



TRC TWW Report

Terror Web Watch Report



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- Item 1: Training Document Instructs Arabian Gulf Terrorists how to Use Deadly Poisons against American Expatriates Living in Their Countries
- Item 2: Two New Operational Units Announced by Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (Group Profile)
- Item 3: Al-Qaeda (Group Profile) Training Unit Provides Guidelines for Establishing "Hidden Training Camps"
- Item 4: New Ways to Circulate Jihad Propaganda
- Item 5: Part II of the Jihad Biography of Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, Written by al-Qaeda Leader Saif al-Adl



Graphic: Weapons manuals provide beginners with a basic overview of different guns used for Jihad.



Orientation/Introduction:

Please review the introduction to the Terror Web Watch at [Intel Report](#).

Item 1: Training Document Instructs Arabian Gulf Terrorists how to Use Deadly Poisons against American Expatriates Living in Their Countries

More training materials instructing in the use of deadly poisons are available from the "Mujahideen training forum" of the al-Firdaws jihadist Web site (<http://www.alfirdaws.info/forums/index.php>).

The document appears to be written by and directed toward Arabs living in the Arabian Gulf who would like to attack American expatriates resident in their countries. It begins by focusing on the use of cyanide. It claims that cyanide can be easily purchased at stores. It instructs the aspiring terrorist to purchase cyanide and then to "go to the supermarket and look for moisturizing cream that is super absorbing and fast absorbing."

It then instructs him to mix the two materials together and to test the concoction on the skin of a live rabbit. "Wait five seconds, if the rabbit has not died, then you know the ratio of cyanide to cream in your mixture is too low. Increase the amount of cyanide little by little until it achieves the desired result [killing a rabbit in under five seconds]." It claims that the blood of a rabbit is similar in pressure to the blood of a person, so this composition ratio effectively will be fatal for a human being.

The document continues: "How do you apply the poison to the skin of one of Allah's enemies?" It offers suggestions to this question. "You can put the poison on the cars of the Americans, and other enemies of the religion. Put a little of the poison mixture on the car door, on the handle or the part touched when opening a door. Do not apply it in a random way. Apply it with some cotton, and be careful of your hand. Wear gloves. Apply the poison inside and out, wear it will get on most of the fingers of the enemy of Allah."

The document also gives guidelines for using the poisons "sodium peroxides" and "sodium oxides", both of which it suggests should be sprayed into the air conditioning vents of cars and homes. It says that "cars are preferable because the desired result will occur after only nine seconds."

Following that is a section on using agricultural poisons (it asks the reader to reference previous poison manuals for types of these poisons and how to prepare them). It instructs the terrorist "to go to a supermarket where the American pigs shop. Perform thorough observation. You will have to get close to an [American]'s shopping cart...Spray the poisons on any fruits and vegetables in the cart...or inject the poison into a piece of fruit, an orange or an apple or anything like that. You can even inject it into drinking containers..."

Finally, the document recommends the use of insecticides. It instructs the terrorist to buy two strong insecticides, to mix them, dry them, and grind them into a fine powder. It recommends using them on air-conditioning vents of homes and cars of Americans. It says that the fatality rate is 50 percent but that the poison will do severe damage if it does not kill, like causing blindness.

The terror attacks of the past two years have already convinced many westerners to leave the Gulf countries. Though the methods described in this document are sufficient to kill only one or two people at a time, the terror such methods would generate could have a severe psychological impact on expatriate communities throughout the Gulf. These methods also allow terrorists to access places populated by expatriates with just a syringe or small container of poison, neither of which would be stopped by a metal detector nor would be detected on the person by guards (barring a very thorough search). This is an advantage in Gulf countries where security around expatriate homes and venues has been greatly tightened.

Item 2: Two New Operational Units Announced by Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers ([Group Profile](#))



In two statements released this past week, Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers has revealed the existence of two new brigades in its organization. The first – a unit made up of snipers -- was announced in a claim of responsibility for the shooting of an American soldier in Iraq ([Country Profile](#)). "Your brothers in the Snipers' Unit of al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers carried out an operation against those who worship the cross on Wednesday [June 1], in the al-Malaab region. One American was killed, praise God," read the statement. Recruiting and using snipers is a new focus for the insurgency (for more see Terror Web Watch, May 20 ([Intel Report](#))).

The second group was a new Martyrs' Brigade led by Zarqawi lieutenant Abu Dujana al-Ansari, whose name would suggest that he is Iraqi. In an audio statement published on the Internet, al-Ansari, who named the brigade the Al-Bara'a ibn Malik Martyrs' Brigade, says that the martyrdom operations will target "the fortified bases of the Americans." The statement was circulated on popular sites like [www.tajdeed.net](#), [www.qal3ab.net](#), and [www.hkmah.net](#).

Item 3: Al-Qaeda ([Group Profile](#)) Training Unit Provides Guidelines for Establishing "Hidden Training Camps"

A document by the same group that publishes al-Qaeda's training manuals on this subject was posted on the al-Firdaws Web site. The eight-page document describes a six-day course for no more than 13 beginner Jihadists that also includes the construction of the camp over the course of the week. It recommends the camp be built in a heavily wooded, hilly area, away from habitation. It instructs that small rooms for sleeping and living should be built, then covered in dirt, with live grass placed atop. The document specifies that the camp should have one leader who has received Jihad training elsewhere, and 13 beginner students with no prior Jihad experience. The specification that the students be inexperienced is probably a recognition of the limitations of a such a camp for teaching anything but the most rudimentary skills. Still, the camp may provide a place for the crucial, preliminary processes for creating new terrorists: isolation from the rest of society, intensive ideological and religious indoctrination, team building, and fostering a sense of loyalty and belonging. The camp described is so small and rudimentary that it could be set up almost anywhere, as long as it is far enough from habitation that sounds of gunfire cannot be detected and reported. This document, like many recent training manuals, is indicative of the focused effort to decentralize jihadist operations by inspiring and providing distance instruction for entrepreneurial jihadists to form cells and attack on their own initiative, without direct support, contact, or training from al-Qaeda or other established groups.

Item 4: New Ways to Circulate Jihad Propaganda

Web sites are popping up that allow jihadist videos and propaganda to be downloaded to the Bluetooth function on mobile phones. Bluetooth has been available in the Middle East, especially the Arabian Gulf, longer than it has been available in the States and is much more popular. Videos can be sent around to a person's own social networks or to any one with Bluetooth capability in the physical area. Three such sites that offer jihadist material (in addition to benign Bluetooth downloads) are [http://saaid.net/jwal/](#), [http://alhesbah.net/mobile/index.php](#), and [http://www.jawaly.org/](#). One such video clip downloaded by TWW showed a scene of wedding guests dancing and celebrating at an Israeli wedding, before a flash is seen from the explosion of a suicide bomber in the middle of the crowd. This new trend shows how Jihadists are becoming increasingly adept at leveraging modern technology to spread their messages and publicize their exploits.

Item 5: Part II of the Jihad Biography of Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, Written by al-Qaeda Leader Saif al-Adl

See last week's Terror Web Watch ([Intel Report](#)) for an introduction and Part 1 of this biography that describes how Zarqawi began his career with al-Qaeda.

The next day was our appointment with the brother Abu Musaab. It was at nine in the morning. I headed over with the Egyptian brother who came the time before, and a brother from the Arabian Peninsula accompanied us.



He was originally from the Hijaz region, and had a lot of experience with Islamist activities and Jihad in many places, and agreed with me on a number of issues.

We did not go into the guest house this time, but instead asked Abu Musaab to accompany us by himself. He rode with us in the car, and we headed for the house of the brother from the Hijaz. We introduced Abu Musaab to this brother, and I felt that he accepted him, which eased my mind. I began to speak, because it was my idea and I had the complete picture of it – its goals and all of its aspects.

The basic point in the plan was to establish a small, simple training camp for daily military training, which Abu Musaab would supervise. It would aim to attract brothers from Jordan and Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey, because of the importance of these regions, and because of our estimation that our presence was weak within them.

The second point, which I had discussed with some of the brothers who were experts, was the area that we had chosen must be far from our main [area of operations in Afghanistan]. It would be located in western Afghanistan on the border with Iraq. We wanted that because the safest way for the brothers to come to it was through Iran. The authorities in Pakistan had cracked down on us and on our movement. The way to Afghanistan through Pakistan had become very hard for the Arab and Muslim brothers, and so the brothers would use the Turkey-Iran-Afghanistan route, which was easier. We had chosen Herat as the most appropriate city. It was the closest Afghani city to the Iranian border, but it was also far from where we were located. Entering and leaving the city was also easy. As for material resources, the brother from the Hijaz and some of his companions agreed to supply them, based upon how many people came to Herat and what was appropriate for the work.

One of the points that we brought up was that we did not want from Abu Musaab nor from those who came to him a complete Biya [pledge of allegiance]. We wanted cooperation and coordination on shared goals. We clarified to him that we were prepared to offer specific, specialized training to any individual or any group from his side that distinguished itself. We decided that we would undertake an operation in cooperation with the brothers from the Taliban movement so that they would not hinder us in the future. We brought up the topic of installing two stations – one in Tehran and one in Mashhad in Iran in order to make it easier to bring the brothers in and out of Afghanistan.

The goal behind all of what we discussed was to reach out to one of the most important regions in the Arab and Islamic worlds. An opportunity opened to bring together the brothers, especially those who did not agree, whose ideas differed from al-Qaeda's ideas. Hopefully they would converge in the near future, with God's permission. We tried to get a quick response from the brother Abu Musaab, but he said: "I have to get some advice. The brother Khalid al-Arruri and the brother Abdul Hadi Daghlis have been with me since the beginning. They have the right to council me and give me advice." We decided to meet after two days. The appointment was for Friday. The Hijazi brother invited us to lunch. We all agreed and Abu Musaab said that his companions would accompany him to lunch. We agreed to send a car to them right before prayer, so that we might pray together before lunch.

This happened as we planned. We performed Friday prayers together, and then headed to the home of the Hijazi brother for lunch. We had Arabian *Kibsa* for lunch, and we began to talk over the food. The brother Abdul Hadi asked for an explanation and clarification of some of the points. It was clear from his questions that he was intelligent. We agreed, thank God, on most of the answers to the questions he brought up. Abu Musaab and his friends agreed completely with the plan. We agreed that we would begin the preparations immediately after lunch.

The plan required that Abu Musaab and his friends would receive special training for 45 days, and during that time we [al-Qaeda] would be setting up and preparing in Herat and Mashhad. Abu Musaab began to contact other friends to urge them to come to him [to train in Herat].

I noticed that Abu Musaab and his friends were very intense during their training. They pushed themselves a lot. They strove to achieve the highest level always.

The training period ended quickly, and we began to prepare to move to Herat, as according to the plan. During this time, two brothers from Syria arrived. We brought up the idea of [training in] Herat to them. They agreed



without hesitation. We moved to Herat. We found that the brothers had chosen for us an area that was located on the outskirts of Herat, and included an old, small, military camp. We started doing the things we needed to do to begin.

We praised God for helping us obtain this [land]. We stayed in Herat for four days with [Abu Musaab and his companions]. We felt like Abu Musaab and his Jordanian and Syrian brothers were in total agreement with our ideas. We agreed to meet up on a monthly basis. One month they would come to us, and the next we would go to them. We left with them three of the pickup trucks that we had driven over to Herat. We promised them another car if they needed it. We left Abu Musaab with his friends Khalid and Abdul Hadi and the Syrian brothers. We were convinced that they would be successful, that they would excel, even exceed what we had planned. All of them possessed powerful determination.

When we arrived at our headquarters, we gave a detailed report to the brothers. An entire month passed. During that time, we had prepared three more pickup trucks filled with the supplies that we thought the brothers in Herat would need. I went with five Arab companions. One of them was the Salafi brother from the Hijaz that I have mentioned before. Two Afghani brothers came with us also. We arrived in Herat after some time.

We had told Abu Musaab ahead of time when we expected to arrive. [In Herat] we found the brothers waiting for us. They had prepared food for our lunch. The food they presented to us was of many different types, but most of it was Syrian. It was fresh and delicious. It was different than the food we had eaten during the four days we were in Herat during the previous month. We asked them about it. They told us that two Syrian families, originally from Aleppo, who had been among the Syrians living in Turkey, had arrived in Herat five days before. They were the ones who had prepared the food. This was very glad news, in my opinion, because it meant that the idea was on the way to success [to bring Arabs from the Levant countries to Herat]. I praised God a lot for that.

We asked the brothers to describe any difficulties they had encountered during the last month. They described their progress as the following:

- 1_Abu Musaab and his friends were able to establish a relationship with the officials from the Taliban in the area, and because of this relationship, they had all the capabilities of the Taliban at their disposal.
 - 2_We had left them in Herat the previous month as five people: Abu Musaab and his friends and the two Syrian brothers. We found that two Syrian families had come to Herat. They had 13 members between them. These were the fathers of the families, three young men over 16, two women, six young women, and so this meant that the number of Arabs in Herat had grown to 18 people.
 - 3_We found that the brother Abu Musaab, with cooperation from the Syrian brothers, had already prepared the military and cultural training program. It was wonderful in my estimation at that time. The cultural program focused on building a foundation of belief, memorizing the Koran, and studies in history and geography.
 - 4_It was clear to us that the brother Abu Musaab and his companions had a sketch of the organizational skeleton of the group that they would form. They expected that hundreds of brothers and their families would join them and that they would soon arrive in Herat.
 - 5_We learned that the brother Abu Musaab had sent word to his brothers in Jordan, giving them the good news of the beginnings of his success in Afghanistan. He had requested that whoever could immigrate to Afghanistan should do so. He had sent the request to his household and Abdul Hadi and Khalid had also sent it to their families, which to me indicated that they were convinced that they would succeed.
- We praised God for this great progress, and we had a discussion about increasing their resources and establishing stations in Mashhad and Istanbul. We spent three days [in Herat]. We participated in their daily program, and saw the enthusiasm and sense of commitment take hold of them. We agreed that they would come over to our side after a month. We returned to our headquarters satisfied to the point where the Hijazi brother began to seriously think about Abu Musaab and his companions in Herat. We added the new information and results to the Herat file which we had opened three months before.

A Small, Islamic Group

The days passed quickly, and our monthly appointment arrived. The brother Abu Musaab and the Syrian brother Abu Ghadia came. They brought news: the number of Arabs in the camp had become 42 people: men, women,



and children. Among them were Abu Musaab's family and those of his friends. The others were three new Syrian families who had joined them. One of the families had come from Europe.

Abu Musaab began to fill us in. They had begun to build a small Islamic group. He informed us that Jordanians had come, and Palestinians would arrive shortly in Herat. He said that the Afghani-Iranian route had been established and secured. This point was new and important to us in al-Qaeda. We would exploit it a lot in the near future, because we wanted to reroute people away from the old way through Pakistan, especially for those belonging to the Afghani Arab movement. This point made us think about establishing a good relationship with some of the Iranians, in order to further facilitate this route, and to cooperate on some matters of shared interest. Shortly afterwards we established cooperation with the Iranians.

The cooperation was with some of the reliable individuals in their confrontations with their enemies the Americans and the Israelis, but not the Iranian government. During this time, I noticed that Abu Musaab had developed in his personality in an important way in the four months since he had become leader. He used to never be the one to initiate talk, and his thoughts and interest in general political news was limited. But now, Abu Musaab was initiating talk, and was interested in many matters. He had taken the initiative to create relationships that would help the plan succeed. I noticed that he had become more convincing and influential in his speech, and that he had become more eloquent in his speech, rather than speaking in his [Jordanian] dialect. These things together indicated that his character was being molded into that of an exceptional leader. His Syrian friend was wonderful. He had expansive expertise and spoke a number of languages, among them English, Turkish, and a little Kurdish. As for the Syrian brothers who had met him in Afghanistan, they were among the most wonderful and loyal brothers that I had met in my life. The importance of what they were doing was playing a big role in forming their characters. They were polite and obedient to their leader and had motivation to learn and acquire operational and ideological expertise. Thereby did my peace of mind over Abu Musaab's plan increase every time I learned what new progress the brothers were making.

The rest of Abu Musaab's plan was developing and progressing. This included the training of the brothers that had joined him in Herat. Their nationalities had begun diversifying; there were Syrians, Jordanians, Palestinians, and some Lebanese and Iraqis. God had graced Abu Musaab with a relationship with the Kurdish Ansar al-Islam organization which was spreading in northern Iraq, with bases and a wide presence throughout the north. The monthly visits continued, and in every visit I noticed new developments on ever level: organizational, administrative, and militarily in the abilities of the young men...

[end translation. More to come in the next edition of TWW].

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