



# TRC TWW Report

Terror Web Watch Report



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Item 1: A strategic document by former al-Qaeda branch leader aids in preparing insurgents

Item 2: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula issues claim of responsibility for "terrorist attack" in Saudi Arabia

Item 3: Part IV of the Jihad Biography of Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, written by al-Qaeda leader Saif al-Adl

Item 4: Film available: The Jihad in Uzbekistan (Country Profile)



## Orientation/Introduction:

Please review the introduction to the Terror Web Watch at [Intel Report](#).

### Item 1: A strategic document by former al-Qaeda branch leader aids in preparing insurgents

Yousif al-Aiyeri was the al-Qaeda leader and trainer for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula ([Group Profile](#)) until his death on June 1, 2003. He was nicknamed "al-Battar" and was the namesake for the group's al-Battar training series. He has been credited with laying out the framework for the insurgency in Iraq ([Country Profile](#)).

Al-Qaeda has published the first in what it claims will be a series of "military lessons" from the teachings of al-Aiyeri. The first lesson is titled "Sectarian War" and lays out the basic conceptual framework for insurgency. Aiyeri gives tips on operational and even tactical strategy. Much of the document may be considered common sense to most civilians, but there are some points of interest. First, Aiyeri urges fighters to choose very carefully where they will operate. They should pick places that are difficult to access by helicopter and tanks. He says that cities are good places to fight, but he urges that the insurgents get to know the inhabitants of the city and stay away from the areas in which any security apparatuses patrol. "If you prepare well [in urban warfare], the enemy will not be able to use weapons against you... neither aircraft nor tanks." He emphasizes raids and kidnappings and urges thorough surveillance before an operation of either kind. The following is a translated excerpt:

[translation begin]

- Do not strike the enemy from the front; you must strike him from the rear, such as his lines of support and other weak areas.
- You must disperse the enemy as much as possible. It is better to launch four operations in four different places that are far from one another than it is to launch eight operations in one place.
- The goal should not be killing many of the enemy's men, but in causing him to disperse. You need to bleed the enemy. For example, a brigade moves in a 50 by 2 kilometer area. Attack them, and then move elsewhere in that 50 by 2 kilometer area to attack them again. You need to disperse him as much as possible. This is called "bleeding," or "dog and flea." You need to use this style. If you can launch four attacks in different places and kill 100 men, it is preferable to launching eight attacks in the same place and killing 300. At this level, you want to drain the enemy of his energy. You do not want your enemy to ever feel he is safe anywhere. If you are facing a nation and an army, then it is a mistake to focus your attacks in one place. The enemy will only come and focus on protecting that place...you do not need to kill a million or more...to make your enemy lose his desire for war. For example, the Americans lost 76,000 during Vietnam. There were four million people total killed in the war, but it was the Americans that declared defeat because the Vietnamese made them lose their appetite for war. As for the Soviet forces, they would destroy the forces of their enemy [not specified] and then return after a period to find that the enemy had returned anew to be victorious, just like the British during World War II.

Thus, the foundation for defeat is: loss of the appetite for war.

[end translation]

### Item 2: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula issues claim of responsibility for "terrorist attack" in Saudi Arabia

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula issued a claim of responsibility for a "terrorist operation" against three empty airplanes at an airport in the al-Gusaym region of Saudi Arabia ([Country Profile](#)). The group claims that the "Brigade of the Martyr Saud al-Otaibi," named after an alleged group leader killed in December 2004, snuck past security guards, boarded the planes, covered them inside and out with flammable substances, and lit them on fire. The group said that the operation was a message to the Saudi government that "what has been done to our brothers in terms of killing, capturing, deporting has not lessened our determination." It is likely the group, which



has not undertaken any operations in recent months, felt it was under pressure to send some signal that it was still active.

The group's operations have been increasingly less effective and newsworthy since its ranks have been cut down by intense Saudi efforts to eradicate it. Indeed, this incident barely graced the English press, and the Saudi government barely gave it a mention, refusing to admit that it was a terrorist operation. This operation may be evidence that this particular terrorist outfit in Saudi Arabia is on its last legs. If the organization remains weak, then operations of this type, which are low-risk and perhaps cause only property damage and financial loss, may become the mainstay of this particular organization in Saudi Arabia. The effort to cause financial loss may be an acknowledgement of Osama Bin Laden's emphasis on the financial aspect of terrorism, as laid out in his December 16 speech ([WAR Report](#)). In the claim of responsibility, the group brags that this operation cost them only 331 Saudi riyals (approx US\$88).

TRC has long forecast that Saudi veterans returning home from the war in Iraq may join the ranks of the al-Qaeda organization ([Group Profile](#)) at home, contributing to the organization's resurgence. However, it is possible the Saudi government learned a lesson from the aftermath of the Afghan jihad and will do more to control or apprehend the veterans of the Iraqi insurgency ([Group Profile](#)). If the security forces can keep the group diminished, then there is a chance that the thousands of westerners who left the country after a wave of terrorist attacks in 2003-2004 ([Terrorism](#)) may return to participate in the Saudi economy once again. However, this cannot be accurately assessed until Saudi jihadists begin returning home and the Saudi government's response is observed. The Saudi Arabian failure to reform its culture of hate and intolerance and create jobs for the masses of unemployed youth bode poorly for the country's long-term counter-terror outlook.

### **Item 3: Part IV of the Jihad Biography of Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, written by al-Qaeda leader Saif al-Adl**

See previous weeks' Terror Web Watches for an introduction and parts 1, 2, and 3 of this biography that describes how Zarqawi began his career with al-Qaeda.

[*Tr. Note* = "Umma" is a word denoting the global Muslim community. It roughly translates into "Islamic nation."]

[begin translation]

#### **Abu Musaab was not aware of the [September 11] attack before it happened,**

And neither was he aware of the targets. Therefore we gave Abu Musaab a good explanation of our goals and explained some of the important details of our goals for the next level, with the possibility of the anticipated and desired American response. And what happened, happened.

In the two months following the attack, [the United States] threatened and promised to put a stop to al-Qaeda and its followers every where. They promised to uproot Jihadist Islam and its manifestations everywhere. The Americans began to fumble in their words and their actions. Its allies, followers, and henchmen kept pace with everything [the United States] was doing and saying. It happened just as we had hoped and planned. Bush junior declared his Crusade on Islam and Muslims everywhere. This crusade had been actually been going on for a long time; as a matter of fact, the first Crusade from the time of Saladin and Richard the Lionhearted had never ended. It had been waged in a number of theaters. Bush and his myrmidons were ignorant to this and its importance to us. This was a big victory for us. We gained a lot from their foolishness, their utterances, and their carelessness.

I return now to the brother Abu Musaab. He had begun to establish a presence in Qandahar by way of our contacts that was more considerable than his presence in Herat. He had learned more lessons, which had a role in forming a complete picture of the ongoing conflict in the world between truth and falsehood. The truth was represented by the followers of the message and the companions of the true, Semitic messages, while falsehood was represented by the followers of Satan and the twisted versions of the Semitic messages, which had been altered to serve the personal interests and ambitions of some people.



The American attacks on Afghanistan came at the end of 2001. Abu Musaab returned to Herat to be close to his brothers and his group. We did not have a clear or studied plan to confront [the American attack]. The Herat region had a considerable number of Shi'a. The military bases of the Taliban were bombed, their fighters were gathered and their weapons were put away with violence. The opposition and the Shia moved into the region quickly and took control the area. The men of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Abu Musaab's group [in Herat] did not have any choice except to withdraw quickly. They joined up with us in eastern Afghanistan. It happened just before they left that a group of his companions had been arrested by the Shia and the opposition, and a rescue operation to free them was almost impossible. But Abu Musaab insisted on freeing them – according to what I saw – and gathered together about 25 fighters from his group. They prayed, and then launched an attack on the area in which their companions were being held. It was a violent attack, it was the kind of attack where all the fighters seek martyrdom and will not except a resolution other than the freeing of their brothers or their own deaths.

The result was the retreat of the defenders and the rescue of all the brothers without a single loss. This event was indicative of the success Abu Musaab had achieved in his training camp over the previous two years. The camp had produced talented fighting men who could defend their initiatives and companions, even if it required exposing themselves to danger. After Abu Musaab and his brothers freed their companions, they prepared to leave Herat. They left in a caravan of around 135 vehicles, which consisted of their group, Arab brothers from al-Qaeda in the region, and what was left of the brothers from the Taliban.

The way to Qandahar was long. Airplanes were flying everywhere over Afghanistan. In spite of this, the caravan arrived safely in Qandahar, praise God. They had decided in the beginning that they must defend Qandahar no matter what the outcome. We began by sending the Arab brothers' women and children to Pakistan. Then we prepared for the confrontation.

One day there was a meeting of some of the important brothers. Abu Musaab was among them. One brother began to use his satellite phone. Three of the brothers and I left the meeting place. Just minutes after the brother used his phone, and just ten minutes after we had left, an American plane bombed the house. Abu Musaab and some of the other brothers were still inside. The bombardment caused the roof to cave in, but not one of the brothers was killed, although some were injured. Abu Musaab was among [the injured]. Some of his ribs had been broken and he was bruised.

The attack on Qandahar began. There was a new decision from the leadership that it was necessary to retreat to the mountains in order to move the wounded to a safe area that would not be targeted. We wanted Abu Musaab to go to Pakistan. He was one of the wounded, but despite that he wanted to stay with us and join the battle. The Americans were avoiding direct engagement, and so they were dependent upon attacking with their aircraft. They put the Northern [Alliance] forces, who were hypocrites, and the opposition in the front. We could say Abu Musaab had to flee to Pakistan, or at least get out of the way of the confrontation. According to legal [Sharia] excuse [to flee].

The attack was not effective, indirect, and the Americans' goals in attacking revolved around the following points:

- 1 – The fall of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan, with no hope for its return or revival at any future stage. The [Islamic Emirate] is what provided al-Qaeda with land and a secure place to operate. It would not ever be allowed to return. The Emirate, if it had persisted, would have been the start of the Islamic Caliphate.
- 2 – Getting rid of al-Qaeda and its leadership, making it a lesson that any who dared to touch the giant elephant (the United States), would get what he deserved, which is to be uprooted and destroyed. This was one of the greatest challenges that we faced in our work since the beginning. I should explain this clearly. The decision by the leadership of the necessity of breaking up the Emirate and starting the Afghani situation from the beginning, and to work to return during the next seven years, this was planned from the beginning, in order to defeat the Americans and their helpers and followers from among the hypocrites and traitors. We began to put the plan into place immediately. Based on that there was no place for us in al-Qaeda to continue to have the same open presence or continue to operate in the same way. We had to spread out the organization every where in the world that we could go.



## We Did Not Flee From the Battle

Some people have asked: Is this manhood? Is this an organization committed to belief? This is especially because Islam considers fleeing a form of treason. My response to that revolves around the following points:

- 1 – We did not run from the battle and we did not leave our brothers in the Taliban to meet their fate with the Americans alone. It was part of our plan to spread out the organization everywhere in the world and the attempt to open numerous new battle fronts with the Americans to make them have to disperse their strength and to prevent them from being able to focus on one region.
- 2 – The shape we chose for the leadership to attack in the end depended upon sectarian war, which operates according to "strike and withdraw." This requires that those undertaking the attacks be from the area. Our appearance, language, and pronunciation as Arabs would not meet these requirements, except for those that could adopt the language and dialect of the people of a region. These men had the choice of staying [in Afghanistan] or leaving and going to other regions of conflict in which they could lead other brothers.
- 3 – The operation to get the brothers out of the country and spread them out into other nations took much material and human resources that we could have used in battle. [But we decided to use them] not in a battle over one specific spot of geography, but instead to let the whole world become the battle ground.
- 4 – We knew that these plans were crucial to the survival of the ideology, and in preventing the Americans from strengthening and achieving their goals – which were eradicating the leadership and the brothers. The result of this is that the losses were suffered were light, praise God, and the leadership is still safe and still working as well as they did in Afghanistan. The young men who spread out into the world opened new fronts of conflict with the Americans and their followers from among the hypocrites and apostates. The results that Abu Musaab and his brothers have achieved in Iraq are an example of that.

I was responsible for the security of some of the Arab brothers, for taking them to Iran, and from there, distributing them as I saw fit. The brother Abu Musaab and his group were among these brothers.

[end translation.. the conclusion in next week's Terror Web Watch]

Hyperlinks: 9/11 ([Terrorist Incident](#)); United States ([Country Profile](#)); Afghanistan ([Country Profile](#)); Taliban ([Group Profile](#)); Pakistan ([Country Profile](#)); Iran ([Country Profile](#))

## Item 4: Film available: The Jihad in Uzbekistan ([Country Profile](#))

Seemingly a recruiting video, the recording showcases the camaraderie between the Mujahideen more so than Jihad operations.

This film is available upon request.

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