



# TRC TWW Report

Terror Web Watch Report




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Item 1: Terrorist Analysis of the Madrid Attacks (Terrorist Incident)

Item 2: The Army of Ansar al-Sunna (Group Profile) Releases New Edition of their Online Periodical

Item 3: Strategic Discussion of Attacking Oil Infrastructure



**Graphic:** The title page from Item 1 reads "An Analytic Lesson and Summary of the Blessed Madrid Raid and the Fatal Mistake."



## Orientation/Introduction:

Please review the introduction to the Terror Web Watch at [Intel Report](#).

### **Item 1: Terrorist Analysis of the Madrid Attacks ([Terrorist Incident](#))**

Full translation of terrorists' "Lessons Learned" from Madrid

This unique document discusses lessons learned from the Madrid attacks from the terrorist's perspective, describing tactical pros and cons in the planning stage of the operation. It encourages the "new Mujahid generation" to study the operation to learn from its mistakes. The analysis closes by calling upon future terrorists in Spain ([Country Profile](#)) to "finish what your brothers in the blessed Madrid raid began."

The opening pages claim that the analysis is the work of "One of the Brigades of the World Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders." This World Front was an organization led by Osama bin Laden and four other extremist leaders who issued an infamous fatwa in 1998 calling upon Muslims to kill Americans. The document also bears the signature of an individual at the end, named Abdullah dhu al-Bejadeen, who is also the alleged author of courses in bomb making that have circulated Jihadist websites.

[begin translation]

In the Name of God the Merciful and the Compassionate

The Brigades of the Highest Paradise, One of the Brigades of the World Islamic Front for the Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders

Presents

A Special Training Publication for the Knowledge and Personal Development of the Mujahideen...

An Analytic Study and Summary of the Blessed Madrid Raid and the Fatal Mistake...

...[The Madrid attacks] were and still are to this day one of the most successful operations to come after the raids on New York and Washington. Yet, there was a fatal mistake, which was made during the preparation of the raid, which led to most of the members of the Jihad cell that carried out the operation being quickly martyred, and also allowed Spanish security to put a stop to the entire cell.

We must spend some time discussing the things that led to this end. Even as we maintain the knowledge that what happened was God's will, we must clarify what happened in this raid, mentioning both the positives and negatives, so as not to repeat the negatives and also to make every Jihad operation hence forth more effective. We also want to teach the new Mujahid generation what happened so they can avoid these negative aspects in their coming operations...

#### The Beginning

The Targets: Four trains employed in the Spanish capital of Madrid days before the elections.

The Operation: A chain of organized, consecutive explosions in the trains within a time period of three minutes.



## نبدأ ان شاء الله

الاهداف : - اربعة من قطارات السكك الحديدية التي تستخدم في العاصمة الاسبانية مدريد قبيل الانتخابات الاسبانية بإيام قلائل .

العملية : - سلسلة من الانفجارات في قطارات السكك الحديدية بشكل متتابع ومنظم وفي فترة قصيرة لا تتجاوز الثلاث دقائق .



### The Execution of the Raid:

On the morning of March 11, 2004, a number of Mujahideen arrived at the train station in the city of Alcala de Henares in at least two vehicles. One was a Skoda Fabia with a license plate of CFK 3039, and the other was a small truck of the make Renault Kango, with license plate number BX 0576. They left the cars on Enfantado street [tr note: this transliteration from Spanish to Arabic to English of the street name have distorted the original name] close to one of the entrances leading to the station. They headed toward this entrance with 13 bags holding timed bombs connected to Trium T-110 cellular phones. At 7:00, the first train departed from platform four with four bombs on it. Each one weighed about 15 kilograms, with 12 kilograms of Goma-2 ECO explosives and the rest [of the weight consisting] of nails.

At 7:05, the second train left the station. On board were four other bombs. At 7:10 the third train left the station, also carrying four bombs. The fourth train departed the station at 7:15 with one bomb on board. The Mujahideen left the bombs on the trains after getting off and before the trains arrived at their final destinations.

### Zero Hour

The time was 7:37 when the first bomb exploded in the train that had arrived at the Atocha station. Seconds afterward, two other bombs exploded in the same train. The fourth bomb did not go off.

At 7:38, a bomb exploded at El Pozo station. The three other bombs did not go off. Then, another bomb exploded in a train in the Santa Eugenia station. The time was 7:39. Four bombs exploded in the last train when it had almost arrived at the Atocha station.

Nine bombs exploded and four bombs did not. Three of them were detonated by Spanish security because they feared they might go off at any time. The fourth was found by Spanish authorities later and was dismantled. This is what we shall discuss here because this was the fatal mistake.



## The Preparation for the Blessed Raid (divided into two parts)

### The First Part: Logistical Preparation:

The targets were studied quickly and precisely without drawing anyone's attention, and the best times and locations in which the trains moved and stopped were determined. The safest places for each Mujahid to put his device [were also determined], and the appropriate timing for the operation was decided. The most crowded cars were picked to ensure the greatest direct effect of the explosions (and thus the greatest indirect pressure on the Spanish government aligned against Islam and the Muslims).

The materials necessary for the operation were easily and secretly prepared, like the mobile phones that would be used to consecutively time the explosions. The mobile phones were of the model Trium T-110.



*The phone used in the blessed Madrid raid was a Trium T-110. One of them had the number 652282963.*

### The Second Part: The Military Preparation (the Explosive Charges):

Here we see the Mujahid cell's ability in preparing powerful explosive charges with appropriate amounts [of explosives]. They selected one kind of explosive for the operation that was a kind of dynamite used to break up rock in the mountains. It is called Goma-2 ECO.





The brothers did a good job of obtaining this military and industrial material, and in selecting [Goma-2 ECO] to use instead of other explosives, such as homemade ones, which require a lot of time, money, preparation, and a secure place to make them, all of which would have risked exposure to Spanish intelligence.

Here, we discuss the positives of using this explosive material and the difference between it and other explosives:

- 1- This explosive is considered more powerful than TNT in terms of explosiveness, which guaranteed a certain amount of destruction. The power of this substance and its impact is also already known; that saved the brothers from having to experiment to make sure that it would work in the operation.
- 2- Using this substance helped hide the brothers because it is similar to that used by the separatist organization ETA in its conflict with the Spanish government. The Spanish security apparatus, upon seeing this explosive that had been used by this separatist organization, turned its gaze toward [ETA] for a significant period of time, allowing the brother Mujahideen to move with freedom, without fear or hesitation, to prepare for other raids.
- 3- This [kind of] explosive charge is easy to prepare, without the complications of preparing homemade explosives. They had only to put this explosive in a container and attach it to a detonator, linked to a mobile phone, and it was ready to explode.
- 4- The explosive used in these bombings is not sensitive, meaning that if you put a source of flame near it, it would not explode for some time. Also, it is not sensitive to movement, which guaranteed that the Mujahid could carry the charge to the pre-determined place, even if it was jostled about on the way by passing amongst people and by the movement of the train.

B [sic] – Also, the other material added to the charge was, in spite of its simplicity, very beneficial and helped to raise the number of dead. Nails were added of a length of 1-5 centimeters, at a ratio of three kilograms of nails to 12 kilograms of explosive material in each device.



C - The bags in which the devices were placed were chosen for a number of reasons. The first is that they were large enough to accommodate the devices, each with its weight of 15 kilograms (12 kilograms of explosive material and three kilograms of nails). The second reason was that these bags were not scary or strange looking, either of which would deflect any doubt and not draw any attention. They were sports bags of the kind that are carried by many people who ride the trains and metros.



*<i>The kinds of bags used in the explosions could carry the charge used without attracting attention or creating suspicion. </i>*

These were the positive aspects of the preparation of the raid that we must mention so that the Mujahid can learn to select knowledgeably his targets and materials. In spite of the positives, the topic [of analyzing the Madrid attacks] also includes negative aspects. No work can be perfect; perfection belongs to God only. Therefore, we shall also focus on bringing to light the technical problems with the operation.

#### We Mention Here the Negatives and the Fatal Mistake Made by the Brother Mujahideen during this Blessed Raid

The First Mistake (divided into two parts):

1. In order to obtain this powerful explosive substance, the brothers had to expose themselves to whomever supplied it to them. We must bring up this mistake because the Mujahid must cut all threads and deflect all doubts that may lead the security services to follow him, even if those threads are trivial.
2. The dangerous, negative aspect [of this operation] and the fatal mistake was that the brothers used cell phones as timing devices to blow up the charges, which relied upon the timing and alarm specific to each phone. This meant that they relied upon the alarm clocks, [instead of] controlling the phones [themselves].

Another drawback was that they purchased the phones from stores that were known to the government, stores whose owners (who were of Indian nationality) knew that the nationality of the Mujahideen was Moroccan. They also made the mistake of purchasing the components of the operation not long before they used them. The timing and the use of the cellular phones exposed them to danger. They could have purchased some clocks that could be timed to light up or ring an alarm, which are available every where and whose purchase would not have engendered suspicion and would not have cost the Mujahideen anything worth a mention.

The Second Mistake:

[The terrorists] left the cars in which they had arrived at the targets in front of the targeted trains. This was a big mistake, and furthermore the cars that they used had been stolen. The brothers forgot seven detonators in the car and an Arabic-language tape of the Koranic chapter Al Amran.

The Third Mistake:

The brother Mujahideen forgot that they must not touch the phones with their bare hands. This would leave evidence if fingerprints could be extracted off [the phones], and it would be known who had touched the phones in a very short time after looking it up on a special military computer, which can determine identities from finger prints. The brothers should have worn gloves when they purchased the phones and during the preparation of the explosive charges. In spite of those dangerous security mistakes, the charges exploded, but it is necessary to mention these mistakes, no matter how trivial.

Yet another mistake was made that exposed the brothers to failure and cost them a lot. When the explosive charges were prepared, the charges were all timed to explode at the same time or within just seconds of each other. It happened that they got set to go off within three minutes of one another, between 7:37 and 7:41 in the morning. However, in the situation of the four bombs [that did not explode], the brother Mujahid had confused the matter. He set them to the same time – 7:40 – but he did not set them to the 7:40 am; he set them for 7:40 pm, twelve hours after they were supposed to explode.

When the first nine bombs went off one after another in the cars stopped at the station, it was certain that many infidels would be killed. The four remaining bombs did not go off because their timers were set too late. Therefore, when the ruined trains were inspected, they found the [unexploded] charges. Three were blown up immediately, out of the fear that they might go off at any time. But a fourth bomb was taken apart because there were 12 hours before it might explode. Spanish security, thereby, got its first thread in the search for the perpetrators of the blessed raid. The bomb consisted of parts used by the Mujahideen that had their fingerprints on them, and [Spanish security] also obtained the phones upon which appeared names, and the owners of the stores where the phones were purchased would know who [the perpetrators] were.

[Spanish security] also knew then what kind of explosive was used, the weight of the charge, and lots of other things. One thread would lead to another, just as the torture of one Mujahid leads to another Mujahid...

[“A Picture Album from the Blessed Raid” follows, with 12 pages of full-page color pictures of the aftermath of the attack.]

...Praise God and thanks to God...who granted the Mujahideen victory, for after the elections, the Spanish Prime Minister, who was one of the pillars of the Crusader alliance in the war against the Muslims in Iraq, fell. The new Spanish government decided to withdraw Spanish forces immediately from Iraq. May God grant our brother Mujahideen martyrdom and paradise...

However, do not forget that Spanish forces are still killing our brothers in Afghanistan. [Spain's] secret prisons are filled with our brother Mujahideen, for Spain is considered “the Guantanamo of Europe.” It is your turn, my brothers, to finish what your brothers in the blessed Madrid raid began.

The Blood, the Blood, the Destruction, the Destruction: what is coming will be even craftier, God willing.

All preparation and organization to the Mujahideen,

Your brother under God,

Abdullah dhu al-Bejadeen.

[end translation]

Links: September 11 attacks ([Terrorist Incident](#)), Iraq ([Country Profile](#))

## **Item 2: The Army of Ansar al-Sunna ([Group Profile](#)) Releases New Edition of their Online Periodical**

The Army of Ansar al-Sunna has put out the newest issue of its online magazine, called “Ansar al-Sunna.” In this issue is an article detailing “the Lie of the Jewish Holocaust” and messages to the Iraqi people, the Mujahideen, and those participating in Iraqi elections. Most of the articles show little innovation on Iraqi insurgents’ typical rhetoric of religious justifications of the killings that they do and the promise of victory ordained by God. The piece on the Holocaust shows a slight departure from the normally Iraq-centric focus.

Another article’s scope expands alarmingly outside of the Iraqi theater. Entitled “the Goals and Objectives of the Jihad,” the article, penned by an author named Dr. Salah Matasim, hints at the group’s desire to attack outside of





Iraq. The article discusses the imperative of "returning the attacks of those who attack the Muslims." It refers to Koranic passages and sayings of the Prophet that are said to support this "obligation."

The article also discusses the goal of killing "infidels" for its own sake, rather than targeting aggressors in the context of a war. "This is because the state of being an infidel is like a cancer, but worse. And so if they do not convert to Islam and accept Islamic Sharia law, we must eradicate them so that they do not corrupt society." "Terrorizing infidels" is also discussed as an objective in this article. The following illustration, depicting an attack on Washington, DC, accompanies the article:



### **Item 3: Strategic Discussion of Attacking Oil Infrastructure**

This 13-page essay draws on resources from the US Department of Energy's Energy Information Agency and other English language web sources to suggest that the best way to attack the United States ([Country Profile](#)) economically is to attack its sources of natural gas and oil: Alaska.

An excerpt of the essay follows:

"Strategic centers of gravity are, in their military definition, sources of strength for the enemy from which he derives his ability to fight and his will to fight. If we took the infidel America as an example, it would be clear to us that, in its theater of operations, it relies upon air and missile power. If we took it to the strategic level, we would find that America derives its military power generally from its economic might, from which it is able to sustain and continue developing its military. If we were able to prevent sales of oil to America, would America be able to continue its criminal measures and keep up the strength of its global terrorism? Would it be able to pay the billions necessary to sustain and develop its military strength? It is hard to overestimate the importance of crude oil and natural gas to America's economy."



The document draws on mostly English language sources from the EIA, the BBC, and others to show the US's reliance on imported oil and natural gas. It also focuses heavily on the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan ([Country Profile](#)) as being motivated by the US need for energy: Iraq for its oil resources and Afghanistan as a base from which to control Central Asian and Caspian Sea energy resources. It discusses the importance of coordinating Jihad operations against oil and gas infrastructure in order to prevent the US from easy access to these resources. In the case of Iraq, the author says it is better to find a way to prevent Americans from exporting Iraqi oil than it is to further destroy Iraq's already ruined oil production infrastructure.

The author also posts links to maps (some of which are no longer active) to oil infrastructure in the United States, focusing on the trans-Alaska pipeline. He advises more Internet research on the subject: "In response to the brothers who have requested detailed and precise maps of oil installations in the land of the bloody infidel regime America, I am telling you that the Internet is full of maps like these. Also, you can purchase detailed, precise maps for a reasonable price from a number of sites like [http://www.mapsearch.com/paper\\_products.cfm](http://www.mapsearch.com/paper_products.cfm)...Also, facts about the trans-Alaska pipeline can be found here: <http://www.alyeska-pipe.com/pipelinefacts.html>. We must understand that this is one of the most important pipelines, as 17 percent of oil inside America flows from Alaska to the port of Valdez..."

After some discussion of the pipeline, the author concludes that the pipeline could be attacked "at a remote point, which they will not be able to get to quickly to do repairs. It might be possible to blow up the pipeline in forested regions so that the explosion may start a fire in the area, adding to the burden..." He adds, "...Only a small group – four or five Mujahideen – would be needed...it would be best to put explosive charges at different places along these pipes...note: the best time for the operation would be in the summer, June or July."

This particular essay is not new; it has appeared on a forum on the site of British based-Islamist Mohammed al-Masaari and may have also appeared on the website of al-Masaari's one-time colleague, another England-based Islamist named Said al-Faqih. It has been resubmitted for consideration recently on the al-Saf.net site, in a forum that discusses planning, tactics, and strategies of terrorist attacks.

In December 2004, Osama bin Laden called upon terrorists in Saudi Arabia ([Country Profile](#)) to attack the oil infrastructure there, with the goal of driving the price of oil up to US\$100 a barrel ([WAR Report](#)). There have been subsequent discussions of the importance of this target set in the Arabian Gulf on Jihadist websites ([Terror Web Watch](#)). However, this may be the first time such an extensive discussion of attacking oil infrastructure outside of southwest/central Asia has been carried out on these forums.

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