue to threaten security in Southeast Asia. In his opening address to Parliament on 25 March 2002, President Nathan stated, "The Jemaah Islamiya terrorist group is a stark reminder that these are not faraway problems, but immediate threats to us here and now." Singaporean authorities, who have warned that additional arrests may occur as they continue their investigations, are committed to cooperating with the security agencies of neighboring countries to eliminate the group entirely from the region.

## Taiwan

Taiwan has supported the global war on terrorism and taken steps to improve its counterterrorism laws and regulations. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Taiwan was quick to implement fully all increased security requirements requested by the US Transportation Security Administration and to increase security for the American Institute on Taiwan. In May 2002, Taiwan Minister of Economic Affairs Lin Yi-Fu said during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, that Taiwan fully supports the ongoing global war on terrorism. In October, President Chen Shui-Bian condemned the terrorist bombing in Bali and said that Taiwan would offer assistance to Indonesia.

Although Taiwan currently has no antiterrorism laws, the Taiwan Executive Yuan in October ordered the Ministry of Justice to draft a special antiterrorism law. The new law, if enacted, would simplify the process of freezing financial accounts and enhance the use of compulsory measures such as a prosecutor's power to search, detain, and summon suspects and witnesses. At the end of the year, the draft of the antiterrorism law had undergone an extensive interagency review process coordinated by the Executive Yuan and awaited consideration by the Legislative Yuan.

(In January 2003, the Legislative Yuan passed an enhanced anti-money-laundering law, which lowers the threshold of amounts required to report, raises the penalties for noncompliance, and allows the Government to seize suspicious bank accounts.) Even before the passage of this legislation, the Ministries of Finance and Justice had followed up on requests by the United States to check suspicious bank accounts in Taiwan.

## Thailand

Thailand continued to cooperate closely with the United States on counterterrorism, intelligence, and

law-enforcement matters, and the Government enhanced its counterterrorism cooperation with its neighbors. During the year, Thailand indicated its intent to join the Container Security Initiative and began active negotiations with US Customs. In 2002, Thailand began discussions with the United States on the possible introduction of a border-security system called the Terrorist Interdiction Program. Regionally, Thailand joined a counterterrorism agreement—initially signed by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia—that establishes a framework for cooperation and inter-operability of procedures for handling border and security incidents. Thailand also signed a bilateral counterterrorism cooperation agreement with Australia. It signed an ASEAN-sponsored Declaration of Cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism and joined the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference counterterrorism declaration. It reaffirmed its commitment to accede to the remaining seven of 12 UN antiterrorism conventions.

On terrorism finance, Thailand established an interagency financial crimes group to coordinate CT finance policy. It submitted CT finance revisions to its Anti-Money-Laundering Act and the penal code to Parliament in the fall, where they were awaiting adoption at the end of the year. Thailand has been a strong supporter of US and other efforts to designate terrorists and terrorist entities at the UN Sanctions Committee. Thailand is a party to four of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Thailand served as host to four US-Thai bilateral military exercises with significant counterterrorism components, providing valuable training to US forces and reinforcing Thai capabilities to respond to potential terrorist incidents in Thailand. In 2002, there were no incidents of terrorism in Thailand.



## Eurasia Overview

*"The member nations of the Coalition must continue their concerted action to deny safehaven to terrorists; to destroy their financial, logistical, communications, and other operational networks; and to bring terrorists to justice."*

*Joint statement on counterterrorism cooperation  
US President George W. Bush and Russian  
President Vladimir V. Putin, 24 May 2002*

Central Asia, which for years had suffered from Afghanistan-based extremism, saw no significant terrorist activity in 2002. The operations of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a group on the US Foreign Terrorist Organization list that seeks to overthrow the Uzbekistani Government and create an Islamic state, were seriously disrupted when some of its leaders and many of its members were killed in Afghanistan fighting with the Taliban against Coalition forces. Russia, however, continued to be the target of terrorist attacks in 2002, most of which were carried out by extremists fighting in Chechnya. The most significant was the 23 October takeover of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow, where some 40 extremists held 800 theatergoers hostage and threatened to blow up the theater.

States in the region continued to provide overflight and temporary basing rights; share law-enforcement and intelligence information; and identify, monitor, and apprehend al-Qaida members and other terrorists. Countries in the region also took diplomatic and political steps to contribute to the international struggle against terrorism, such as becoming party to some or all of the 12 United Nations international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Enhancing regional counterterrorism cooperation has been a priority for the United States. Toward that end, the US Department of State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism hosted the Fourth Annual Counterterrorism Conference for Central Asia and the Caucasus in Ankara in June 2002. Counterterrorism officials from Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as observers from Russia,

Turkey, Afghanistan, China, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), discussed issues related to human rights, the rule of law, and combating terrorist financing. Throughout the conference, and in other bilateral and multilateral fora, the United States stressed that effective counterterrorism is impossible without respect for human rights, and that the rule of law is a formidable and essential weapon in the fight against al-Qaida and other international terrorist organizations. A policy exercise held on the last day of the conference helped reinforce key tenets of effective counterterrorism policy and operations.

The United States continues to work with the OSCE and other regional organizations to strengthen policing capability, encourage improved regional cooperation, and combat terrorist financing. The OSCE held a meeting on terrorist-financing issues in Prague in May, which addressed the 40 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations on money laundering and how to strengthen states' capabilities to implement these standards. Following the conference, OSCE participating states adopted a US proposal committing each state to complete the FATF self-assessment exercise by 1 September 2002, and virtually all of them did so by that date. In cooperation with the UN Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention, the OSCE is conducting training seminars in Central Asia on money- laundering and terrorist-financing issues to strengthen states' abilities to prevent terrorist organizations from obtaining access to funds. The United States was the major contributor to this project.

The European Union (EU) has also been deeply involved with both Russia and the OSCE in an effort to enhance counterterrorism cooperation throughout the region. At the November 2002 Summit, the EU and Russia reached agreement on a far-reaching framework for the fight against terrorism through more intensified cooperation. The framework sets out the shared values and

commitments in the fight against terrorism and identifies a series of specific areas for future EU-Russia cooperation. EU-OSCE cooperation also has advanced through close contact between the Personal Representative on Counter Terrorism of the OSCE and the Chairman of the OSCE. The objective is to maximize the abilities of both organizations to counter terrorism in the region, especially in Central Asia.

In August, the United States designated the terrorist group East Turkistan Islamic Movement under Executive Order 13224 on terrorist financing. The organization had been involved in several terrorist acts in eastern China, and some of its members had been caught trying to carry out an attack against US Embassies in Central Asia.

## **Azerbaijan**

In 2002, Azerbaijan continued to be a staunch supporter of the United States in the war against terrorism. Since September 11, 2001, Azerbaijan has added to an already strong record of cooperation with the United States, rendering dozens of foreign citizens with suspected ties to terrorists. Azerbaijan's border guards have increased their patrols of the southern border with Iran, and the aviation department has increased security at Baku's Bina Airport as well as implemented recommendations of the international civil aviation organization on aviation security.

While Azerbaijan had previously been a route for international mujahidin with ties to terrorist organizations seeking to move men, money, and materiel throughout the Caucasus, Baku stepped up its interdiction efforts in 2002 and has had some success in suppressing these activities. Azerbaijan has taken steps to combat terrorist-related funding by distributing lists of suspected terrorist groups and individuals to local banks. In November, a platoon of Azerbaijani soldiers joined the Turkish peacekeeping contingent in Afghanistan.

On 25 January, President Bush waived section 907 of the Freedom Support Act for 2002, thereby

lifting restrictions on US assistance to the Government of Azerbaijan. The waiver cleared the way for the United States to deepen its cooperation with Azerbaijan in fighting terrorism and in impeding the movement of terrorists into the South Caucasus. The waiver also provided a foundation to deepen security cooperation with Azerbaijan on a common antiterrorist agenda.

Azerbaijan has also provided strong political support to the United States and to the global Coalition against terrorism. In May, President Aliyev instructed his government to implement UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1368, 1373, and 1377. The Government also approved changes to the criminal code that increased the maximum penalty for acts of terrorism from 15 years to life imprisonment and added a provision making the financing of terrorist activities a crime. In October, Baku hosted a US-sponsored seminar on money laundering and financial crimes, including terrorist financing. The United States is working with the Government of Azerbaijan to develop a plan to combat financial crimes.

In April, the Justice Ministry revoked the registrations of two Islamic charities—the Kuwait Fund for the Sick and the Qatar Humanitarian Organization—for activities against Azerbaijan's national interests. In November, Azerbaijan froze the bank accounts of locally registered Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) pursuant to UNSCR 1373. The Justice Ministry subsequently revoked BIF's registration.

In April, the Government sentenced six members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an extremist political movement that wants to establish a borderless, theocratic caliphate throughout the entire Muslim world, to up to seven years in prison for attempted terrorist activities. In May, Azerbaijan convicted seven Azerbaijani citizens who had received military and other training in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge and who had intended to fight in Chechnya. Four received suspended sentences, and the others were

sentenced to four to five years in prison. Members of Jayshullah, an indigenous terrorist group, who were arrested in 2000 and tried in 2001 for planning an attack against the US Embassy, remained in prison.

Azerbaijan is a party to eight of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## Georgia

Georgian officials, including the President, issued repeated statements condemning terrorism throughout 2002 and supported the United States and global Coalition against terrorism in international fora, in word and deed.

The United States has encouraged Georgia and Russia to work together to promote border security within their respective territories and to find negotiated, political solutions to their many disagreements. The presence in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge of third-country international terrorists with links to al-Qaida and significant numbers of Chechen fighters, nevertheless, accounted for the most significant Georgian counterterrorism issue of 2002.

In 2002, the United States strongly urged Georgia to regain control of the Pankisi Gorge where third-country terrorists with links to al-Qaida had established themselves. These extremists threatened Georgia's security and stability, as well as Russia's.

Georgia has deployed troops from the Ministries of State Security and Interior into the Pankisi Gorge to establish checkpoints and root out Chechen fighters and criminal and international terrorist elements. The efforts signal Georgia's commitment to restoring Georgian authority in the Pankisi Gorge and dealing seriously with international terrorists linked to al-Qaida.

The United States assisted Georgia in addressing this internal-security problem through assistance and cooperative programs, including the



*Masked Georgian soldiers participate in an anticrime operation, 30 August 2002, in the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia, where hundreds of Chechen rebels are located.*

four-phase Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP). The program is intended to help the Government of Georgia eliminate terrorists, secure its borders, reassert central control over its territory, and deny use of its territory to foreign militants and international terrorists. Headquarters and staff training began in late May 2002 with 120 students receiving classroom instruction. In early June, additional staff training for the Land Forces Command began and ended with a successful command-post exercise. By September, US trainers had begun conducting unit-level tactical military training of Georgia's Ministry of Defense and other security forces to strengthen Georgia's ability to fight terrorism, control its borders, and increase internal security. In December, the first Georgian battalion completed GTEP training.

In July, Georgia extradited Adam Dekkushev to Russia for his suspected involvement in the bombing of apartment buildings in Moscow and Volgograd in 1999, blasts that resulted in approximately 300 deaths and for which no one has yet been convicted. A second suspect in the same bombings, Russian citizen Yusef Krymshamkhalov, was extradited to Russia in December. In October, Georgia extradited five individuals accused of terrorism and/or terrorist-related activities to the Russian Federation. They

were among 13 Chechen fighters captured by Georgian authorities along the Russian-Georgian border in August. Georgia determined that two of those captured were Georgian nationals whom it will not extradite to Russia. Of the remaining six, three have pending Georgian court appeals on their extradition to Russia. Before extraditing the other three, Georgia has requested further documentation from Russia.

In 2002, Georgia became a party to the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Georgia is now a party to six of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## **Kazakhstan**

The Government of Kazakhstan continued to be outspoken and supportive in the fight against terrorism. In 2002, President Nazarbayev and senior Government officials have consistently spoken out against terrorism and have taken concrete action to support the international Coalition against terrorism.

In July, the Government signed an agreement to use Almaty Airport as an alternative airfield for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Kazakhstan has allowed more than 800 US overflights in support of OEF since December 2001.

When the US Embassy has requested increased protection, the Government of Kazakhstan has repeatedly deployed rapid-reaction antiterrorist teams and elite police units to respond to changing security circumstances at US Government facilities. It has also continued to be responsive to requests to increase security at major oil facilities with US private investment.

In 2002, Kazakhstan became a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Bombings; Kazakhstan is now a party to 11 of the 12 international terrorism conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. The 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear

Material is in the process of being ratified, undergoing the second round of interagency review. On 27 February, after approval by the Parliament, President Nazarbayev signed into law the two remaining conventions—the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf.

Kazakhstan has also strengthened its antiterrorism legislation. In February, the Government adopted tougher penalties and more precise definitions of terrorist acts. In October, the National Bank issued orders to freeze the assets belonging to an individual identified on the Executive Order 13224 terrorist asset-freeze list who had held shares in a local bank.

## **Kyrgyz Republic**

Since September 11, 2001, President Akayev has repeatedly demonstrated his strong support for the war against terrorism. Following the September 11 events, the Kyrgyz Government immediately offered assistance and allowed US and Coalition combat and support aircraft to operate from Ganci airbase, located at Manas International Airport in Bishkek.

(On 3 January 2003, the Legislative Assembly [lower house of Parliament] ratified the International Convention Against Terrorist Financing and forwarded it to the People's Representative Assembly [upper house of Parliament] for ratification. The International Relations Committee of the People's Representative Assembly recommended the Convention for ratification. The next People's Representative Assembly session was to begin on 1 March 2003, and ratification was to have been on its agenda.) The Kyrgyz Republic is a party to six of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

The Kyrgyz Republic is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, launched in June 2001 and grouping China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. President Akayev has also announced his country's support for China's stand against the terrorist forces of the East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM), which the United States has designated pursuant to Executive Order 13224. The ETIM was responsible for planning and executing a series of terrorist acts within and outside China.

The Kyrgyz Government has been working toward creating a new Drug Control Agency that is designed to stifle cross-border shipments of drugs and arms related to terrorism.

Several thousand members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an extremist political movement that wants to establish a borderless, theocratic caliphate throughout the entire Muslim world, are present in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Hizb ut-Tahrir pamphlets, filled with anti-US propaganda, have been distributed throughout the southern region of the country and even appeared in Bishkek. There is no evidence to date that Hizb ut-Tahrir has committed any terrorist acts, but the group is clearly sympathetic to Islamist extremist objectives.

## Russia

The past year saw a continuation of the US-Russian counterterrorism cooperation that emerged following the attacks of September 11, 2001.

At the Presidential Summit in Moscow in May 2002, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed to expand the scope of the United States-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan, co-chaired by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov. It is now known as the US-Russia Working Group on Counterterrorism. This interagency working group met for the first time under its expanded mandate on 26 July 2002 in Annapolis, Maryland, and again in Moscow on 22-23 January 2003.

But even as the United States and Russia cooperated in the global war on terrorism on all fronts in 2002, Russia faced terrorist acts that struck at the heart of its national security.

Russia continued to be subject to a number of terrorist events in 2002, many connected to the ongoing insurgency and instability in Chechnya. The continuing conflict, which began in late summer 1999, has been characterized by widespread destruction, displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians, and human rights abuses by Russian servicemen and various rebel factions. At least three rebel factions, which consist of both Chechen and foreign—predominantly Arabic—mujahidin fighters, are connected to international Islamic terrorists and have used terrorist methods. (They have been designated, in 2003, as terrorist organizations for asset freeze under Executive Order 13224.) Russian forces have continued to conduct operations against Chechen fighters but also draw heavy criticism over credible reports of human rights violations.

Extremist groups and individuals seeking to create an independent Islamic state in the north Caucasus were responsible for dozens of terrorist attacks in 2002. Russian citizens were the victims



*A rescue worker looks at the huge crater left after a bomb destroyed the government headquarters in Chechnya, killing at least 55 persons and wounding 123 on 28 December 2002.*



## Terrorist Kidnapping

Terrorists have long used kidnapping as a tactic to extort money and to advance their political aims.

In Latin America, the Marxist terrorist groups National Liberation Army in Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia conduct hundreds of kidnappings for ransom, often targeting foreign employees of large corporations, especially those in the petroleum industry. During the 1980s, members of the Lebanon-based Hizballah terrorist group were responsible for kidnapping dozens of US and other citizens from Western countries. The Abu Sayyaf Group is responsible for numerous kidnappings in the Philippines and the subsequent murder of some of the hostages. The group uses this terrorist tactic mainly for financial profit.

There is no clear trend. The frequency of kidnappings and hostage takings has waxed and waned over the years.

In October 2002, Chechen terrorists stormed a theater in Moscow and held more than 800 persons hostage, believed to be the largest incident of hostage taking. The terrorists rigged the theater and themselves with explosives, threatening to kill themselves and the hostages by blowing up the theater if their demands were not met. The Government of Russia refused to accede to the terrorists' demands. Faced with an extremely difficult dilemma, Russia launched an assault on the theater using a gas to immobilize the terrorists. All the hostage takers were killed in the raid—and prevented from detonating their explosives. Unfortunately, 129 hostages died during the assault from the effects of the gas.

For its part, the United States does not make concessions to terrorists. US Government policy is to deny hostage takers the benefits of ransom, prisoner releases, policy changes, or other acts of concession.



*Moscow police wait outside of the theater that Chechen terrorists had stormed, taking some 800 persons hostage, 23 October 2002.*

of frequent attacks with command-detonated mines, including one that killed 36 persons, 12 of them children, and wounded over 100 others attending a Memorial Day parade in Kaspiisk, Dagestan.

But Russia's most serious terrorist event of 2002 occurred on 23 October when more than 40 armed militants took hostage 800 Moscow theatergoers to demand an immediate end to all Russian security operations in Chechnya. More than 120 of the hostages—including one US citizen (and a US Legal Permanent Resident)—died from a narcotic gas used during the rescue operation.

The terrorists, who included several female suicide bombers wearing explosive "suicide" vests, placed several mines throughout the theater and threatened to begin killing the hostages unless their demands were met. The leader of the attack was identified by the Chechen mujahidin news agency Kavkaz Tsentr, and later by Russian news agencies, as Movsar Barayev, commander of the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) of the Chechen State Defense Committee (Majlis al-Shura). On 24 October, the Arabic news agency Al-Jazirah identified the group as the previously unknown "Sabotage and Military Surveillance Group of the 'Riyadh al-Salikhin' Martyrs" (a.k.a.



*Russian singer Iosif Kobson (L) and his assistant help a woman and her three daughters flee from the Moscow theatre, where they were held by Chechen rebels.*

the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs). A group member said in a recorded statement, “Our demands are stopping the war and withdrawal of Russian forces. We are implementing the operation by order of the military commander of the Chechen Republic.” These two groups—Special Purpose Islamic Regiment and Sabotage and Military Surveillance Group of the ‘Riyadh al-Salikhin’ Martyrs—were among the three that the US Government designated as terrorist groups for asset freeze.

On 24 October, the Government of Russia immediately drafted and introduced UNSCR 1440 condemning the Moscow hostage taking as a terrorist act and urging all states, in accordance with their obligations under UNSCR 1373 (2001), to cooperate with Russian authorities in finding and bringing to justice the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of this terrorist attack. The resolution was unanimously adopted the same day.

On 1 November, Chechen rebel commander Shamil Basayev, in a letter to Kavkaz-Tsentr, publicly claimed full responsibility for organizing the attack. Basayev said that the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSMB) had been under his

direct command and that Chechen President Maskhadov had no prior knowledge of the event. Basayev then publicly resigned his positions as Amir of the Council (Majlis) of Muslims of Chechnya and Dagestan and as the Military Commander of the Islamist International Brigade, saying he would henceforth devote himself completely to the RSMB.

Less than one month later, however, Basayev was once again commanding mujahidin units in Chechnya, according to President Maskhadov’s official news agency, and warned that all “military, industrial, and strategic facilities on Russian territory, to whomever they belong” were legitimate targets for attack. Usama Bin Ladin also acknowledged the Moscow hostage takers in a November 2002 audiotape message, saying to the Russians, “If you were distressed by the killing of your nationals in Moscow, remember ours in Chechnya.”

Throughout 2002, Russia continued to take important steps toward strengthening its participation in the global war on terrorism, particularly by ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. By the end of the year, Russia was a party to 11 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. Before 2002, Russia had signed but not ratified the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. Russian officials were optimistic that official ratification of the 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection would soon occur.

The Government of Russia enacted domestic legislation and executive orders to enable its fight against terrorism in 2002. On 11 January, President Putin signed a decree entitled “On Measures to Implement the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1373 of September 28, 2001” that introduced criminal liability for anyone intentionally providing or collecting assets for terrorist use as well as instructions to relevant agencies on how to seize terrorist assets.

On 11 October, Russia was removed from the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) list of Non-Cooperating Countries and Territories, in part due to the establishment of a Russian financial intelligence unit, the Financial Monitoring Committee. A functioning financial intelligence unit is central to Russia's ability to cooperate internationally to combat money laundering, to its participation in the Egmont Group and FATF, and to track and freeze terrorist assets.

Although the Russia Federation maintains diplomatic relations with the seven states presently on the US Government's State Sponsors of Terrorism list, the Russian Government firmly opposes state-sponsored terrorism and supports international initiatives to combat it. The Government of Russia maintains that its relationships with such states serve as a positive influence that has—or may have—moderated or diminished the support these governments provide for terrorism.

In February, the Federal Security Service hosted an antiterrorism conference in St. Petersburg. They invited representatives from the law-enforcement and intelligence agencies of approximately 40 countries, including the United States.

At the United Nations, Russia circulated a draft General Assembly resolution calling for enhanced cooperation among all components of the UN system in the fight against terrorism. The resolution also noted the interconnection between terrorism, transnational organized crime, and drug trafficking. Russia is using its seat at the new NATO-Russia Council to emphasize counterterrorism cooperation. In December, Russia hosted a NATO-Russia conference on the Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism. At the most recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, held at the same time of the Moscow hostage crisis in October, President Putin's representative, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, said that the Moscow crisis compelled "the countries that were to some extent reluctant to join in this coalition to more actively participate in

combating all signs of terrorism." The APEC summit generated a very strong statement against terrorism, including a decision to monitor the misuse of the Islamic alternative remittance *hawala* system.

In a much publicized statement on 11 September, President Putin asserted what he claimed was Russia's international right to take unilateral military action against Chechen fighters and other terrorists in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge (near the border with Russia) if Georgia did not carry out more active measures against the fighters. He followed his statement with a letter to President Bush, which he copied to the United Nations and world leaders. From 29 July to the end of 2002 there were at least five instances of Russian cross-border aerial bombardment of Georgian territory. During an attack on 23 August—witnessed by OSCE border monitors and confirmed through independent means—Russian bombs claimed the life of a Georgian civilian and wounded seven others.

The US Government has stated its unequivocal opposition to any unilateral military action by Russia inside Georgia and repeated its strong support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It has urged Georgia to address the security problems arising from the presence of Chechen and third-country extremists with connections to al-Qaida in the Pankisi Gorge. The United States has encouraged Georgia and Russia to work together to promote regional security within their respective territories and to find negotiated, political solutions to their many disagreements.

## Tajikistan

The Government of Tajikistan continued to cooperate fully with US antiterrorism efforts throughout 2002.

In March, the Government submitted its report on counterterrorism efforts to the UN Security Council Committee created under UNSCR 1373.

Throughout the year, moreover, the government consistently supported antiterrorist efforts in the United Nations and the OSCE. It was also a signatory to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's June statement and its antiterrorism clauses.

Tajikistan continues to be extremely supportive of and cooperative in the global effort to end terrorism. During 2002, Dushanbe became a party to two international antiterrorist conventions—the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (6 May 2002) and the 1997 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (29 July 2002). The Government of Tajikistan is now party to eight of the 12 international conventions and protocols against terrorism. Dushanbe has indicated its willingness to become a party to the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives. (It should be noted that Tajikistan is a landlocked country, and the remaining two conventions relate to maritime navigation and offshore platforms.)

Tajikistan conducted several significant antiterrorist operations during 2002, including the arrests of a number of suspected terrorists. Additionally, in October and November, Government security forces conducted a large counterterrorist operation in the central portion of the country. The Government had announced in November 2001 its agreement to the basing of US and Coalition troops and aircraft in Tajikistan, and throughout 2002, US and Coalition aircraft were permitted to carry out refueling operations at Dushanbe International Airport. The Ministry of Defense detailed four liaison officers to US Central Command Headquarters in connection with Operation Enduring Freedom.

Tajikistani security authorities, moreover, have stepped up border security and pledged to prevent escape attempts into Tajikistan by Taliban and al-Qaida members. The Government has been open to participating in US Government-supplied antiterrorism training and assistance. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance have also

cooperated with Washington's attempts to trace and freeze terrorist assets and have worked to tighten their financial controls.

Throughout 2002, Dushanbe continued its investigations into a number of incidents of domestic and international terrorism that had occurred in Tajikistan in 2001. In August, the Government announced the formation of a special investigation and prosecution unit to look into the assassinations of a number of high-ranking officials in 2001 and previous years. The effort included the killings of the First Deputy Minister of the Interior, the State Advisor to the President on International Affairs, and the Minister of Culture—as well as the Independence Day suicide bombing (which injured one other person) in September 2001 and the murder of two members of the Baha'i faith in Dushanbe in late 2001. According to public statements by the Deputy State Procurator-General (head of the special unit), arrests were made in several of the cases. The investigations continued. Convictions were obtained in some of the cases, including the murders of the First Deputy Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Culture; in both cases, those convicted received the death penalty.

On 3 November 2002, the Government announced the extradition of 12 members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which the United States has designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization and also has designated pursuant to Executive Order 13224, to Uzbekistan for prosecution. The Tajikistani Ministry of Security captured the suspects during a security sweep, according to a public statement. While the United States currently does not have an extradition treaty with Tajikistan, Dushanbe has officially declared that multilateral instruments such as international conventions against terrorism or the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, when it enters into force internationally, could form a basis for extradition under Tajikistani law. In particular, the Government announced in September that those

arrested in the investigation of the murders of two adherents of the Baha'i faith were found to have links to Iranian-backed terrorist groups.

There were no prosecutions during the year of cases relating directly to terrorism, although several participants in the 1998 coup attempt led by Col. Mahmud Khudoberdiev were convicted on charges that included terrorism. The charges stemmed from their association with Khudoberdiev rather than from involvement in terrorist acts.

## **Ukraine**

The Government of Ukraine supported US antiterrorism efforts throughout 2002. Since the beginning of operations in Afghanistan, Ukraine has allowed more than 5,000 overflights for aircraft participating in Operation Enduring Freedom and provided airlift assets for some Coalition forces participating in the operation. The Government also provided, at Washington's request, light weapons and kits to equip the equivalent of a brigade's worth of Afghan National Army troops. Ukraine has become party to all 12 of the United Nations conventions against terrorism, and it also has adopted legislation bringing it into legal conformity with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards. The Government of Ukraine has agreed to install US Government-funded nuclear portal monitors at 20 border crossings, airports, and ports to detect the transit of nuclear material and is working with us to implement technical upgrades for nuclear plant security. We are also working closely with the Ukrainians to implement a program to upgrade security at institutes whose biological agents could be used to produce weapons. The Ukrainian Rada (parliament) recently passed legislation tightening Ukraine's export-control laws to protect against the proliferation of weapons to rogue states.

President Kuchma has repeatedly made public statements supporting US Government efforts against terrorism. Ukrainian citizens were among the victims of the seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow on 23 October by 40 armed Chechen

extremists. Three Ukrainian citizens were killed in the incident.

## **Uzbekistan**

The Government of Uzbekistan continued its unprecedented support of Coalition efforts in the war on terrorism during 2002. It has continued to make public statements condemning terrorist acts, and it has allowed basing of Coalition forces at Karshi-Khanabad and Termez and overflight by Coalition forces. The Ministry of Defense detailed five liaison officers to US Central Command Headquarters in connection with Operation Enduring Freedom. Tashkent agreed to all US requests to freeze assets of groups linked to terrorism financing.

Uzbekistan has continued to be extremely supportive of and cooperative in the global effort to end terrorism. The Government has continued to participate in US-led initiatives such as the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance Program, border-security and law-enforcement projects funded by the Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, US Customs export-control and border-security programs, and the Defense Department's programs on threat reduction and weapons of mass destruction.

Several thousand members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an extremist political movement that wants to establish a borderless, theocratic caliphate throughout the entire Muslim world, are present in Uzbekistan. Hizb ut-Tahrir pamphlets, full of anti-US propaganda, have been distributed throughout the country. There is no evidence to date that Hizb ut-Tahrir has committed any terrorist acts, but the group is clearly sympathetic to Islamist extremist objectives.

The Government of Uzbekistan continues to go to extraordinary lengths to ensure security, especially during significant national holidays, against terrorist acts. Uzbekistan maintains relatively tight security on its borders and is working with the US





*Uzbek President Islam Karimov and US Central Command Chief Gen. Tommy Franks shake hands after their meeting in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 23 August 2002.*

Government to upgrade its capabilities to detect items of concern related to the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Although no incidents were reported in 2002, Uzbek border guards have detected radioactive shipments on the border in previous years.

Tashkent remains vigilant against potential actions by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, despite the loss of its charismatic leader Juma Namangani and their former sanctuary with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan also plays an active role in the counterterrorism agenda of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, and the United Nations.

Uzbekistan is a party to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## Europe Overview

*"Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction combine modern technology and political or religious fanaticism. If unchecked they will, as September 11 showed us, explode into disorder and chaos."*

*British Prime Minister Tony Blair,  
10 September 2002*

European nations continued to work in close partnership with the United States in the global counterterrorism campaign. In addition to sharing intelligence information and working with the United States on investigations of terrorist groups, European countries forged closer cooperative links with their neighbors. As a result, European authorities arrested a significant number of terrorists, disrupted planning for terrorist attacks, and intercepted funds destined for terrorist organizations.

The United Kingdom continued its close partnership with the United States, redoubling its counterterrorism efforts around the world. UK authorities detained several extremists in the United Kingdom on terrorism-related charges. The United Kingdom aggressively moved to freeze the assets of organizations and persons with terrorist links and to proscribe terrorist groups. The United Kingdom provided significant counterterrorism assistance and training to a number of countries and worked with other countries to investigate the Bali bombings in October 2002.

Italy continued its exemplary work against terrorism, disrupting suspected terrorist cells and capturing al-Qaida suspects in Milan and elsewhere who were providing support to terrorist operations and planning attacks. An Italian court sentenced members of the Tunisian Combatant Group to prison terms, marking the first conviction of al-Qaida associates in Europe since 11 September 2001. Members of the New Red Brigades, an offshoot of the once-powerful entity that disrupted Italian life in the 1970s, are suspected of the murder of an adviser to the

Italian Government. Other terrorist groups also carried out several small-scale attacks.

Spain's vigorous investigation of extremist groups resulted in the detention of a significant number of terrorist suspects, including two individuals believed to be financiers for the al-Qaida network. Spanish police, working with French counterparts, also continued to score substantial successes against the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) terrorist organization, arresting two of the group's senior leaders. Spanish and French authorities dealt a strong blow against the First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) when they conducted a joint investigation that resulted in the arrest of over 20 GRAPO suspects. French investigators probed terrorist attacks that killed at least 20 French citizens in Tunisia, Pakistan, and Indonesia.

Cooperation among European law-enforcement authorities was a feature of many successes during the past year. For example, in addition to joint efforts between France and Spain against ETA and GRAPO, France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and others were involved in investigations of "shoe bomber" Richard Reid.

Officials in Germany continued their extensive investigation of extremists associated with the al-Qaida Hamburg cell that supported the September 11 hijackers. Germany also placed several high-profile terrorists on trial, including a member of the Hamburg cell and four North Africans accused of plotting to attack the Strasbourg Christmas market in 2000. Twenty German citizens fell victim to terrorist attacks in Djerba, Tunisia, and in Bali, Indonesia.

Turkey arrested a number of individuals with ties to al-Qaida and continued to fight dangerous domestic terrorist groups. For the first time, Greece arrested members of Revolutionary Organization 17 November, marking significant progress against a domestic terrorism problem. The arrests

appeared to have begun the unraveling and dismantling of one of Europe's oldest terrorist groups.

The countries of southeast Europe have actively supported the international Coalition against terrorism. Albania and Bulgaria have extended blanket landing and overflight clearances. Along with Croatia, they have also contributed troops to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and weapons and ammunition to the Afghan National Army. Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina have shut down nongovernmental organizations with links to terrorist networks and frozen terrorist assets, and the Bosnian Government arrested and transferred to US control several terrorist suspects accused of planning an attack against the US Embassy in Sarajevo.

Denmark also made noteworthy contributions to the war on terrorism. On the economic front under its European Union (EU) Presidency leadership, in forging a workable EU Clearinghouse they froze assets of terrorist groups, even those not taken to the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267 Sanctions Committee. On the military front, they continued their commitment to Operation Enduring Freedom through the Danish-Norwegian-Dutch F-16 contingent at Manas Airbase.

Heads of State and government met at the Prague Summit in November to endorse NATO's commitment to develop capabilities to meet new challenges such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

## **Albania**

Despite its limited resources, Albania has provided considerable support on counterterrorism. Albania supported US and international counterterrorist initiatives by extending blanket landing and overflight clearances for Operation Enduring

Freedom; providing commando troops to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and weapons to the Afghan National Army; and adopting legislation to coordinate the counterterrorism efforts of its police, military, intelligence service, and Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs. Albania also joined international efforts to fight terrorism by signing agreements with Germany to repatriate illegal immigrants and with Romania to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. Albania had some success in implementing measures at its major ports to combat illegal trafficking.

Tirana took measures to freeze terrorist assets and shut down nongovernmental organizations suspected of international extremist activity and detained or expelled individuals suspected of having links to terrorism. Albania also provided ongoing close cooperation to the United States in sharing information and investigating terrorist-related groups and activities. Institutional weaknesses, corruption, organized crime, and difficult terrain continued to hamper Albania's ability to carry out counterterrorism initiatives, however. Efforts to strengthen Albania's money-laundering legislation in May did not clarify or increase the scope of the laws in 2002, but Parliament expects to pass improved legislation, including specific terrorist-financing provisions, in 2003.

The aftershocks of the Chechen hostage crisis at the Moscow Theater in Russia reached Albania. At the Russian Government's request, Albania denied entry to Chechen delegates who tried to attend the Transnational Radical Party Congress, which supports Chechen independence. Although a previously unknown Islamic terrorist group, "Allah's Martyrs," threatened to disrupt the Congress, the Government stepped up security measures, and the Congress concluded peacefully.

Albania is a party to 11 of the 12 UN international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## Belgium

The Belgian Government has cooperated with US counterterrorism efforts on several levels. Brussels was timely and proactive in sharing information with the United States regarding terrorist threats to US citizens or facilities. Belgium's Financial Intelligence Unit provided the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Unit with information on individuals and entities with suspected ties to terrorist groups. The Belgian General Intelligence and Security Service also cooperated closely with US authorities.

Belgian authorities are continuing their investigations of several individuals arrested in 2001 who are of interest to the United States. Authorities are examining Richard Reid's activities and associates in Belgium, particularly in light of Reid's stay at a Brussels hotel shortly before he attempted to ignite his shoe bomb while on American Airlines Flight 63 in December 2001. Nizar Trabelsi, a Tunisian national arrested by Belgian authorities in September 2001 for his involvement with a plot to bomb the US Embassy in Paris, claimed in June 2002 that his plan was to attack Kleine Brogel airbase in Belgium. Authorities have nearly completed the investigation of Tarek Maaroufi—a Tunisian-born Belgian national arrested in December 2001 for allegedly providing forged passports to the two assassins of Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud.

Belgian authorities have been working on several initiatives to improve the country's counterterrorism capabilities. In May 2002, the Government created the Office of the Federal Prosecutor, which has the potential of becoming a centralized point of contact for counterterrorism cooperation with other countries. Before the September 11 attacks, Belgium had established an Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU) within the federal police to centralize domestic investigations of terrorism-related activity. While the ATU was not given formal jurisdiction over terrorism-related cases, it works closely with local police.

Parliament passed legislation expanding the range of investigative measures available to police and

was to consider a draft bill that would enhance the Government's ability to combat terrorism. The bill defines and outlaws membership in, or support for, a terrorist organization. Additional pieces of legislation aimed at enhancing the capabilities of the intelligence service to track terrorist suspects and increasing the access of counterterrorism officials to information gathered by independent investigative magistrates were also being drafted.

Belgium is a party to six of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. Belgium has frozen the assets of individuals and entities included on the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list of individuals as being associated with Usama Bin Ladin, members of al-Qaida, and members of the Taliban. Nonetheless, because the Government lacks the legal authority to do so, Belgium has not fulfilled the broader obligations of UNSCR 1373, which requires nations to freeze the financial assets of terrorists.

## Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has taken a strong stance against terrorism and condemned acts of international terrorism. Bosnia is a party to seven of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and has initiated procedures to ratify four additional ones.

In early 2002, BiH authorities arrested and transferred to US control several individuals suspected of planning an attack on the US Embassy in Sarajevo. In October, Stabilization Force (SFOR) detained an individual linked to al-Qaida for conducting surveillance of SFOR personnel and facilities and for possessing a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. (The suspect was turned over to Bosnian Federation authorities in late January 2003, who released him on bail. The Federation Government filed charges against him for illegal weapons possession in February 2003.)

In accordance with UNSCRs 1267 and 1373, the Government also froze the assets and prohibited future transactions of several Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, and the Global Relief Fund, which have direct links to al-Qaida and Usama Bin Ladin. Documents seized from the offices of the BIF link its leader directly to Usama Bin Ladin. Bosnian cooperation with US law enforcement, including the testimony of BiH officials, supported successful prosecution of the BIF leader in US Federal Court.

The Government has continued to investigate the role of six former Bosnian Federation officials suspected of operating a terrorist-training camp in BiH with Iran in the mid-1990s. Criticism by nationalist Bosnian Muslim politicians, particularly in the runup to October's general elections, appears to have made some officials hesitant to pursue this case and other high-profile counterterrorism actions, however. The formation of nationalist governments at the state, entity, and cantonal levels may adversely affect future cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

The Bosnian Government introduced measures to address some of the administrative and legal challenges it faces in combating terrorism. The Government strengthened its border and financial controls, created a unified Federation intelligence service, and created Bosnia's first national identity card. (The High Representative's imposition of a new state-level criminal code and criminal procedure code in January 2003 reinforced the criminal justice system, including specific provisions aimed at terrorism.) Several additional pieces of antiterrorism legislation remain pending before parliament, however. As of October 2002, the State Border System had assumed coverage over 100 percent of Bosnia's borders and all operating international airports. Since introducing tighter immigration controls, authorities have reduced illegal immigration via Sarajevo Airport by an estimated 90 percent. The State Information and Protection Agency, whose mission includes

combating terrorism, illegal trafficking, organized crime, and smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, thus far has been ineffective because it lacks authority and resources.

## France

France has provided outstanding military, judicial, and law-enforcement support to the war against terrorism. France made a significant military contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom, including some 4,200 military personnel supporting operations in Afghanistan. The Charles de Gaulle carrier battle group flew more than 2,000 air reconnaissance, strike, and electronic warfare missions over Afghanistan. France provided close air support to US and Coalition forces during Operation Anaconda.

French investigators cooperated in a joint investigation with the FBI of Richard Reid, the would-be "shoe bomber." In the 30-day period after Reid's arrest in December 2001, the FBI and the Paris Criminal Brigade maintained often twice-daily contact with US authorities and provided information that proved critical to building the criminal case against Reid. French authorities have continued aggressively to pursue leads related to the Reid case.

The French Government reached a compromise agreement with the United States to provide evidence gathered in the Zacarias Moussaoui case, despite domestic criticism.

The French judiciary continued to pursue domestic terrorism cases vigorously. A French court in October convicted and sentenced two Islamist terrorists to life in prison for their roles in a series of bombings of the Paris subway in 1995 that killed eight persons and wounded more than 200. In October, the Justice Ministry decided to add a fifth investigative magistrate to its specialized team of antiterrorist judges.



In November, French authorities arrested Slimane Khalfaoui, who is likely associated with the Meliani cell, a group of five individuals arrested in December 2000 and April 2001 for allegedly planning to attack the cathedral square in Strasbourg, France. Khalfaoui also is suspected of ties to Ahmad Ressay—the Algerian arrested in December 1999 at the US-Canadian border in an alleged plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport—and Rabah Kadri, an Islamic radical arrested in the United Kingdom for a plot to attack the London subway.

France continued to cooperate with Spain in dismantling Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), the Basque terrorist organization. In November, both countries signed a protocol granting Spanish counterterrorism officials enhanced access to French information obtained from arrested ETA members. In September, two principal ETA leaders, Juan Antonio Olarra and Ainhoa Mugica Goni, were arrested in a joint operation in Bordeaux. Olarra was linked to at least nine murders.

In October, France requested that the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee add two North African terrorist groups operating in France—the Tunisian Combatant Group and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group—to its consolidated list of individuals and entities associated with Usama Bin Ladin, al-Qaida, and the Taliban. The United States subsequently blocked the groups' assets under Executive Order 13224. Despite its generally cooperative stance against terrorism, France opposes listing Hizballah as a terrorist organization. France designates terrorist groups in concert with the EU. The EU has designated the "terrorist wing" of HAMAS but not the group as a whole, citing its political and social role in Lebanon.

France has become a party to 11 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.


Terrorists attacked French interests or citizens several times in 2002. In April, two French citizens were killed in a suicide attack against a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba. In May, a suicide bomber exploded a vehicle alongside a bus in Karachi, killing 14 persons, including 11 French engineers. Terrorists also attacked the Limburg, a French supertanker, off the coast of Yemen in October. The attack resulted in one casualty and caused an oil spill of 90,000 barrels into the Gulf of Aden. Four French nationals were killed and seven wounded in the bombing of a Bali nightclub in October. The Corsican National Liberation Front claimed responsibility for a string of nonlethal bombings in Paris and Marseilles in early May. There were multiple, non-lethal, unclaimed bombings on Corsica in November.

## Germany

Germany is an active and critically important participant in the global Coalition against terrorism. The country's efforts have made a valuable contribution to fighting terrorists inside and outside of German territory.

Several German citizens were killed in terrorist attacks in 2002. In April, 14 German tourists died in a suicide attack against a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba. Six German citizens were killed in the bombing of a Bali nightclub in October.

During 2002, Germany played an important role in both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the UN's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Germany's contribution to OEF included 100 special-forces soldiers; 50 troops manning nuclear, biological, and chemical detection units in Kuwait; and approximately 1,800 personnel in a naval task force off the Horn of Africa. Germany reinforced ISAF's capabilities with approximately 1,300 troops, and German troop levels will



*Courtroom sketch of Mounir el Motassadeq, on trial 22 October 2002, in Hamburg, Germany, for allegedly aiding the Hamburg terrorist cell involved in the September 11 attacks.*

increase to approximately 2,500 in connection with the undertaking by Germany and the Netherlands in December to assume leadership of ISAF in February 2003.

Germany has taken a lead role in Afghanistan's reconstruction through humanitarian and development assistance. German personnel helped train and equip a new Afghan police force, and Germany contributed 10 million Euros to the force.

German law-enforcement officials arrested several suspected terrorists. In October, authorities arrested Abdelghani Mzoudi for allegedly supporting the al-Qaida cell in Hamburg involved in the 11 September 2001 attacks. Mounir el Motassadeq, a Moroccan national who was arrested in November 2001 for his alleged

membership in the Hamburg cell, went on trial, and it was continuing at year's end. (El Motassadeq was convicted early in 2003.) Five reported members of the al-Qaida-linked al-Tawhid organization were arrested in April and were awaiting indictment. German police thwarted a possible terrorist attack when they arrested a Turkish male and an American female suspected of attempting to bomb the US military base in Heidelberg.

In April, a trial opened in Frankfurt against four Algerians and a Moroccan accused of planning an attack on the Strasbourg Christmas market in December 2000. Some of the defendants claim that their intention was to bomb an empty Jewish synagogue but not kill anyone.

After lengthy negotiations, Germany agreed in November to provide the US Government with evidence in the US trial of French national Zacarias Moussaoui, who was arrested in August 2001 and is suspected of involvement with the 11 September hijackings.

Germany continued to take action against Caliphate State—a radical Turkish Islamic group based in Cologne—which was outlawed in December 2001. In September 2002, German authorities banned another 16 groups linked to Caliphate State and raided the homes and offices of suspected affiliates.

Germany has adopted antiterrorism reforms that should further its ability to fight terrorism. The reforms include bolstering the ability of intelligence officials and police to identify and pursue suspected terrorists, screening visa applicants for terrorists, improving border security, and allowing armed air marshals on German aircraft. Germany broadened its legal code to permit prosecutions of terrorists based outside of the country. Germany also modified its law on associations to remove the "religious privilege" clause, which had allowed extremist organizations to operate freely as religious organizations. The Government has used



*President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell walk past honor guards after arriving in Berlin, Germany, 22 May 2002, at the start of a four-nation trip to Europe where Bush told allies, "we've got to be tough" in the battle against terrorism.*

its new legislation, particularly the strengthened law on associations, to ban violence-prone extremist organizations.

Strong data-privacy protections and high evidentiary standards mean that terrorist investigations may take several months before arrests can be made, although administrative measures under the law of associations can be used to hamper the activities of extremist groups. Strong German opposition to the US death penalty has complicated efforts to forge a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States, but negotiations are continuing.

Germany is a party to 10 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Germany has frozen 30 bank accounts associated with terrorist groups valued at about \$95,000.

In 2002, Germany was chosen to chair the international Financial Action Task Force, which coordinates multilateral efforts on countering terrorist financing and money laundering.

## Greece

Greece made significant progress in 2002 combating domestic terrorism. For the first time, Greek authorities arrested suspected members of Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November), a group regarded as one of Europe's deadliest and most enduring in its nearly three decades of operations. Eighteen suspects were put on trial. The Government seized assets belonging to suspected 17 November members and blocked accounts belonging to other indigenous European terrorist organizations. Police also have been seeking evidence that will allow them to arrest members of Greece's other domestic terrorist groups, including Revolutionary Nuclei, its predecessor Revolutionary Peoples' Struggle, and 1 May. Despite the high-profile arrests, other leftist groups and anarchists conducted low-level attacks and demonstrations in Athens and Thessaloniki. The number of anti-US terrorist attacks—all nonlethal—rose from 2001's low of three to seven.

The Greek Government's record against transnational terrorist groups is mixed. It provided engineering troops to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, stationed a frigate in the Arabian Sea, and deployed two cargo aircraft to Pakistan to support the global Coalition against terrorism. The Government also ordered all banks and credit institutions to search for and block accounts belonging to Usama Bin Ladin, the al-Qaida network, and officials of the former Taliban regime.

Greece is a party to 10 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

The Government continued its security preparations for the 2004 Olympics and views the Games as an opportunity to increase international counterterrorism cooperation. To comply with EU counterterrorism regulations, Greece was expected to pass counterterrorism legislation mandating minimum sentences for terrorists and extending the statute of limitations for terrorist-related homicides from 20 to 30 years, in early 2003. Greece also pledged counterterrorism cooperation with its neighbors Romania and Bulgaria.

## **Hungary**

Hungary has been fully supportive of the war against terrorism and US initiatives against al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations both within its borders and abroad. Throughout 2002, Hungary maintained consistent political support for the war on terror, actively promoting the US position in NATO and the UN, and giving high-level endorsement to our policies.

In support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Hungary developed a package of excess weapons, ammunition, and equipment to be donated to help with our Georgia Train and Equip Program and the Afghan National Army training project. The total amount for Afghanistan was 437 tons, valued at \$3.7 million. The Georgia program was 8 tons, valued at \$25,000. Also in 2002, Hungary offered a military medical unit as part of the International Security Assistance Force peacekeeping force, which was to deploy in early March to Afghanistan.

The Government has affirmed the previous government's commitment to contribute \$1 million in humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, \$300,000 of which was sent in December 2001 and the remainder of which will be delivered in 2003. Also

in 2002, Hungary ratified the last of the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism; it is now a party to all 12. In addition to a December 2001 law on money laundering and terrorist financing which brought it into full compliance with EU and Financial Action Task Force norms, Hungary has developed additional legislation which would go well beyond that of most countries in reporting requirements for financial transactions. This legislation is currently before the Hungarian Parliament.

Cooperation with US and regional officials on export and border controls also continues to be outstanding. In several cases, Hungarian officials have proactively pursued and developed leads and provided extensive cooperation to US officers that have stopped the transshipment of hazardous goods. Hungary is actively improving its technical ability to track and control dangerous materials, and its imminent accession into the EU is accelerating this process. Finally, Hungary has been active in mentoring its neighbors to the south and east and in 2002 offered four training courses or programs on counterterrorism and export controls for Balkan neighbors.

## **Italy**

Italy has been an active partner in the war against terror, providing its only carrier battle group—more than 13 percent of its naval forces—to support combat operations in the North Arabian Sea for use in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The “De La Penne” group (a destroyer and a frigate) relieved the carrier battle group on 15 March 2002. In addition to the 350 Italian troops serving as part of the International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan, the Italian Parliament agreed in October to send some 1,000 soldiers to support OEF and deployed troops shortly thereafter. The Italian Air Force has been flying sorties out of Manas Airbase, and Italian engineers helped repair a runway at Bagram Airfield.



## 17 November Case Study



*Composite photo of Alexandros Yiotopoulos, the ideological leader of 17 November.*

*Savvas Xyros, suspected member of 17 November, is escorted by antiterrorist police officers at Korydallos maximum security prison in Athens, 2 September 2002.*



In 2002, Greek law-enforcement officials were able to dismantle Greece's most notorious and lethal terrorist group, Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November). The organization claimed its first victim, US Station Chief Richard Welch, in 1975. Despite the efforts of successive Greek governments, 17 November operated with impunity for almost 28 years. In that time, the group murdered five US Embassy employees and injured many other official US citizens in Greece, even as it was also targeting Turkish and British officials and ordinary and official Greeks. In addition, 17 November caused extensive property damage.

The beginning of the end for 17 November came on 29 June 2002, when a bomb carried by 40-year-old Savvas Xyros exploded prematurely in the port area of Piraeus, severely injuring Xyros. While hospitalized and in custody, Xyros admitted to police and prosecutors that he had been a member of 17 November since 1989, provided information on the structure of the group, and gave authorities the names and aliases of the group's leadership and more than a dozen other members, including two of his own brothers.

Once deemed the most elusive terrorist group in Europe, 17 November quickly unraveled, largely as a result of the diligence of Greek Government and law-enforcement officials. Acting on their own information as well as on the numerous leads provided by the public, Greek authorities rounded up 19 members from across Greece. Key successes in the investigation included:

- The discovery of safehouses. In searches of Savvas Xyros's apartment and following tips received from the public, Greek police discovered two 17 November safehouses in the heart of Athens. In those apartments, authorities found weapons (including infantry-style rockets, grenades, and small arms), explosives, 17 November documents, and other incriminating materials and terrorist paraphernalia that later were tested and forensically linked to 17 November suspects and terrorist acts claimed by the group.
- The arrest of the reputed leader of 17 November. On 17 July, Greek police arrested Alexandros Yiotopoulos, described by 17 November arrestees as the group's leader, on the island of Lipsi. Yiotopoulos, a 58-year-old academic, fit the profile of 17 November's mastermind and author of the group's lengthy proclamations and communiques, according to Greek police. The son of a well-known 1930s Trotskyite, Yiotopoulos is believed to have been active in Paris-based student groups opposed to the Greek military dictatorship. Even after that junta fell, extremist and militant left-wing sympathizers were active in Greece. Yiotopoulos and others capitalized on this and the rise of anti-American sentiment to attract members. Yiotopoulos is also accused of pulling the trigger in the Welch murder.
- The surrender of 17 November's "Operations Chief." On 5 September, an unrepentant Dimitrios Koufodinas, dubbed 17 November's Operations Chief, turned himself in to authorities following an unsuccessful manhunt lasting several months. In addition to his responsibility for much of the group's operational planning, Koufodinas is accused of directly participating in numerous murders and other 17 November attacks.

With each successive arrest and saturated media coverage, the Greek police further dissolved the myth of invincibility surrounding 17 November's organization and leadership structure. At the same time, the Greek public played a growing part in the investigation, offering statements, providing lead information, and cooperating with authorities. Technical experts from the United States and the United Kingdom also offered assistance in the investigation. Many foreign countries, particularly those victimized by 17 November over the years, have praised Greek officials for their efforts against the group. US Ambassador to Greece Thomas Miller said, "The Greek Government is the one deserving to be credited with the success" against 17 November. He added "serious work has been done in past years. There is a very efficient public order minister. There is determination. It is this determination that will help the Greeks round up any remaining 17 November members and finally eradicate their terror from the streets of Greece."



Italian police arrested several suspected terrorists and disrupted potential attacks against the United States and its allies. In May, Italian police in Milan arrested five individuals who were suspected of providing funds to al-Qaida. In October, Italian authorities arrested four Tunisians for document forgery; they may have also been planning to conduct a terrorist attack in Europe, possibly in France.

Italy prosecuted several al-Qaida–affiliated individuals, putting on trial three North Africans suspected of providing logistics support to the group. In February, a judge in Milan sentenced four members of the Tunisian Combatant Group to up to five years in jail for providing false documentation and planning to acquire and transport arms and other illegal goods. Italian authorities also suspect the group was planning a terrorist attack against the US Embassy in Rome. This was the first time al-Qaida associates were convicted in Europe since 11 September 2001.

In August, working with the US Treasury Department, Italian authorities froze the assets of 25 individuals and organizations designated by the United States under Executive Order 13224. Eleven were individuals connected to the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, while 14 were organizations linked to two known al-Qaida–linked financiers, Ahmed Idris Nasreddin and Youssef Nada.

A variety of leftwing terrorist groups carried out attacks in Italy. In March, the recently resurgent Red Brigades–Communist Combatant Party (BR–PCC) was accused of assassinating Marco Biagi, an advisor to the Italian Labor Ministry. Several other groups, including the Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei, the 20 July Brigades, and the Proletarian Nuclei for Communism, claimed responsibility for numerous small-scale attacks throughout Italy.

Italy is a party to 10 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## Lithuania

Lithuania took several steps to combat terrorism. Although there are no known al-Qaida operatives in Lithuania, the Government has worked effectively to arrest and deport a small number of individuals associated with HAMAS and Hizballah. The Government also monitored and reported to the United States on the transfer of \$100,000 to a suspected terrorist via a Lithuanian bank. Lithuania has deployed limited personnel in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

To improve its overall counterterrorist efforts, the Government adopted the National Counter-Terrorism Program, which identified deficiencies, goals, and deadlines and established the Interagency Coordination Commission Against Terrorism. It also increased security along its border with Belarus, at the Vilnius airport, and at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant. As a result of increased scrutiny at the country's border-control points, Lithuanian Border Guards apprehended more than 1,000 persons—mostly Lithuanians—sought by police, none with established terrorist connections.

The Lithuanian Government has emphasized working with European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners, as well as other countries. In April, Lithuania cosponsored with the United States an international conference on terrorist challenges, and in October the Ministry of Defense signed an agreement with the US Defense Department on the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Vilnius has bilateral agreements with Belarus, Germany, Hungary, and Kazakhstan to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. During visits to Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia in April, Lithuania's Foreign Minister and his counterparts discussed joint antiterrorism efforts.

Lithuania is a party to 10 of the 12 major UN antiterrorism conventions and protocols.

## **The Netherlands**

The Netherlands supported the global Coalition against terrorism with leadership, personnel, and materiel, including the deployment of more than 200 ground troops to Afghanistan. (In 2003, it took over joint command of the International Security Assistance Force with Germany.)

The Dutch implemented two agreements with the United States to increase border security. The Netherlands became the first country to agree to host a US Customs team; it will deploy under the Global Container Security Initiative at Rotterdam, one of Europe's busiest ports. The Government also agreed to allow US immigration officers at Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport to work on joint anticrime and counterterrorism operations. The Netherlands' Prime Minister stated that the United States and his country stand "shoulder to shoulder" in the struggle for global security.

In April and August, Dutch authorities arrested approximately two-dozen extremists—10 of whom remain in custody—who are accused of supporting terrorists and recruiting combatants for jihad. Authorities are also investigating their possible links with the assassins of Afghan opposition leader Ahmad Shad Massoud, who was killed in 2001 by al-Qaida members. In September, police arrested Ansar al-Islam's leader, Mullah Krekar. (In January 2003, the Dutch Justice Minister unexpectedly released and deported Krekar to Norway despite a pending Jordanian request for extradition.) In February 2002, a Dutch court, citing insufficient evidence, ordered the release of a man suspected of involvement in an al-Qaida plot to blow up the US Embassy in Paris.

The Dutch have taken a leading role, particularly in the European Union, to establish financial protocols to combat terrorism. They also donated \$400,000 to the International Monetary Fund to provide assistance to countries that lack the wherewithal to implement some of these measures immediately.

The Government has proposed changes to Dutch law that will make it easier to prosecute supporters of terrorist groups. Under Dutch law, terrorist organizations are not illegal entities. The new legislation will criminalize the provision of information, money, and material assistance to terrorist organizations. The Netherlands is a party to all 12 UN antiterrorism conventions and protocols.

The Dutch have taken steps to freeze the assets of individuals and groups included on the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list, most notably the New People's Army and the leader of its political wing, Jose Maria Sison. Nevertheless, the political wings of other terrorist groups, such as KADEK (formerly the PKK) and the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), are allowed to operate as long as they do not commit terrorist acts or other crimes in The Netherlands.

## **Spain**

Spain has offered strong, multifaceted support in the global war against terrorism. In May, the Spanish Government approved a contribution of 1,200 troops to the International Security and Assistance Force. As part of Operation Enduring Freedom, Spain participated in several humanitarian transport missions and contributed three C-130 Hercules planes and 70 soldiers to an airborne detachment. From January to October, a Spanish medical detachment served at the Bagram Air Base near Kabul. Spain also is heading a naval task force off the Horn of Africa to disrupt terrorist movements in the region.

In 2002, Spain arrested several individuals with possible links to al-Qaida. In July, Spanish authorities arrested three individuals of Syrian origin because of their alleged al-Qaida links. One of the detainees made suspicious video recordings while on a trip to the United States in 1997, including a videotape of the World Trade



*Citizens protest against ETA in Santa Pola, Spain, 6 August 2002, two days after a powerful car bomb killed two persons and injured 45.*

Center. The three individuals were released on bail because of weak evidence in the case. In April, Spanish police arrested two suspected al-Qaida financiers—Mohammed Galeb Kalaje Zouaydi, a naturalized Spanish citizen of Syrian descent, and Ahmed Brahim, an Algerian. In January, police arrested Najib Chaib Mohamed, a Moroccan national, for his alleged involvement in a suspected al-Qaida recruiting and logistics cell headed by Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, whom Spanish authorities had apprehended in November 2001.

Spain made progress in its decades-old campaign to eliminate domestic terrorist groups, including the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) organization—a radical Basque terrorist group. In November, Spain and France signed a protocol granting Spanish counterterrorism officials enhanced access to French information obtained from arrested ETA members. In September, Spanish and French police arrested two principal ETA leaders, Juan Antonio Olarra and Ainhoa Mugica Goni, in a joint operation with French authorities in Bordeaux. Olarra is linked to at least nine murders. The Spanish Parliament passed a law that provides a strong mechanism for the possible de-legalization of Batasuna, ETA's political wing. A case against Batasuna was before the Spanish Supreme Court at year's end. In a

separate case in August, a judge ordered a provisional ban on Batasuna's activities, froze the group's financial assets, and closed their offices. ETA's attacks, nonetheless, had killed five Spanish citizens by year's end, down from 15 in 2001 and 23 in 2000.

Thirty-two ETA members and ETA-related organizations, such as Askatasuna, were included in Executive Order 13224, which blocks the assets of terrorists.

Spanish and French authorities made joint advances against the domestic terrorist group First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group (GRAPO). A series of arrests in July and November resulted in the capture of 22 suspected GRAPO members.

Spain is a party to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## Turkey

The Turkish Government, long a staunch counterterrorism ally, continued to provide strong support in the campaign against terrorism. Turkey was quick to provide military assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom. Former Prime Minister Ecevit backed a parliamentary resolution permitting the Government to send Turkish troops abroad and to allow foreign troops to be stationed on Turkish soil. Turkey offered to provide a 90-man special-operations unit in Afghanistan. In June, Turkey took the leadership of the United Nation's International Security Assistance Force and contributed 1,400 soldiers to the peacekeeping force.

Turkish authorities have arrested several suspected terrorists who may be linked to al-Qaida. In August, authorities arrested Mevlut Kar, a Turkish citizen suspected of being an Islamic terrorist, at the Ankara airport. In April, Turkish authorities arrested four individuals associated with al-Qaida in Bursa.

Three members of the Union of Imams, a Jordanian group with links to al-Qaida, were arrested in February in Van. The individuals were suspected of planning a bombing attack in Israel. Subsequently, Turkish police arrested Ahmet Abdullah, a courier from northern Iraq, for providing assistance to the Union of Imams.

The Government of Turkey continued to take steps against domestic terrorist groups. Turkish authorities arrested several members from the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)—a virulently anti-US group that killed two US defense contractors and wounded a US Air Force officer during the Gulf war. Although the group did not conduct any attacks in 2002, Turkish officials have expressed displeasure that the group's leadership is ensconced in Western Europe. The European Union included the DHKP/C on its terrorism list in May.

Turkish arrests also weakened Turkish Hizballah, a Kurdish Islamic (Sunni) extremist group that is unrelated to Lebanese Hizballah. In December, authorities arrested Ali Aslan Isik, reportedly one of the group's top leaders. The group's last attack in October 2001 killed two Turkish police officers in Istanbul.

In April, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and declared its commitment to political versus armed tactics to advance Kurdish rights in Turkey. In October, a Turkish court commuted Abdullah Ocalan's, the group's imprisoned leader, death sentence to a life term. KADEK maintains that it has continued to abide by its self-declared peace initiative throughout 2002, but it continues to arm an estimated 8,000 trained fighters in and around Turkey.

Turkey is a party to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## United Kingdom

The United Kingdom, which has taken important political, financial, and law-enforcement steps to advance international counterterrorist efforts, remains one of the United States' staunchest allies. At its peak, the British contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom included more than 4,500 personnel as well as aircraft, ships, and submarines. In March, it deployed a 1,700-strong force to Afghanistan to combat al-Qaida and initially led the International Security Assistance Force. It also participated in Coalition counterterrorism operations outside Afghanistan, including maritime patrols in the Arabian Sea. London has unfrozen assets linked to al-Qaida and the Taliban totaling \$100 million and made them available to the legitimate Afghan Government.

The United Kingdom is a party to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and chairs the UN's Counter Terrorism Committee. The United Kingdom actively campaigned in the European Union, G-8, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and United Nations for coordinated counterterrorism efforts and routinely lobbied UN members to become parties to the 12 antiterrorism conventions and protocols.

The United Kingdom launched aggressive efforts to disrupt and prosecute terrorists. Since December 2001, the Government has detained 15 foreign nationals under its Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, which allows extended detention of non-British nationals suspected of being international terrorists but who cannot be removed from the country immediately. The Government defeated a legal challenge to the antiterrorism law on appeal after the Special Immigration Appeals Commission ruled the law discriminatory and unlawful. Several other terror suspects also have been arrested and charged with terrorism-related offenses. In February authorities arrested Shaykh



*British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw listens to remarks by Secretary of State Colin Powell as they brief the press, 15 October 2002. Both stated that the Bali bombings made them more determined than ever to pursue the war on terrorism.*

Abdullah Ibrahim el-Faisal on charges of inciting racial hatred for remarks he made calling for the murder of nonbelievers, Jews, Americans, and Hindus. He was charged with crimes under the Public Order Act and the Offences Against the Person Act.

The United Kingdom froze the assets of more than 100 organizations and 200 individuals with links to terrorism. In October, the Government proscribed four terrorist groups associated with al-Qaida—Jemaah Islamiya, the Abu Sayyaf Group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Asbat al-Ansar—bringing to 25 the total number of groups banned under the Terrorism Act of 2000. The United Kingdom has not frozen the assets belonging to political or humanitarian wings of terrorist groups HAMAS and Hizballah, owing to Britain's definition of terrorist organizations.

The United Kingdom was assisting in extraditing four individuals charged with terrorist acts in the United States or against US citizens, including an Algerian suspected of involvement in the 2000 "Millennium Conspiracy." The US request to extradite three men for their involvement in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in East Africa is pending an appeal to the European Court of Human Rights. British courts denied one US extradition request—an Algerian pilot suspected of training the September 11 hijackers, citing insufficient evidence. In November, the Government introduced legislation to streamline the lengthy extradition process. The

United States and United Kingdom are also in the process of negotiating a new extradition treaty.

Training and financial assistance have been in the forefront of the UK's bilateral counterterrorism relationships. The United Kingdom trained security personnel in bomb disposal and hostage-negotiating techniques, assisted law-enforcement and regulatory authorities in terrorist-finance investigations, and, through its capacity-building programs, helped countries draft counterterrorism legislation.

The United Kingdom's intelligence and security agencies significantly deepened their bilateral counterterrorist relationships. It established major counterterrorism-assistance programs in South and Southeast Asia and worked with Indonesia, Australia, and the United States to investigate the October bombings in Bali. The British Government in November introduced a new bill on international crime cooperation that would allow police from EU member states to operate independently in Britain under specific circumstances and permit British police to track suspicious individuals across most UK borders, except its border with Ireland. The British police have worked closely with the Greek police to investigate the assassination in June 2000 of the British military attaché in Athens and in the wider hunt for members of the 17 November terrorist group.

The Government took steps against domestic terrorism as well. Security officials disrupted numerous planned terrorist attacks, although in August the Real IRA (RIRA) killed a construction worker at a British Army base. In October, RIRA threatened additional violence. The investigation into the 1998 Omagh bombing linked to the RIRA continues, and British authorities also prepared for the trial of two suspected RIRA members connected with a series of car bombings in England in 2001. Sectarian violence—in large part fueled by loyalist paramilitaries—continued throughout the year and served as the backdrop to the decision by the British Government to suspend the Northern Ireland Assembly in October.



## Middle East Overview

*"Islam rejects all acts of terrorism and every terrorist. Moreover, an evil act is considered a contradiction of both Islamic Sharia (law) and human logic."*

*Saudi Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz,  
10 September 2002*

Terrorism remained a fundamental feature of the Middle East political landscape in 2002. Terrorist groups and their state sponsors continued terrorist activities and planning throughout 2002. Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qaida continued to be active in the region. Additionally, HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Hizballah, and other groups opposed to a comprehensive Middle East peace maintained their attacks on civilians. Most Middle Eastern countries—including some that sponsor terrorist groups and with which the United States has differences—showed significant cooperation with the US-led campaign against terrorism, however.

In many nations, Middle Eastern allies of the United States thwarted terrorist incidents targeted against US interests and citizens, disrupted terrorist planning and operations, and enhanced their counterterrorism relations with the United States. Many have continued to provide tangible support for Operation Enduring Freedom, including personnel, basing, and overflight privileges. Most Middle East governments froze al-Qaida financial assets pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1267, 1390 and 1455. Notably, all Middle Eastern countries with an American diplomatic and/or military presence were responsive to US requests for enhanced security for personnel and facilities during periods of heightened alert. The Government of Saudi Arabia, for example, has begun enhanced direct cooperation and coordination with the United States to counter terrorist financing and operations.

The Government of Yemen has continued a broad counterterrorism campaign against al-Qaida and suspected al-Qaida members within its territory with several notable successes and provided

excellent cooperation with the United States. Jordan and Kuwait continued to counter suspected terrorists and provided superb security support to US facilities in the wake of the assassination of US diplomat Laurence Foley in Amman and the fatal shootings of US servicemen in Kuwait. The United Arab Emirates continued to buttress ongoing counterterrorism efforts in the Gulf.

Egypt's solid record of counterterrorism cooperation included efforts at brokering a cease-fire among Palestinian rejectionist groups that would halt terrorist violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories. The Governments of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco all actively supported the global campaign against terrorism.

Syria cooperated with the US Government and its partners in investigating al-Qaida and some other organizations. Damascus has continued, however, to support Hizballah, HAMAS, the PIJ, and other Palestinian rejectionist groups that conduct terrorist operations in the region. The Syrians have continued to assert that the activities of these groups constitute legitimate resistance. They sometimes even condone Palestinian suicide bombings and other attacks against civilian targets within Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip.

The Gulf countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates played strong roles in the international Coalition against terrorism. These governments have continued to implement positive steps to halt the flow of terrorism financing and provide other assistance in the war on terrorism. In many instances, they did so despite popular disquiet over their governments' military support for Operation Enduring Freedom and other counterterrorism activities. As in many other countries, US interests were often subject to terrorist threats. The Gulf governments as a whole were extremely responsive in providing appropriate and effective security measures.

Maghreb governments likewise gave strong support by searching for terrorist financing, providing increased security to US interests, and thwarting actual terrorist plots. For example, Morocco arrested and prosecuted Saudis and Moroccans who allegedly were planning to attack NATO ships in the Straits of Gibraltar and also developed comprehensive antiterrorism legislation.

Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, which have been designated as state sponsors of terrorism, are discussed in the state sponsorship section of this report.

## **Algeria**

President Bouteflika has publicly pledged his Government's full cooperation in the war against terror. As part of its effort, the Government of Algeria strengthened its information sharing with the United States and worked with European and other governments to eliminate terrorist-support networks linked to Algerian groups, most of which are in Europe. In 2002, Algeria hosted an international conference on crime and counterterrorism that was attended by almost 20 international delegations. The Government also hosted the Africa Union Summit on terrorism.

The Algerian Government enacted new laws combating violent extremism, most significantly a presidential decree allowing Government institutions to monitor accounts in private banks and creating a unit in the Ministry of Finance to fight money laundering. On the security front, Algerian authorities in late November announced that they had eliminated an al-Qaida operative who had been working with the country's domestic extremist groups.

Algeria is a party to 10 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Algeria itself has been ravaged by terrorism since the early 1990s. Terrorism within the country remained a serious problem in 2002, although the level of violence has declined markedly over the past decade as Government forces have steadily reduced the areas in which militants operate. Most violence occurred in areas outside the capital, although militants on occasion still attempt attacks in the Algiers region.

The Salafist Group for Call and Combat—the largest, most active terrorist organization operating in the country—maintained the capability to conduct operations. It collaborated with smugglers and Islamists in the south who supplied insurgents with weapons and communications equipment for attacks in the north.

## **Bahrain**

Bahrain, which hosts the US Naval Forces Central/Fifth Fleet Headquarters and provides basing and extensive overflight clearances for a multitude of US military aircraft, has been essential to the continued success of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Bahraini military assets have participated in OEF Coalition naval operations including terrorist interdiction efforts, and Bahrain offered a medical unit for OEF duty. The King, Crown Prince, and other senior Bahraini ministers have been outspoken public proponents of the war on terrorism. The Government of Bahrain cooperated closely and effectively on criminal investigations related to the campaign against terrorism. In September, for instance, Bahraini authorities were essential in the transfer to US custody of Mukhtar al-Bakri, a US citizen suspected of terrorist activity.

Equally important, the Bahrain Monetary Authority quickly implemented UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1267, 1390, and 1455, as well as 1373, ordering financial institutions to identify and freeze accounts of organizations associated with members of al-Qaida, Usama Bin Ladin, and members of the Taliban that the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee has included on its consolidated list. To date, seven accounts have been identified and frozen. Bahrain has developed financial regulations to ensure that charitable contributions are not channeled to financing terrorists. The Government of Bahrain has been extraordinarily responsive to US Government requests for additional security measures in recent years and continued to give the highest priority to the protection of US lives and property in Bahrain.

Bahrain is a party to five of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## Egypt

The Egyptian and US Governments continued their close cooperation on a broad range of counterterrorism issues in 2002. The relationship deepened in 2002 as the countries coordinated closely on law-enforcement issues and the freezing of assets, consistent with the requirements of UNSCRs 1373, 1267, 1390 and 1455. Egypt also cooperated with the United States in freezing the assets of individuals and organizations designated by the United States pursuant to Executive Order 13224. In law enforcement, the Egyptian Government deepened its information-sharing relationship in terrorist-related investigations. The Government provided immediate information, for example, in the investigation of the shootings on 4 July at Los Angeles airport, which involved an Egyptian national. Its response was critical in determining that the shooting was an individual act, not part of a terrorist conspiracy. The Egyptian Government also provided the name and full identification (numerical identifiers and photo) of a terrorist believed to be in the United States.



*His Royal Highness Prince Saud Al Faisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia; His Excellency Ahmed Maher Al-Sayyed, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt; His Excellency Marwan Jamil Al-Muasher, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; and Secretary of State Colin Powell speak to reporters after their meeting at the State Department, July 2002.*

The Government of Egypt has continued to be committed to searching and freezing terrorist funds in Egyptian banks. In 2002, the Egyptian parliament passed an anti-money-laundering law that strengthens banking regulations and permits the Government more latitude in its campaign to staunch the flow of terrorist funds. The Egyptian Government, both secular and clerical, continued to make public statements supportive of US efforts and indicative of its commitment to the worldwide campaign against terrorism.

In addition to combating global terrorism, Cairo continued to place a high priority on the protection of US citizens and facilities in Egypt. It increased security for US citizens and facilities and for US forces, both stationed in Egypt and transiting the country to the Gulf, by air or through the Suez Canal. Egypt has strengthened its airport security, agreed to stricter aviation-security measures, and granted extensive overflight and canal transit clearances.

Egypt was for many years itself a victim of terrorism. President Mubarak first called for an international conference to combat terrorism in 1986. With US assistance and training, Egypt has effectively combated the internal terrorist/extremist threat. There were no acts of terrorism in Egypt in 2002, either against US citizens, Egyptians, or other nationals. The Government continued a “zero tolerance” policy toward suspected terrorists and extremists.

During 2002, the Government prosecuted 94 members (seven of whom were tried in absentia) of a group dubbed “al-Wa’ad” (the Promise), accused of having supplied arms and financial support to Chechen rebels and HAMAS. On 9 September, the military tribunal sentenced 51 defendants to terms ranging from two to 15 years while acquitting 43. On 20 October, the Government brought 26 members of the Islamic Liberation Party to trial in the supreme state security court. The defendants, who include three Britons, stand accused of joining a banned group, attempting to recruit members for that group, and spreading extremist ideology. The group was banned in Egypt in 1974, following an attempt to overthrow the Government and establish an Islamic caliphate.

The United States deported a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in 2002 for trial in connection with the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. Several other members of Egyptian terrorist organizations were returned to Egypt from abroad. During the summer, the Egyptian Government announced plans to release from prison a large group of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG) leaders and members, sentenced in the early 1980s. In 1997, the group’s leadership in prison declared a cease-fire and halt to all armed operations and acts of violence. In 1999, IG leadership abroad declared their support for the initiative. This year, the IG leadership in prison in Egypt published four pamphlets on the religious basis and legitimacy for ending all violence and armed operations. In the fall, the Government

began releasing IG members and leaders who they believe have transformed their ideology and religious beliefs while in prison.

Egypt is a party to nine of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## **Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip**

Israel maintained staunch support for US-led counterterrorist operations as terrorist activity in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip continued at a heightened level in 2002. HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, all of which the United States has designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and has designated pursuant to Executive Order 13224, were responsible for most of the attacks, which included suicide bombings, shootings, and mortar firings against civilian and military targets. Terrorists killed more than 370 persons—including at least 10 US citizens—compared to fewer than 200 persons killed in 2001.

Israel is a party to eight of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Israeli authorities arrested individuals claiming allegiance to al-Qaida, although the group does not appear to have an operational presence in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Palestinian terrorist groups in these areas publicly distanced themselves from Usama Bin Ladin and appear focused on attacking Israel, versus joining in a fight against the West.

Israel responded to Palestinian terrorism with large-scale military operations. Israeli forces launched incursions into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, conducted targeted killings of suspected Palestinian terrorists, destroyed the homes of families of suicide bombers, and imposed closures and curfews in Palestinian areas. Israel expelled two family members of Palestinian

terrorists from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip in September. Two of Israel's most extensive operations—Defensive Shield, launched in March, and Determined Path, launched in June—reduced the frequency of Palestinian attacks; continuing attacks, however, show the groups remained potent.

HAMAS was particularly active, carrying out over 50 attacks, including shootings, suicide bombings, and standoff mortar-and-rocket attacks against civilian and military targets. The group was responsible for the most deadly Palestinian terrorist attack of the year—the suicide bombing of a Passover gathering at a Netanya hotel that killed 29 Israelis, including one dual US-Israeli citizen. HAMAS's bombing of a cafeteria on the Hebrew University campus, which killed nine, including five US citizens, demonstrated its willingness to stage operations in areas frequented by Westerners, including US citizens.

The PIJ increased its number of lethal attacks in 2002, staging a car bombing in June that killed 17 Israelis near Megiddo. It carried out similar attacks in or near Afula, Haifa, and Hadera. PIJ terrorists conducted deadly shooting attacks in 2002 as well, including a two-stage ambush in Hebron in late November that killed at least 12 persons, including several security personnel who responded to the initial attack. Syrian officials declined to act on a US request in November to close the PIJ's offices in Damascus.

In March, the US Department of State officially designated the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (al-Aqsa), which emerged in 2000, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), and designated it pursuant to Executive Order 13224. Al-Aqsa-linked attacks have killed at least five US citizens. The group conducted numerous shooting attacks and suicide bombings in 2002, some of which employed new techniques. On 27 January, an al-Aqsa suicide bombing that killed one person and injured 50 used a female suicide bomber for the first time. The group claimed responsibility for a shooting attack that killed six Israelis waiting to vote in the Israeli Likud party elections in November. Documents

seized by the Israelis and information gleaned from the interrogation of arrested al-Aqsa members indicate that Palestinian Authority (PA) and Fatah members, including Chairman Yasir Arafat, made payments to al-Aqsa members known to have been involved in violence against Israelis.

Payments by Iraq to the families of Palestinian "martyrs" in 2002 were intended to encourage attacks against Israeli targets and garner more support for Iraq among Palestinians. In October, the West Bank leader of the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front admitted under Israeli interrogation to having overseen the transfer and distribution of up to \$15 million in Iraqi money to martyrs' families, confirming Palestinian and other press accounts of such transfers.

Jewish extremists raised their profile in 2002. Several Jewish extremists, some with ties to Kach, a designated FTO, were arrested in April and May for plotting to blow up a Palestinian school for girls or a Palestinian hospital in Jerusalem. Jewish extremists were also arrested for inciting a violent clash between Israeli settlers and Israeli security forces in October; extremists also attacked and injured Palestinian agricultural workers, and some US citizens were also the victims in these attacks.

The Palestinian Authority's efforts to thwart terrorist operations were minimal in 2002. Israeli military operations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip degraded a PA security apparatus that was already hobbled by corruption, infighting, and poor leadership. Some personnel in the security services, including several senior officers, have continued to assist terrorist operations. Incidents such as the seizure in January of the Karine-A, a ship carrying weapons that Iran planned to deliver to the PA, further called into question the PA's ability and desire to help prevent terrorist operations. President Bush expressed "disappointment" in Arafat, indicating the intercepted shipment would encourage terrorism. In June, President Bush called for a new Palestinian leadership "not compromised by terror."



## Jordan

The Jordanian Government continued to strongly support global counterterrorist efforts while remaining vigilant against the threat of terrorism at home. Jordan was highly responsive to the security needs of US citizens in country and played a critical role in thwarting attempts to exploit Jordanian territory for attacks in Israel.

Jordan aggressively pursued suspected terrorists and successfully prosecuted and convicted many involved in plots against US or Israeli interests. Jordanian authorities, in mid-January 2003, convicted 10 Jordanians of weapons charges but acquitted them of participating in a plot to target US interests in Jordan. Jordan is working closely with US officials to investigate the murder in late October of USAID officer Laurence Foley. In December, Jordanian authorities arrested two men, a Libyan and a Jordanian, who later admitted to carrying out the assassination after receiving money from al-Qaida leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The two have been charged with the murder and remain in Jordanian custody awaiting trial.

Suspected terrorists continued attempts to exploit Jordanian territory to transit weapons to and from groups in neighboring states, or to use Jordanian territory to facilitate terrorist attacks. Jordanian authorities have successfully intercepted such



*Jordan's King Abdullah and Queen Rania offer condolences to the wife of assassinated US senior diplomat Laurence Foley at her home in Amman, 29 October 2002.*

transiting weapons and personnel on virtually all of its borders. In June, Jordan rendered to Lebanese security authorities three Lebanese Hizballah members arrested after allegedly trying to smuggle weapons destined for the West Bank into Jordan. Jordanian authorities in June also reportedly arrested three Jordanian youths suspected of planning to infiltrate into Israel to conduct terrorist attacks. In July, four Syrians were sentenced to prison terms for illegally possessing explosives they intended to transport to the West Bank. In October, Jordan's State Security Court sentenced four individuals to prison terms ranging from five to eight years after convicting them of possessing and attempting to transport machineguns and missiles into the West Bank.

In May, Jordan's State Security Court indicted six unnamed suspects in connection with a bombing in late February of a Jordanian counterterrorism official's vehicle, killing two passersby.

Jordan is a party to seven of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.



*Jordanian Islamists hold banners showing names of Palestinian suicide bombers during a pro-Palestinian rally in Amman, 21 August 2002.*

## Kuwait

Kuwait has continued to support and cooperate with all actions and requests for assistance in the war on terrorism, particularly in the aftermath of the 8 October attack on Failaka Island in which one US Marine was killed and another wounded, and the attack on 21 November that took place on a Kuwaiti highway in which two US soldiers were wounded. These were the only confirmed terrorist incidents among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations in 2002. The attacks strengthened the Government's concerns about the activities of extremists within Kuwait. In the immediate aftermath of the October incident, the Government of Kuwait rapidly located and arrested individuals involved (the two shooters were killed during the attack) and continued to respond favorably to all US Government requests in connection with the ongoing investigation and other security threats. Kuwaiti authorities completed their investigations of the 26 persons suspected of involvement in the attack. Twenty-one were released, and five were referred to the public prosecutor. Trials had begun by year's end. A policeman suspected of carrying out the November shooting was arrested immediately after the attack and remains in Kuwaiti custody.

Cooperation has been strong in the area of terrorist financing as well. Following a review of Kuwaiti laws by the Financial Services Assessment Team, the United States is preparing a technical-assistance program for Kuwait. The Government remains eager to receive formal proposals for training and has indicated a willingness to support such efforts. The Government of Kuwait also established a new entity within the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor to monitor Islamic charities.

Kuwait is a party to seven of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.



*Marines and their families bow their heads during the benediction for Lance Cpl. Antonio J. Sledd, who was gunned down by terrorists during a military exercise in Kuwait, 8 October 2002.*

## Lebanon

Despite its counterterrorism efforts in 2002, Lebanon experienced an increase in terrorist attacks by Sunni extremist and terrorist groups. Explosions at several US-franchise restaurants and a spike of cross-border attacks into Israel in March and April indicated worsening security conditions. Large demonstrations at the US Embassy during April against US policy in the Middle East

highlighted rising public anger. The murder of a US missionary in Sidon on 21 November may not have been entirely politically motivated, but it clearly demonstrated the danger US citizens face in Lebanon. Prime Minister Hariri condemned the murder, and Lebanese law-enforcement officials launched a full investigation of the crime.

In 2002, the Lebanese Government demonstrated greater efforts against Sunni terrorist groups such as Asbat al-Ansar, which was outlawed. The United States has designated Asbat al-Ansar a Foreign Terrorist Organization and has designated it pursuant to Executive Order 13224. A July confrontation at the Ayn al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp—the center of Asbat's activities—resulted in the surrender of a Sunni extremist who had fled into the camp after killing three Lebanese military personnel in Sidon. The Lebanese Armed Forces, however, did not itself enter the camp, and Palestinian refugee camps, much of the Beka'a Valley, southern Beirut, and the southern border area remain effectively outside the Government's control. In October, the judiciary arrested three men (two Lebanese and one Saudi) and indicted 18 others *in absentia* on charges of preparing to carry out terrorist attacks and forging documents and passports. The detainees, because of their al-Qaida connections, will be tried in a military tribunal.

Lebanese efforts against Sunni extremists, including al-Qaida, stand in contrast to its continuing unwillingness to condemn as terrorists several organizations that maintain a presence in Lebanon: Hizballah, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), and the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS). The Lebanese Government has long considered these organizations that target Israel to be legitimate resistance groups and has permitted them to establish offices in Beirut. The Government refused to freeze the assets of Hizballah or close down the offices of rejectionist Palestinian organizations. It also continued to reject the US Government's

position that Hizballah has a global reach, instead concentrating on its political wing and asserting it to be a local, indigenous organization integral to Lebanese society and politics. Syrian and Iranian support for Hizballah activities in the south, as well as training and assistance to Palestinian rejectionist groups in Lebanon, help permit terrorist elements to flourish. On 12 March, infiltrators from Lebanon killed six Israelis in Shelomi, Israel, and Hizballah-Palestinian rejectionist groups carried out several cross-border attacks—including firing Katyusha rockets—into Israel.

The Lebanese Government acknowledges the UN list of terrorist groups designated pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1390. It does not, however, acknowledge the terrorist groups designated only by the US Government and will take no action against these groups. Constitutional provisions prohibit the extradition of any Lebanese national to a third country. Lebanese authorities maintain that the Government's provision of amnesty to Lebanese involved in acts of violence during the civil war prevents them from prosecuting many cases of interest to the United States, including the 1985 hijacking of TWA 847 and the murder associated with it, and the abduction, torture, and murder of US hostages from 1984 to 1991. US courts have brought indictments against Hizballah operatives responsible for a number of those crimes, and some of these defendants remain prominent in the organization.

The Lebanese Government has insisted that Imad Mugniyah—wanted in connection with the TWA hijacking and other terrorist acts, and placed on the FBI's list of most-wanted terrorists in 2001—is no longer present in Lebanon. The Government's legal system has also failed to hold a hearing on the prosecutor's appeal in the case of Tawfiz Muhammad Farroukh, who, despite the evidence against him, had been found not guilty of murder for his role in the killings of US Ambassador Francis Meloy and two others in 1976.

The Financial Action Task Force recognized Lebanon's amendments to its penal code and administrative efforts against money laundering in June when it dropped Lebanon from the list of countries deemed uncooperative. The Government of Lebanon also offered cooperation with the US Government on the investigation of September 11 hijacker Ziad Jarrah, a Lebanese national.

Lebanon is a party to 10 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## **Morocco**

The Moroccan Government has been quite helpful in the war on terror. King Muhammad VI has unambiguously condemned those who espouse or conduct terrorism and has worked to keep Rabat firmly on the side of the United States against extremists. Morocco is a party to 10 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Domestically, the Moroccan Government's solid record of vigilance against terrorist activity and intolerance for the perpetrators of terrorism remained uninterrupted in 2002. In order to fight terrorism better, the Government began to draft new, stronger laws in the financial and law-enforcement sectors. In addition, Moroccan authorities in 2002 detained several individuals suspected of belonging to an al-Qaida cell. Moroccan authorities say the individuals—some Saudi, some Moroccan—were involved in a plot to attack Western shipping interests in the Straits of Gibraltar. The Moroccan Government put the suspected terrorists on trial.

## **Oman**

Oman continued to provide public and private statements of support for the war on terrorism in 2002 and has been responsive to all Coalition requests for military and/or civilian support. Omani financial authorities have worked closely with the

Coalition to prevent financing of terrorism and have shown keen interest in pursuing cases of particular interest to US law enforcement. In 2002, Oman became a party to the 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, making it a party to nine of 12 antiterrorism treaties. It is reviewing the three remaining conventions. There were no incidents of terrorist activity in Oman in 2002.

## **Qatar**

Qatar's support for the United States after the attacks of September 11, 2001 continued throughout 2002. Qatar provides substantial ongoing support for Operation Enduring Freedom. It publicly and repeatedly condemned terrorism, most recently on the occasion of the attack in Bali. The Government took steps to improve border security and has supported US and international efforts to combat terrorist financing. It independently strengthened laws and regulations to prevent money laundering. Both in coordination with the United States and at its own initiative, Qatari law-enforcement authorities detained and investigated individuals suspected of supporting terrorist networks. The Government of Qatar also provided additional security for US installations in response to threat warnings, as requested.

Qatar is a party to five of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## **Saudi Arabia**

Saudi Arabia over the past year has continued to provide support for the war on terror. Riyadh has supported Operation Enduring Freedom, has contributed to the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan through significant donations and has worked as one of the co-chairs of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Steering Committee, and has worked to enhance security at US installations to

match the heightened threat level throughout the Arabian Peninsula. Many within the Government of Saudi Arabia view the events of September 11 as a direct attack against the Kingdom and US-Saudi relations.

Riyadh has expanded its cooperation in the war on terror in some areas, such as sharing threat information and details of ongoing investigations. As a first step in dealing with terrorism financing, the Saudi Government has undertaken a review of its charitable organizations and measures to regulate their operations better, including the adoption of new financial-control mechanisms. In September, the Saudi Interior Minister announced the establishment of the Saudi Higher Authority for Religion and Charity Work to ensure that humanitarian assistance was channeled to appropriate persons and purposes. In October, the Crown Prince brought together the heads of Saudi Arabia's major charities and called for greater responsibility and transparency in their work. The Government is currently in the process of implementing these reforms. It is too soon to tell whether these reforms are preventing terrorists from exploiting these funds.

There were no major successful terrorist attacks in the Kingdom in 2002. Saudi authorities arrested a Sudanese and five Saudis for firing a missile at a US military aircraft taking off from a Saudi airbase, and they continued to investigate the incident. Riyadh was investigating a string of recent car bombings in the Kingdom but maintained that no firm ties to terrorism had been established. In late June, a British national died in a car-bomb explosion in Riyadh. Nine days later, Saudi police removed an explosive device from the car of a US resident in Riyadh. In September, a German national died in another similar car explosion in Riyadh. In addition to investigations of recent incidents, Saudi authorities continued to investigate past terrorist attacks, including the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in which 19 US servicemen died.

Saudi Arabia is a party to six of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## Tunisia

The Tunisian Government has supported the international Coalition against terrorism and has responded to requests from the US Government for assistance in blocking financial assets and providing information on extremists. In October, the United States blocked the assets of the Tunisian Combatant Group under Executive Order 13224, at the same time France proposed adding the group to the UN Security Council Resolution 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list. Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali has forcefully condemned terrorist activities and reiterated his country's determination to combat violence and extremism. Tunisia is now a full party to 11 of the 12 existing UN antiterrorism conventions; it has yet to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material agreed to in October 1979.

The Tunisian Government's active stance against terrorism was reinforced by the bombing attack against the El-Ghriba synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba on 11 April, which claimed more than 20 lives. In the wake of this attack, the Tunisian Government continued to bring judicial, law-enforcement, and military resources to bear against terrorist suspects. Tunisian authorities have detained an individual in connection with the attack; the suspect is awaiting trial. Earlier in 2002, Tunisian authorities convicted 34 persons—31 *in absentia*—of belonging to Al-Jamaa wal Sunnah, a terrorist organization linked to al-Qaida. The Government says the accused were involved in recruiting European-based Tunisians to fight in Chechnya, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. The Tunisian Government also continued to play a role in countering threats in the region. After signing a





*Bomb damage to a Jewish synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia, after terrorists exploded a tanker truck containing cooking gas outside the synagogue, killing 17 persons, 11 April 2002.*

2001 agreement with the Algerian Government to strengthen border security, Tunisia continued to respond quickly to counter possible border incursions from Islamic militants in Algeria.

Tunisia is a party to 10 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## **United Arab Emirates**

In 2002, the United Arab Emirates continued to provide considerable assistance and cooperation in the war on terrorism. In November, UAE authorities arrested and subsequently turned over

to US authorities Abdul Raheem Al-Nashiri, the head of al-Qaida operations in the Arabian Gulf and the mastermind of the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen. UAE authorities, in the course of their investigation into Al-Nashiri's activities, discovered that he had been planning terrorist operations against major economic targets in the UAE that would have resulted in massive civilian casualties.

In suppressing terrorist financing, the UAE played a critical role in the continuing investigation into the September 11 attacks and provided literally thousands of pages of financial documents pertaining to the movement of terrorist funds. The UAE has created a stronger legal and regulatory framework to deter abuse of UAE financial markets through the passage in January of a comprehensive law criminalizing money laundering, including terrorist money laundering and tightened reporting requirements and oversight. Cooperation across the board—from the financial realm through to security and intelligence—has been strong and sustained.

The UAE in 2002 indicated its commitment to ratifying the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism to which it is not yet a party and is working toward that goal. (In early 2003, the UAE became a party to the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.) The UAE is now a party to six of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. The Government is in the process of drafting domestic legislation to bring the UAE's counterterrorism legislation fully into compliance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. In June 2002, the United States sponsored the UAE's financial-intelligence unit (FIU) for membership in the prestigious Egmont Group, an informal association founded in 1995 to provide support for the FIUs of different nations. The UAE thus became the first Middle Eastern country to join this organization.

The UAE in May hosted a groundbreaking international conference to draw attention to the need for concerted action on the *hawala* informal money-transfer system—a remittance system handling billions of dollars annually but whose informal nature and lack of reporting requirements renders it vulnerable to abuse by terrorists. In November, the UAE began implementing oversight regulations for the local *hawala* market.

## Yemen

The Government of Yemen has continued a broad counterterrorism campaign against al-Qaida and cooperated with the United States in eliminating Abu Ali al-Harithi, al-Qaida's senior leader in Yemen, as cited by President Bush in his State of the Union Address. The Yemeni Government continued to express public support for the international fight against terror throughout 2002. During the year, Yemen enhanced intelligence, military, and law-enforcement cooperation with the United States and, during Vice President Cheney's visit to Sanaa in March, President Salih underscored Yemen's determination to be an active counterterrorism partner. Senior US officials acknowledged that their Yemeni counterparts face challenges in the counterterrorism arena and welcomed President Salih's commitment but made clear that any counterterrorism cooperation will be judged on its continuing results.

There was very close and productive law-enforcement cooperation between Yemeni and US law-enforcement authorities throughout the year. In cooperation with the US Government, Yemen has been actively preparing trials for the majority of those accused of the 12 October 2000 attack on the USS Cole. In addition, Yemeni counterparts cooperated with US law-enforcement elements in several investigations, including that of an explosion in an al-Qaida safehouse in Sanaa on 9 August, analysis of evidence after a raid on 21 September by Yemeni security forces of another al-Qaida location in a northern suburb of Sanaa, joint investigation with Yemeni and French law-enforcement agents of the terrorist attack on

6 October against the French oil tanker Limburg near the Yemeni port of Mukalla, and investigation of suspected al-Qaida involvement in a shooting on 3 November at a Yemen Hunt helicopter shortly after takeoff from Sanaa airport.

As in 2001, the Yemeni Government arrested suspected terrorists and pledged to neutralize key al-Qaida nodes in the country. Political will against terrorism has also been augmented by President Salih's public campaign against terrorism that includes speeches, meetings with local political leaders, and articles in national newspapers. Since September 11, 2001, Yemen has enhanced previously lax security at its borders, tightened its visa procedures, installed the Terrorist Interdiction Program at most border crossings, and prevented potential terrorists from traveling to Afghanistan. Authorities have continued to carefully monitor travelers returning from abroad and have cracked down on foreigners who were residing in the country illegally or were suspected of engaging in terrorist activities. The Government integrated formerly autonomous private religious schools—many of which were propagating extremism—into the national educational system and tightened requirements for visiting foreign students.

Numerous threats against US personnel and facilities in Yemen were reported in 2002. Yemeni security services, however, provided extensive security protection for official US diplomatic and business interests in the country. The Yemeni Government's attitude has been that an attack against US interests would also be an attack against Yemen's interests.

Several terrorist organizations maintained a presence in Yemen throughout 2002. HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic Jihad continued to be recognized as legal organizations and maintained offices in Yemen but did not engage in terrorist activities there. Other international terrorist groups that had an illegal presence in Yemen included the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya,

## US Missionaries Killed in Yemen



*Kathy Gariety*



*Bill Koehn*



*Dr. Martha Myers*

They all called Yemen home. They hailed from Alabama, Kansas, and Wisconsin. Their paths crossed at a Baptist hospital that provided free health care and friendship to the local community in Jibla, a poor town in the rugged hills of southern Yemen. Their lives ended on 30 December 2002, when a lone man walked into the hospital, a Kalashnikov rifle cradled like a baby under his jacket, and gunned down Kathleen Gariety, William Koehn, and Martha Myers. He gained access to the facility by pretending to bring a child to his targets—the hospital workers—for treatment. Before fleeing, the gunman also shot and wounded the hospital pharmacist, Donald Caswell. All four shooting victims were US citizens.

For the three hospital workers who died, Yemen was not a temporary assignment. William Koehn, 60, who worked as the hospital's administrator, had lived with his wife in Yemen for 27 years and planned to retire the following October. Kathleen Gariety, 53, a purchasing agent for the hospital, had been in Yemen for almost a decade. Martha Myers, 54, a physician, had called Yemen home for the past 24 years. The people of Jibla expressed shock and dismay at the murders; many gathered outside the hospital to mourn the day after the attack. They also attended the funerals of the two victims who were buried in Yemen.

President Ali Abdallah Salih sent his condolences to President Bush and, in an official release by the Saba news agency, stated, "The authors of this hateful crime will not escape punishment and will be punished by justice so they can serve as examples to others. We are in the same trench in fighting terrorism and drying up its resources because it is a scourge that threatens peace and security in the world."

and al-Qaida. Similarly, members of indigenous terrorist groups such as the Aden Abuyan Islamic Army may continue to be active in Yemen.

Yemen is a party to eight of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## Western Hemisphere Overview

*"The purposes of this convention are to prevent, punish, and eliminate terrorism."*

*The Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism opened for signature in Barbados in June 2002 and signed by 34 member states of the Organization of American States.*

When compared to other regions of the world, the Western Hemisphere generally does not attract attention as a "hot zone" in the war on terror. Terrorism in the region was not born on 11 September 2001, however; Latin American countries have struggled with domestic sources of terrorism for decades. International terrorist groups, moreover, have not hesitated to make Latin America a battleground to advance their causes elsewhere. The bombings of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and the Argentine-Jewish Cultural Center in 1994 are two well-known examples. More recent international terrorist attacks in Bali, Indonesia, and Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002 demonstrate that no region of the world—and no type of target—is beyond the reach or strategic interest of international terrorist organizations.

Recognizing this threat and the impact of terrorism on their economic and social development, the vast majority of countries across the Americas and the Caribbean have given strong support to the international Coalition against terrorism. In June, at the OAS General Assembly in Barbados, member states adopted and opened for signature the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism—a direct response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the first international treaty against terrorism adopted since the attacks. The Convention, a binding legal instrument which is consistent with, and builds upon, previous UN conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and UN Security Council



*Secretary of State Colin Powell signs the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Barbados, 3 June 2002, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs from El Salvador, Maria Eugenia Brizuela de Avila, looks on.*

Resolution 1373, will improve regional cooperation in the fight against terrorism through exchanges of information, experience and training, technical cooperation, and mutual legal assistance. The Convention will enter into force when six states have deposited their instruments of ratification. All OAS member states but one have signed (Dominica is the exception); Canada became the first state to ratify in late 2002. President Bush transmitted the Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification in November.

Spurred by the Convention and the September 11 attacks, many countries in the Hemisphere have sought to shore up legislative tools to outlaw terrorism, discourage terrorist financing, and make their territory as unattractive as possible to terrorists fleeing from other regions who might seek safehaven in the hemisphere. A number of countries, however, remain engaged in deep internal debate over the scope of new

antiterrorism bills that would grant governments broader powers necessary to prosecute the war on terror. An ongoing OAS Legislative Action Against Terrorism project with Central American parliaments, for example, is aimed specifically at helping legislatures draft antiterrorism legislation and ratify the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism.

The Western Hemisphere has created a model regional counterterrorism institution in its Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (known by its Spanish acronym CICTE). CICTE is a body of the OAS that was created in 1998. Since 11 September 2001, it has been reinvigorated as an effective coordinating body for OAS member states on all counterterrorism issues—but with a primary focus on information sharing, training, and strengthening of financial and border controls. Under US chairmanship and Argentine vice-chairmanship, CICTE established a full-time Secretariat in 2002 that is funded by voluntary donations from OAS member states.

(At its Third Regular Session in El Salvador in early 2003, CICTE member states adopted a strong “Declaration of San Salvador Against Terrorism” and made recommendations on counterterrorism initiatives for adoption by the Special Conference on Hemispheric Security, to be held May 2003. The declaration and recommendations both call for increased cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism and recognize the emerging threats posed to the Hemisphere by international terrorist groups and attacks on cyber security.)

The OAS in 2002 also played an important role in the investigation of an illicit diversion in late 2001 of more than 3,000 AK-47 rifles and ammunition from Nicaraguan police and army stocks to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which the United States has designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and has designated pursuant to Executive Order 13224 on terrorist financing. (The OAS-commissioned report, released in January 2003, contained a detailed analysis of the case along with a series of

recommendations for improving the existing inter-American, arms-control regime. The Government of Nicaragua quickly expressed its intention to follow up on the report and to strengthen its arms-controls and export procedures.)

Domestic terrorist groups have continued to ravage Colombia and, to a lesser extent, Peru. The Colombian Government in February under former President Pastrana cut off long-running peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which the United States has designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization, after a series of provocative actions, including kidnapping of a Colombian senator. The FARC intensified its campaign throughout the year and steadily moved its attacks from the countryside to the cities. On 7 August, new Colombian President Alvaro Uribe was inaugurated amid an errant FARC mortar attack that killed 21 residents of a poor Bogota neighborhood. Some elements of the AUC disbanded and reconstituted themselves in an effort to seek political legitimacy, but their ties to narcotrafficking and human rights abuses persist. In December, the AUC declared a unilateral cease-fire and sought peace negotiations with the Government. The National Liberation Army—like the FARC—continued to pursue its favorite terrorist methods of kidnapping and infrastructure bombing. All three organizations are linked to narcotrafficking.

In Peru, a resilient Shining Path is suspected of carrying out the 20 March car bombing at a shopping center across from the US Embassy, two days before a state visit by President Bush. Ten Peruvians died in the attack, including security personnel protecting the Embassy.

At year’s end, there was no confirmed, credible information of an established al-Qaida presence in Latin America. Terrorist fundraising continued to be a concern throughout the region, however. Activities of suspected Hizballah and HAMAS financiers in the Triborder area (Argentina, Brazil,



and Paraguay) led those three countries to take determined and cooperative action during 2002 to investigate and disrupt illicit financial activities. Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay also invited the United States to join a new “Three Plus One” counterterrorism consultative and cooperation mechanism to analyze and combat any terrorist-related threats in the Triborder. The mechanism is an excellent example of terrorism prevention and regional foresight.

Canada and Mexico worked closely with the United States to secure their common borders and to implement the comprehensive bilateral border accords (signed in December 2001 and March 2002, respectively). The accords aim to ensure national border security while facilitating the free and rapid flow of legitimate travel and commerce.

Cuba, one of the seven state sponsors of terrorism, is discussed in the state sponsorship portion of this report.

## **Bolivia**

The Bolivian Government demonstrated its commitment to combating terrorism in 2002. Since the September 11 attacks, Bolivia has become a party to nine international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, making it a party to all 12. On 3 June, Bolivia signed the new Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, although it has not yet ratified the treaty. Throughout the year, Bolivia’s financial investigations unit cooperated with the US Embassy in sharing information about possible terrorist-linked financial transactions and preventing the abuse of Bolivian financial institutions by terrorists.

Bolivia’s new government—inaugurated on 6 August 2002—has maintained its predecessor’s policy of forcibly eradicating illegal coca plants. This policy ensures that Bolivia does not revert to its former status as a key source of coca for cocaine and, through this connection, bolster the terrorist organizations that thrive on the drug trade.

There were no significant acts of terrorism in Bolivia in 2002. Illegal coca growers (*cocaleros*) are thought to be responsible for the deaths of five military and police in 2002, although no individuals have been charged with the crimes. Legal proceedings continued against the alleged perpetrators of a car-bomb explosion near the regional headquarters of the Bolivian National Police in Santa Cruz in December 2001. Some of the alleged perpetrators in custody are former members of the Bolivian national police, and the bombing itself appeared to have been related to local criminal activity.

## **Chile**

The Chilean Government is a consistent and active supporter of US counterterrorism efforts and has taken an active interest in the activities of Islamic extremists connected to the Triborder area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. In addition, the Chilean Government is working to enact new counterterrorism legislation and strengthen current laws. Chile is a party to 11 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. The Chilean Senate is considering a bill to create a new Financial Intelligence Unit and criminalize money laundering for arms trafficking and terrorist financing. Chilean officials have sought advice from the US Embassy on how to improve the money-laundering bill and have participated in training courses to improve financial investigations.

The Chilean Government also has contracted an independent consulting firm to author a study on how US law-enforcement agencies have implemented new counterterrorism legislation. Although the Chilean Government has cooperated in efforts to eliminate terrorist financing, it is limited in its ability to investigate and prosecute suspect individuals. Currently, Chilean money-laundering legislation does not cover terrorist activity, so efforts to freeze terrorist funds are hindered by a lack of legal authority.

There were no acts of international terrorism in Chile in 2002, but there were significant developments in three counterterrorism investigations begun in 2001. In late September 2001, the US Embassy had received a letter bomb that local police successfully destroyed in a controlled demolition, and a Santiago doctor's office received an anthrax-tainted letter. The Chilean Government also opened an investigation into the activities in the northern port city of Iquique of Brazil-based Lebanese businessman Assad Ahmad Barakat—suspected of opening two businesses as cover to move money clandestinely to Lebanese Hizballah.

In September 2002, a Chilean judge sentenced two individuals—Lenin Guardia and Humberto Lopez—to 10 years and 300 days in prison for sending the letter bomb to the US Embassy and another to a prominent Chilean attorney. The motivation of Guardia, the professed ringleader, was to create fear in order to generate business for his security-consulting firm.

Another Chilean judge, with the assistance of the FBI, determined the anthrax letter sent in November 2001 to Dr. Antonio Bafi Pacheco was not related to the anthrax cases in the United States and was contaminated locally. This investigation continues.

The investigation into Assad Ahmad Barakat's business in Chile has not led to new information. Barakat was arrested in Brazil in June 2002, and the Brazilian Supreme Court ordered his extradition to Paraguay in December. His lawyers have applied for refugee status in Brazil, and Barakat will remain in detention in Brazil while his refugee case is considered. Barakat no longer has significant holdings in Chile, and his partners in Saleh Trading Limited, located in the northern duty-free port of Iquique, severed ties with him in 2002. Assad and his brother still own an import-export business in Iquique, but according to the Chilean Government, it has not been active.

In August and September, Chilean authorities discovered several small arms caches throughout Santiago and other cities as well as the remnants of explosive material at two communications transmission towers outside Santiago. The weapons and explosives are believed to belong to the largely defunct terrorist group Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR). Law-enforcement agents believe the weapons were smuggled into Chile in the 1980s, at the height of FPMR's activity, but some view the caches as evidence of an FPMR comeback.

Chile continues to lead other South American nations in its implementation of aviation security. The Government has implemented FAA security regulations ahead of schedule, including the installation of reinforced cockpit doors and the transfer of responsibility for inspecting unaccompanied baggage to the Government.

## Colombia

Colombia's three terrorist organizations—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation Army (ELN), and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)—were responsible for some 3,500 murders in 2002. By February, President Pastrana had broken off three-year-old peace talks—a cornerstone of his presidency—with Colombia's largest terrorist organization, the 16,000-member FARC. That month, the group's abduction of a Colombian Senator during an airliner hijacking proved to be the incident that led to the collapse of the discussions. In addition to ending the dialogue, Pastrana also terminated the group's *despeje*, or demilitarized zone, where the FARC had been allowed to exist without government interference during the deliberations.

The inauguration of President Alvaro Uribe on 7 August 2002 set the stage for an intensified war on domestic terrorism. The FARC carried out errant mortar attacks on a military facility and the

Presidential Palace—with heads of state and high-level representatives from many nations in attendance—resulting in the deaths of 21 residents of a poor Bogota neighborhood near the Palace. President Uribe has proposed pension and labor reforms and has imposed a government austerity program, as well as a one-time “wealth tax,” to improve Bogota’s fiscal ability to prosecute its war on terrorism. Bogota’s goal is to increase government defense spending from 3.2 percent of gross domestic product to more than five percent. Colombia is party to four of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

In 2002, as in years past, Colombia endured more kidnappings (roughly 3,000) than any other country in the world. Ransom payments and extortion fees demanded by the primary perpetrators of kidnapping—the FARC and ELN—continued to hobble the Colombian economy and limit investor confidence. Since 1980, the FARC has murdered at least 10 US citizens, and three New Tribes Missionaries abducted by the FARC in 1993 remain unaccounted for.

Throughout 2002, Colombia was highly cooperative in blocking terrorist assets. Bogota created the Financial Information and Analysis Unit, similar in function to the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Unit. Bogota also has been very responsive to US requests for extradition. As of 6 December, Colombia had extradited 29 Colombian citizens to the United States during 2002, with 26 additional cases pending. Of the six FARC members indicted for the capture and killing in 1999 of three US peace activists, one has been apprehended. Three other FARC members not included in the original indictment were arrested in November 2002 in connection with the murders. The FARC and the AUC continued their practice of massacring one another’s alleged supporters, especially in areas where they were competing for narcotics-trafficking corridors and prime coca-growing terrain. FARC and ELN attacks on oil pipelines and other infrastructure vital to the Colombian economy continued as well, although at a reduced level.

As in past years, the on-again, off-again peace talks between Bogota and the ELN did not lead to substantive breakthroughs. The AUC disbanded itself and subsequently reorganized during 2002. It continued to press for political recognition by the Colombian Government and, as of 1 December, began a unilateral cease-fire that included most of the elements that fall under the AUC’s umbrella.

## **Ecuador**

Although Ecuador has generally supported US counterterrorism initiatives, the Government’s weak financial controls, inadequately trained security personnel, and widespread document fraud limit its counterterrorism efforts. Quito signed the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism but has not yet ratified it. Ecuador is party to seven of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Ecuadorian security forces worked to reduce the smuggling of arms destined for Colombian terrorist groups and limited travel at a key border crossing to daytime hours. Nevertheless, armed violence on the Colombian side of the border contributed to increased lawlessness in Ecuador’s northern provinces.

In the autumn there were two bombings in Guayaquil, possibly related to Ecuador’s presidential elections, while thousands of protesters traveled to Quito for the Free Trade Area of the Americas Ministerial in October. Several police and demonstrators were shot in the protests and the police dispersed tear gas.

## **Peru**

Major actions taken by the Peruvian Government during 2002 against terrorism included attempts to strengthen its counterterrorism laws. In June, Lima passed a law that facilitates prosecution for money laundering related to terrorism and mandates the



*A damaged car on its roof after a car bomb exploded in front of the US Embassy in Lima, Peru, 21 March 2002.*

establishment of a financial intelligence unit (FIU). Implementing regulations for the FIU were issued on 31 October, but Lima has provided only token funding for 2003. The Congressional Defense Committee has been reviewing a draft antiterrorism law designed to strengthen law-enforcement agencies, simplify judicial procedures in terrorism cases, increase prison sentences for terrorists, and ensure that Peruvian antiterrorism legislation conforms to international norms. The executive branch also has proposed a draft law that would change the formula for reducing sentences of terrorists from one day off for two days of good behavior to one day off for five days of good behavior.

Peru has aggressively prosecuted terrorist suspects. The Peruvian National Police reported that 199 suspected terrorists were arrested between January and mid-November. These cases and those involving common crimes, however, can remain in the judicial system for years before being resolved. Some 67 percent of inmates held in prisons have not been sentenced. In January, President Toledo directly addressed the issue of long imprisonment for individuals wrongfully held by publicly apologizing to them. A total of 760 persons have been pardoned and released since 1996 after it was determined that they had been accused unjustly of terrorism. Another 1,664 cases are pending review.

In the most significant terrorist act in Peru in 2002, Sendero Luminoso (SL), or Shining Path, is suspected of being responsible for the bombing on 20 March across the street from the US Embassy that killed 10 persons. Peruvian authorities have so far arrested eight suspected SL members for alleged complicity in the bombing. They were being held pending charges, which could take up to one year. SL's involvement in the illegal narcotics business in Peru is noticeably growing, providing the terrorists with a greater source of funding with which to conduct operations. SL is believed to have conducted 119 terrorist acts in 2002 including roadblocks, harassment of security forces, and raids of towns and villages.

Peru is a party to all 12 of the conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

### **Triborder Area (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay)**

The Triborder area (TBA)—where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay converge—has long been characterized as a regional hub for Hizballah and HAMAS fundraising activities, but it is also used for arms and drug trafficking, contraband smuggling, document and currency fraud, money laundering, and the manufacture and movement of pirated goods. Although there were numerous media reports in 2002 of an al-Qaida presence in the TBA, these reports remained uncorroborated by intelligence and law-enforcement officials.

In December, a high-level interagency delegation from the United States attended a special meeting in Buenos Aires of the Tripartite Commission of the Triple Frontier, a security mechanism established by the three TBA countries in 1998. This “Three Plus One” meeting (the three TBA countries plus the United States) is intended to serve as a continuing forum of counterterrorism cooperation and prevention among all four countries. At the conclusion of the December talks, the four



*In December 2002, delegates including (L-R) Ambassador Oscar Cabello Sarubbi of Paraguay, US Coordinator for Counterterrorism Cofer Black, US Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Francis Taylor, Vice Foreign Minister for Argentina Martin Redrado, Ambassador Marcelo Huergo of Argentina, and Ambassador Antonino Mena Goncalves of Brazil meet for the first Three Plus One Triborder Area Counterterrorism Meeting.*

countries agreed to establish a permanent working group to examine specific counterterrorism issues affecting the four countries. The first issue the working group will tackle in 2003 is that of terrorist fundraising on behalf of Hizballah and HAMAS. Experts from the “Three Plus One” countries will share available information on the problem, draw conclusions, and cooperate to reinforce existing countermeasures.

Host of the December meeting on the Triborder area and a past target of international terrorism, the Government of **Argentina** demonstrated its continuing strong support for the global war on terrorism throughout 2002. Argentina cooperated closely in all significant international counterterrorism efforts within the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS), where it was vice-chair of the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism; the United States was chair. The Argentine Government was instrumental in promoting improved coordination with its neighbors (Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, and

Chile) in strengthening security and countering terrorist-support networks in the Triborder area. The Government of Argentina has been particularly cooperative in responding to requests related to blocking the financial assets of terrorists. Argentina is a party to eight of the 12 conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

In 2002, Argentina reiterated its offer—initially made shortly after the September 11 attacks—of material support for UN-mandated Coalition peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan or elsewhere, if needed.

Although there were no acts of international terrorism in Argentina in 2002, investigations into the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy and the 1994 bombing of the Argentina-Israeli Community Center (AMIA) continued. The trials of 20 suspects in the AMIA bombing—of whom 15 are former police officers—were expected to continue well into 2003.

Since 11 September 2001, Argentina has made no significant progress in enacting new antiterrorism laws that would facilitate the investigation and prosecution of terrorists—largely because past abuses by military regimes have limited the degree to which the public will accept an enhancement of the Government’s police powers. In January, the Government created a new office within the Foreign Ministry to coordinate action and policy on international counterterrorism issues, however. In October, Argentina also established a new Financial Intelligence Unit to investigate money laundering and terrorist finance-related crimes.

The Government of **Brazil** extended practical, effective support to US counterterrorism efforts in 2002. Authorities have been cooperative, following up on leads provided by the US Government on terrorist suspects.



A Sao Paulo judge sentenced three Chileans, two Colombians, and one Argentine to 16 years in prison for kidnapping a Brazilian advertising executive. A well-known terrorist and former high-ranking member of the largely defunct Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (Chile), Mauricio Hernandez Norambuena, was among those sentenced.

The Brazilian Federal Police in 2002 arrested individuals with alleged ties to terrorist groups. In April, police arrested Egyptian Mohammed Ali Aboul-Ezz al-Mahdi Ibrahim Soliman (a.k.a. Suleiman), in the Triborder city of Foz do Iguazu. Soliman was arrested on the basis of an Egyptian Government extradition request for his alleged involvement in the 1997 al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG) attack on tourists in Luxor, Egypt, but the Brazilian Supreme Court released him on 11 September due to insufficient evidence to extradite. On 14 September, another IG suspect, Hesham al-Tarabili was arrested in Brazil at Egypt's request in connection with the Luxor attack.

In another case, authorities in June arrested Assad Ahmad Barakat as a result of an extradition request from Paraguay on charges of tax evasion and criminal association. Barakat is a naturalized Paraguayan of Lebanese origin who had lived in the Triborder area for approximately seven years and had become notorious for allegedly moving millions of dollars to Lebanese Hizballah. The Brazilian Supreme Court on 19 December approved the extradition request. At year's end, Barakat was still in Brazilian custody and applying for refugee status in Brazil.

In January, former President Fernando Cardoso proposed a revision of Brazil's antiterrorism laws that would define terrorism more precisely and impose stricter punishment for those involved in terrorist acts. Brazil became a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings in 2002, making it party to nine of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. Legislation also was pending

to allow wiretaps for court-approved investigations and to become a party to the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. At year's end, neither piece of legislation had yet been submitted for Congressional approval. The Brazilian Government is willing and able to monitor financial operations domestically.

**Paraguay** continued to be an active partner in the war on terror in 2002. Paraguayan authorities have taken numerous steps to disrupt illicit networks that supply substantial funds to Middle East terrorist groups. Authorities carried out two raids on suspected financial terror cells and pursued the extradition from Brazil of local Lebanese Hizballah leader Assad Ahmad Barakat.

Paraguay became a party to the Montreal Protocol in 2002, making it now a party to six of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. Paraguay has diligently responded to requests to block the assets of individuals or organizations designated by the United States, included on the UN Security Council Resolution 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list, or designated by the European Union as terrorists or affiliates.

During 2002, the United States provided technical assistance to help the Government of Paraguay assess vulnerabilities in its financial system and to plan appropriate policy remedies.

Paraguayan authorities arrested Hizballah fundraiser Sobhi Fayad—an associate of Barakat—after he violated the terms of his conditional release from detention while awaiting trial. Because Paraguay's antiterrorism legislation still has not been passed—due to concerns of possible abuses of the law by authorities—Fayad had been imprisoned for nearly 10 months on charges of tax evasion and criminal association. He subsequently was convicted and sentenced to six-and-a-half years in prison.

During the year, authorities took legal action against persons and organizations in the Triborder area involved in illicit activities in an attempt to disrupt the ability of sympathizers to raise funds for terrorists. For example, Paraguay's counterterrorism Secretariat (SEPRINTE) on 27 June arrested suspected Sunni extremist Ali Nizar Dahroug, nephew of former Triborder shopkeeper and suspected al-Qaida associate Muhammad Dahroug Dahroug. Police seized counterfeit goods and receipts documenting wire transfers of large sums of money to persons in the United States and the Middle East, some payable to Muhammad Dahroug Dahroug in Lebanon.

On 25 July, SEPRINTE raided the Ciudad del Este office and apartment of alleged money launderer Fajkumar Naraindas Sabnani, who is allegedly connected to Hizballah. Police found letters detailing the sale of military assault rifles and other military weapons, receipts for large wire transfers, and what appeared to be bomb-making materials. Although police arrested three employees of Sabnani, he remained in Hong Kong.

Officials also have increased security at Asuncion airport. In November, immigration officials detained a self-proclaimed supporter of Usama Bin Ladin en route to the United States, and airline agents prevented three persons claiming to be from Taiwan bearing false passports and US visas from boarding an aircraft bound for the United States.

The Paraguayan Congress rejected antiterrorism legislation that would have defined terrorism and established criminal penalties for activities related to terrorism. Many legislators fear that a corrupt government could use the new law to target political opposition.

## **Uruguay**

Uruguay did not experience any acts of international terrorism in 2002. The Uruguayan Government has been supportive of the global

Coalition's war against terrorism and routinely condemns acts of international terrorism. Uruguay is a party to eight of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. Although Uruguay does not have the financial or military resources to play a direct role in the war on terrorism, it provides troops to international peacekeeping missions in Africa and the Middle East. Uruguay has seconded staff to the secretariat of the OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) and, following its offer to host CICTE in 2004, was elected Vice Chair in early 2003.

Uruguayan authorities routinely share information and cooperate on counterterrorism efforts with their counterparts—Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. Since the Islamic extremist activity is centered on Uruguay's northern border with Brazil, the two countries have worked together closely.

In 2002, Uruguayan law-enforcement authorities assisted with international investigations to monitor the movements and activities of suspected terrorists, and the Parliament is currently drafting new terrorism laws that will further facilitate domestic and international counterterrorism efforts. The Uruguayan Government readily cooperates with US Government requests to investigate individuals or financial transactions linked to terrorism.

Egypt has asked Uruguay to extradite suspected al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG) terrorist al-Said Hassan Mokhles, wanted in connection with the 1997 attack on tourists in Luxor, Egypt. He has been held in Uruguay since early 1999 on charges of document fraud, but Uruguay and Egypt have been unable to agree on the terms for extradition, in part, because Egypt has not guaranteed in writing that Mokhles will not be subject to the death penalty.

## Venezuela

While the Venezuelan Government expressed sympathy in the months following the 11 September 2001 attacks, Caracas made it clear that it opposed the use of force in Afghanistan and has sent mixed signals during the war on terrorism. Venezuela signed the OAS Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism in June 2002, but has not yet ratified the treaty. Venezuela is a party to four of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Nevertheless, Venezuelan laws do not support the efficient investigation of terrorist organization financing or activities; the United States during 2002 provided technical assistance to help the Government of Venezuela assess vulnerabilities in its financial system and to plan appropriate policy remedies. The political crisis at the end of the year, however, had pushed all unrelated issues to the backburner. While Venezuela did extradite two members of the terrorist organization Basque Fatherland and Liberty to Spain, reports abounded that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian National Liberation Army were using the border area between Venezuela and Colombia for cross-border incursions and as an unchallenged safehaven for the guerrillas. Additionally, unconfirmed reports persist that elements of the Venezuelan Government may have provided material support to the FARC, particularly weapons.

## Canada

At the end of 2001, the Canadian Parliament passed into law an antiterrorism act that toughens penalties for terrorists and terrorist supporters and provides new investigative tools for Canadian law-enforcement and national-security agencies. It also makes terrorist fundraising illegal and allows officials to freeze the assets of suspected terrorists, but it cannot be applied retroactively to activities before the law was passed. In July 2002, Canadian officials published a list of banned terrorist organizations pursuant to the antiterrorism

act, which consisted of al-Qaida and six of its known affiliate groups. Addendums to the list in late November and mid-December added nine more groups, including HAMAS and Hizballah, and Canadian officials expect the list to grow further as they examine and evaluate more organizations.

The Government of Canada has been a helpful and strong supporter of the United States in the fight against international terrorism. Despite some differences in approach, overall antiterrorism cooperation with Canada remains excellent and is a model for bilateral cooperation on counterterrorism issues. Seven US law-enforcement agencies have officers posted to Ottawa and other Canadian cities. Canadian law-enforcement personnel, in turn, are assigned to the United States.

Some US law-enforcement officers have expressed concern that Canadian privacy laws, as well as funding levels for law enforcement, inhibit a fuller and more timely exchange of information and response to requests for assistance. Also, Canadian laws and regulations intended to protect Canadian citizens and landed immigrants from Government intrusion sometimes limit the depth of investigations.

The US Attorney General and Canadian Solicitor General conduct policy coordination at the US-Canada Cross-Border Crime Forum, established during the Prime Minister's 1997 visit to Washington. (The Forum met most recently in Calgary in July 2002.) Under the US-Canada Terrorist Interdiction Program, or TIP, Canada records about one "hit" of known or suspected terrorists per week from the State Department's Visa Lookout List.

Additionally, Canada and the United States will hold a new round of talks under the auspices of the Bilateral Consultative Group on Counterterrorism Cooperation, or BCG. This bilateral group is tasked with reviewing international terrorist trends and planning ways to intensify joint counterterrorist efforts. It last met in June 2001 and was expected

to meet in mid-2003. Other cooperative mechanisms include groups led by the immigration and customs services known as Border Vision and the Shared Border Accord, extradition and mutual legal-assistance treaties, and an information-sharing agreement between the US Drug Enforcement Administration and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In 2002, Canada cooperated with the United States in implementing most provisions of the Smart Border Action Plan. This plan and its bilateral implementation have become a model for securing national frontiers while ensuring the free and rapid flow of legitimate travel and commerce.

Canada has continued to be a strong supporter of international efforts to combat terrorism. Besides signing and ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing and implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1373, Canada is active in the G-7, G-8, and G-20 and promotes the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering's Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing and other international efforts to counter terrorist financing. In the autumn, Canada also became the first country to ratify the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, which was opened for signature in June. Canadian armed forces participated in Operation Enduring Freedom with the largest deployment of Canadian troops overseas since the Korean war. Canada also maintained a naval task force group engaged in interdiction operations in the Arabian Sea. On 5 December 2002, the United States and Canada established a binational planning group at North

American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to prepare contingency plans to respond to threats and attacks and other major emergencies in Canada or the United States.

## **Mexico**

Mexico remained a strong supporter of the global war on terrorism during 2002. The Mexican Senate ratified three international conventions on counterterrorism. The UN International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism were ratified on 29 October, and the Inter-American Counterterrorism Convention was signed in June and ratified in November. Mexico's military has been on high alert since the September 11 attacks, with increased military checkpoints throughout the country. Mexico has cooperated fully with the United States in implementing a 22-point border-action plan signed in March that aims to improve border infrastructure, expedite the secure flow of people, and facilitate the secure flow of goods across the United States-Mexico border.

There were no international acts of terrorism in Mexico within the past five years, but during times of demonstrations outside the US Embassy, the Mexican Government routinely cooperated by providing extra security to the Embassy. Notably, Mexico closed the offices of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia in Mexico City in April 2002, after a presence of 10 years.

## Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism

Despite significant pressure from the US Government, the seven designated state sponsors of terrorism—Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan—did not take all the necessary actions to disassociate themselves fully from their ties to terrorism in 2002. While some of these countries have taken steps to cooperate in the global war on terrorism, most have also continued the very actions that led them to be declared state sponsors.

Although Cuba is a party to all 12 international counterterrorism conventions and protocols, and Sudan is a party to 11, both nations continued to provide support to designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Likewise, Syria and Libya have continually indicated that they wish to aid the United States in the conflict against terrorism and have curtailed their sponsorship activities. Their cooperation remained deficient in other areas, however. Syria continued to provide safehaven and transit to some Palestinian rejectionist groups. Suspended UN sanctions against Libya remained in place, as Libya again failed to comply with UN requirements related to the bombing in 1988 of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.

While some of the designated state sponsors have taken steps to accede to the international norms of combating terrorism, others—notably Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—have done little to comply. Iraq, through its intelligence service, prepared for possible attacks against Western targets and was a safehaven, transit point, and operational base for terrorist organizations that included members of al-Qaida. Iran, for its part, remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism during 2002. It has provided funding, training, and weapons to Central Asian and anti-Israeli terrorist groups. In addition, some members of these groups, as well as al-Qaida, have found safehaven in Iran.

State sponsors of terrorism impede the efforts of the United States and the international community to fight terrorism. These countries provide a critical

foundation for terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have a much more difficult time obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations. The United States will continue to insist that these countries end the support they give to terrorist groups.

## Cuba

Although Cuba signed and ratified all 12 international counterterrorism conventions in 2001, it has remained opposed to the US-led Coalition prosecuting the war on global terrorism and has been actively critical of many associated US policies and actions. On repeated occasions, for example, Cuba sent agents to US missions around the world who provided false leads designed to subvert the post-September 11 investigation. Cuba did not protest the use of the Guantanamo Bay base to house enemy combatants from the conflict in Afghanistan.

In 2002, Cuba continued to host several terrorists and US fugitives. Havana permitted up to 20 Basque Fatherland and Liberty members to reside in Cuba and provided some degree of safehaven and support to members of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) groups. Bogota was aware of the arrangement and apparently acquiesced; it has publicly indicated that it seeks Cuba's continued mediation with ELN agents in Cuba.

An accused Irish Republican Army (IRA) weapons expert and longtime resident of Havana went on trial in Colombia in 2002. He had been caught a year earlier in Colombia with two other IRA members and detained for allegedly training the FARC in advanced use of explosives. Some US fugitives continued to live on the island.



## State Sponsor: Implications

Designating countries that repeatedly support international terrorism (i.e., placing a country on the “terrorism list”) imposes four main sets of US Government sanctions:

1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales.
2. Controls over exports of dual use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist list country's military capability or ability to support terrorism.
3. Prohibitions on economic assistance.
4. Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including:
  - Lifting the diplomatic immunity to allow families of terrorist victims to file civil lawsuits in US courts.
  - Denying companies and individuals tax credits for income earned in terrorist list countries.
  - Denial of duty-free treatment for goods exported to the United States.
  - Authority to prohibit any US person from engaging in a financial transaction with a terrorist list government without a Treasury Department license.
  - Prohibition of Defense Department contracts above \$100,000 with companies controlled by terrorist list states.

## Iran

Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2002. Its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence and Security were involved in the planning of and support for terrorist acts and continued to exhort a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals.

Iran's record against al-Qaida has been mixed. While it has detained and turned over to foreign governments a number of al-Qaida members, other al-Qaida members have found virtual safehaven there and may even be receiving protection from elements of the Iranian Government. Iran's long, rugged borders are difficult to monitor, and the large number of Afghan refugees in Iran complicates efforts to locate and apprehend extremists. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that al-Qaida elements could escape the attention of Iran's formidable security services.

During 2002, Iran maintained a high-profile role in encouraging anti-Israeli activity, both rhetorically and operationally. Supreme Leader Khamenei referred to Israel as a “cancerous tumor,” a sentiment echoed by other Iranian leaders in speeches and sermons. Matching this rhetoric with action, Iran provided Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups—notably HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command—with funding, safehaven, training, and weapons. Tehran also encouraged Hizballah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups to coordinate their planning and to escalate their terrorist activities against Israel.

Iran also provided support to extremist groups in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iraq with ties to al-Qaida, though less than that provided to the groups opposed to Israel.

## Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism

*"The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology."*

*President Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17 September 2002.*

The September 11 attacks confirmed that terrorists will seek to produce mass casualties whenever they believe it serves their purposes. Although terrorists will probably continue to rely on traditional terrorist tactics, several groups, including al-Qaida, increasingly look to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials as a means to potentially cause mass casualties rivaling or exceeding those of September 11. Troublesome amounts of dangerous materials—and information about how to create and deliver CBRN weapons—remain available to terrorists.

*"Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination."*

*President Bush*

Usama Bin Ladin has said he sees the acquisition of "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD) as a "religious duty," and he has threatened to use such weapons. This rhetoric was underscored by reports that documents retrieved from al-Qaida facilities in Afghanistan contain information on CBRN materials.

The threat is not limited to Bin Ladin and al-Qaida, however. Information indicates that small but growing numbers of other terrorist groups are also interested in CBRN materials. In Europe, French police seized a chemical contamination suit and arrested a terrorist cell in December 2002 that allegedly was planning an attack using chemical agents. At least one related group was making ricin toxin in London at that same time for a future terrorist attack.

CBRN terrorism events to date have generally involved crude and improvised delivery means that have been only marginally effective. With the exception of the US anthrax attacks, the materials employed in these events also have been crudely

manufactured. Other events have involved dual-use materials that have legitimate civilian applications, such as industrial chemicals, poisons and pesticides, and radiological source materials embedded in legitimate measuring instruments. While terrorist events involving these materials and improvised delivery systems can cause significant casualties, damage, and disruption, such events pale in comparison to the casualties and damage that could occur if terrorists acquired WMD and the ability to effectively deliver them.

*"...The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed."*

*President Bush*

Preventing the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials and technologies, has long been a pillar of national security. Since September 11, it has become an even more urgent global priority. President Bush made this urgency clear in his December 2002 *National Strategy To Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, in which he set out a comprehensive strategy to prevent WMD proliferation, including to terrorists. Nations around the world have joined the United States in undertaking greater efforts to prevent terrorist acquisition of WMD, relevant materials, and related technologies.

*"In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action."*

*President Bush*

The United States is working within multilateral nonproliferation regimes and other international fora. Bilaterally, the United States promotes more stringent nonproliferation policies and programs; strengthened export controls; and improved border security to prevent terrorists or their state sponsors from acquiring WMD, their delivery systems, related materials, or technologies. As the President's National Strategy notes, however, should our diplomatic efforts fall short, we will be prepared to deter and defend against the full range of WMD scenarios.


In 2002, Iran became party to the 1988 Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation. It is party to five of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## Iraq

Iraq planned and sponsored international terrorism in 2002. Throughout the year, the Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS) laid the groundwork for possible attacks against civilian and military targets in the United States and other Western countries. The IIS reportedly instructed its agents in early 2001 that their main mission was to obtain information about US and Israeli targets. The IIS also threatened dissidents in the Near East and Europe and stole records and computer files detailing antiregime activity. In December 2002, the press claimed Iraqi intelligence killed Walid al-Mayahi, a Shi'a Iraqi refugee in Lebanon and member of the Iraqi National Congress.

Iraq was a safehaven, transit point, and operational base for groups and individuals who direct violence against the United States, Israel, and other countries. Baghdad overtly assisted two categories of Iraqi-based terrorist organizations—Iranian dissidents devoted to toppling the Iranian Government and a variety of Palestinian groups opposed to peace with Israel. The groups include the Iranian Mujahedin-e Khalq, the Abu Nidal organization (although Iraq reportedly killed its leader), the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF). In the past year, the PLF increased its operational activity against Israel and sent its members to Iraq for training for future terrorist attacks.

Baghdad provided material assistance to other Palestinian terrorist groups that are in the forefront of the *intifadah*. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, HAMAS, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad are the three most important groups to whom Baghdad has extended outreach and support efforts.



*Suspected leader of Iraqi Kurdish Islamic extremist group, Ansar al-Islam, Mullah Krekar attends a press conference, 14 January 2003 in Oslo, Norway, after being expelled from the Netherlands.*

Saddam paid the families of Palestinian suicide bombers to encourage Palestinian terrorism, channeling \$25,000 since March through the ALF alone to families of suicide bombers in Gaza and the West Bank. Public testimonials by Palestinian civilians and officials and cancelled checks captured by Israel in the West Bank verify the transfer of a considerable amount of Iraqi money.

The presence of several hundred al-Qaida operatives fighting with the small Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam in the northeastern corner of Iraqi Kurdistan—where the IIS operates—is well documented. Iraq has an agent in the most senior levels of Ansar al-Islam as well. In addition, small numbers of highly placed al-Qaida militants were present in Baghdad and areas of Iraq that Saddam controls. It is inconceivable these groups were in Iraq without the knowledge and acquiescence of Saddam's regime. In the past year, al-Qaida operatives in northern Iraq concocted suspect chemicals under the direction of senior al-Qaida associate Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and tried to smuggle them into Russia, Western Europe, and the United States for terrorist operations.

Iraq is a party to five of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

*(Note: See Appendix G for a fuller description of Iraq's ties to terrorism—particularly al-Qaida—excerpted from Secretary Powell's 5 February 2003 presentation before the United Nations Security Council.)*

## Libya

In 2002, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi continued the efforts he undertook following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks to identify Libya with the war on terrorism and the struggle against Islamic extremism. In August, Qadhafi told visiting British officials that he regards Usama Bin Ladin and his Libyan followers a threat to Libya. In his 1 September speech, he declared that Libya would combat members of al-Qaida and “heretics”—a likely reference to Libyan extremists allied with al-Qaida and opposed to his regime—as doggedly as the United States did. He further claimed that all political prisoners would be released and that the Libyan Government would henceforth only hold members of al-Qaida. Libya appears to have curtailed its support for international terrorism, although it may maintain residual contacts with some of its former terrorist clients.

Libya’s past record of terrorism continued to hinder Qadhafi’s efforts to shed Libya’s pariah status in 2002. In March, a Scottish appellate court upheld the conviction—originally returned in January 2001—of Libyan intelligence agent Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi for murder in connection with planting an explosive device on Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988. The explosion killed all 259 passengers and crew on board and 11 persons on the ground in Lockerbie, Scotland. There have been reports of a proposed out-of-court settlement of a suit brought by Pan Am 103 family members against Libya, but by year’s end it had not been concluded.

Despite progress toward the payment of appropriate compensation, at year’s end Libya had yet to comply with the remaining UN Security Council requirements related to Pan Am Flight 103, necessary for the permanent lifting of UN sanctions, including accepting responsibility for the actions of its officials.

In October, lawyers representing the seven US citizens who died in the bombing of UTA Flight 772 in 1989—for which a French court convicted

six Libyans *in absentia* in 1999—filed a suit against Libya and Qadhafi, reportedly seeking \$3 billion in compensation. The same month, Libya reportedly pledged to French authorities to increase payments already made to victims of the UTA bombing following the French court ruling in 1999.

In 2002, Libya became a party to the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. It is a party to all the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## North Korea

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) response to international efforts to combat terrorism was disappointing throughout 2002, although in a statement released after the September 11 attacks, the DPRK had reiterated its public policy of opposing terrorism and any support for terrorism. In 2001, following the September 11 attacks, it also signed the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and became a party to the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.

Despite the urging of the international community, however, North Korea did not take substantial steps to cooperate in efforts to combat terrorism. Its initial and supplementary reports to the UN Counterterrorism Committee on actions it had undertaken to comply with its obligations under UNSCR 1373 were largely uninformative and nonresponsive. It did not respond to previous US proposals for discussions on terrorism and did not report any efforts to freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts that UNSCR 1373, among other things, requires all states to do.

North Korea is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since 1987. It has sold weapons to several terrorist groups, however, even as it reiterated its opposition to all forms of international terrorism. Pyongyang also has provided safe-haven to several Japanese Red Army members who participated in the hijacking of a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970.

Pyongyang continued to sell ballistic missile technology to countries designated by the United States as state sponsors of terrorism, including Syria and Libya.

North Korea is a party to six of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

## **Sudan**

Sudan was cooperating with US counterterrorism efforts before 11 September 2001, which included a close relationship with various US Government agencies to investigate and apprehend extremists suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. Sudan is a party to 11 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. Sudan also has participated in regional efforts to end the civil war that has been ongoing since 1983—a US policy priority that parallels the US objective of having Sudan deny safehaven to terrorists.

While concerns remain regarding Sudanese Government support for certain terrorist groups, such as HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, the United States is pleased with Sudan's cooperation and the progress being made in their antiterrorist activities.

## **Syria**

The Syrian Government has continued to provide political and limited material support to a number of Palestinian groups, including allowing them to maintain headquarters or offices in Damascus. Some of these groups have committed terrorist

acts, but the Syrian Government insists that their Damascus offices undertake only political and informational activities. The most notable Palestinian rejectionist groups in Syria are the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS). Syria also continued to permit Iranian resupply, via Damascus, of Hizballah in Lebanon. Nonetheless, the Syrian Government has not been implicated directly in an act of terrorism since 1986.

At the UN Security Council and in other multilateral fora, Syria has taken a leading role in espousing the view that Palestinian and Lebanese terrorist groups fighting Israel are not terrorists; it also has used its voice in the UN Security Council to encourage international support for Palestinian national aspirations and denounce Israeli actions in the Palestinian territories as "state terrorism."

The Syrian Government has repeatedly assured the United States that it will take every possible measure to protect US citizens and facilities from terrorists in Syria. In times of increased threat, it has increased police protection around the US Embassy. During the past five years, there have been no acts of terrorism against US citizens in Syria. The Government of Syria has cooperated significantly with the United States and other foreign governments against al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations and individuals. It also has discouraged any signs of public support for al-Qaida, including in the media and at mosques.

In 2002, Syria became a party to the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, making it party to five of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.





## Appendix A

### Chronology of Significant Terrorist Incidents, 2002

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*Note: The incidents listed have met the US Government's Incident Review Panel criteria. An International Terrorist Incident is judged significant if it results in loss of life or serious injury to persons, abduction or kidnapping of persons, major property damage, and/or is an act or attempted act that could reasonably be expected to create the conditions noted.*

#### January

12 January

##### Venezuela

In El Amparo, armed militants kidnapped two persons, an Italian and Venezuelan citizen. On 17 May, a rebel defecting from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) released the two hostages.

15 January

##### West Bank

In Bayt Sahur, militants attacked a vehicle carrying two passengers, killing one person, who was a US-Israeli citizen, and wounding the other. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion claimed responsibility.

22 January

##### India

In Kolkata (Calcutta), armed militants attacked the US Consulate, killing five Indian security forces and injuring 13 others. The Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami and the Asif Raza Commandoes claimed responsibility.

##### India

In Jammu, Kashmir, a bomb exploded in a crowded retail district, killing one person and injuring nine others. No one claimed responsibility.

23 January

##### Pakistan

In Karachi, armed militants kidnapped and killed a US journalist working for the *Wall Street Journal* newspaper. No one claimed responsibility.

24 January

##### Algeria

In Larbaa-Tablat Road, militants set up an illegal roadblock, killing three persons, including one Syrian. No one claimed responsibility.

31 January

##### Philippines

Two hikers on the slopes of the Pinatubo volcano were attacked by militants. One of the hikers, a US citizen, was killed.

## **February**

**9 February**

### **France**

In Saint-Jean-De-Luz, unidentified persons threw gasoline bombs at a police headquarters, causing material damage to police barracks and three parked vehicles but resulting in no injuries. No one claimed responsibility, but authorities suspect radical groups associated with the Basque Fatherland and Liberty.

**16 February**

### **West Bank**

In Karnei Shomron, a suicide bomber attacked a pizzeria in an outdoor food court, killing four persons, two of whom were US citizens and wounding 27 others including two US citizens. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) claimed responsibility.

**28 February**

### **Colombia**

In Antioquia, an Italian tourist was kidnapped at a checkpoint armed rebels had illegally set up. On 17 March in San Francisco, the rebels released the Italian tourist.

### **Jordan**

In Amman, a bomb placed in a car was detonated by a timing device, killing an Egyptian and an Iraqi laborer who worked in a nearby food shop. The car belonged to the wife of the head of the Jordanian Anti-Terrorism Unit and was parked near their home. No one claimed responsibility.

## **March**

**7 March**

### **West Bank**

In Ariel, a suicide bomber entered a large supermarket collocated with a hotel and detonated the explosive device he was wearing, wounding 10 persons including a US citizen, according to media and US Embassy reporting. The PFLP claimed responsibility.

**9 March**

### **Israel**

In Jerusalem, a suicide bomber entered a restaurant/cafe detonating the explosive device he was wearing, killing 11 persons and wounding 52 others including a US citizen, according to media and US Embassy reporting. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claimed responsibility.

**14 March**

### **Colombia**

In Cali, two US citizens were shot and killed by motorcycle-riding gunmen. The two US citizens were brothers who arrived in town the day before to negotiate the release of their father who had been taken captive by the FARC. No one claimed responsibility.

**17 March**

### **Pakistan**

In Islamabad, during a Protestant service, several grenades were thrown inside a church used by diplomatic and local personnel, killing five persons—including two US citizens and 46 others, according to press reports. The Lashkar-e-Tayyiba probably is responsible.

<b>18 March</b>	<p><b>Georgia</b></p> <p>In Abkhazia, Georgian guerrillas kidnapped four Russian peacekeepers to negotiate an exchange for two Georgian gunmen who were being held by Russian authorities. On 21 March, the four Russian peacekeepers and their weapons were released in exchange for the two Georgian gunmen. Georgian guerrillas claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>20 March</b>	<p><b>Peru</b></p> <p>In Lima, a vehicle bomb exploded at a shopping center some 50 meters from the US Embassy, killing nine persons, injuring 32 others, and causing major damage. Authorities suspect the Maoist Shining Path rebels and/or the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. The dead included two police officers and a teenager but no US citizens. The attack occurred three days before the US President's planned visit to Peru.</p>
<b>21 March</b>	<p><b>Israel</b></p> <p>In Jerusalem, a suicide bomber detonated the explosive device he was wearing, killing three persons and wounding 86 others, including two US citizens, according to US Consulate and media reporting. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>22 March</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Shopiyan, Kashmir, militants threw several grenades into a busy market at midmorning, injuring 35 persons. No one claimed responsibility.</p> <p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Anantnag, Kashmir, militants tossed several grenades at a busy bus stand, injuring 17 persons. No one claimed responsibility.</p> <p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Rajouri, Kashmir, a bomb exploded in a sweet shop, injuring five persons. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>22 March</b>	<p><b>Uganda</b></p> <p>In Kalosaric, gunmen stopped a vehicle traveling on the Moroto-Kotido Road, killing three persons—an Irish Catholic priest, his driver, and his cook. Karamojong gunmen are probably responsible.</p>
<b>23 March</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Kadal, Kashmir, a grenade hurled at a police installation missed its target and landed in a group of civilians, killing two persons and injuring 20 others, including nine policemen. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>26 March</b>	<p><b>Senegal</b></p> <p>In Kafountine, Casamance Province, rebels attacked the coastal resort, killing five persons and wounding four others including a French citizen. The Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces is probably responsible.</p>

**West Bank**

In Hebron, gunmen stopped and fired on a vehicle owned and operated by the Temporary Presence in Hebron (TIPH), killing two persons—a Turkish Army officer and a Swiss office worker—and wounding a Turkish Army officer, according to media and government reports. No one claimed responsibility. The Palestinian Authorities and the Israeli Army accuse each other of the incident.

**27 March****Israel**

In Netanya, a suicide bomber entered the crowded restaurant of a hotel and detonated the explosive device he was wearing, killing 22 persons including one US citizen and wounding 140 others. The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) claimed responsibility.

**30 March****India**

In Jammu, Kashmir, a bomb exploded at a Hindu temple, killing 10 persons, according to press reports. The Islamic Front has claimed responsibility.

**31 March****West Bank**

In Efrat, a suicide bomber standing next to an ambulance station detonated the explosive device he was wearing, injuring four persons including one US citizen, according to press and US Consulate reporting. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed responsibility.

**April****1 April****Nigeria**

In Niger Delta, 10 oil workers contracted to the Royal Shell Oil Group were kidnapped by militant youths, according to press reports. Six of the hostages were foreign nationals, including one US citizen, one Filipino, and four Ghanaians.

**10 April****India**

In Gando, Kashmir, armed militants killed five persons and injured four others in their residence. No one claimed responsibility.

**11 April****Tunisia**

In Djerba, a suicide bomber crashed and detonated a propane gas truck into the fence of a historic synagogue, killing 16 persons including 11 German citizens, one French citizen, and three Tunisians and injuring 26 German citizens. The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Sites claimed responsibility.

**12 April****Israel**

In Jerusalem, a suicide bomber detonated the explosive vest she was wearing, killing six persons, including two Chinese citizens, and wounding 90 others. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claimed responsibility.

**14 April****India**

In Pulwama, Kashmir, a grenade fired at a police vehicle missed its target, landing in a crowded bus stop, killing one person and injuring 13 others. No one claimed responsibility.



<b>16 April</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Balhama-Rafiabad, armed militants killed five persons and injured two others. The Ikhwan are probably responsible.</p>
<b>26 April</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Gharat, Kashmir, a bomb planted under a bus was detonated by remote control, killing one person and injuring 21 others—nine security personnel and 12 civilians. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>28 April</b>	<p><b>Colombia</b></p> <p>In Bogotá, according to US Embassy reporting, a car packed with 88 pounds of explosives was discovered adjacent to the World Business Port commercial building that houses the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other international organizations. A policeman identified the vehicle as suspicious and called the bomb squad who disarmed the device. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>May</b>	
<b>4 May</b>	<p><b>Istanbul</b></p> <p>In Istanbul, an armed gunman entered a large tourist hotel and took several Turkish nationals and one Bulgarian hostage, according to press and US Embassy reporting. About an hour later, all the hostages were released unharmed, and the gunman surrendered. No group claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>7 May</b>	<p><b>Colombia</b></p> <p>In Quebradas, a section of the Cano Limon-Covenas pipeline was bombed, killing two persons, wounding four others, and causing millions of dollars in property damage. The FARC or National Liberation Army (ELN) is probably responsible.</p>
<b>8 May</b>	<p><b>Pakistan</b></p> <p>In Karachi, a vehicle parked next to a Navy shuttle bus exploded, killing 10 French nationals and two Pakistanis and wounding 19 others—11 French nationals and eight Pakistanis—shattering windows in nearby buildings and leaving a large crater in the road, according to press reports. Al-Qaida is probably responsible.</p>
<b>9 May</b>	<p><b>Lebanon</b></p> <p>In Tripoli, a bomb placed beside a US fast food restaurant—Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC)—detonated, wounding an employee, according to press reports. No one claimed responsibility.</p> <p><b>Russia</b></p> <p>In Kapiisk, Dagestan, militants detonated a remote-controlled bomb in the bushes as the May Day Parade was passing by on Main Street, killing 42 persons, including 14 soldiers, and wounding 150 others, including 50 soldiers, according to press reports. Islamist militants linked to al-Qaida are probably responsible.</p> <p><b>Thailand</b></p> <p>In Tachilek, a bomb exploded at a hotel, killing one Burmese national and injuring three others. No one claimed responsibility.</p>

<b>10 May</b>	<p><b>United Kingdom</b></p> <p>In London, a timer-detonated bomb exploded at the Armenian Embassy. No casualties were reported, and no one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>14 May</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Kaluchak, Jammu, militants fired on a passenger bus, killing seven persons, then entered a military housing complex killing three soldiers, four soldiers' wives, and three children. The Al-Mansooran and Jamiat ul-Mujahedin claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>17 May</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Srinagar, Kashmir, a bomb exploded outside the high-security civil secretariat area, injuring six persons. No one claimed responsibility.</p> <p>In Jammu, Kashmir, a bomb exploded at a fire services headquarters, killing two persons and injuring 16 others. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>21 May</b>	<p><b>Colombia</b></p> <p>In Srinagar, armed gunmen killed a senior Hurriyat conference leader, according to press reports. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>30 May</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Kashmir, armed militants shot and injured a subeditor of a local English language newspaper, <i>Kashmir Images</i>. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>June</b>	
<b>1 June</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Kulgam, Kashmir, a grenade thrown into a crowd killed one person and injured seven others. No one claimed responsibility.</p> <p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Srinagar, armed militants threw a grenade into a paramilitary foot patrol, killing one person and injuring 13 others. No one claimed responsibility.</p> <p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Anantnag, armed militants threw a grenade into a police station, injuring 18 persons. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>7 June</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Pindi, armed militants killed one person, injured three others, and damaged several houses. No one claimed responsibility.</p> <p>Philippine military units on a rescue mission engaged terrorists from the ASG in a firefight that took the life of US citizen Martin Burnham, who had been held hostage along with his wife, for more than a year. She was wounded and freed.</p>
<b>9 June</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Rajouri, Kashmir, armed militants wounded six persons including three security personnel and damaged a television tower building. No one claimed responsibility.</p>

<b>14 June</b>	<p><b>Pakistan</b></p> <p>In Karachi, a vehicle bomb exploded on the main road near the US Consulate and Marriott Hotel, killing 11 persons, injuring 51 others, including a US and a Japanese citizen, and damaging nearby buildings. Al Qaida or Al-Qa'nun is possibly responsible.</p>
<b>19 June</b>	<p><b>Israel</b></p> <p>In Jerusalem, a suicide bomber jumped out of a car, ran into the concrete shelter at a bus stop, and detonated the explosive device he was wearing, killing six persons and wounding 43 others, including two US citizens. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>20 June</b>	<p><b>Pakistan</b></p> <p>In Neelum Valley, armed militants fired on a passenger bus sending it over a cliff, killing the driver and nine passengers and injuring 12 others. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>21 June</b>	<p><b>Spain</b></p> <p>In Fuengirola, a vehicle bomb exploded in a parking lot adjacent to a beach hotel/apartment building injuring six persons, including four Britons, one Moroccan, and one Spaniard. The Basque Fatherland and Liberty is probably responsible.</p>
<b>24 June</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Kupwara, Kashmir, a bomb exploded at the State Law and Parliamentary Minister's residence, injuring five police officers guarding the home. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>30 June</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Nishat, Kashmir, armed militants killed a National Conference leader. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>July</b>	
<b>5 July</b>	<p><b>Algeria</b></p> <p>In Larbaa, rebels detonated a homemade bomb in the downtown area, killing 35 persons, including two Nigerian citizens, and wounding 80 others. The Armed Islamic Group is possibly responsible.</p>
<b>8 July</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Indh, Kashmir, a bomb exploded near a water tank, killing three persons. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>13 July</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Jammu, armed militants attacked a village, killing 27 persons. The Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is probably responsible.</p> <p><b>Pakistan</b></p> <p>In Mansehra, a grenade thrown into a group of European tourists visiting at an archeological site exploded, injuring 12 persons—seven Germans, one Austrian, one Slovak, and three Pakistanis. No one claimed responsibility.</p>

17 July	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Anantnag, Kashmir, a bomb exploded in a government building, killing three persons and injuring nine others. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
	<p><b>Israel</b></p> <p>In Tel Aviv, two suicide bombers carried out an attack simultaneously near the old bus station, killing five persons, including one Romanian and two Chinese, and wounding 38 others, including one Romanian. The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.</p>
22 July	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Sumer, Kashmir, armed militants killed three persons, all members of the Village Defense Committee. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
24 July	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Rajouri, Kashmir, a grenade exploded in a crowded marketplace, killing one person and injuring 27 others. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
25 July	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Batmaloo, Kashmir, militants threw a grenade into a crowded marketplace, injuring 15 persons. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
31 July	<p><b>West Bank</b></p> <p>In Jerusalem, a bomb hidden in a bag that was placed on a table in the Frank Sinatra International Student Center, Hebrew University, detonated, killing nine persons including five US citizens and four Israeli citizens and wounding approximately 87 others including four US citizens, two Japanese citizens, and three South Korean citizens, according to media reports. The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) claimed responsibility.</p>
August	
4 August	<p><b>Israel</b></p> <p>In Safed, a suicide bomber boarded a bus and detonated the explosive device he was wearing, killing nine persons, including two Philippine citizens, and injuring 50 others, including an unspecified number of military personnel returning from leave. HAMAS claimed responsibility.</p>
5 August	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Malik, Kashmir, a grenade was thrown into a crowded marketplace injuring 10 persons. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
	<p><b>Pakistan</b></p> <p>In Murree, gunmen attacked a Christian School attended by 146 children of missionaries from around the world, killing six persons—two security guards, a cook, a carpenter, a receptionist, and a private citizen—and injuring a Filipino citizen visiting her son. A group called al-Intigami al-Pakistani claimed responsibility.</p>

**6 August**

**Colombia**

In Cuanata, a bomb exploded on a segment of the Canadian-owned Ocesa oil pipeline, causing oil spillage and environmental damage. The explosion forced the suspension of crude oil transport to the Port of Covenas. The FARC is responsible.

**India**

In Pahalgam, Kashmir, armed militants threw several grenades and then fired into a group of Hindu pilgrims, killing nine persons and injuring 32 others. The Lashkar-e-Tayyiba claimed responsibility.

**13 August**

**India**

In Ananthag, Kashmir, a bomb exploded at a bus stop, killing one person and injuring 21 others. No one claimed responsibility.

**20 August**

**Germany**

In Berlin, militants occupied the Iraqi Embassy, taking hostage six Iraqi nationals and injuring two persons. German police ended the five-hour siege and arrested the five militants. The Democratic Iraqi Opposition is responsible.

**25 August**

**Afghanistan**

In Kabul, a bomb exploded outside the United Nations main guesthouse, injuring two persons. There were 50 persons living at the guesthouse. No one claimed responsibility.

**28 August**

**Ecuador**

In Guayaquil, a pamphlet bomb exploded at a McDonald's restaurant, injuring three persons and causing major property damage. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Ecuador is responsible.

**31 August**

**India**

In Mahore, armed militants entered the private residence of a Revenue Department official who had been deployed on election duty, killing three persons. No one claimed responsibility.

**September**

**3 September**

**India**

In Langet, Kashmir, armed militants attacked a political rally, killing three persons and injuring four others. No one claimed responsibility.

**India**

In Kishtwar, Kashmir, a bomb exploded near the downtown area, injuring 19 persons. The Hizb ul-Mujahedin is possibly responsible.

**6 September**

**Macedonia**

In Skopje, a bomb exploded in a restaurant, injuring two persons including one Turkish citizen. No one claimed responsibility.

**8 September**

**India**

In Dodasanpal, Kashmir, armed militants killed five persons and injured one other. No one claimed responsibility.

11 September	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Dhamhal Hanjipora, Kashmir, militants hurled a grenade at the private residence of the Minister of Tourism, injuring four persons inside. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Tikipora, Kashmir, armed militants killed the Law Minister and six security guards escorting him while he was out campaigning. Three different groups claimed responsibility: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jamiat ul-Mujahedin, and Hizb ul-Mujahedin.</p>
15 September	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Dhamhal Hanjipora, Kashmir, armed militants fired on then threw an improvised explosive device at the motorcade carrying the Minister of Tourism, killing a police officer and injuring two others. The Minister of Tourism escaped unharmed. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
17 September	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Srinagar, Kashmir, armed militants shot and injured the leading editor of the <i>Urdu Daily Srinagar Times</i> at his private residence. No one claimed responsibility.</p> <p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Srinagar, militants lobbed a grenade at the office of a local political party, injuring a security guard. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
18 September	<p><b>West Bank</b></p> <p>In Yahad, gunmen ambushed and overturned a vehicle on the Mevo Dotan-Hermesh Road, killing one person, an Israeli, and wounding a Romanian worker. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed responsibility.</p>
19 September	<p><b>Israel</b></p> <p>In Tel Aviv, a suicide bomber boarded a bus and detonated the explosive device concealed in his backpack, killing five Israelis and one UK citizen and wounding 52 others, according to media and US Embassy reporting. HAMAS claimed responsibility.</p>
20 September	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Jammu, Kashmir, armed militants killed a senior National Conference Party worker in his home. No one claimed responsibility.</p> <p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Srinagar, Kashmir, armed militants opposed to Indian held elections, killed a political activist of the ruling National Conference Party. A National Conference leader stated that the Hizb ul-Mujahedin may be responsible.</p>
22 September	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Shopian, Kashmir, armed militants threw grenades and then fired at the residence of the ruling National Conference legislator who was in residence at the time but was unharmed in the attack. No one claimed responsibility.</p>



	<p><b>India</b> In Bandgam, Kashmir, armed militants shot and killed the Ruling Block president. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>23 September</b>	<p><b>India</b> In Bijbiara, Kashmir, militants hurled a grenade at a vehicle belonging to the Jammu and Kashmir's Peoples Democratic Party. The grenade missed its target and exploded on the roadside, injuring eight persons. No one claimed responsibility.</p> <p><b>India</b> In Sangam, Kashmir, armed militants attempted to hurl a grenade at a political rally, but it missed the intended victims, exploded near a group of private citizens and injured eight persons. No one claimed responsibility.</p> <p><b>India</b> In Srinagar, Kashmir, militants hurled a grenade at an army vehicle but missed its target and exploded in a crowded marketplace, injuring 12 persons and two police officers. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>27 September</b>	<p><b>India</b> In Pulwama, Kashmir, a grenade exploded on the road, injuring 17 persons and five soldiers. The attack came right before India's scheduled elections.</p>
<b>28 September</b>	<p><b>India</b> In Devsar, Kashmir, a landmine exploded under a vehicle carrying a National Congress Party member and three other persons. The explosion killed the three passengers and injured the National Congress Party member. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>29 September</b>	<p><b>India</b> In Tral, Kashmir, militants threw a grenade at a bus station, killing one person and injuring 12 others, according to press reports. No one claimed responsibility.</p> <p><b>India</b> In Ganderbal, Kashmir, armed militants killed a political activist belonging to the ruling National Conference Party. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>30 September</b>	<p><b>India</b> In Manda Chowk, Kashmir, a timed device exploded on a bus carrying Hindu pilgrims, killing one person and injuring 18 others. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>October</b>	
<b>1 October</b>	<p><b>India</b> In Kathu, Kashmir, militants hijacked a minivan, driving it into a utility pole near an open-air vegetable market. The gunmen fired grenades at the minivan, killing all nine passengers. The Al-Arifeen, an offshoot group of the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, claimed responsibility.</p>

<b>2 October</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Haihama, Kashmir, armed militants killed three political activists working with India's ruling National Conference Party. The Al-Arifeen, an offshoot group of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaiba, claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>6 October</b>	<p><b>Yemen</b></p> <p>In al-Dhabbah, a small boat carrying a large amount of explosives rammed the hull of the French oil tanker Limburg as it was anchored approximately 5 miles from port. The attack killed one person and wounded four others. Al-Qaida is probably responsible.</p>
<b>8 October</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Doda, Kashmir, armed militants hurled grenades and then fired into a polling station, causing no injuries. No one claimed responsibility.</p> <p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Kashmir, militants attempted to throw a grenade at a security patrol, but the grenade missed the target and exploded in a crowded marketplace, injuring 14 persons. No one claimed responsibility.</p> <p><b>Kuwait</b></p> <p>On Failaka Island, gunmen attacked US soldiers while they were conducting a non-live-fire exercise, killing one US Marine and wounding one other. Al-Qaida claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>12 October</b>	<p><b>Indonesia</b></p> <p>In Manado, a bomb exploded near the Philippine Consulate, damaging the front gate and breaking several windows. No one claimed responsibility.</p> <p><b>Indonesia</b></p> <p>In Bali, a car bomb exploded outside the Sari Club Discotheque on Legian Street, a busy tourist area filled with nightclubs, cafes, and bars, killing at least 187 international tourists and injuring about 300 others. The resulting fire also destroyed the nearby Padi Club and Panin Bank and other buildings and cars. Al-Qaida claimed responsibility for this attack.</p>
<b>20 October</b>	<p><b>India</b></p> <p>In Onagam, armed militants killed three persons and injured two others near a mosque. No one claimed responsibility.</p>
<b>23 October</b>	<p><b>Russia</b></p> <p>In Moscow, 50 armed Chechen rebels took control of the Palace of Culture Theater to demand an end to the war in Chechnya. The theater was rigged with landmines and explosive devices to control hostages and promote leverage with Russian authorities. The rebels held more than 800 hostages including foreign nationals from the United Kingdom, France, Belarus, Germany, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Ukraine, Israel, Austria, United States, and two permanent residents of the United States. During the three-day siege, rebels killed one Russian police officer and five Russian hostages.</p>

On 26 October, the third day of the siege, Russian Special Forces administered the anesthetic gas fentanyl through the ventilation system. Commandos stormed the theater and killed all of the Chechen rebels after a brief gun battle. In the rescue attempt, 124 hostages died including citizens from Russia (115), United States (1), Azerbaijan (1), Netherlands (1), Ukraine (2), Armenia (1), Austria (1), Kazakhstan (1), and Belarus (1). Chechen rebels led by Movsar Barayev claimed responsibility.

**25 October**

**Russia**

In Moscow, an explosive device described as a shrapnel-filled artillery shell equivalent to five kilograms of TNT exploded in an automobile parked in a McDonald's parking lot, killing one person and injuring eight others. The explosion caused major damage to the restaurant. The explosive device was similar to the type commonly used in Chechnya. Russian authorities arrested a Chechen male in connection with the explosion. No one claimed responsibility.

**28 October**

**Jordan**

In Amman, press reports stated that gunmen shot and killed a US diplomat, the senior administrator at the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The Honest People of Jordan claimed responsibility.

**November**

**18 November**

**Turkey**

In Istanbul, an Israeli Arab attempted to hijack El Al Flight 581, 15 minutes before landing. The passenger ran toward the cockpit, attacked the stewardess with a penknife, and demanded that she open the cockpit door. Security guards simultaneously overpowered the man and took him into custody. Shin Bet stated that his actions were nationalistically motivated. No one claimed responsibility.

**21 November**

**Israel**

In Jerusalem, a suicide bomber entered a bus on Mexico Street near Kiryat Menachem and detonated the explosive device he was wearing, killing 11 persons including a Romanian citizen and wounding 50 others, according to media and US Consulate reports. HAMAS claimed responsibility.

**Kuwait**

In Kuwait City, a Kuwaiti police officer stopped and shot two US soldiers driving a rental car, wounding both, according to media and US Embassy reports. The military personnel were both in uniform and armed but did not return fire. No group claimed responsibility.

**Lebanon**

In Sidon, a gunman shot and killed a US citizen who was an office manager/nurse for a church-run health facility, according to media and US Embassy reports. The female victim, married to a citizen of the United Kingdom, was shot as she entered the facility. An' Asbat al-Ansar-linked extremist is probably responsible.

**24 November**

**India**

In Jammu, Kashmir, armed militants attacked the Reghunath and Shiv temples, killing 13 persons and wounding 50 others. The Lashkar-e-Tayyiba claimed responsibility for this attack.

**28 November**

**Kenya**

In Mombasa, a vehicle containing three suicide bombers drove into the front of the Paradise Hotel and exploded, killing 15 persons including three Israelis and 12 Kenyans and wounding 40 others including 18 Israelis and 22 Kenyans. Al-Qaida, the Government of Universal Palestine in Exile, and the Army of Palestine claimed responsibility. Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) is probably linked to the attack.

**Kenya**

In Mombasa, two SA-7 Strela antiaircraft missiles were launched but missed downing a Arkia Boeing 757 taking off from Mombasa enroute to Israel. The aircraft carried 261 passengers and continued its flight. Al-Qaida, the Government of Universal Palestine in Exile, and the Army of Palestine claimed responsibility. AIAI is probably linked to the attack according to reports.

**30 November**

**India**

In Awantipora, Kashmir, a grenade exploded, injuring four persons. No one claimed responsibility.

**India**

In Srinagar, Kashmir, a bomb exploded near a police vehicle, injuring seven persons. No one claimed responsibility.

**India**

In Srinagar, Kashmir, a bomb exploded near a police vehicle, injuring seven persons. No one claimed responsibility.

**December**

**4 December**

**India**

In Srinagar, Kashmir, authorities safely defused a bomb found at a bus station. No one claimed responsibility.

**5 December**

**Pakistan**

In Karachi, a bomb exploded at the Macedonia Consulate destroying the consulate building. When the authorities searched through the debris, they found three local workers with their throats slit. No one claimed responsibility.

**6 December**

**India**

In Rajpora Chowk, Kashmir, militants threw a grenade toward a vehicle carrying several military officers, but it missed its mark and landed near a group of private citizens, injuring eight persons. No one claimed responsibility.

**India**

In Damhal Hanjipora, Kashmir, militants threw a grenade and fired shots at the private residence of a former minister. The Lashkar-e-Tayyiba probably is responsible.

**India**

In Pulwama, Kashmir, armed militants killed the brother of the recently slain Law Minister outside his private residence. The militants threw a grenade then fired shots at him. The Lashkar-e-Tayyiba claimed responsibility in a communique to a local television station.

**India**

In Bombay, a bomb exploded at a local McDonald's restaurant located in a busy rail station mall, injuring 23 persons. The bomb consisted of gunpowder, nails, and iron balls and followed a bomb attack on 6 December at a McDonald's outlet in the Indonesian city of Makassar. No one claimed responsibility.

**Indonesia**

In Makassar, a bomb exploded in a McDonald's restaurant, killing three persons, injuring 11 others, and causing major damage to the restaurant. No one claimed responsibility though police are focusing on a hardline Islamic group, Laskar Jundullah.

**18 December****India**

In Yaripora, Kashmir, militants lobbed a handgrenade at a parked military vehicle, but it missed its target and landed near a group of private citizens, injuring 15 persons, three military personnel, and causing major damage to the military vehicle. No one claimed responsibility.

**20 December****India**

In Kashmir, armed militants killed a newly elected state legislator. No one claimed responsibility.

**24 December****Pakistan**

In Islamabad, authorities safely dismantled several grenades and about 30 rounds of ammunition, which had been placed in a bag near a church where local and Western worshippers were to gather for Christmas services. An anonymous phone call to the local authorities had warned that a bomb had been placed near the church. No one claimed responsibility.

**26 December****Philippines**

In Zamboanga del Norte, armed militants ambushed a bus carrying Filipino workers employed by a local Canadian mining company, killing 13 persons and injuring 10 others. Police said that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) had been extorting money from the workers' employer, the Calgary-based mining firm Toronto Ventures Inc. Pacific. The Catholic charity Caritas-Philippines said that the Canadian mining company has been harassing tribesmen opposed to mining operations on their ancestral lands. Authorities have accused the MILF of carrying out the attack.

**27 December****Chechnya**

In Grozny, suicide bombers drove two trucks packed with explosives to the headquarters of Chechnya's pro-Moscow government building and detonated them, killing 72 persons and wounding 210 others. Chechen officials believe the explosives had the force of one ton of TNT and left a 20-foot-wide crater. The explosions

destroyed the government building and caused extensive damage to surrounding government facilities. The Kavkaz Center, which operates a Chechen Web site, reported that Chechen *shaheeds* (martyrs) were responsible.

### **30 December**

#### **Yemen**

In Jibla, a gunman entered a Baptist missionary hospital, killing three persons and wounding one other, all US citizens. The gunman is believed to have acted alone. He admitted, however, to being affiliated with the Islah Party and coordinated the attack with Ali al-Jarala who had killed Yemeni Socialist Party leader Jarala Omar.



## Appendix B

### Background Information on Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations

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*The following descriptive list constitutes the 36 terrorist groups that currently (as of 30 January 2003) are designated by the Secretary of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The designations carry legal consequences:*

- *It is unlawful to provide funds or other material support to a designated FTO.*
- *Representatives and certain members of a designated FTO can be denied visas or excluded from the United States.*
- *US financial institutions must block funds of designated FTOs and their agents and must report the blockage to the US Department of the Treasury.*

**Abu Nidal  
organization (ANO)**  
a.k.a. Fatah—the  
Revolutionary Council,  
Arab Revolutionary  
Brigades, Black  
September, and  
Revolutionary  
Organization of  
Socialist Muslims

**Description**

International terrorist organization founded by Sabri al-Banna (a.k.a Abu Nidal). Split from PLO in 1974. Made up of various functional committees, including political, military, and financial. In November 2002, Abu Nidal died in Baghdad; the new leadership of the organization is unclear.

**Activities**

Has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons. Targets include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul and the Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in Greece in July 1988. Suspected of assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO security chief Abu Hul in Tunis in January 1991. ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994 and has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative there. Has not staged a major attack against Western targets since the late 1980s.

**Strength**

Few hundred plus limited overseas support structure.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Al-Banna relocated to Iraq in December 1998, where the group maintains a presence. Has an operational presence in Lebanon including in several Palestinian refugee camps. Authorities shut down the ANO's operations in Libya and Egypt in 1999. Has demonstrated ability to operate over wide area, including the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Financial problems and internal disorganization have reduced the group's activities and capabilities.

**External Aid**

Has received considerable support, including safehaven, training, logistic assistance, and financial aid from Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987), in addition to close support for selected operations.

**Abu Sayyaf Group  
(ASG)**

**Description**

The ASG is the most violent of the separatist groups operating in the southern Philippines. Some ASG leaders allegedly fought in Afghanistan during the Soviet war and are students and proponents of radical Islamic teachings. The group split from the Moro National

Liberation Front in the early 1990s under the leadership of Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police on 18 December 1998. His younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani, has replaced him as the nominal leader of the group, which is composed of several semiautonomous factions.

#### **Activities**

Engages in kidnappings for ransom, bombings, assassinations, and extortion. Although from time to time it claims that its motivation is to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern Philippines heavily populated by Muslims, the ASG has primarily used terror for financial profit. Recent bombings may herald a return to a more radical, politicized agenda. The group's first large-scale action was a raid on the town of Ipil in Mindanao in April 1995. In April of 2000, an ASG faction kidnapped 21 persons, including 10 foreign tourists, from a resort in Malaysia. Separately in 2000, the group abducted several foreign journalists, three Malaysians, and a US citizen. On 27 May 2001, the ASG kidnapped three US citizens and 17 Filipinos from a tourist resort in Palawan, Philippines. Several of the hostages, including one US citizen, were murdered. During a Philippine military hostage rescue operation on 7 June 2002, US hostage Gracia Burnham was rescued, but US hostage Martin Burnham and Filipina Deborah Yap were killed during the operation. Philippine authorities say that the ASG had a role in the bombing near a Philippine military base in Zamboanga on 2 October that killed three Filipinos and one US serviceman and wounded 20 others.

#### **Strength**

Estimated to have 200 to 500 members.

#### **Location/Area of Operation**

The ASG was founded in Basilan Province and mainly operates there and in the neighboring provinces of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in the Sulu Archipelago. It also operates in the Zamboanga peninsula, and members occasionally travel to Manila and other parts of the country. The group expanded its operations to Malaysia in 2000 when it abducted foreigners from a tourist resort.

#### **External Aid**

Largely self-financing through ransom and extortion; may receive support from Islamic extremists in the Middle East and South Asia. Libya publicly paid millions of dollars for the release of the foreign hostages seized from Malaysia in 2000.

### **Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (al-Aqsa)**

#### **Description**

The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade comprises an unknown number of small cells of Fatah-affiliated activists that emerged at the outset of the current *intifadah* to attack Israeli targets. It aims to drive the Israeli military and settlers from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem and to establish a Palestinian state.

#### **Activities**

Al-Aqsa has carried out shootings and suicide operations against Israeli military personnel and civilians and has killed Palestinians who it believed were collaborating with Israel. At least five US citizens, four of them dual Israeli-US citizens, were killed in al-Aqsa's attacks. The group probably did not attack them because of their US citizenship. In January 2002, al-Aqsa claimed responsibility for the first suicide bombing carried out by a female.

#### **Strength**

Unknown.

**Armed Islamic Group  
(GIA)**

**Location/Area of Operation**

Al-Aqsa operates mainly in the West Bank and has claimed attacks inside Israel and the Gaza Strip. It may have followers in Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon.

**External Aid**

Unknown.

**Description**

An Islamic extremist group, the GIA aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The GIA began its violent activity in 1992 after Algiers voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front—the largest Islamic opposition party—in the first round of legislative elections in December 1991.

**Activities**

Frequent attacks against civilians and government workers. Since 1992, the GIA has conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation, although the group's dwindling numbers have caused a decrease in the number of attacks. Since announcing its campaign against foreigners living in Algeria in 1993, the GIA has killed more than 100 expatriate men and women—mostly Europeans—in the country. The group uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats. The GIA hijacked an Air France flight to Algiers in December 1994. In 2002, a French court sentenced two GIA members to life in prison for conducting a series of bombings in France in 1995.

**Strength**

Precise numbers unknown, probably fewer than 100.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Algeria.

**External Aid**

None known.

**'Asbat al-Ansar**

**Description**

'Asbat al-Ansar—the League of the Followers—is a Lebanon-based, Sunni extremist group, composed primarily of Palestinians and associated with Usama Bin Ladin. The group follows an extremist interpretation of Islam that justifies violence against civilian targets to achieve political ends. Some of those goals include overthrowing the Lebanese Government and thwarting perceived anti-Islamic and pro-Western influences in the country.

**Activities**

'Asbat al-Ansar has carried out multiple terrorist attacks in Lebanon since it first emerged in the early 1990s. The group assassinated Lebanese religious leaders and bombed nightclubs, theaters, and liquor stores in the mid-1990s. The group raised its operational profile in 2000 with two attacks against Lebanese and international targets. It was involved in clashes in northern Lebanon in December 1999 and carried out a rocket-propelled grenade attack on the Russian Embassy in Beirut in January 2000.

In 2002, there was an increase in anti-US attacks, including bombings of US-franchised restaurants and the murder of an American missionary. The perpetrators are believed to be Sunni extremists that may be linked to 'Asbat al-Ansar.

**Aum Supreme Truth  
(Aum)**  
a.k.a. Aum Shinrikyo,  
Aleph

### **Strength**

The group commands about 300 fighters in Lebanon.

### **Location/Area of Operation**

The group's primary base of operations is the 'Ayn al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp near Sidon in southern Lebanon.

### **External Aid**

Probably receives money through international Sunni extremist networks and Bin Ladin's al-Qaida network.

### **Description**

A cult established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, the Aum aimed to take over Japan and then the world. Approved as a religious entity in 1989 under Japanese law, the group ran candidates in a Japanese parliamentary election in 1990. Over time the cult began to emphasize the imminence of the end of the world and stated that the United States would initiate Armageddon by starting World War III with Japan. The Japanese Government revoked its recognition of the Aum as a religious organization in October 1995, but in 1997, a government panel decided not to invoke the Anti-Subversive Law against the group, which would have outlawed the cult. A 1999 law gave the Japanese Government authorization to continue police surveillance of the group due to concerns that the Aum might launch future terrorist attacks. Under the leadership of Fumihiko Joyu, the Aum changed its name to Aleph in January 2000 and claimed to have rejected the violent and apocalyptic teachings of its founder. (Joyu took formal control of the organization early in 2002 and remains its leader.)

### **Activities**

On 20 March 1995, Aum members simultaneously released the chemical nerve agent sarin on several Tokyo subway trains, killing 12 persons and injuring up to 6,000. The group was responsible for other mysterious chemical accidents in Japan in 1994. Its efforts to conduct attacks using biological agents have been unsuccessful. Japanese police arrested Asahara in May 1995, and he remained on trial facing charges for 13 crimes, including 7 counts of murder at the end of 2001. Legal analysts say it will take several more years to conclude the trial. Since 1997, the cult continued to recruit new members, engage in commercial enterprise, and acquire property, although it scaled back these activities significantly in 2001 in response to public outcry. The cult maintains an Internet home page. In July 2001, Russian authorities arrested a group of Russian Aum followers who had planned to set off bombs near the Imperial Palace in Tokyo as part of an operation to free Asahara from jail and then smuggle him to Russia.

### **Strength**

The Aum's current membership is estimated at 1,500 to 2,000 persons. At the time of the Tokyo subway attack, the group claimed to have 9,000 members in Japan and up to 40,000 worldwide.

### **Location/Area of Operation**

The Aum's principal membership is located only in Japan, but a residual branch comprising an unknown number of followers has surfaced in Russia.

### **External Aid**

None.



**Basque Fatherland  
and Liberty (ETA)**

a.k.a. Euzkadi  
Ta Askatasuna

**Description**

Founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist principles in the northern Spanish Provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava, and Navarra, and the southwestern French Departments of Labourd, Basse-Navarra, and Soule. Recent Spanish counterterrorism initiatives are hampering the group's operational capabilities. Spanish police arrested 123 ETA members and accomplices in 2002; French authorities arrested dozens more. In August, a Spanish judge placed a provisional ban on ETA's political wing, Batasuna.

**Activities**

Primarily involved in bombings and assassinations of Spanish Government officials, security and military forces, politicians, and judicial figures; in December 2002, however, ETA reiterated its intention to target Spanish tourist areas. In 2002, ETA killed five persons, including a child, a notable decrease from 2001's death toll of 15, and wounded approximately 90 persons. The group has killed more than 800 persons and injured hundreds of others since it began lethal attacks in the early 1960s. ETA finances its activities through kidnappings, robberies, and extortion.

**Strength**

Unknown; hundreds of members, plus supporters.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Operates primarily in the Basque autonomous regions of northern Spain and southwestern France, but also has bombed Spanish and French interests elsewhere.

**External Aid**

Has received training at various times in the past in Libya, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. Some ETA members allegedly have received sanctuary in Cuba while others reside in South America.

**Communist Party of  
Philippines/New  
People's Army  
(CPP/NPA)**

**Description**

The military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the NPA is a Maoist group formed in March 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the government through protracted guerrilla warfare. The chairman of the CPP's Central Committee and the NPA's founder, Jose Maria Sison, directs all CPP and NPA activity from the Netherlands, where he lives in self-imposed exile. Fellow Central Committee member and director of the CPP's National Democratic Front (NDF) Luis Jalandoni also lives in the Netherlands and has become a Dutch citizen. Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla group, the NPA has an active urban infrastructure to conduct terrorism and uses city-based assassination squads. Derives most of its funding from contributions of supporters in the Philippines, Europe, and elsewhere, and from so-called revolutionary taxes extorted from local businesses.

**Activities**

The NPA primarily targets Philippine security forces, politicians, judges, government informers, former rebels who wish to leave the NPA, and alleged criminals. Opposes any US military presence in the Philippines and attacked US military interests before the US base closures in 1992. Press reports in 1999 and in late 2001 indicated that the NPA is again targeting US troops participating in joint military exercises as well as US Embassy personnel. The NPA claimed responsibility for the assassination of congressmen from Quezon in May 2001 and Cagayan in June 2001 and many other killings. In January 2002, the NPA publicly expressed its intent to target US personnel in the Philippines.

**Al-Gama'a  
al-Islamiyya  
(Islamic Group, IG)**

**Strength**

Slowly growing; estimated at more than 10,000.

**Location/Area of Operations**

Operates in rural Luzon, Visayas, and parts of Mindanao. Has cells in Manila and other metropolitan centers.

**External Aid**

Unknown.

**Description**

Egypt's largest militant group, active since the late 1970s; appears to be loosely organized. Has an external wing with supporters in several countries worldwide. The group issued a cease-fire in March 1999, but its spiritual leader, Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, sentenced to life in prison in January 1996 for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and incarcerated in the United States, rescinded his support for the cease-fire in June 2000. The Gama'a has not conducted an attack inside Egypt since August 1998. Senior member signed Usama Bin Ladin's *fatwa* in February 1998 calling for attacks against the United States.

Unofficially split in two factions; one that supports the cease-fire led by Mustafa Hamza, and one led by Rifa'i Taha Musa, calling for a return to armed operations. Taha Musa in early 2001 published a book in which he attempted to justify terrorist attacks that would cause mass casualties. Musa disappeared several months thereafter, and there are conflicting reports as to his current whereabouts. In March 2002, members of the group's historic leadership in Egypt declared use of violence misguided and renounced its future use, prompting denunciations by much of the leadership abroad.

For members still dedicated to violent jihad, primary goal is to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state. Disaffected IG members, such as those potentially inspired by Taha Musa or Abd al-Rahman, may be interested in carrying out attacks against US and Israeli interests.

**Activities**

Group conducted armed attacks against Egyptian security and other government officials, Coptic Christians, and Egyptian opponents of Islamic extremism before the cease-fire. From 1993 until the cease-fire, al-Gama'a launched attacks on tourists in Egypt, most notably the attack in November 1997 at Luxor that killed 58 foreign tourists. Also claimed responsibility for the attempt in June 1995 to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Gama'a never has specifically attacked a US citizen or facility but has threatened US interests.

**Strength**

Unknown. At its peak the IG probably commanded several thousand hard-core members and a like number of sympathizers. The 1999 cease-fire and security crackdowns following the attack in Luxor in 1997 and, more recently, security efforts following September 11, probably have resulted in a substantial decrease in the group's numbers.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Operates mainly in the Al-Minya, Asyut, Qina, and Sohaj Governorates of southern Egypt. Also appears to have support in Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban locations, particularly among unemployed graduates and students. Has a worldwide presence, including in the United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Yemen, and various locations in Europe.

**HAMAS (Islamic  
Resistance Movement)**

**External Aid**

Unknown. The Egyptian Government believes that Iran, Bin Ladin, and Afghan militant groups support the organization. Also may obtain some funding through various Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGO).

**Description**

Formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Various HAMAS elements have used both political and violent means, including terrorism, to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel. Loosely structured, with some elements working clandestinely and others working openly through mosques and social service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda. HAMAS's strength is concentrated in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Also has engaged in peaceful political activity, such as running candidates in West Bank Chamber of Commerce elections.

**Activities**

HAMAS activists, especially those in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, have conducted many attacks—including large-scale suicide bombings—against Israeli civilian and military targets. In the early 1990s, they also targeted suspected Palestinian collaborators and Fatah rivals. HAMAS increased its operational activity during 2001-2002 claiming numerous attacks against Israeli interests. The group has not targeted US interests—although some US citizens have been killed in HAMAS operations—and continues to confine its attacks to Israelis inside Israel and the territories.

**Strength**

Unknown number of official members; tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers.

**Location/Area of Operation**

HAMAS currently limits its terrorist operations to Israeli military and civilian targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel. The group's leadership is dispersed throughout the Gaza Strip and West Bank, with a few senior leaders residing in Syria, Lebanon, and the Gulf States.

**External Aid**

Receives some funding from Iran but primarily relies on donations from Palestinian expatriates around the world and private benefactors in moderate Arab states. Some fundraising and propaganda activity take place in Western Europe and North America.

**Harakat ul-Mujahidin  
(HUM) (Movement of  
Holy Warriors)**

**Description**

The HUM is an Islamic militant group based in Pakistan that operates primarily in Kashmir. It is politically aligned with the radical political party, Jamiat-i Ulema-i Islam Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F). Longtime leader of the group, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, in mid-February 2000 stepped down as HUM emir, turning the reins over to the popular Kashmiri commander and his second in command, Farooq Kashmiri. Khalil, who has been linked to Bin Ladin and signed his *fatwa* in February 1998 calling for attacks on US and Western interests, assumed the position of HUM Secretary General. HUM operated terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan until Coalition airstrikes destroyed them during fall 2001.

**Activities**

Has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir. Linked to the Kashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; one was killed in August 1995 and the other four

reportedly were killed in December of the same year. The HUM is responsible for the hijacking of an Indian airliner on 24 December 1999, which resulted in the release of Masood Azhar—an important leader in the former Harakat ul-Ansar imprisoned by the Indians in 1994—and Ahmed Omar Sheik, who was convicted of the abduction/murder in January-February 2002 of US journalist Daniel Pearl.

#### **Strength**

Has several thousand armed supporters located in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris and also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. Uses light and heavy machineguns, assault rifles, mortars, explosives, and rockets. HUM lost a significant share of its membership in defections to the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) in 2000.

#### **Location/Area of Operation**

Based in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi, and several other towns in Pakistan, but members conduct insurgent and terrorist activities primarily in Kashmir. The HUM trained its militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

#### **External Aid**

Collects donations from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf and Islamic states and from Pakistanis and Kashmiris. The HUM's financial collection methods also include soliciting donations from magazine ads and pamphlets. The sources and amount of HUM's military funding are unknown. In anticipation of asset seizures by the Pakistani Government, the HUM withdrew funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and production of consumer goods. Its fundraising in Pakistan has been constrained since the government clampdown on extremist groups and freezing of terrorist assets.

#### **Hizballah (Party of God)**

a.k.a. Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine

#### **Description**

Formed in 1982 in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, this Lebanon-based radical Shi'a group takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The Majlis al-Shura, or Consultative Council, is the group's highest governing body and is led by Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Hizballah is dedicated to liberating Jerusalem, ultimately eliminating Israel, and has formally advocated ultimate establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon. Nonetheless, Hizballah has actively participated in Lebanon's political system since 1992. Hizballah is closely allied with, and often directed by, Iran but may have conducted operations that were not approved by Tehran. While Hizballah does not share the Syrian regime's secular orientation, the group has been a strong tactical ally in helping Syria advance its political objectives in the region.

#### **Activities**

Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-US and anti-Israeli terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombings of the US Embassy and US Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 and the US Embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984. Three members of Hizballah, 'Imad Mughniyah, Hasan Izz-al-Din, and Ali Atwa, are on the FBI's list of 22 Most Wanted Terrorists for the hijacking in 1985 of TWA Flight 847 during which a US Navy diver was murdered. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping and detention of US and other Westerners in Lebanon in the 1980s. Hizballah also attacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 and the Israeli cultural center in Buenos Aires in 1994. In fall 2000, it captured three Israeli soldiers in the Shab'a Farms and kidnapped an Israeli noncombatant whom it may have lured to Lebanon under false pretenses.

**Islamic Movement of  
Uzbekistan (IMU)**

**Strength**

Several thousand supporters and a few hundred terrorist operatives.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Operates in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon. Has established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia.

**External Aid**

Receives financial, training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran and diplomatic, political, and logistic support from Syria.

**Description**

Coalition of Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states opposed to Uzbekistani President Islom Karimov's secular regime. Although the IMU's primary goal remains to overthrow Karimov and establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, IMU political and ideological leader Tohir Yoldashev is working to rebuild the organization and appears to have widened the IMU's targets to include all those he perceives as fighting Islam. The IMU generally has been unable to operate in Uzbekistan and thus has been more active in Kyrgystan and Tajikistan.

**Activities**

The IMU primarily targeted Uzbekistani interests before October 2001 and is believed to have been responsible for five car bombs in Tashkent in February 1999. Militants also took foreigners hostage in 1999 and 2000, including four US citizens who were mountain climbing in August 2000, and four Japanese geologists and eight Kyrgyz soldiers in August 1999. Even though the IMU's rhetoric and ultimate goals may have been focused on Uzbekistan, it was generally more active in Kyrgystan and Tajikistan. In Operation Enduring Freedom, the counterterrorism coalition has captured, killed, and dispersed many of the IMU's militants who were fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan and severely degraded the movement's ability to attack Uzbekistani or Coalition interests in the near term. IMU military leader Juma Namangani was killed during an air strike in Afghanistan in November 2001; Yoldashev remains at large.

**Strength**

Probably fewer than 1,000 militants.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Militants are scattered throughout South Asia, Tajikistan, and Iran. Area of operations includes Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

**External Aid**

Support from other Islamic extremist groups and patrons in the Middle East and Central and South Asia.

**Jaish-e-Mohammed  
(JEM) (Army of  
Mohammed)**

**Description**

The Jaish-e-Mohammed is an Islamic extremist group based in Pakistan that was formed by Masood Azhar upon his release from prison in India in early 2000. The group's aim is to unite Kashmir with Pakistan. It is politically aligned with the radical political party, Jamiat-i Ulema-i Islam Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F). The United States announced the addition of JEM to the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control's (OFAC) list—which includes organizations that are believed to support terrorist groups and have assets in US jurisdiction that can be frozen or controlled—in October 2001 and the Foreign Terrorist Organization list in December 2001.

**Activities**

The JEM's leader, Masood Azhar, was released from Indian imprisonment in December 1999 in exchange for 155 hijacked Indian Airlines hostages. The 1994 HUA kidnappings by Omar Sheik of US and British nationals in New Delhi and the July 1995 HUA/AI Faran kidnappings of Westerners in Kashmir were two of several previous HUA efforts to free Azhar. The JEM on 1 October 2001 claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly building in Srinagar that killed at least 31 persons but later denied the claim. The Indian Government has publicly implicated the JEM—along with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba—for the 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament that killed nine and injured 18. Pakistani authorities suspect that perpetrators of fatal anti-Christian attacks in Islamabad, Murree, and Taxila, during 2002 were affiliated with the JEM.

**Strength**

Has several hundred armed supporters located in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and in India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions, including a large cadre of former HUM members. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris and also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. Uses light and heavy machineguns, assault rifles, mortars, improvised explosive devices, and rocket grenades.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Based in Peshawar and Muzaffarabad, but members conduct terrorist activities primarily in Kashmir. The JEM maintained training camps in Afghanistan until the fall of 2001.

**External Aid**

Most of the JEM's cadre and material resources have been drawn from the militant groups Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI) and the Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM). The JEM had close ties to Afghan Arabs and the Taliban. Usama Bin Ladin is suspected of giving funding to the JEM. The JEM also collects funds through donation requests in magazines and pamphlets. In anticipation of asset seizures by the Pakistani Government, the JEM withdrew funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and production of consumer goods.

**Jemaah Islamiya (JI)****Description**

Jemaah Islamiya is a Southeast Asian terrorist network with links to al-Qaida. The network plotted in secrecy through the late 1990s, following the stated goal of creating an idealized Islamic state comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern Philippines, and southern Thailand.

**Activities**

The JI was responsible for the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002, which killed nearly 200 and wounded 300 others. The Bali plot was apparently the final outcome of meetings in early 2002 in Thailand, where attacks against Singapore and soft targets such as tourist spots in the region were considered. In December 2001, Singapore authorities uncovered a JI plot to attack the US and Israeli Embassies and British and Australian diplomatic buildings in Singapore. Recent investigations also linked the JI to December 2000 bombings where dozens of bombs were detonated in Indonesia and the Philippines.

**Strength**

Exact numbers are currently unknown, and Southeast Asian authorities continue to uncover and arrest additional JI elements. Singaporean officials have estimated total JI members to be approximately 5,000. The number of actual operationally oriented JI members probably is several hundred.



**Location/Area of Operation**

Following the regional crackdown against JI, it is unclear how the network has responded. The JI is believed to have cells spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and southern Thailand and may have some presence in neighboring countries.

**External Aid**

Based on information from ongoing investigations, in addition to raising its own funds, the JI receives money and logistic assistance from Middle Eastern and South Asian contacts, NGOs, and other groups, including al-Qaida.

**Al-Jihad**

a.k.a. Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad

**Description**

Egyptian Islamic extremist group active since the late 1970s. Merged with Bin Ladin's al-Qaida organization in June 2001, but may retain some capability to conduct independent operations. Primary goals are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack US and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad.

**Activities**

Historically specialized in armed attacks against high-level Egyptian Government personnel, including cabinet ministers, and car bombings against official US and Egyptian facilities. The original Jihad was responsible for the assassination in 1981 of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Claimed responsibility for the attempted assassinations of Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993. Has not conducted an attack inside Egypt since 1993 and has never targeted foreign tourists there. Responsible for Egyptian Embassy bombing in Islamabad in 1995; in 1998 an attack against US Embassy in Albania was thwarted.

**Strength**

Unknown, but probably has several hundred hard-core members.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Historically operated in the Cairo area, but most of its network is outside Egypt, including Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and the United Kingdom, and its activities have been centered outside Egypt for several years.

**External Aid**

Unknown. The Egyptian Government claims that Iran supports the Jihad. Its merger with al-Qaida also boosts Bin Ladin's support for the group. Also may obtain some funding through various Islamic nongovernmental organizations, cover businesses, and criminal acts.

**Kahane Chai (Kach)****Description**

Stated goal is to restore the biblical state of Israel. Kach (founded by radical Israeli-American rabbi Meir Kahane) and its offshoot Kahane Chai, which means "Kahane Lives," (founded by Meir Kahane's son Binyamin following his father's assassination in the United States) were declared to be terrorist organizations in March 1994 by the Israeli Cabinet under the 1948 Terrorism Law. This followed the groups' statements in support of Dr. Baruch Goldstein's attack in February 1994 on the al-Ibrahimi Mosque—Goldstein was affiliated with Kach—and their verbal attacks on the Israeli Government. Palestinian gunmen killed Binyamin Kahane and his wife in a drive-by shooting in December 2000 in the West Bank.

**Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)**  
a.k.a. Kurdistan  
Freedom and  
Democracy Congress  
(KADEK) and Freedom  
and Democracy  
Congress of  
Kurdistan.

**Activities**

The group has organized protests against the Israeli Government and has harassed and threatened Palestinians in the West Bank. Kach members have threatened to attack Arabs, Palestinians, and Israeli Government officials. Has vowed revenge for the death of Binyamin Kahane and his wife. Suspected of involvement in a number of low-level attacks since the start of the al-Aqsa *intifadah*.

**Strength**

Unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Israel and West Bank settlements, particularly Qiryat Arba' in Hebron.

**External Aid**

Receives support from sympathizers in the United States and Europe.

**Description**

Founded in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist insurgent group primarily composed of Turkish Kurds. The group's goal has been to establish an independent, democratic Kurdish state in the Middle East. In the early 1990s, the PKK moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to include urban terrorism. Turkish authorities captured Chairman Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya in early 1999; the Turkish State Security Court subsequently sentenced him to death. In August 1999, Ocalan announced a "peace initiative," ordering members to refrain from violence and requesting dialogue with Ankara on Kurdish issues. At a PKK Congress in January 2000, members supported Ocalan's initiative and claimed the group now would use only political means to achieve its new goal, improved rights for Kurds in Turkey. In April 2002 at its 8<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, the PKK changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and proclaimed a commitment to nonviolent activities in support of Kurdish rights. A PKK/KADEK spokesman stated that its armed wing, The People's Defense Force, would not disband or surrender its weapons for reasons of self-defense, however. This statement by the PKK/KADEK avowing it would not lay down its arms underscores that the organization maintains its capability to carry out terrorist operations. PKK/KADEK established a new ruling council in April, its membership virtually identical to the PKK's Presidential Council.

**Activities**

Primary targets have been Turkish Government security forces in Turkey, local Turkish officials, and villagers who oppose the organization in Turkey. Conducted attacks on Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities in dozens of West European cities in 1993 and again in spring 1995. In an attempt to damage Turkey's tourist industry, the PKK bombed tourist sites and hotels and kidnapped foreign tourists in the early-to-mid 1990s. The PKK/KADEK did not conduct a terrorist attack in 2002; however, the group periodically issues veiled threats that it will resume violence if the conditions of its imprisoned leader are not improved, and it continues its military training and planning.

**Strength**

Approximately 4,000 to 5,000, most of whom currently are located in northern Iraq. Has thousands of sympathizers in Turkey and Europe.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Operates in Turkey, Europe, and the Middle East.

**Lashkar-e-Tayyiba  
(LT) (Army of the  
Righteous)**

**External Aid**

Has received safehaven and modest aid from Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Damascus generally upheld its September 2000 antiterror agreement with Ankara, pledging not to support the PKK. Conducts extensive fundraising in Europe.

**Description**

The LT is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization, Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI)—a Sunni anti-US missionary organization formed in 1989. The LT is led by Abdul Wahid Kashmiri and is one of the three largest and best-trained groups fighting in Kashmir against India; it is not connected to a political party. The United States in October 2001 announced the addition of the LT to the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control's (OFAC) list—which includes organizations that are believed to support terrorist groups and have assets in US jurisdiction that can be frozen or controlled. The group was banned, and the Pakistani Government froze its assets in January 2002.

**Activities**

The LT has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir since 1993. The LT claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in 2001, including an attack in January on Srinagar airport that killed five Indians along with six militants; an attack on a police station in Srinagar that killed at least eight officers and wounded several others; and an attack in April against Indian border-security forces that left at least four dead. The Indian Government publicly implicated the LT—along with JEM—for the 13 December attack on the Indian Parliament building. The LT is also suspected of involvement in the 14 May 2002 attack on an Indian Army base in Kaluchak that left 36 dead. Senior al-Qaida lieutenant Abu Zubaydah was captured at an LT safehouse in Faisalabad in March 2002, suggesting some members are facilitating the movement of al-Qaida members in Pakistan.

**Strength**

Has several hundred members in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and in India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions. Almost all LT cadres are foreigners—mostly Pakistanis from madrassas across the country and Afghan veterans of the Afghan wars. Uses assault rifles, light and heavy machineguns, mortars, explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Based in Muridke (near Lahore) and Muzaffarabad. The LT trains its militants in mobile training camps across Pakistan-administered Kashmir and had trained in Afghanistan until fall of 2001.

**External Aid**

Collects donations from the Pakistani community in the Persian Gulf and United Kingdom, Islamic NGOs, and Pakistani and Kashmiri businessmen. The LT also maintains a Web site (under the name of its parent organization Jamaat ud-Daawa), through which it solicits funds and provides information on the group's activities. The amount of LT funding is unknown. The LT maintains ties to religious/military groups around the world, ranging from the Philippines to the Middle East and Chechnya through the MDI fraternal network. In anticipation of asset seizures by the Pakistani Government, the LT withdrew funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and production of consumer goods.

**Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ)  
(Army of Jhangvi)****Description**

Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) is the militant offshoot of the Sunni sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The group focuses primarily on anti-Shia attacks and was banned by Pakistani President Musharraf in August 2001 as part of an effort to rein in sectarian violence. Many of its members then sought refuge with the Taliban in Afghanistan, with whom they had existing ties.

**Activities**

LJ specializes in armed attacks and bombings. The group attempted to assassinate former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shabaz Sharif, Chief Minister of Punjab Province, in January 1999. Pakistani authorities have publicly linked LJ members to the kidnap and murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl in early 2002. Police officials initially suspected LJ members were involved in the two suicide car bombings in Karachi in 2002—against a French shuttle bus in May and the US Consulate in June—but their subsequent investigations have not led to any LJ members being charged in the attacks. Similarly, press reports have linked LJ to attacks on Christian targets in Pakistan, including a grenade assault on the Protestant International Church in Islamabad in March 2002 that killed two US citizens, but no formal charges have been filed against the group.

**Strength**

Probably fewer than 100.

**Location/Area of Operation**

LJ is active primarily in Punjab and Karachi. Some members travel between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

**External Aid**

Unknown.

**Liberation Tigers of  
Tamil Eelam (LTTE)**

Other known front organizations: World Tamil Association (WTA), World Tamil Movement (WTM), the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT), the Ellalan Force, the Sangilian Force.

**Description**

Founded in 1976, the LTTE is the most powerful Tamil group in Sri Lanka and uses overt and illegal methods to raise funds, acquire weapons, and publicize its cause of establishing an independent Tamil state. The LTTE began its armed conflict with the Sri Lankan Government in 1983 and has relied on a guerrilla strategy that includes the use of terrorist tactics. The LTTE is currently observing a cease-fire agreement with the Sri Lankan Government and is engaged in peace talks.

**Activities**

The Tigers have integrated a battlefield insurgent strategy with a terrorist program that targets not only key personnel in the countryside but also senior Sri Lankan political and military leaders in Colombo and other urban centers. The Tigers are most notorious for their cadre of suicide bombers, the Black Tigers. Political assassinations and bombings are commonplace. The LTTE has refrained from targeting foreign diplomatic and commercial establishments.

**Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)**  
a.k.a. The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA, the militant wing of the MEK), the People's *Mujahedin* of Iran (PMOI), National Council of Resistance (NCR), the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), Muslim Iranian Student's Society (front organization used to garner financial support)

### **Strength**

Exact strength is unknown, but the LTTE is estimated to have 8,000 to 10,000 armed combatants in Sri Lanka, with a core of trained fighters of approximately 3,000 to 6,000. The LTTE also has a significant overseas support structure for fundraising, weapons procurement, and propaganda activities.

### **Location/Area of Operations**

The Tigers control most of the northern and eastern coastal areas of Sri Lanka but have conducted operations throughout the island. Headquartered in northern Sri Lanka, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran has established an extensive network of checkpoints and informants to keep track of any outsiders who enter the group's area of control.

### **External Aid**

The LTTE's overt organizations support Tamil separatism by lobbying foreign governments and the United Nations. The LTTE also uses its international contacts to procure weapons, communications, and any other equipment and supplies it needs. The LTTE exploits large Tamil communities in North America, Europe, and Asia to obtain funds and supplies for its fighters in Sri Lanka.

### **Description**

The MEK philosophy mixes Marxism and Islam. Formed in the 1960s, the organization was expelled from Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and its primary support now comes from the Iraqi regime. The MEK's history is studded with anti-Western attacks as well as terrorist attacks on the interests of the clerical regime in Iran and abroad. The MEK now advocates a secular Iranian regime.

### **Activities**

The worldwide campaign against the Iranian Government stresses propaganda and occasionally uses terrorist violence. During the 1970s, the MEK killed US military personnel and US civilians working on defense projects in Tehran and supported the takeover in 1979 of the US Embassy in Tehran. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombs in the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Premier's office, killing some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. Near the end of the 1980-88 war with Iran, Baghdad armed the MEK with military equipment and sent it into action against Iranian forces. In 1991, it assisted the Government of Iraq in suppressing the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in southern Iraq and the Kurdish uprisings in the north. Since then, the MEK has continued to perform internal security services for the Government of Iraq. In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian Embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group's ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. In recent years, the MEK has targeted key military officers and assassinated the deputy chief of the Armed Forces General Staff in April 1999. In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters—the interagency board responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The normal pace of anti-Iranian operations increased during the "Operation Great Bahman" in February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was involved regularly in mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids on Iranian military and law-enforcement units and government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border, although MEK terrorism in Iran declined throughout the remainder of 2001. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the tactics along the border have garnered almost no military gains and have become commonplace. MEK insurgent activities in Tehran constitute the biggest

security concern for the Iranian leadership. In February 2000, for example, the MEK launched a mortar attack against the leadership complex in Tehran that houses the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. Assassinated the Iranian Chief of Staff.

**Strength**

Several thousand fighters are scattered throughout Iraq, and most are organized in the MEK's National Liberation Army (NLA). Some NLA units possess tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy artillery. The MEK also has an overseas support structure.

**Location/Area of Operation**

In the 1980s, the MEK's leaders were forced by Iranian security forces to flee to France. Since resettling in Iraq in 1987, almost all of its armed units are currently stationed in fortified bases near the border with Iran. In the mid-1980s, the group did not mount terrorist operations in Iran at a level similar to its activities in the 1970s, but by the 1990s the MEK had claimed credit for an increasing number of operations in Iran.

**External Aid**

Beyond receiving all of its military assistance, and most of its financial support, from the Iraqi regime, the MEK uses front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian communities.

**National Liberation  
Army (ELN)—  
Colombia****Description**

Marxist insurgent group formed in 1965 by urban intellectuals inspired by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. Began a dialogue with Colombian officials in 1999 following a campaign of mass kidnappings—each involving at least one US citizen—to demonstrate its strength and continuing viability and force the Pastrana administration to negotiate. Peace talks between Bogota and the ELN, started in 1999, continued sporadically but once again had broken down by year's end.

**Activities**

Kidnapping, hijacking, bombing, and extortion. Minimal conventional military capability. Annually conducts hundreds of kidnappings for ransom, often targeting foreign employees of large corporations, especially in the petroleum industry. Derives some revenue from taxation of the illegal narcotics industry. Frequently assaults energy infrastructure and has inflicted major damage on pipelines and the electric distribution network.

**Strength**

Approximately 3,000 to 5,000 armed combatants and an unknown number of active supporters.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Mostly in rural and mountainous areas of north, northeast, and southwest Colombia and Venezuela border regions.

**External Aid**

Cuba provides some medical care and political consultation.



**The Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)**

**Description**

Originated among militant Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during the 1970s. PIJ-Shiqaqi faction, currently led by Ramadan Shallah in Damascus, is most active. Committed to the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel through holy war. Also opposes moderate Arab governments that it believes have been tainted by Western secularism.

**Activities**

PIJ activists have conducted many attacks including large-scale suicide bombings against Israeli civilian and military targets. The group increased its operational activity in 2002, claiming numerous attacks against Israeli interests. The group has not yet targeted US interests and continues to confine its attacks to Israelis inside Israel and the territories, although US citizens have died in attacks mounted by the PIJ.

**Strength**

Unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Primarily Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip, but the group's leaders reside in other parts of the Middle East, including Lebanon and Syria.

**External Aid**

Receives financial assistance from Iran and limited logistic support assistance from Syria.

**Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)**

**Description**

Broke away from the PFLP-GC in the late 1970's. Later split again into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. Pro-PLO faction led by Muhammad Abbas (a.k.a Abu Abbas), currently based in Baghdad.

**Activities**

The Abu Abbas-led faction is known for aerial attacks against Israel. Abbas's group also was responsible for the attack in 1985 on the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of US citizen Leon Klinghoffer. A warrant for Abu Abbas's arrest is outstanding in Italy. Has become more active since the start of the al-Aqsa *intifadah*, and several PLF members have been arrested by Israeli authorities for planning attacks in Israel and the West Bank.

**Strength**

Unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Based in Iraq since 1990; has a presence in Lebanon and the West Bank.

**External Aid**

Receives support mainly from Iraq. Has received support from Libya in the past.

**Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)**

**Description**

Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1967 by George Habash—as a member of the PLO—when it broke away from the Arab Nationalist Movement. The PFLP views the Palestinian struggle as a legitimate struggle against illegal occupation. The PFLP is opposed to negotiations with Israel.

**Activities**

Committed numerous international terrorist attacks during the 1970s. Since 1978 has conducted attacks against Israeli or moderate Arab targets, including killing a settler and her son in December 1996. The PFLP has stepped up its operational activity since the start of the current *intifadah* highlighted by its assassination of the Israeli Tourism Minister in October 2001 to avenge Israel's killing of the PFLP Secretary General earlier that year.

**Strength**

Unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Syria, Lebanon, Israel, West Bank, and Gaza Strip.

**External Aid**

Receives safehaven and some logistic assistance from Syria.

**Popular Front for the  
Liberation of  
Palestine—General  
Command (PFLP-GC)****Description**

Split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming it wanted to focus more on fighting and less on politics. Opposed to Arafat's PLO. Led by Ahmad Jabril, a former captain in the Syrian Army. Jabril's son, Jihad, was killed by a car bomb in May 2002. Closely tied to both Syria and Iran.

**Activities**

Carried out dozens of attacks in Europe and the Middle East during 1970s-80s. Known for cross-border terrorist attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders. Primary focus now on guerrilla operations in southern Lebanon and small-scale attacks in Israel, West Bank, and Gaza Strip.

**Strength**

Several hundred.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Headquartered in Damascus with bases in Lebanon.

**External Aid**

Receives logistic and military support from Syria and financial support from Iran.

**Al-Qaida**

a.k.a. Qa'idat al-Jihad

**Description**

Established by Usama Bin Ladin in the late 1980s to bring together Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. Helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists for the Afghan resistance. Current goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems "non-Islamic" and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries—particularly Saudi Arabia. Issued statement under banner of "the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders" in February 1998, saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill US citizens—civilian or military—and their allies everywhere. Merged with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Al-Jihad) in June 2001.

**Activities**

In 2002, carried out bombing on 28 November of hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, killing 15 and injuring 40. Probably supported a nightclub bombing in Bali, Indonesia, on 12 October that killed about 180. Responsible for an attack on US military personnel in Kuwait, on

8 October, that killed one US soldier and injured another. Directed a suicide attack on the MV Limburg off the coast of Yemen, on 6 October that killed one and injured four. Carried out a firebombing of a synagogue in Tunisia on 11 April that killed 19 and injured 22. On 11 September 2001, 19 al-Qaida suicide attackers hijacked and crashed four US commercial jets, two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon near Washington, DC, and a fourth into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, leaving about 3,000 individuals dead or missing. Directed the 12 October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, killing 17 US Navy members, and injuring another 39. Conducted the bombings in August 1998 of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, that killed at least 301 individuals and injured more than 5,000 others. Claims to have shot down US helicopters and killed US servicemen in Somalia in 1993 and to have conducted three bombings that targeted US troops in Aden, Yemen, in December 1992.

Al-Qaida is linked to the following plans that were disrupted or not carried out: to assassinate Pope John Paul II during his visit to Manila in late 1994, to kill President Clinton during a visit to the Philippines in early 1995, to bomb in midair a dozen US trans-Pacific flights in 1995, and to set off a bomb at Los Angeles International Airport in 1999. Also plotted to carry out terrorist operations against US and Israeli tourists visiting Jordan for millennial celebrations in late 1999. (Jordanian authorities thwarted the planned attacks and put 28 suspects on trial.) In December 2001, suspected al-Qaida associate Richard Colvin Reid attempted to ignite a shoe bomb on a transatlantic flight from Paris to Miami. Attempted to shoot down an Israeli chartered plane with a surface-to-air missile as it departed the Mombasa airport in November 2002.

#### **Strength**

Al-Qaida probably has several thousand members and associates. The arrests of senior-level al-Qaida operatives have interrupted some terrorist plots. Also serves as a focal point or umbrella organization for a worldwide network that includes many Sunni Islamic extremist groups, some members of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin.

#### **Location/Area of Operation**

Al-Qaida has cells worldwide and is reinforced by its ties to Sunni extremist networks. Was based in Afghanistan until Coalition forces removed the Taliban from power in late 2001. Al-Qaida has dispersed in small groups across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East and probably will attempt to carry out future attacks against US interests.

#### **External Aid**

Al-Qaida maintains moneymaking front businesses, solicits donations from like-minded supporters, and illicitly siphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations. US efforts to block al-Qaida funding has hampered the group's ability to obtain money.

#### **Real IRA (RIRA) a.k.a True IRA**

#### **Description**

Formed in early 1998 as clandestine armed wing of the 32-County Sovereignty Movement, a "political pressure group" dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. RIRA also seeks to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process. The 32-County Sovereignty Movement opposed Sinn Fein's adoption in September 1997 of the Mitchell principles of democracy and nonviolence and opposed the amendment in December 1999 of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, which laid claim to Northern Ireland. Despite internal rifts and calls by some jailed members—

including the group's founder Michael "Mickey" McKevitt—for a cease-fire and the group's disbandment, the group pledged additional violence in October and continued to conduct attacks.

#### **Activities**

Bombings, assassinations, and robberies. Many Real IRA members are former Provisional IRA members who left that organization following the Provisional IRA cease-fire and bring to RIRA a wealth of experience in terrorist tactics and bombmaking. Targets have included civilians (most notoriously in the August 1998 Omagh bombing), the British military, the police in Northern Ireland and Northern Ireland Protestant communities. Since October 1999, RIRA has carried out more than 80 terrorist attacks. RIRA claimed responsibility for an attack in August at a London Army Base that killed a construction worker.

#### **Strength**

100 to 200 activists plus possible limited support from IRA hardliners dissatisfied with the IRA cease-fire and other republican sympathizers. Approximately 40 RIRA members are in Irish jails.

#### **Location/Area of Operation**

Northern Ireland, United Kingdom, and Irish Republic.

#### **External Aid**

Suspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in the United States and of attempting to buy weapons from US gun dealers. RIRA also is reported to have purchased sophisticated weapons from the Balkans. In May, three Irish nationals associated with RIRA pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to cause an explosion and trying to obtain weapons following their extradition from Slovenia to the United Kingdom.

### **Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)**

#### **Description**

Established in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party, the FARC is Colombia's oldest, largest, most capable, and best-equipped Marxist insurgency. The FARC is governed by a secretariat, led by septuagenarian Manuel Marulanda (a.k.a. "Tirofijo") and six others, including senior military commander Jorge Briceño (a.k.a. "Mono Jojoy"). Organized along military lines and includes several urban fronts. In February 2002, the group's slow-moving peace negotiation process with the Pastrana administration was terminated by Bogotá following the group's plane hijacking and kidnapping of a Colombian Senator from the aircraft. On 7 August, the FARC launched a large-scale mortar attack on the Presidential Palace where President Álvaro Uribe was being inaugurated. High-level foreign delegations—including from the United States—attending the inauguration were not injured, but 21 residents of a poor neighborhood nearby were killed by stray rounds in the attack.

#### **Activities**

Bombings, murder, mortar attacks, kidnapping, extortion, hijacking, as well as guerrilla and conventional military action against Colombian political, military, and economic targets. In March 1999, the FARC executed three US Indian rights activists on Venezuelan territory after it kidnapped them in Colombia. Foreign citizens often are targets of FARC kidnapping for ransom. Has well-documented ties to full range of narcotics trafficking activities, including taxation, cultivation, and distribution.

**Revolutionary Nuclei  
(RN)**  
a.k.a. Revolutionary  
Cells

**Strength**

Approximately 9,000 to 12,000 armed combatants and several thousand more supporters, mostly in rural areas.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Colombia with some activities—extortion, kidnapping, logistics, and R&R—in Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador.

**External Aid**

Cuba provides some medical care and political consultation. A trial is currently underway in Bogota to determine whether three members of the Irish Republican Army—arrested in Colombia in 2001 upon exiting the FARC-controlled demilitarized zone (*despeje*)—provided advanced explosives training to the FARC.

**Description**

Revolutionary Nuclei (RN) emerged from a broad range of antiestablishment and anti-US/ NATO/EU leftist groups active in Greece between 1995 and 1998. The group is believed to be the successor to or offshoot of Greece's most prolific terrorist group, Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA), which has not claimed an attack since January 1995. Indeed, RN appeared to fill the void left by ELA, particularly as lesser groups faded from the scene. RN's few communiqués show strong similarities in rhetoric, tone, and theme to ELA proclamations. RN has not claimed an attack since November 2000 nor has it announced its disbandment.

**Activities**

Since it began operations in January 1995, the group has claimed responsibility for some two-dozen arson attacks and low-level bombings targeting a range of US, Greek, and other European targets in Greece. In its most infamous and lethal attack to date, the group claimed responsibility for a bomb it detonated at the Intercontinental Hotel in April 1999 that resulted in the death of a Greek woman and injured a Greek man. Its modus operandi includes warning calls of impending attacks, attacks targeting property vice individuals; use of rudimentary timing devices; and strikes during the late evening-to-early morning hours. RN last attacked US interests in Greece in November 2000 with two separate bombings against the Athens offices of Citigroup and the studio of a Greek/American sculptor. The group also detonated an explosive device outside the Athens offices of Texaco in December 1999. Greek targets have included judicial and other government office buildings, private vehicles, and the offices of Greek firms involved in NATO-related defense contracts in Greece. Similarly, the group has attacked European interests in Athens, including Barclays Bank in December 1998 and November 2000.

**Strength**

Group membership is believed to be small, probably drawing from the Greek militant leftist or anarchist milieu.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Primary area of operation is in the Athens metropolitan area.

**External Aid**

Unknown, but believed to be self-sustaining.

**Revolutionary  
Organization  
17 November**  
a.k.a. 17 November

**Description**

Radical leftist group established in 1975 and named for the student uprising in Greece in November 1973 that protested the ruling military junta. Anti-Greek establishment, anti-US, anti-Turkey, anti-NATO group that seeks the ouster of US Bases from Greece, the removal of Turkish military forces from Cyprus, and the severing of Greece's ties to NATO and the European Union (EU).

**Activities**

Initially conducted assassinations of senior US officials and Greek public figures. Added bombings in the 1980s. Since 1990 has expanded its targets to include EU facilities and foreign firms investing in Greece and has added improvised rocket attacks to its methods. Supports itself largely through bank robberies. A failed 17 November bombing attempt in June at the Port of Piraeus in Athens coupled with robust detective work led to the first-ever arrests of this group; trials began in March 2003.

**Strength**

Unknown, but presumed to be small. Police arrested 19 suspected members of the group in 2002.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Athens, Greece.

**External Aid**

Unknown.

**Revolutionary  
People's Liberation  
Party/Front (DHKP/C)**  
a.k.a. Devrimci Sol,  
Revolutionary Left,  
Dev Sol

**Description**

Originally formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth). Renamed in 1994 after factional infighting; "Party" refers to the group's political activities, while "Front" is a reference to the group's militant operations. The group espouses a Marxist-Leninist ideology and is virulently anti-US, anti-NATO, and anti-Turkish Establishment. It finances its activities chiefly through armed robberies and extortion.

**Activities**

Since the late 1980s, the group has targeted primarily current and retired Turkish security and military officials. It began a new campaign against foreign interests in 1990, which included attacks against US military and diplomatic personnel and facilities. In its first significant terrorist act as DHKP/C in 1996, it assassinated a prominent Turkish businessman and two others. DHKP/C added suicide bombings to its repertoire in 2001, with successful attacks against Turkish police in January and September. Security operations in Turkey and elsewhere have weakened the group, however. DHKP/C did not conduct any major terrorist attacks in 2002.

**Strength**

Unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Turkey, primarily Istanbul. Raises funds in Europe.

**External Aid**

Unknown.

**The Salafist Group for  
Call and Combat  
(GSPC)**

**Description**

The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), an outgrowth of the GIA, appears to have eclipsed the GIA since approximately 1998, and is currently the most effective armed group inside Algeria. In contrast to the GIA, the GSPC has gained popular support through its pledge to avoid civilian attacks inside Algeria. Its adherents abroad appear to have largely co-opted the external networks of the GIA, active particularly throughout Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.

**Activities**

The GSPC continues to conduct operations aimed at government and military targets, primarily in rural areas, although civilians are sometimes killed. Such attacks include false roadblocks and attacks against convoys transporting military, police, or other government personnel. According to press reporting, some GSPC members in Europe maintain contacts with other North African extremists sympathetic to al Qaida. In late 2002, Algerian authorities announced they had killed a Yemeni al-Qaida operative who had been meeting with the GSPC inside Algeria.

**Strength**

Unknown; probably several hundred fighters with an unknown number of support networks inside Algeria.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Algeria.

**External Aid**

Algerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad, many residing in Western Europe, provide financial and logistic support. In addition, the Algerian Government has accused Iran and Sudan of supporting Algerian extremists in years past.

**Sendero Luminoso  
(Shining Path, or SL)**

**Description**

Former university professor Abimael Guzman formed SL in Peru in the late 1960s, and his teachings created the foundation of SL's militant Maoist doctrine. In the 1980s, SL became one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere—approximately 30,000 persons have died since Shining Path took up arms in 1980. The Peruvian Government made dramatic gains against SL during the 1990s, but reports of a recent SL involvement in narcotrafficking indicate that it may have a new source of funding with which to sustain a resurgence. Its stated goal is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with a communist peasant revolutionary regime. It also opposes any influence by foreign governments, as well as by other Latin American guerrilla groups, especially the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA).

In 2002, eight suspected SL members were arrested on suspicion of complicity in the 20 March bombing across the street from the US Embassy that killed 10 persons. They are being held pending charges, which could take up to one year. Lima has been very aggressive in prosecuting terrorist suspects in 2002. According to the Peruvian National Police Intelligence Directorate, 199 suspected terrorists were arrested between January and mid-November. Counterterrorist operations targeted pockets of terrorist activity in the Upper Huallaga River Valley and the Apurimac/Ene River Valley, where SL columns continued to conduct periodic attacks.



**United Self-Defense  
Forces/Group of  
Colombia  
(AUC—Autodefensas  
Unidas de Colombia)**

**Activities**

Conducted indiscriminate bombing campaigns and selective assassinations. Detonated explosives at diplomatic missions of several countries in Peru in 1990, including an attempt to car bomb the US Embassy in December. Peruvian authorities continued operations against the SL in 2002 in the countryside, where the SL conducted periodic raids on villages.

**Strength**

Membership is unknown but estimated to be 400 to 500 armed militants. SL's strength has been vastly diminished by arrests and desertions but appears to be growing again, possibly due to involvement in narcotrafficking.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Peru, with most activity in rural areas.

**External Aid**

None.

**Description**

The AUC—commonly referred to as the paramilitaries—is an umbrella organization formed in April 1997 to consolidate most local and regional paramilitary groups each with the mission to protect economic interests and combat FARC and ELN insurgents locally. During 2002, the AUC leadership dissolved and then subsequently reconstituted most of the organization, claiming to be trying to purge it of the factions most heavily involved in narcotrafficking. The AUC is supported by economic elites, drug traffickers, and local communities lacking effective government security and claims its primary objective is to protect its sponsors from insurgents. It is adequately equipped and armed and reportedly pays its members a monthly salary

**Activities**

AUC operations vary from assassinating suspected insurgent supporters to engaging guerrilla combat units. AUC political leader Carlos Castano has claimed that 70 percent of the AUC's operational costs are financed with drug-related earnings, the rest from "donations" from its sponsors.

Since December 2002, the paramilitary groups under Carlos Castano's influence have adopted a cease-fire and are exploring peace negotiations with Bogota. The AUC generally avoids actions against US personnel or interests.

**Strength**

Estimated 6,000 to 8,150, including former military and insurgent personnel.

**Location/Areas of Operation**

AUC forces are strongest in the northwest in Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre, and Bolivar Departments. Since 1999, the group demonstrated a growing presence in other northern and southwestern departments. Clashes between the AUC and the FARC insurgents in Putumayo in 2000 demonstrated the range of the AUC to contest insurgents throughout Colombia.

**External Aid**

None.

## Appendix C

### Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups

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**Al-Badhr Mujahidin  
(al-Badr)**

**Description**

Split from Hizb ul-Mujahidin (HM) in 1998. Traces its origins to 1971 when a group of the same name attacked Bengalis in East Pakistan. Later operated as part of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-I-Islami (HIG) in Afghanistan and from 1990 as a unit of HM in Kashmir.

**Activities**

Has conducted a number of operations against Indian military targets in Kashmir.

**Strength**

Perhaps several hundred.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Kashmir, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

**External Aid**

Unknown.

**Alex Boncayao  
Brigade (ABB)**

**Description**

The ABB, the breakaway urban hit squad of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, was formed in the mid-1980s. The ABB was added to the Terrorist Exclusion list in December 2001.

**Activities**

Responsible for more than 100 murders and believed to have been involved in the murder in 1989 of US Army Col. James Rowe in the Philippines. In March 1997, the group announced it had formed an alliance with another armed group, the Revolutionary Proletarian Army (RPA). In March 2000, the group claimed credit for a rifle grenade attack against the Department of Energy building in Manila and strafed Shell Oil offices in the central Philippines to protest rising oil prices.

**Strength**

Approximately 500.

**Location/Area of Operation**

The largest RPA/ABB groups are on the Philippine islands of Luzon, Negros, and the Visayas.

**External Aid**

Unknown.

**Al-Ittihad al-Islami  
(AIAI)  
a.k.a. Islamic Union**

**Description**

Somalia's largest militant Islamic organization rose to power in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime. Its aims to establish an Islamic regime in Somalia and force the secession of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia have largely been abandoned. Some elements associated with AIAI maintain ties to al-Qaida.

**Activities**

Conducted terrorist attacks against Ethiopian forces and other Somali factions in the 1990s. The group is believed to be responsible for a series of bomb attacks in public places in Addis Ababa in 1996 and 1997 as well as the kidnapping of several relief workers in 1998. AIAI sponsors Islamic social programs, such as orphanages and schools, and provides pockets of security in Somalia.

**Strength**

Estimated at some 2,000 members, plus additional reserve militias. Sustained significant losses at the hands of the Ethiopian military in the late 1990s, and members are now relegated to operating in small cells.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Primarily in Somalia, with limited presence in Ethiopia and Kenya.

**External Aid**

Receives funds from Middle East financiers and Western diaspora remittances and suspected training in Afghanistan. Past weapons deliveries from Sudan and Eritrea.

**Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)****Description**

Consists of a diverse coalition of former members of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) and Islamists from the Salaf Tabliq group. The conglomeration of fighters formed in 1995 in opposition to the government of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.

**Activities**

The ADF uses the kidnapping and murder of civilians to create fear in the local population and undermine confidence in the government. The group is suspected to be responsible for dozens of bombings in public areas. The Ugandan military offensive in mid-2000 destroyed several ADF camps.

**Strength**

A few hundred fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Northeastern Congo.

**External Aid**

Received past funding, supplies, and training from the Government of Sudan. Some funding suspected from sympathetic Hutu groups.

**Ansar al-Islam (AI)**

a.k.a. Partisans of Islam, Helpers of Islam, Supporters of Islam

**Description**

Ansar al-Islam is a radical Islamist group of Iraqi Kurds and Arabs who have vowed to establish an independent Islamic state in northern Iraq. It was formed in September 2001 and is closely allied with al-Qaida. Its members trained in al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan and now provide safehaven to al-Qaida fighters fleeing Afghanistan. (Ansar al-Islam was designated on 20 February 2003, under E.O. 13224. The UNSCR 1267 Committee designated Ansar al-Islam pursuant to UNSCRs 1267, 1390, and 1455 on 27 February 2003.)

**Anti-Imperialist  
Territorial Nuclei (NTA)**  
a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist  
Territorial Units

**Activities**

The group is challenging one of the two main Kurdish political factions, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and has mounted ambushes and attacks in PUK areas. AI members have been implicated in assassinations and assassination attempts against PUK officials and claim to have produced cyanide-based toxins, ricin, and alfatoxin.

**Strength**

Approximately 700 members.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Ansar al-Islam is based in northern Iraq near the Iranian border outside Baghdad's control.

**External Aid**

The group receives funding, training, equipment, and combat support from al-Qaida.

**Description**

Clandestine leftist extremist group that first appeared in the Friuli region in Italy in 1995. Adopted the class struggle ideology of the Red Brigades of the 1970s-80s and a similar logo—an encircled five-point star—for their declarations. Seeks the formation of an “anti-imperialist fighting front” with other Italian leftist terrorist groups including NIPR and the New Red Brigades. Opposes what it perceives as US and NATO imperialism and condemns Italy's foreign and labor policies. Identified experts in four Italian Government sectors—federalism, privatizations, justice reform, and jobs and pensions—as potential targets in a January 2002 leaflet.

**Activities**

To date, the group has conducted attacks against property rather than persons. In January 2002, police thwarted an attempt by four NTA members to enter the Rivolto Military Air Base. NTA attacked property owned by US Air Force personnel at Aviano Air Base. It claimed responsibility for a bomb attack in September 2000 against the Central European Initiative office in Trieste and a bomb attack in August 2001 against the Venice Tribunal building. During the NATO intervention in Kosovo, NTA members threw gasoline bombs at the Venice and Rome headquarters of the then-ruling party, Democrats of the Left.

**Strength**

Approximately 20 members. To date, no NTA members have been arrested and prosecuted.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Primarily northeastern Italy.

**External Aid**

None evident.

**Army for the  
Liberation of Rwanda  
(ALIR)**  
a.k.a. Interahamwe,  
Former Armed Forces of  
Rwanda (ex-FAR)

**Description**

The FAR was the army of the Rwandan Hutu regime that carried out the genocide of 500,000 or more Tutsis and regime opponents in 1994. The Interahamwe was the civilian militia force that carried out much of the killing. The groups merged and recruited additional fighters after they were forced from Rwanda into the Democratic Republic of

Congo (then Zaire) in 1994. They are now often known as the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR), which is the armed branch of the PALIR or Party for the Liberation of Rwanda.

#### **Activities**

The group seeks to topple Rwanda's Tutsi-dominated government, reinstitute Hutu control, and, possibly, complete the genocide. In 1996, a message—allegedly from the ALIR—threatened to kill the US Ambassador to Rwanda and other US citizens. In 1999, ALIR guerrillas critical of alleged US-UK support for the Rwandan regime kidnapped and killed eight foreign tourists, including two US citizens, in a game park on the Congo-Uganda border. In the current Congolese war, the ALIR is allied with Kinshasa against the Rwandan invaders. The Government of Rwanda recently transferred to US custody three former ALIR insurgents who are suspects in the 1999 Bwindi Park murder case.

#### **Strength**

Several thousand ALIR regular forces operate alongside the Congolese army on the front lines of the Congo civil war, while a like number of ALIR guerrillas operate in eastern Congo closer to the Rwandan border.

#### **Location/Area of Operation**

Mostly Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, but some operate in Burundi.

#### **External Support**

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has provided ALIR forces in Congo with training, arms, and supplies.

### **Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF)**

a.k.a. Cholana  
Kangtoap Serei  
Cheat Kampouchea

#### **Description**

The Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF) emerged in November 1998 in the wake of political violence that saw many influential Cambodian leaders flee and the Cambodian People's Party assume power. With an avowed aim of overthrowing the Government, the US-based group is led by a Cambodian-American, a former member of the opposition Sam Rainsy Party. The CFF's membership includes Cambodian-Americans based in Thailand and the United States and former soldiers from the separatist Khmer Rouge, Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, and various political factions.

#### **Activities**

The CFF was not reported to have participated in terrorist activities in 2002. Cambodian courts in February and March 2002 prosecuted 38 CFF members suspected of staging an attack in Cambodia in 2000. The courts convicted 19 members, including one US citizen, of "terrorism" and/or "membership in an armed group" and sentenced them to terms of five years to life imprisonment. The group claimed responsibility for an attack in late November 2000 on several government installations that killed at least eight persons and wounded more than a dozen civilians. In April 1999, five CFF members were arrested for plotting to blow up a fuel depot outside Phnom Penh with antitank weapons.

#### **Strength**

Exact strength is unknown, but totals probably never have exceeded 100 armed fighters.

#### **Location/Area of Operation**

Northeastern Cambodia near the Thai border.



**The Communist Party  
of Nepal (Maoist)**

**External Aid**

US-based leadership collects funds from the Cambodian-American community.

**Description**

The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) insurgency grew out of the increasing radicalization and fragmentation of left-wing parties following the emergence of democracy in 1990. The United People's Front—a coalition of left-wing parties—participated in the 1991 elections, but the Maoist wing failed to win the minimum 3 percent of the vote leading to their exclusion from voter lists in the 1994 elections. In response, they abandoned electoral politics and in 1996 launched the insurgency. The Maoists' ultimate objective is the takeover of the government and the transformation of society, probably including the elimination of the present elite, nationalization of the private sector, and collectivization of agriculture.

**Activities**

The Maoist insurgency largely engages in a traditional guerrilla war aimed at ultimately overthrowing the Nepalese Government. In line with these efforts, the Maoist leadership has allowed some attacks against international targets in an attempt to further isolate the Nepalese Government. In 2002, Maoists claimed responsibility for assassinating two US Embassy guards, citing anti-Maoist spying, and in a press statement threatened foreign embassy—including the US—missions, to deter foreign support for the Nepalese Government. Maoists, targeting US symbols, also bombed Coca-Cola bottling plants in April and January 2002 and November 2001. In May, Maoists destroyed a Pepsi Cola truck and its contents.

**Strength**

Numbering in the thousands.

**Location**

Nepal.

**External Aid**

None.

**Continuity Irish  
Republican Army  
(CIRA)**

**Description**

Terrorist splinter group formed in 1994 as the clandestine armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein (RSF), which split from Sinn Fein in 1986. "Continuity" refers to the group's belief that it is carrying on the original IRA goal of forcing the British out of Northern Ireland. Cooperates with the larger Real IRA.

**Activities**

CIRA has been active in Belfast and the border areas of Northern Ireland where it has carried out bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortions, and robberies. On occasion, it has provided advance warning to police of its attacks. Targets include British military, Northern Ireland security targets, and loyalist paramilitary groups. Unlike the Provisional IRA, CIRA is not observing a cease-fire. CIRA continued its bombing campaign in 2002 with an explosion at a Belfast police training college in April and a bombing in July at the estate of a Policing Board member; other CIRA bombing attempts in the center of Belfast were thwarted by police.

**Eastern Turkistan  
Islamic Movement  
(ETIM)**

**Strength**

Fewer than 50 hard-core activists. Eleven CIRA members have been convicted of criminal charges and others are awaiting trial. Police counterterrorist operations have reduced the group's strength, but CIRA has been able to reconstitute its membership through active recruiting efforts.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Northern Ireland, Irish Republic. Does not have an established presence on the UK mainland.

**External Aid**

Suspected of receiving funds and arms from sympathizers in the United States. May have acquired arms and materiel from the Balkans in cooperation with the Real IRA.

**Description**

The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a small Islamic extremist group based in China's western Xinjiang Province, is one of the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist groups pursuing an independent "Eastern Turkistan," which would include Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Xinjiang. ETIM and other overlapping militant Uighur groups are linked to the international mujahidin movement—and to a limited degree al-Qaida—beginning with the participation of ethnic Uighur mujahidin in the Soviet/Afghan war.

**Activities**

US and Chinese Government information suggests ETIM was responsible for terrorist acts inside and outside China. Most recently, in May 2002, two ETIM members were deported to China from Kyrgyzstan for plotting to attack the US Embassy in Kyrgyzstan as well as other US interests abroad.

**Strength**

Unknown. Only a small minority of ethnic Uighurs supports the Xinjiang independence movement or the formation of an East Turkistan.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Xinjiang Province and neighboring countries in the region.

**External Aid**

ETIM is suspected of having received training and financial assistance from al-Qaida.

**First of October  
Antifascist  
Resistance Group  
(GRAPO) Grupo de  
Resistencia  
Anti-Fascista  
Primero de Octubre**

**Description**

Formed in 1975 as the armed wing of the illegal Communist Party of Spain during the Franco era. Advocates the overthrow of the Spanish Government and its replacement with a Marxist-Leninist regime. GRAPO is vehemently anti-US, seeks the removal of all US military forces from Spanish territory, and has conducted and attempted several attacks against US targets since 1977. The group issued a communique following the 11 September attacks in the United States, expressing its satisfaction that "symbols of imperialist power" were decimated and affirming that "the war" has only just begun.

**Activities**

GRAPO did not mount a successful terrorist attack in 2002. GRAPO has killed more than 90 persons and injured more than 200. The group's operations traditionally have been designed to cause material damage and gain publicity rather than inflict casualties, but the terrorists have conducted lethal bombings and close-range assassinations. In May 2000,

the group killed two security guards during a botched armed robbery attempt of an armored truck carrying an estimated \$2 million, and in November 2000, members assassinated a Spanish policeman in a possible reprisal for the arrest that month of several GRAPO leaders in France. The group also has bombed business and official sites, employment agencies, and the Madrid headquarters of the ruling Popular Party.

#### **Strength**

Fewer than two-dozen activists remaining. Police have made periodic large-scale arrests of GRAPO members, crippling the organization and forcing it into lengthy rebuilding periods. In 2002, Spanish and French authorities arrested 22 suspected members, including some of the group's reconstituted leadership.

#### **Location/Area of Operation**

Spain.

#### **External Aid**

None.

### **Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI) (Movement of Islamic Holy War)**

#### **Description**

HUJI, a Sunni extremist group that follows the Deobandi tradition of Islam, was founded in 1980 in Afghanistan to fight in the jihad against the Soviets. It also is affiliated with the Jamiat Ulema-I-Islam Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F) and the Deobandi school of Sunni Islam. The group, led by chief commander Amin Rabbani, is made up primarily of Pakistanis and foreign Islamists who are fighting for the liberation of Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan.

#### **Activities**

Has conducted a number of operations against Indian military targets in Kashmir. Linked to the Kashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; one was killed in August 1995, and the other four reportedly were killed in December of the same year.

#### **Strength**

Exact numbers are unknown, but there may be several hundred members in Kashmir.

#### **Location/Area of Operation**

Pakistan and Kashmir. Trained members in Afghanistan until fall of 2001.

#### **External Aid**

Specific sources of external aid are unknown.

### **Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) (Movement of Islamic Holy War)**

#### **Description**

The mission of HUJI-B, led by Shauqat Osman, is to establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh. HUJI-B has connections to the Pakistani militant groups Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI) and Harak ul-Mujahidin (HUM), who advocate similar objectives in Pakistan and Kashmir.

#### **Activities**

HUJI-B was accused of stabbing a senior Bangladeshi journalist in November 2000 for making a documentary on the plight of Hindus in Bangladesh. HUJI-B was suspected in the July 2000 assassination attempt of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

**Strength**

HUJI-B has an estimated cadre strength of more than several thousand members.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Operates and trains members in Bangladesh, where it maintains at least six camps.

**External Aid**

Funding of the HUJI-B comes primarily from madrassas in Bangladesh. The group also has ties to militants in Pakistan that may provide another funding source.

**Hizb-I Islami  
Gulbuddin (HIG)****Description**

Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Bin Ladin. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Bin Ladin after the latter fled Sudan in 1996.

**Activities**

HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force US troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA), and establish a fundamentalist state.

**Strength**

HIG possibly could have hundreds of veteran fighters to call on.

**Location/ Area of Operation**

Eastern Afghanistan (particularly Konar and Nurestan Provinces) and adjacent areas of Pakistan's tribal areas.

**External Aid**

Unknown.

**Hizb ul-Mujahidin (HM)****Description**

Hizb ul-Mujahidin, the largest Kashmiri militant group, was founded in 1989 and officially supports the liberation of Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan, although some cadres are proindependence. The group is the militant wing of Pakistan's largest Islamic political party, the Jamaat-i-Islami. It currently is focused on Indian security forces and politicians in Kashmir and has conducted operations jointly with other Kashmiri militants. It reportedly operated in Afghanistan through the mid-1990s and trained alongside the Afghan Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) in Afghanistan until the Taliban takeover. The group, led by Syed Salahuddin, is made up primarily of ethnic Kashmiris. Currently, there are visible splits between Pakistan-based commanders and several commanders in Indian-occupied Kashmir.

**Activities**

Has conducted a number of operations against Indian military targets in Kashmir. The group also occasionally strikes at civilian targets in Kashmir but has not engaged in terrorist acts elsewhere.

**Strength**

Exact numbers are unknown, but there may be several hundred members in Indian-controlled Kashmir and Pakistan.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Indian-controlled Kashmir and Pakistan. Trained members in Afghanistan until the Taliban takeover.

**External Aid**

Specific sources of external aid are unknown.

**Irish Republican Army (IRA)**

a.k.a. Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Provos (Sometimes referred to as the PIRA to distinguish it from RIRA and CIRA.)

**Description**

Dissension within the IRA over support for the Northern Ireland peace process resulted in the formation of two more radical splinter groups: Continuity IRA, in 1995 and the Real IRA in 1997. Until its July 1997 cease-fire, the Provisional IRA had sought to remove British forces from Northern Ireland and unify Ireland by force. In July 2002, the IRA reiterated its commitment to the peace process and apologized to the families of what it called "non-combatants" who had been killed or injured by the IRA. The IRA is organized into small, tightly knit cells under the leadership of the Army Council.

**Activities**

IRA traditional activities have included bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, punishment beatings, extortion, smuggling, and robberies. Before the 1997 cease-fire, bombing campaigns had been conducted on various targets in Northern Ireland and Great Britain and included senior British Government officials, civilians, police, and British military targets. In April 2002, the IRA conducted a second act of arms decommissioning that the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) called "varied" and "substantial." In late October, however, the IRA suspended contact with the IICD. The IRA retains the ability to conduct paramilitary operations. The IRA's extensive criminal activities reportedly provide the organizations with millions of dollars each year.

**Strength**

Several hundred members, plus several thousand sympathizers—despite the defection of some members to RIRA and CIRA.

**Local/Area of Operation**

Northern Ireland, Irish Republic, Great Britain, and Europe.

**External Aid**

Has in the past received aid from a variety of groups and countries and considerable training and arms from Libya and the PLO. Is suspected of receiving funds, arms, and other terrorist-related materiel from sympathizers in the United States. Similarities in operations suggest links to ETA and the FARC. In August 2002, three suspected IRA members were arrested in Colombia on charges of assisting the FARC to improve its explosives capabilities.

**Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)**

a.k.a. Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)

**Description**

The Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) emerged publicly in mid-1998 when the group released a series of communiqués that expressed support for Usama Bin Ladin and appealed for the overthrow of the Yemeni Government and operations against US and other Western interests in Yemen. IAA's assets were frozen under E.O. 13224 in September 2001, and it was designated for sanctions under UNSCR 1333 in the same month.

**Activities**

Engages in bombings and kidnappings to promote its goals. Kidnapped 16 British, US, and Australian tourists in late December 1998 near Madiyah in southern Yemen. Since the capture and trial of the Madiyah kidnappers and the execution in October 1999 of the group's leader, Zein al-Abidine al-Mihdar (a.k.a. Abu Hassan), individuals associated with the IAA have remained involved in terrorist activities on a number of occasions. In 2001, the Yemeni Government convicted an IAA member and three associates for their role in the bombing in October 2000 of the British Embassy in Sanaa. The current status of the IAA is unknown. Despite the appearance of several press statements attributed to the IAA and released through intermediaries and the Internet in 2002, Yemeni officials claim that the group is operationally defunct.

**Strength**

Not known.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Operates in the southern governorates of Yemen—primarily Aden and Abyan.

**External Aid**

Not known.

**Islamic International  
Peacekeeping  
Brigade (IIPB)****Description**

One of three terrorist groups affiliated with Chechen guerrillas that furnished personnel to carry out the seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow on 23 October 2002. The suicide attackers took more than 800 hostages, whom they threatened to kill if the Russian Government did not meet their demands, including the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya. Chechen extremist leader Shamil Basayev—who claimed responsibility for ordering the seizure—established the IIPB in 1998, which he led with Saudi-born mujahidin leader Ibn al-Khattab until the latter's death in March 2002. Arab mujahidin leader Abu al-Walid since has taken over Khattab's leadership role in the IIPB, which consists of Chechens, Arabs, and other foreign fighters.

**Activities**

Primarily guerrilla operations against Russian forces.

**Strength**

Up to 400 fighters, including as many as 150 Arabs and other foreign fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Primarily in Chechnya and adjacent areas of the north Caucasus, but major logistic activities also occur in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.

**External Aid**

The IIPB and its Arab leaders appear to be a primary conduit for Islamic funding for the Chechen guerrillas, in part through links to al-Qaida-related financiers on the Arabian Peninsula.

**Jamiat ul-Mujahidin  
(JUM)****Description**

Small pro-Pakistan militant group formed in Indian-controlled Kashmir in 1990. Followers are mostly Kashmiris, but include some Pakistanis.

**Japanese Red Army  
(JRA)**  
a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist  
International Brigade  
(AIIB)

**Activities**

Has conducted a number of operations against Indian military targets in Kashmir.

**Strength**

Unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Kashmir and Pakistan.

**External Aid**

Unknown.

**Description**

An international terrorist group formed around 1970 after breaking away from Japanese Communist League–Red Army Faction. Fusako Shigenobu led the JRA until her arrest in Japan in November 2000. The JRA's historical goal has been to overthrow the Japanese Government and monarchy and to help foment world revolution. After her arrest, Shigenobu announced she intended to pursue her goals using a legitimate political party rather than revolutionary violence, and the group announced it would disband in April 2001. May control or at least have ties to Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB); also may have links to Antiwar Democratic Front—an overt leftist political organization—inside Japan. Details released following Shigenobu's arrest indicate that the JRA was organizing cells in Asian cities, such as Manila and Singapore. The group had a history of close relations with Palestinian terrorist groups—based and operating outside Japan—since its inception, primarily through Shigenobu. The current status of the connections is unknown.

**Activities**

During the 1970s, JRA carried out a series of attacks around the world, including the massacre in 1972 at Lod Airport in Israel, two Japanese airliner hijackings, and an attempted takeover of the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. In April 1988, JRA operative Yu Kikumura was arrested with explosives on the New Jersey Turnpike, apparently planning an attack to coincide with the bombing of a USO club in Naples, a suspected JRA operation that killed five, including a US servicewoman. He was convicted of the charges and is serving a lengthy prison sentence in the United States. Tsutomu Shirosaki, captured in 1996, is also jailed in the United States. In 2000, Lebanon deported to Japan four members it arrested in 1997 but granted a fifth operative, Kozo Okamoto, political asylum. Longtime leader Shigenobu was arrested in November 2000 and faces charges of terrorism and passport fraud.

**Strength**

About six hard-core members; undetermined number of sympathizers. At its peak, the group claimed to have 30 to 40 members.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Location unknown, but possibly in Asia and/or Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon.

**External Aid**

Unknown.



**Kumpulan Mujahidin  
Malaysia (KMM)**

**Description**

Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) favors the overthrow of the Mahathir government and the creation of an Islamic state comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines. Malaysian authorities believe that smaller, more violent, extremist groups have split from KMM. Zainon Ismail, a former mujahid in Afghanistan, established KMM in 1995. Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz, currently detained under Malaysia's Internal Security Act (ISA), assumed leadership in 1999. Malaysian police assert that three Indonesian extremists, one of whom is in custody, have disseminated militant ideology to the KMM.

**Activities**

Malaysia is currently holding 48 alleged members of the KMM and its more extremist wing under the ISA for activities deemed threatening to Malaysia's national security, including planning to wage a jihad, possession of weaponry, bombings and robberies, the murder of a former state assemblyman, and planning attacks on foreigners, including US citizens. Several of the arrested militants have reportedly undergone military training in Afghanistan, and some fought with the Afghan mujahidin during the war against the former Soviet Union. Others are alleged to have ties to Islamic extremist organizations in Indonesia and the Philippines.

**Strength**

Malaysian police assess the KMM to have 70 to 80 members. The Malaysian police continued to investigate more than 200 suspected Muslim militants throughout 2002.

**Location/Area of Operation**

The KMM is reported to have networks in the Malaysian states of Perak, Johor, Kedah, Selangor, Terengganu, and Kelantan. They also operate in Wilayah Persukutuan, the federal territory comprising Kuala Lumpur. According to press reports, the KMM has ties to radical Indonesian Islamic groups and has sent members to Ambon, Indonesia, to fight against Christians.

**External Aid**

Largely unknown, probably self-financing.

**Libyan Islamic  
Fighting Group**  
a.k.a. Al-Jam'a  
al-Islamiyyah  
al-Muqatilah, Fighting  
Islamic Group, Libyan  
Fighting Group,  
Libyan Islamic Group

**Description**

Emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qaida organization or are active in the international mujahidin network. The group was designated for asset freeze under E. O. 13224 and UNSCR 1333 in September 2001.

**Activities**

Claimed responsibility for a failed assassination attempt against Qadhafi in 1996 and engaged Libyan security forces in armed clashes during the mid-to-late 1990s. Continues to target Libyan interests and may engage in sporadic clashes with Libyan security forces.

**Strength**

Not known but probably has several hundred active members or supporters.

**Lord's Resistance  
Army (LRA)**

**Location/Area of Operation**

Probably maintains a clandestine presence in Libya, but since late 1990s, many members have fled to various Middle Eastern and European countries.

**External Aid**

Not known. May obtain some funding through private donations, various Islamic nongovernmental organizations, and criminal acts.

**Description**

Founded in 1989 as the successor to the Holy Spirit Movement, the LRA seeks to overthrow the Ugandan Government and replace it with a regime that will implement the group's brand of Christianity.

**Activities**

Since the early 1990's, the LRA has kidnapped and killed local Ugandan civilians in order to discourage foreign investment, precipitate a crisis in Uganda, and replenish their ranks.

**Strength**

Estimated 1,000.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Northern Uganda and southern Sudan.

**External Aid**

While the LRA has been supported by the Government of Sudan in the past, the Sudanese are now cooperating with the Government of Uganda in a campaign to eliminate LRA sanctuaries in Sudan.

**Loyalist Volunteer  
Force (LVF)**

**Description**

An extreme loyalist group formed in 1996 as a faction of the loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) but did not emerge publicly until 1997. Composed largely of UVF hardliners who have sought to prevent a political settlement with Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland by attacking Catholic politicians, civilians, and Protestant politicians who endorse the Northern Ireland peace process. LVF occasionally uses the Red Hand Defenders as a cover name for its actions but in February called for the group's disbandment. In October 2001, the British Government ruled that the LVF had broken the cease-fire it declared in 1998 after linking the group to the murder of a journalist. According to the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, the LVF decommissioned a small amount of weapons in December 1998, but it has not repeated this gesture.

**Activities**

Bombings, kidnappings, and close-quarter shooting attacks. Finances its activities with drug money and other criminal activities. LVF bombs often have contained Powergel commercial explosives, typical of many loyalist groups. LVF attacks have been particularly vicious: the group has murdered numerous Catholic civilians with no political or paramilitary affiliations, including an 18-year-old Catholic girl in July 1997 because she had a Protestant boyfriend. The terrorists also have conducted successful attacks against Irish targets in Irish border towns. Since 2000, the LVF has been engaged in a violent feud with other loyalists that intensified in 2002 with several high-profile murders and defections.

**Moroccan Islamic  
Combatant Group  
(GICM)**

**Strength**

300 members, half of whom are active.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Northern Ireland, Ireland.

**External Aid**

None.

**Description**

The goals of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) reportedly include establishing an Islamic state in Morocco and supporting al-Qaida's jihad against the West. The group appears to have emerged in the late 1990s and comprises Moroccan recruits who trained in armed camps in Afghanistan. GICM members interact with other North African extremists, particularly in Europe. On 22 November 2002, the United States designated the GICM for asset freeze under E.O. 13224. This followed the submission of the GICM to the UNSCR 1267 sanctions committee.

**Activities**

GICM members, working with other North African extremists, engage in trafficking falsified documents and possibly gunrunning. The group in the past has issued communiques and statements against the Moroccan Government.

**Strength**

Unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Western Europe, Afghanistan, and possibly Morocco.

**External Aid**

Unknown.

**New Red Brigades/  
Communist  
Combatant Party  
(BR/PCC)**

a.k.a. Brigade Rosse/  
Partito Comunista  
Combattente

**Description**

This Marxist-Leninist group is a successor to the Red Brigades, active in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition to ideology, both groups share the same symbol, a five-pointed star inside a circle. The group is opposed to Italy's foreign and labor policies and NATO.

**Activities**

BR/PCC first struck in May 1999 claiming responsibility for the assassination of Labor Minister advisor Massimo D'Antona. In March 2002, the group assassinated Professor Marco Biagi, also a Labor Minister advisor. One person arrested in conjunction with the Biagi attack was released later on a technicality. In 2001, Italian police arrested a suspected Red Brigade member in connection with a bombing in April at the Institute for International Affairs in Rome. May finance its activities through armed robberies.

**Strength**

Estimated at fewer than 30 members; probably augments its strength through cooperation with other leftist groups in Italy, such as the Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Italy.

**People Against  
Gangsterism and  
Drugs (PAGAD)**

**External Aid**

Has obtained weapons from abroad.

**Description**

PAGAD and its Islamic ally Qibla view the South African Government as a threat to Islamic values. The two promote greater political voice for South African Muslims. Abdus Salaam Ebrahim currently leads both groups. PAGAD's G-Force (Gun Force) operates in small cells and is believed responsible for carrying out acts of terrorism. PAGAD uses several front names including Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO) and Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders (MAIL) when launching anti-Western protests and campaigns.

**Activities**

Since 2001, PAGAD's activities have been severely curtailed by law-enforcement and prosecutorial efforts against leading members of the organization. Between 1996 and 2000, however, they conducted a total of 189 bomb attacks, including nine bombings in the Western Cape that caused serious injuries. PAGAD's previous bombing targets have included South African authorities, moderate Muslims, synagogues, gay nightclubs, tourist attractions, and Western-associated restaurants. PAGAD is believed to have masterminded the bombing on 25 August 1998 of the Cape Town Planet Hollywood.

**Strength**

Current operational strength is unknown, but previous estimates were several hundred members. PAGAD's G-Force probably contains fewer than 50 members.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Operates mainly in the Cape Town area.

**External Aid**

Probably has ties to Islamic extremists in the Middle East.

**Red Hand Defenders  
(RHD)**

**Description**

Extremist terrorist group formed in 1998 and composed largely of Protestant hardliners from loyalist groups observing a cease-fire. Red Hand Defenders seeks to prevent a political settlement with Irish nationalists by attacking Catholic civilian interests in Northern Ireland. In January 2002, the group announced all staff at Catholic schools in Belfast and Catholic postal workers were legitimate targets. Despite calls in February by the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), and Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) to announce its disbandment, RHD continued to make threats and issue claims of responsibility. RHD is a cover name often used by elements of the banned UDA and LVF.

**Activities**

In recent years, the group has carried out numerous pipe bombings and arson attacks against "soft" civilian targets such as homes, churches, and private businesses. In January 2002, the group bombed the home of a prison official in North Belfast. Twice in 2002 the group claimed responsibility for attacks—the murder of a Catholic postman and Catholic teenager—that were later claimed by the UDA-UFF, further blurring distinctions between the groups. In 2001, RHD claimed responsibility for killing five persons.

**Strength**

Up to 20 members, some of whom have experience in terrorist tactics and bombmaking. Police arrested one member in June 2001 for making a hoax bomb threat.

**Revolutionary  
Proletarian Initiative  
Nuclei (NIPR)**

**Location/Area of Operation**

Northern Ireland.

**External Aid**

None.

**Description**

Clandestine leftist extremist group that appeared in Rome in 2000. Adopted the logo of the Red Brigades of the 1970s and 1980s—an encircled five-point star—for their declarations. Opposes Italy's foreign and labor polices. Has targeted property interests rather than personnel in its attacks.

**Activities**

Did not claim responsibility for an attack in 2002. Claimed responsibility for bomb attack in April 2001 on building housing a US-Italian relations association and an international affairs institute in Rome's historic center. Claimed to have carried out May 2000 explosion in Rome at oversight committee facility for implementation of the law on strikes in public services. Claimed responsibility for explosion in February 2002 on Via Palermo adjacent to Interior Ministry in Rome.

**Strength**

Approximately 12 members.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Mainly in Rome, Milan, Lazio, and Tuscany.

**External Aid**

None evident.

**Revolutionary United  
Front (RUF)**

**Description**

The RUF is a loosely organized force that fought a ten-year civil war to seize control of the lucrative diamond-producing regions of the country. The group funds itself largely through the extraction and sale of diamonds obtained in areas of Sierra Leone under its control.

**Activities**

The RUF was virtually dismantled by the imprisonment of RUF leader Foday Sankoh in 2001; a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program begun in mid-2001; and the official end to the civil war in January 2002. The group's poor showing in the May 2002 Presidential elections and the possibility of prosecution if the impending UN-sponsored Sierra Leone Special Court for war crimes have further weakened organizational cohesion. From 1991 to 2000, they used guerrilla, criminal, and terror tactics, such as murder, torture, and mutilation, to fight the government, intimidate civilians, and keep UN peacekeeping units in check. In 2000, they held hundreds of UN peacekeepers hostage until their release was negotiated, in part, by the RUF's chief sponsor, Liberian President Charles Taylor. The group also has been accused of attacks in Guinea at the behest of President Taylor.

**Riyadus-Salikhin  
Reconnaissance and  
Sabotage Battalion of  
Chechen Martyrs  
(RSRSBCM)**

**Strength**

Once estimated at several thousand supporters and sympathizers, the group has dwindled to several hundred, although many of the demobilized fighters have not been reintegrated into society and could take up arms against the government again.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea.

**External Aid**

A UN experts' panel report on Sierra Leone said President Charles Taylor of Liberia provided support and leadership to the RUF. The UN also identified Libya, Gambia, and Burkina Faso as conduits for weapons and other materiel for the RUF.

**Description**

One of three terrorist groups affiliated with Chechen guerrillas that furnished personnel to carry out the seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow on 23 October 2002. The suicide attackers took more than 800 hostages, whom they threatened to kill if the Russian Government did not meet their demands, including the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya. The RSRSBCM—whose name translates into English as “Requirements for Getting into Paradise”—was not known to Western observers before the seizure. Chechen extremist leader Shamil Basayev, who claimed responsibility for ordering the seizure, continues to lead the RSRSBCM.

**Activities**

Primarily guerrilla operations against Russian forces.

**Strength**

Probably no more than 50 fighters at any given time.

**Location/Area of Operations**

Primarily Chechnya.

**External Aid**

May receive some external assistance from foreign mujahidin.

**Sipah-I-Sahaba/  
Pakistan (SSP)**

**Description**

The Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP) is a Sunni sectarian group that follows the Deobandi school. Violently anti-Shi'a, the SSP emerged in central Punjab in the mid-1980s as a response to the Iranian Revolution. Pakistani President Musharraf banned the SSP in January 2002.

**Activities**

The group's activities range from organizing political rallies calling for Shi'as to be declared non-Muslims to assassinating prominent Shi'a leaders.

**Strength**

Unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Pakistan.

**Special Purpose  
Islamic Regiment  
(SPIR)**

**External Aid**

Unknown.

**Description**

One of three terrorist groups affiliated with Chechen guerrillas that furnished personnel to carry out the seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow on 23 October 2002. The suicide attackers took more than 800 hostages, whom they threatened to kill if the Russian Government did not meet their demands, including the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya. Movzar Barayev commanded the SPIR until he was killed in the October seizure, which he led. The SPIR has continued to carry out guerrilla operations in Chechnya under the leadership of another Chechen leader, Khamzat, whose true identity is not known.

**Activities**

Primarily guerrilla operations against Russian forces. Has also been involved in various hostage and ransom operations, as well as the execution of ethnic Chechens who have collaborated with Russian authorities.

**Strength**

Probably no more than 100 fighters at any given time.

**Location/Area of Operations**

Primarily Chechnya.

**External Aid**

May receive some external assistance from foreign mujahidin.

**The Tunisian  
Combatant Group  
(TCG)**

**Description**

The Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), also known as the Jama'a Combattante Tunisienne, reportedly is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets US and Western interests. Probably founded in 2000 by Tarek Maaroufi and Saifallah Ben Hassine, the loosely organized group has come to be associated with al-Qaida and other North African extremist networks that have been implicated in terrorist plots during the past two years. The group was designated for sanctions under UNSCR 1333 in December 2000. Belgian authorities continue to hold Maaroufi, whom they arrested in December 2001.

**Activities**

Tunisians associated with the TCG are part of the support network of the broader international jihadist movement. According to European press reports, TCG members or affiliates in the past have engaged in trafficking falsified documents and recruiting for terror training camps in Afghanistan. Some TCG associates are suspected of planning an attack against the US, Algerian, and Tunisian diplomatic missions in Rome in January 2001. Some members reportedly maintain ties to the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).

**Strength**

Unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Western Europe, Afghanistan.



**Tupac Amaru  
Revolutionary  
Movement (MRTA)**

**External Aid**

Unknown.

**Description**

Traditional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement formed in 1983 from remnants of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, a Peruvian insurgent group active in the 1960s. Aims to establish a Marxist regime and to rid Peru of all imperialist elements (primarily US and Japanese influence). Peru's counterterrorist program has diminished the group's ability to carry out terrorist attacks, and the MRTA has suffered from infighting, the imprisonment or deaths of senior leaders, and loss of leftist support. In 2002, several MRTA members remained imprisoned in Bolivia.

**Activities**

Previously conducted bombings, kidnappings, ambushes, and assassinations, but recent activity has fallen drastically. In December 1996, 14 MRTA members occupied the Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima and held 72 hostages for more than four months. Peruvian forces stormed the residence in April 1997 rescuing all but one of the remaining hostages and killing all 14 group members, including the remaining leaders. The group has not conducted a significant terrorist operation since and appears more focused on obtaining the release of imprisoned MRTA members.

**Strength**

Believed to be no more than 100 members, consisting largely of young fighters who lack leadership skills and experience.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Peru with supporters throughout Latin America and Western Europe. Controls no territory.

**External Aid**

None.

**Turkish Hizballah**

**Description**

Turkish Hizballah is a Kurdish Islamic (Sunni) extremist organization that arose in the late 1980s in response to Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) atrocities against Muslims in southeastern Turkey, where (Turkish) Hizballah seeks to establish an independent Islamic state.

**Activities**

Beginning in the mid-1990s, (Turkish) Hizballah, which is unrelated to Lebanese Hizballah, expanded its target base and modus operandi from killing PKK militants to conducting low-level bombings against liquor stores, bordellos, and other establishments that the organization considered "anti-Islamic." In January 2000, Turkish security forces killed Huseyin Velioglu, the leader of (Turkish) Hizballah, in a shootout at a safehouse in Istanbul. The incident sparked a yearlong series of counterterrorist operations against the group that resulted in the detention of some 2,000 individuals; authorities arrested several hundred of those on criminal charges. At the same time, police recovered nearly 70 bodies of Turkish and Kurdish businessmen and journalists that (Turkish) Hizballah had tortured and brutally murdered during the mid-to-late 1990s. The group began targeting official Turkish interests in January 2001, when its operatives assassinated the Diyarbakir police chief in the group's most sophisticated operation to date. Turkish Hizballah did not conduct a major operation in 2002.

**Ulster Defense  
Association/Ulster  
Freedom Fighters  
(UDA/UFF)**

**Strength**

Possibly a few hundred members and several thousand supporters.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Turkey, primarily the Diyarbakir region of southeastern Turkey.

**External Aid**

Unknown.

**Description**

The Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the largest loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland, was formed in 1971 as an umbrella organization for loyalist paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). Today, the UFF constitutes almost the entire UDA membership. The UDA/UFF declared a series of cease-fires between 1994 and 1998. In September 2001, the UDA/UFF's Inner Council withdrew its support for Northern Ireland's Good Friday Agreement. The following month, after a series of murders, bombings, and street violence, the British Government ruled the UDA/UFF's cease-fire defunct. The dissolution of the organization's political wing, the Ulster Democratic Party, soon followed. In January 2002, however, the UDA created the Ulster Political Research Group (UPRG) to serve in a similar capacity.

**Activities**

The UDA/UFF has evolved into a criminal organization involved in drug trafficking and other moneymaking criminal activities. In January 2002, the UDA/UFF called for an end to sectarian violence; in the preceding months, the UDA had been blamed for more than 300 bombings and shootings against Catholics in Belfast. Nevertheless, the UDA/UFF continued its attacks against Catholics, as well as those seen as a threat to its criminal enterprises. The UDA/UFF admitted responsibility for the murder of a Catholic postman in January, an attack also claimed by the Red Hand Defenders (RHD), a group used as a cover name by some UDA/UFF elements. The UDA also was blamed for a drive-by shooting that wounded three Catholics in September. Later in the year, three deaths were attributed to the group's escalating feud with the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF). Johnny Adair, the only person ever convicted of directing terrorism in Northern Ireland, was a leading UDA member until September when he was expelled from the group because of his growing ties to the LVF. In 2000, a feud between the UDA/UFF and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) resulted in the deaths of seven men.

**Strength**

Estimates vary from 2,000 to 5,000 members, with several hundred active in paramilitary operations.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Northern Ireland.

**External Aid**

Probably obtains weapons from abroad.

## Appendix D

### US Programs and Policy

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#### **Antiterrorism Assistance Program**

Congress authorized the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program in 1983 as part of a major initiative against international terrorism. Since that time ATA has provided training for over 31,000 students from 127 countries. The ATA Program provides training and related assistance to law-enforcement and security services of selected friendly foreign governments. Assistance to the qualified countries focuses on the following objectives:

- Enhancing the antiterrorism skills of friendly countries by providing training and equipment to deter and counter the threats of terrorism.
- Strengthening the bilateral ties of the United States with friendly, foreign governments by offering concrete assistance in areas of mutual concern.
- Increasing respect for human rights by sharing with civilian authorities modern, humane, and effective antiterrorism techniques.

ATA courses are developed and customized in response to terrorism trends and patterns. The training can be categorized into four functional areas: Crisis Prevention, Crisis Management, Crisis Resolution, and Investigation. Countries needing assistance are identified on the basis of the threat, or actual level of terrorist activity they face.

Antiterrorist assistance and training, which begins with a comprehensive, in-country assessment, can take many forms, including airport security, crime-scene investigations, chemical and biological attacks, and courses for first responders. Most of this training is conducted overseas to maximize its effectiveness, and even more courses are being conducted in country under ATA's new "Fly-Away" concept.

ATA programs may also take the form of advisory assistance, such as police administration and management of police departments, how to train police instructors or develop a police academy, and modern interview and investigative techniques. Equipment or bomb-sniffing dogs may also be included in the assistance package.

The post-September 11 era has shifted the focus of ATA outreach to the newly identified frontline nations. These include Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Djibouti, Egypt, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. The United States delivered 80 courses to these frontline nations in 2002.

ATA has also identified specific areas in which courses will be added or expanded to enhance the antiterrorism capabilities in frontline and other countries. These include medical response to mass casualties, advanced police tactical intervention, physical security, border controls, and operations to deal with weapons of mass destruction such as mail security, customs/immigration inspection, disaster response, and urban search and rescue.

The ability of the United States to assist friendly governments with mastering the detection and prevention of terrorist activities will clearly enhance the mutual security of all the participating nations. Detecting and eliminating terrorist cells at the root before their violence can cross borders and oceans will ensure a safer world for all nations.

In the wake of the September 11 attacks, government officials of these frontline countries expressed greater interest in receiving antiterrorism assistance. ATA has increased efforts to familiarize ambassadors, regional security officers, and other US officials with the program offerings. The success of these efforts is evidenced by the fact that every frontline nation has requested antiterrorist assistance in some form. US diplomats report that the ability of the United States to offer immediate, specific, and intensive training, along with technical tools and equipment, has succeeded in breaking down barriers and building trust.

ATA is responding to the growing demand for training and services, not only by expanding course selection, but also by pursuing development of the Center for Antiterrorism and Security Training (CAST). ATA is already offering training at the Louisiana State Police Academy (Baton Rouge, Louisiana), the DOE Nonproliferation and National Security Institute (Albuquerque, New Mexico), the FBI Academy (Quantico, Virginia), and in the Washington, DC metropolitan area.

## **Rewards for Justice Program**

The Rewards for Justice Program is one of the most valuable US Government assets in the fight against international terrorism. Established by the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, Public Law 98-533, the Program is administered by the US Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

Under the Program, the Secretary of State may offer rewards of up to \$5 million for information that prevents or favorably resolves acts of international terrorism against US persons or property worldwide. Rewards also may be paid for information leading to the arrest or conviction of terrorists attempting, committing, and conspiring to commit, or aiding and abetting in the commission of such acts.

The USA Patriot Act of 2001 authorizes the Secretary to offer or pay rewards of greater than \$5 million if he determines that a greater amount is necessary to combat terrorism or to defend the United States against terrorist acts. Secretary Powell has authorized a reward of up to \$25 million for information leading to the capture of Usama Bin Ladin and other key al-Qaida leaders.

In November 2002, the State and Treasury Departments announced a \$5 million rewards program that will pay for information leading to the disruption of any terrorism financing operation.

Diplomatic Security has fully supported the efforts of the private business sector/ citizens to establish a Rewards for Justice Fund, a nongovernmental, nonprofit 501 C (3) charitable organization administered by a group of private US citizens. One hundred percent of all donated funds will be used to supplement reward payments only. Diplomatic Security has forged a strong relationship with the private business and US citizen representatives of the Rewards for Justice Fund. Diplomatic Security has embarked on a much closer relationship with the US public and private business in the US Government's continuing efforts to bring those individuals responsible for the planning of the September 11 attacks to justice and preventing future international terrorist attacks against the United States at home or abroad.

**International  
Terrorism: US  
Hostages, US Policy**

The US Government will make no concessions to individuals or groups holding official or private US citizens hostage. The United States will use every appropriate resource to gain the safe return of US citizens who are held hostage. At the same time, it is US Government policy to deny hostage takers the benefits of ransom, prisoner releases, policy changes, or other acts of concession.

**Basic Premises**

It is internationally accepted that governments are responsible for the safety and welfare of persons within the borders of their nations. Aware of both the hostage threat and public security shortcomings in many parts of the world, the United States has developed enhanced physical and personal security programs for US personnel and established cooperative arrangements with the US private sector. It has also established bilateral assistance programs and close intelligence and law-enforcement relationships with many nations to prevent hostage-taking incidents or resolve them in a manner that will deny the perpetrators benefits from their actions. The United States also seeks effective judicial prosecution and punishment for hostage takers victimizing the US Government or its citizens and will use all legal methods to these ends, including extradition. US policy and goals are clear, and the US Government actively pursues them alone and in cooperation with other governments.

**US Government Responsibilities When Private US Citizens  
Are Taken Hostage**

Based upon past experience, the US Government concluded that making concessions that benefit hostage takers in exchange for the release of hostages increased the danger that others will be taken hostage. US Government policy is, therefore, to deny hostage takers the benefits of ransom, prisoner releases, policy changes, or other acts of concession.

At the same time, the US Government will make every effort, including contact with representatives of the captors, to obtain the release of hostages without making concessions to the hostage takers.

Consequently, the United States strongly urges US companies and private citizens not to accede to hostage-taker demands. It believes that good security practices, relatively modest security expenditures, and continual close cooperation with embassy and local authorities can lower the risk to US citizens living in high-threat environments.

The US Government is concerned for the welfare of its citizens but cannot support requests that host governments violate their own laws or abdicate their normal enforcement responsibilities.

If the employing organization or company works closely with local authorities and follows US policy, US Foreign Service posts can be involved actively in efforts to bring the incident to a safe conclusion. This includes providing reasonable administrative services and, if desired by local authorities and the US entity, full participation in strategy sessions. Requests for US Government technical assistance or expertise will be considered on a case-by-case basis. The full extent of US Government participation must await an analysis of each specific set of circumstances.

The host government and the US private organizations or citizen must understand that if they wish to follow a hostage-resolution path different from that of US Government policy, they do so without US Government approval. In the event a hostage-taking incident is resolved through concessions, US policy remains steadfastly to pursue investigation leading to the apprehension and prosecution of hostage takers who victimize US citizens.

### **Legal Caution**

Under current US law, 18 USC 1203 (Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage Taking, enacted October 1984 in implementation of the UN convention on hostage taking), seizure of a US citizen as a hostage anywhere in the world is a crime, as is any hostage-taking action in which the US Government is a target or the hostage taker is a US national. Such acts are, therefore, subject to investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to prosecution by US authorities. Actions by private persons or entities that have the effect of aiding or abetting the hostage taking, concealing knowledge of it from the authorities, or obstructing its investigation may themselves be in violation of US law.

### **US Terrorism Lists: Prevention, Punishment, Pressure**

The US Government has established four primary counterterrorism “lists” to serve as tools in the fight against terrorism: The State Sponsors of Terrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), Executive Order 13224, and the Terrorist Exclusion (TEL) list. Each list has its individual mechanisms, but they all serve to prevent terrorism, punish terrorists and their supporters, and pressure changes in the behavior of designated states and groups.

Because these lists are a means to fight terrorism, rather than an end in themselves, they are not designed or intended to be immutable. The US Government encourages states and organizations to take the necessary actions to get out of the terrorism business. The bar for a state or group being removed from a US terrorism list is and must be high—it must end all involvement in any facet of terrorism, including passive support, and satisfy all US counterterrorism concerns.

### **State Sponsors of Terrorism**

The Secretary of State is authorized to designate a government as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” if that government “has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” United States law requires the imposition of various sanctions on a state so designated. A number of US laws and sanctions affect countries whose governments have been designated as state sponsors of terrorism. The four main categories of sanctions include a ban on arms-related exports and sales; restrictions on exports of dual-use items; prohibitions on official US Government economic assistance (except humanitarian assistance), including a requirement that the US Government oppose multilateral bank assistance; and imposition of miscellaneous trade and other restrictions, including a prohibition on imports and liability in US courts for officials of that country that engage in terrorist activity. Inclusion on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list also targets a country for other sanctions laws that penalize persons and countries engaging in certain trade with state sponsors. Currently, there are seven countries on the list: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.

### **Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)**

The Secretary of State is authorized to designate as FTOs groups that conduct international terrorism and threaten the interests of the United States. Designation allows the US to block designees’ assets in US financial institutions; criminalizes witting provision of material support to designated groups; and blocks visas for members of FTOs without having to show that the individual was involved in specific terrorist activities. FTO designation also sends a strong signal that any group that engages in terrorism regardless of its purported goals will be condemned and penalized for its actions. (The list of FTOs can be found in Appendix B.)

### **Executive Order 13224–Terrorist Financing**

President Bush signed Executive Order 13224 on 23 September 2001, to give the US Government a strong tool for eliminating the financial supporters and networks of terrorism. EO 13224 enables the US Government to block designees’ assets in any

financial institution in the United States or held by any US person. It also expands US Government authority to permit the designation of individuals and organizations that provide support or financial or other services to, or associate with, designated terrorists. EO 13224 designations have allowed the US Government, as well as Coalition partners acting in concert, to block tens of millions of dollars intended to bankroll the murderous activities of al-Qaida and other terrorist groups.

A complete listing of individuals and entities covered under EO 13224 can be found at: [www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/terrorism.html](http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/terrorism.html)

**USA Patriot Act:  
Terrorist Exclusion  
List**

President Bush on 26 October 2001 signed into law a comprehensive counterterrorism bill (Public Law 107-56, also known as USA PATRIOT). The new law strengthened enforcement tools and made improvements to the last major terrorism bill, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The Patriot USA Act also created a Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL) with immigration consequences for groups named therein. Designation on the TEL allows the US Government to exclude or deport aliens who provide material assistance to, or solicit it for, designated organizations, giving the Department of State and US law-enforcement agencies a critical tool for bolstering homeland security.

**Terrorist Exclusion  
List Designees  
Designated on  
5 December 2001**

- al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)
- al-Wafa al-Igatha al-Islamia
- 'Asbat al-Ansar
- Darkazanli Company
- Salafist Group for Preaching (Call) and Combat (GSPC)
- Islamic Army of Aden
- Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
- Maktab al-Khidamat
- al-Hamati Sweets Bakeries
- al-Nur Honey Center
- al-Rashid Trust
- al-Shifa Honey Press for Industry and Commerce
- Jaish-e-Mohammed
- Jamiat al-Ta'awun al-Islamiyya
- Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)
- Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR)—a.k.a. Interahamwe, Former Armed Forces (EX-FAR)
- First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)—a.k.a. Grupo de Resistencia Anti-Fascista Primero de Octubre
- Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)—a.k.a. Army of the Righteous

- Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)—a.k.a. Continuity Army Council
- Orange Volunteers (OV)
- Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
- New People's Army (NPA)
- People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)
- Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
- al-Ma'unah
- Jayshullah
- Black Star
- Anarchist Faction for Overthrow
- Red Brigades-Combatant Communist Party (BR-PCC)
- Revolutionary Proletarian Nucleus
- Turkish Hizballah
- Jerusalem Warriors
- Islamic Renewal and Reform Organization
- The Pentagon Gang
- Japanese Red Army (JRA)
- Jamiat ul-Mujahidin (JUM)
- Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI)
- Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
- Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
- Al Taqwa Trade, Property and Industry Company Ltd.
- Bank Al Taqwa Ltd.
- Nada Management Organization
- Youssef M. Nada & Co. Gesellschaft M.B.H.
- Ummah Tameer E-Nau (UTN)
- Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
- Ulster Defense Association
- Afghan Support Committee
- Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (Pakistan and Afghanistan offices—Kuwait office not designated)

***Designated on  
6 November 2002***



## Appendix E

### The US Military Counterterrorism Campaign in 2002: A Summary

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#### The US Military Counterterrorism Campaign in 2002: A Summary

US military forces and allies continued their campaign to oust al-Qaida and the Taliban from Afghanistan into 2002 by completing an exhaustive search of the Tora Bora cave complex in eastern Afghanistan. Although senior al-Qaida operatives were captured in the operation, high-priority targets such as Mullah Omar and Usama Bin Ladin remained at large.

After visiting Kabul on 18 January, Secretary of State Colin Powell facilitated international efforts to rebuild Afghanistan by meeting in Tokyo with representatives from 60 nations and development organizations. Of the \$4.5 billion contributed, the United States provided \$297 million for 2002, the largest single pledge by any government.

Relations with Kabul's nascent government were further bolstered by the visit of interim Afghan president Hamid Karzai to Washington in late January. US forces continued to rout Taliban and al-Qaida operatives in Afghanistan as Karzai reopened his nation's embassy, met with President Bush in the oval office, and called upon State Department and Congressional officials. The abduction on 23 January, and eventual execution, of journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan illustrated the continued hazard to US personnel in the region.

In response to internal security concerns, Karzai's government called for additional personnel to support international peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan. Washington renewed its commitment to train an indigenous Afghan national army (ANA), which now comprises two brigades and will eventually grow to 18 battalions. In the regions, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were formed and deployed in Gardez, Bamiyan, and Konduz, beginning in December 2002. The teams will work to stabilize the regions by coordinating the reconstruction efforts of the Coalition military forces, aid organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the Afghan Government. Ten PRTs are planned for major regional cities in Afghanistan.

On 2 March, US-led allied forces initiated Operation Anaconda to seize the Taliban and al-Qaida-infested Shai-i-Kot valley in eastern Afghanistan. Resistance ceased after 11 days of the heaviest fighting yet seen in the campaign. Although Taliban and al-Qaida fighters were pushed out of their defensive positions during the operation, critics suggested that premature US and Canadian withdrawal from the Shai-i-Kot region on 20 March allowed many to escape through the loosely guarded Pakistani border.

Following the late March announcement by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that training for the ANA would begin in April, US troops—in conjunction with British and Canadian allies—redeployed to seal the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and remove the remaining Taliban and al-Qaida strongholds in the region. Operations along the Pakistani border with Afghanistan continued despite renewed tension and the possibility of war between Pakistan and India in May and June.

As Hamid Karzai was officially sworn in as president of the Transitional State of Afghanistan (TISA) in Kabul on 19 June, US officials predicted it would take up to a year to secure Afghanistan against loyalist Taliban and al-Qaida remnants. Although grateful for the additional security provided by US forces, Afghan officials were highly

critical of an incident on 1 July in which nearly 40 civilians attending a wedding celebration were reportedly killed by an AC-130 gunship responding to antiaircraft fire. Karzai's government was dealt another blow a week later in Kabul with the assassination of Vice President Abdul Qadir, who had been valued as one of the few ethnic Pashtuns in the new Afghan Government. A thwarted car-bombing attempt in Kabul the following week, as well as an assassination attempt against President Karzai in late August, dramatically illustrated the existence of continued security threats in Afghanistan.

Through the final months of 2002, efforts to destroy weapons caches and capture Taliban and al-Qaida fighters met with slow but steady success. In early November, Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that military operations in Afghanistan would be gradually replaced by reconstruction efforts. With the Taliban and al-Qaida presence all but removed by the end of 2002, focus shifted to implementing humanitarian development and reconstruction in Afghanistan, with cost estimates ranging from \$10–15 billion over the next decade.

US counterterrorism efforts also expanded beyond the borders of Afghanistan in 2002, with operations in the Philippines, Georgia, and Yemen. Early in the year, 1,200 advisors were dispatched to the Philippines to train soldiers fighting members of the radical Islamist group Abu Sayyaf. An attempt by Philippine commandos to rescue three US citizens held by Abu Sayyaf in June resulted in the unfortunate deaths of two of the hostages. Following the conclusion of training in July, several hundred US soldiers remained in the Philippines to assist with infrastructure projects.

Washington initiated a similar, though more limited effort in the former Soviet republic of Georgia. Beginning in May, US military personnel trained 1,500 indigenous troops to clear Georgia's Pankisi Gorge region of foreign fighters that possibly included al-Qaida and Chechen separatist groups among their numbers.

## Appendix F

### Countering Terrorism on the Economic Front

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Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the US Government has taken a number of steps to block terrorist funding.

On 23 September 2001, for example, the President signed Executive Order (EO) 13224. In general terms, the Order provides a means to disrupt the financial-support network for terrorists and terrorist organizations. The Order authorizes the US Government to designate and block the assets of foreign individuals and entities that commit, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism. In addition, because of the pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial foundations of foreign terrorists, the Order authorizes the US Government to block the assets of individuals and entities that provide support, financial or other services, or assistance to, or otherwise associate with, designated terrorists and terrorist organizations. The Order also covers their subsidiaries, front organizations, agents, and associates.

The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, has continued to designate foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended. Among other consequences of such a designation, it is unlawful for US persons or any persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to provide funds or material support to a designated FTO. US financial institutions are also required to retain the funds of designated FTOs.

A few 2002 highlights follow:

On 27 June, the United States designated Babbar Khalsa International responsible for the killing of 22 Americans when it bombed Air India 182.

On 12 August, the United States added two groups and an individual (New People's Army/Communist Party of the Philippines and Jose Maria Sison) responsible for the death of Americans in the Philippines. The United States also obtained the cooperation of the European Union on this designation.

On 23 October, the United States designated Jemaah Islamiya under both the EO and as an FTO. Jemaah Islamiya is responsible for the Bali bombings as well as plots to bomb US interests elsewhere in Southeast Asia. On the same date, 50 countries joined the United States at the United Nations in requesting that the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267 Sanctions Committee add this group to its consolidated list of individuals and entities associated with Usama Bin Ladin, al-Qaida, or the Taliban.

On 30 January 2003, under the authority of both the EO and FTO, the United States designated Lashkar i Jhangvi, which was involved in the killing of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl. The UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee also included this group on its consolidated list.

Actions taken through January 2003 brought the total number of groups designated under EO 13224 to 250, and the total designated under the FTO authority to 36.

These steps have already achieved results. By year's end, the US Government had blocked more than \$36 million in assets of the Taliban, al-Qaida, and other terrorist entities and supporters. Other nations have blocked more than \$88 million in assets.

UNSCR 1373, adopted on 28 September, 2001, requires, among other things, all states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and to deny safehaven to those who finance, plan, facilitate, or commit terrorist acts.

Since 11 September 2001, the 29-nation Financial Action Task Force (FATF) established a series of key international standards on financial regulation and best practices. It uses a variety of tools to encourage nations worldwide to adopt and implement these standards so as to deny access by terrorists to those financial institutions, formal and informal, which terrorist networks have used in the past to raise, hold, or move funds. FATF has also invited action plans from all countries to achieve full implementation of such financial standards. The G-8 and FATF have both agreed to work with the coordinating committee of the UN to provide technical assistance to countries seeking to implement UNSCR 1373.

## Appendix G

### Iraq and Terrorism

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**Secretary of State  
Colin L. Powell  
Excerpt from Remarks  
to the United Nations  
Security Council  
5 February 2003**

My friends, the information I have presented to you about these terrible weapons and about Iraq's continued flaunting of its obligations under Security Council Resolution 1441 links to a subject I now want to spend a little bit of time on, and that has to do with terrorism.

Our concern is not just about these illicit weapons; it's the way that these illicit weapons can be connected to terrorists and terrorist organizations that have no compunction about using such devices against innocent people around the world.

Iraq and terrorism go back decades. Baghdad trains Palestine Liberation Front members in small arms and explosives. Saddam uses the Arab Liberation Front to funnel money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers in order to prolong the *Intifadah*. And it's no secret that Saddam's own intelligence service was involved in dozens of attacks or attempted assassinations in the 1990s.

But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Mud'ab al-Zarqawi an associate and collaborator of Usama Bin Ladin and his Al-Qaida lieutenants.

Zarqawi, Palestinian born in Jordan, fought in the Afghan war more than a decade ago. Returning to Afghanistan in 2000, he oversaw a terrorist training camp. One of his specialties, and one of the specialties of this camp, is poisons.

When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the Zarqawi network helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp, and this camp is located in northeastern Iraq. You see a picture of this camp.

The network is teaching its operatives how to produce ricin and other poisons. Let me remind you how ricin works. Less than a pinch—imagine a pinch of salt—less than a pinch of ricin, eating just this amount in your food, would cause shock, followed by circulatory failure. Death comes within 72 hours and there is no antidote. There is no cure. It is fatal.

Those helping to run this camp are Zarqawi lieutenants operating in northern Kurdish areas outside Saddam Hussein's controlled Iraq. But Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical organization Ansar al-Islam that controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000, this agent offered al-Qaida safehaven in the region.

After we swept al-Qaida from Afghanistan, some of those members accepted this safehaven. They remain there today.

Zarqawi's activities are not confined to this small corner of northeast Iraq. He traveled to Baghdad in May of 2002 for medical treatment, staying in the capital of Iraq for two months while he recuperated to fight another day.

During his stay, nearly two-dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and established a base of operations there. These al-Qaida affiliates based in Baghdad now coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network, and they have now been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months.

Iraqi officials deny accusations of ties with al-Qaida. These denials are simply not credible. Last year, an al-Qaida associate bragged that the situation in Iraq was "good," that Baghdad could be transited quickly.

We know these affiliates are connected to Zarqawi because they remain, even today, in regular contact with his direct subordinates, include the poison-cell plotters. And they are involved in moving more than money and materiel. Last year, two suspected al-Qaida operatives were arrested crossing from Iraq into Saudi Arabia. They were linked to associates of the Baghdad cell and one of them received training in Afghanistan on how to use cyanide.

From his terrorist network in Iraq, Zarqawi can direct his network in the Middle East and beyond. We in the United States, all of us, the State Department and the Agency for International Development, we all lost a dear friend with the cold-blooded murder of Mr. Laurence Foley in Amman, Jordan, last October. A despicable act was committed that day, the assassination of an individual whose sole mission was to assist the people of Jordan. The captured assassin says his cell received money and weapons from Zarqawi for that murder. After the attack, an associate of the assassin left Jordan to go to Iraq to obtain weapons and explosives for further operations. Iraqi officials protest that they are not aware of the whereabouts of Zarqawi or of any of his associates. Again, these protests are not credible. We know of Zarqawi's activities in Baghdad. I described them earlier.

Now let me add one other fact. We asked a friendly security service to approach Baghdad about extraditing Zarqawi and providing information about him and his close associates. This service contacted Iraqi officials twice and we passed details that should have made it easy to find Zarqawi. The network remains in Baghdad. Zakawi still remains at large, to come and go.

As my colleagues around this table and as the citizens they represent in Europe know, Zarqawi's terrorism is not confined to the Middle East. Zarqawi and his network have plotted terrorist actions against countries including France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany and Russia. According to detainees Abu Atiya, who graduated from Zarqawi's terrorist camp in Afghanistan, tasked at least nine North African extremists in 2001 to travel to Europe to conduct poison and explosive attacks.

Since last year, members of this network have been apprehended in France, Britain, Spain and Italy. By our last count, 116 operatives connected to this global web have been arrested.

We know about this European network and we know about its links to Zarqawi because the detainees who provided the information about the targets also provided the names of members of the network. Three of those he identified by name were arrested in France last December. In the apartments of the terrorists, authorities found circuits for explosive devices and a list of ingredients to make toxins.

The detainee who helped piece this together says the plot also targeted Britain. Later evidence again proved him right. When the British unearthed the cell there just last month, one British police officer was murdered during the destruction of the cell.

We also know that Zarqawi's colleagues have been active in the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia, and in Chechnya, Russia. The plotting to which they are linked is not mere chatter. Members of Zarqawi's network say their goal was to kill Russians with toxins.

We are not surprised that Iraq is harboring Zarqawi and his subordinates. This understanding builds on decades-long experience with respect to ties between Iraq and al-Qaida. Going back to the early and mid-1990s when Bin Ladin was based in Sudan, an al-Qaida source tells us that Saddam and Bin Ladin reached an understanding that al-Qaida would no longer support activities against Baghdad. Early al-Qaida ties were forged by secret high-level intelligence service contacts with al-Qaida, secret Iraqi intelligence high-level contacts with al-Qaida.

We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s. In 1996, a foreign security service tells us that Bin Ladin met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum and later met the director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service.

Saddam became more interested as he saw al-Qaida's appalling attacks. A detained al-Qaida member tells us that Saddam was more willing to assist al-Qaida after the 1998 bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Saddam was also impressed by al-Qaida's attacks on the USS Cole in Yemen in October 2000.

Iraqis continue to visit Bin Ladin in his new home in Afghanistan. A senior defector, one of Saddam's former intelligence chiefs in Europe, says Saddam sent his agents to Afghanistan sometime in the mid-1990s to provide training to al-Qaida members on document forgery.

From the late 1990s until 2001, the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan played the role of liaison to the al-Qaida organization.

Some believe, some claim, these contacts do not amount to much. They say Saddam Hussein's secular tyranny and al-Qaida's religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together, enough so al-Qaida could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that al-Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction.

And the record of Saddam Hussein's cooperation with other Islamist terrorist organizations is clear. HAMAS, for example, opened an office in Baghdad in 1999, and Iraq has hosted conferences attended by Palestine Islamic Jihad. These groups are at the forefront of sponsoring suicide attacks against Israel.

Al-Qaida continues to have a deep interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. As with the story of Zarqawi and his network, I can trace the story of a senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq provided training in these weapons to al-Qaida. Fortunately, this operative is now detained and he has told his story. I will relate it to you now as he, himself, described it.

This senior al-Qaida terrorist was responsible for one of al-Qaida's training camps in Afghanistan. His information comes firsthand from his personal involvement at senior levels of al-Qaida. He says Bin Ladin and his top deputy in Afghanistan, deceased

al-Qaida leader Mohammed Atef, did not believe that al-Qaida labs in Afghanistan were capable enough to manufacture these chemical or biological agents. They needed to go somewhere else. They had to look outside of Afghanistan for help.

Where did they go? Where did they look? They went to Iraq. The support that the operative describes included Iraq offering chemical or biological weapons training for two al-Qaida associates beginning in December 2000. He says that a militant known as Abdullah al-Araqi had been sent to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring poisons and gasses. Abdullah al-Araqi characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful.

As I said at the outset, none of this should come as a surprise to any of us. Terrorism has been a tool used by Saddam for decades. Saddam was a supporter of terrorism long before these terrorist networks had a name, and this support continues. The nexus of poisons and terror is new. The nexus of Iraq and terror is old. The combination is lethal.


With this track record, Iraqi denials of supporting terrorism take their place alongside the other Iraqi denials of weapons of mass destruction. It is all a web of lies.

When we confront a regime that harbors ambitions for regional domination, hides weapons of mass destruction, and provides haven and active support for terrorists, we are not confronting the past; we are confronting the present. And unless we act, we are confronting an even more frightening future.



## Appendix H Statistical Review


### Total International Terrorist Attacks, 1981-2002




In past years, serious violence by Palestinians against other Palestinians in the occupied territories was included in the database of worldwide international terrorist incidents because Palestinians are considered stateless people. This resulted in such incidents being treated differently from intraethnic violence in other parts of the world. In 1989, as a result of further review of the nature of intra-Palestinian violence, such violence stopped being included in the US Government's statistical database on international terrorism. The figures shown above for the years 1984 through 1988 have been revised to exclude intra-Palestinian violence, thus making the database consistent.

Investigations into terrorist incidents sometimes yield evidence that necessitates a change in the information previously held true (such as whether the incident fits the definition of international terrorism, which group or state sponsor was responsible, or the number of victims killed or injured). As a result of these adjustments, the statistics given in this report may vary slightly from numbers cited in previous reports.


## Total International Attacks by Region, 1997-2002



## Total International Casualties by Region, 1997-2002




## Total Facilities Struck by International Attacks, 1997-2002



## Total US Citizen Casualties Caused by International Attacks, 1997-2002

Note scale break


Dead  
Wounded



## Total Anti-US Attacks, 2002




### Region




**Total - 77**

### Type of Event



**Total - 77**

### Total US Targets Attacked



**Total - 85**



