



TRC TWW Report

Terror Web Watch Report



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Graphic: Iraqi insurgents watch the sun go down, waiting for news of Zarqawi's fate.



Orientation/Introduction:

Please review the introduction to the Terror Web Watch at [Intel Report](#).

Item 1: Conflicting Reports on the Status of Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi

The focal point of the "Terror Web" this week has been the announcement of the wounding of Iraqi insurgency leader, Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi. The announcement was made by al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers' ([Group Profile](#)) spokesman Abu Maysara al-Iraqi in the form of a statement posted to the Internet on May 24, 2005. Web sites were abuzz after the announcement with contradictory statements appearing, claiming that Zarqawi was dead and had been replaced or alternately that he was fine and not badly injured.

One posting came from a member of the "Qal'ah" [fortress] forum, who wrote that he had been in touch with some of the Mujahideen in Iraq ([Country Profile](#)), and they had reported to him that Zarqawi had undergone a "complicated operation" for a gunshot wound that was performed by two doctors in his network. The posting said that he was stable but had been taken out of Iraq to a neighboring country to undergo more treatment. There is no way to verify this particular posting – it did not come from "Abu Maysara" and was neither confirmed nor denied by the group.

In spite of the seemingly conflicting statements posted on the Web on Zarqawi's condition, most people who are not a part of one of these groups are reluctant to lie outright or act as false spokesmen because typically these groups will come online and denounce the fraudulent individual, and the web administrator revokes his membership or bans him. The message boards and forums are controlled by site administrators in terms of who can post material and who can join, and some have very limited membership and a good deal of oversight. In the few cases that a person has attempted to speak in the name of a group s/he does not represent, the individual has been chastised by the administrator and sometimes the group's spokesman.

This was seen this week, when Web administrators admonished members for empty speculation, and Abu Maysara al-Iraqi posted a second statement explaining to the online Jihadist community that they should trust no information that does not come from him. He said that Zarqawi was "doing fine" and that rumors that he had died or had been replaced were baseless. The rumor that he had left Iraq, however, was not denied.

This whole matter of announcing a leader's injury is unprecedented and rather exceptionally odd. Zarqawi and his al-Qaeda branch's whole media strategy for the last several months has been to build up Zarqawi into a figure of mythical proportions, to make him sound almost invincible, someone who can strike terror in the hearts of the "Crusader occupying army" while alluding the countrywide manhunt for him with ease. It is a great departure to announce that he has been injured, and especially without a heroic story about how he was injured.

No al-Qaeda leader has ever announced that he has been injured or is sick. Part of this has to do with the culture – talking about such things is thought to be bad form and bad luck. But more importantly, it is bad for the morale of the group and also for the supporters. It destroys the mythological image of the leader that is so carefully cultivated. If a leader is to die, then his martyrdom, which is considered an honorable thing, is announced, and he is both mourned and celebrated. But injury, or incapacitation, is completely different. It is not honorable, it is not motivating for the group, and it is not good image control for target audiences. Your supporters are disheartened; your enemies are hopeful.

This is probably what has begotten all the speculation that Zarqawi is actually dead. It may be believed that the group is testing the waters, easing the community of supporters into the fact that Zarqawi is gone, and trying to arrange quietly for succession amongst themselves. Meanwhile, they are also proving – to both their supporters and the Coalition -- that having the leader out of commission does not affect the ability to attack. In the past week, they have continued to claim responsibility for multiple attacks a day.

This logic is not bad. He may not be dead, though, it is also possible that he is injured and not expected to recover. For the above reasons, that group has made this announcement, wanting to alleviate the impact of a



later announcement of his death. Sources who claim they are close to Zarqawi have spoken to various media outlets about lieutenants vying to replace him. It seems Zarqawi did not specifically plan a successor.

Another possibility is that this is something of a media stunt on the part of Zarqawi and his group. US forces have been hot on his trail, and he may think that one of the ways to alleviate pressure is to take himself out of commission for a while, create rumors that he is incapacitated or has left Iraq. His entire support base around the Muslim world will be waiting anxiously word of him and praying for him. Then when he emerges unscathed, he will look all the more invincible. In the eyes of this community, this will be further evidence that the al-Qaeda leader is somehow blessed, that God is truly on his side and has made him immune to the bullets of the "Crusaders."

The reaction of the Jihadi community to Zarqawi's supposed injury has been to organize a "campaign of one million prayers to heal Zarqawi." However, the reaction of the rest of the Iraqi insurgency is interesting. The pro-Jihadist, Arabic language news agency operating in Iraq – called *Mafkra al-Islam* - has reported on a letter they have been given by "the United Leadership of the Resistance," a loose network of Iraqi insurgent groups. The group is apparently upset about the amount of emphasis put on Zarqawi as the orchestrator of the Iraqi insurgency. "The resistance to the occupation and the fight against it is not dependent upon one person," the letter read, "the resistance is not going to stop at Zarqawi, or any other one person, because we have thousands of sons of this persevering nation that will tolerate neither humiliation nor occupation...the cause will not die because of the death of one leader. We are telling you that Zarqawi led just one group out of dozens of groups..."

The letter also contained a message to the Coalition troops, lest they think the death of Zarqawi will change the insurgency: "We say to [the coalition], do not be gladdened by the news today of the wounding of Zarqawi, because Zarqawi's group is just one of many fighting groups, and we will not stop fighting the occupation until we achieve victory, or are sent to paradise – and that decision is God's."

In reality, killing Zarqawi, if it created a power struggle among his lieutenants, could be a severe blow for his particular organization. Though al-Qaeda branches in other places (such as Yemen ([Country Profile](#)) and Saudi Arabia ([Country Profile](#))) have been very good about organized succession, Zarqawi's group may not be. There have been Internet postings from the group announcing a second-in-command (named Abu Abdurrahman al-Iraqi), but nothing has been heard of him recently. If other lieutenants in the group refuse to pay *Biya'a* (a pledge of allegiance) to the next leader or if he cannot command the respect of the many small, affiliated groups that make up Zarqawi's network in Iraq, then the group could dissolve over time.

Item 2: Al-Qaeda Core Member Saif al-Adl Publishes Zarqawi's Jihad Biography

Saif al-Adl, a high ranking member of Bin Laden's original al-Qaeda ([Group Profile](#)) group in Afghanistan ([Country Profile](#)) has published an online account of his personal experiences with Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi in the Iraqi terrorist's early career as a Jihadist. The biography sheds new light on the relationship between Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi and the Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda core group.

Below is the first installment of the biography. Subsequent translations will follow in the next TWW editions:

[begin translation]

Saif al-Adl, Security Official for the Global Army of Qaidat al-Islam, presents the biography of Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi

Jihad Biography of the Leader of the Slaughters, Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi

In the name of God the Merciful and the Compassionate



Praise God, Lord of the Two Worlds, and peace and blessings upon the Master of the Messengers, the Imam of the righteous, the Leader of the Mujahideen, and the Leader of dignity, and upon His friends and companions.

There has never been a day that I have not enjoyed reading and writing, and also talking a great deal, but with the circumstances I am in right now I have found myself with a good deal of free time. I invested it in prayer, in memorizing the Koran, and in exercising. And as this daily program of mine continued, the desire suddenly grew within me to write about my experiences with the dear brother Abu Musaab (Ahmed Fadhil). I hesitated in undertaking this in the beginning, but then found in my heart the reserves to do it. I believe that my brothers the free Mujahideen in every place will benefit from it, and so will all those who follow the news of their Jihad and who support them. They are the lions and the heroes of this Umma; they are its hope, and the best men that it produces. They lead on the path of glory and honor and victory and strength, with God's permission. I consider Abu Musaab the best of these lions and heroes.

After God granted the Mujahideen in Afghanistan victory over the infidel Russians and after differences began to arise between the different groups of Afghan Mujahideen, many of the Arab brothers began to think about returning to their countries of origin, especially those from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Jordan, who would not encounter security difficulties reentering their countries. It was the opposite for us, the brothers from Egypt, and also for those from Syria, Algeria, and Libya. We did not really have a choice except to stay in Afghanistan, or to move to another field of Jihad, or perhaps some other region that was relatively safe – that is, a region in which we had some strong allies in a country which did not have a strong central government. We ended up choosing to go to Sudan and Somalia, and some of the other weak African countries. Some of the brothers also went early on to some of the newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union, and others roamed about to different places on the earth. It was in this variety of places that I saw the loyal brothers, possessing the most loyal souls, and in which I also saw great losses, and it was obvious that steps had to be taken to defend against these losses. It was this news and this knowledge that produced the idea for the blessed "Qaeda of Jihad," as the first step on this path.

The Level of Preparation

We began to gather the information that we needed to prepare for this task. One of our priorities in this matter was to gather information – new and old – on every pioneering leader of Jihad that participated in the Afghani theater. Among these pioneers were our brothers the Jordanians and the Palestinians, who were at the top of the list of people we needed information on.

And therefore we began to follow the military court rulings that were handed down by the Jordanian national security court upon our brothers the Jordanians who were returning from Afghanistan. We [followed] also the small, various Islamic groups that were trying to undertake Jihad operations against the state of the Zionist enemy in our beloved Palestine, launched from Jordanian land. The brothers with the most prominent media profile out of all of them were Abu Mohammed al-Maqdese and Abu Musaab [al-Zarqawi]. The court case of their organization, al-Tawhid (Bayyat al-Imam), received the most media coverage.

Our brother Omar Abu Omar (Abu Qatada) focused on circulating the case of these two brothers in his magazine, "Al-Manhaj" ["the way"], which he was published in London. We read the letters of the brother Abu Mohammed al-Maqdese and the letters of the brother Abu Musaab, and we followed the historic case in front of the court. The brother Abu Qatada al-Filistini would never fail to inform us that these were great brothers, active in Jordan, and that they had a future in the path of the blessed Dawa [calling people to "true" Islam].

It made us very happy when we heard that these two were released in the beginning of 1999, and it did not surprise us when the news came that the brother Abu Musaab had arrived in Pakistan with some other brothers. I say that we were not surprised by them, because we knew that they would join some Muslim Jihadist group in some place. This is mandatory for everyone who understands Islam well.



We had a lot of information that indicated that Abu Musaab meant to go to Chechnya – this was the hottest field of Jihad, and most were headed there at this time. From our analysis of the information we received, Abu Musaab had a high degree of awareness and trustworthiness.

Going to Chechnya required total preparation, to be ready to sacrifice, and to give for the cause one believed in...It required not only strengthening one's point of view and attitude, but also effective practice in strengthening belief. The republics of the Umma follow any donkey who brays, but when one becomes aware, and is not convinced by anything except what he can touch in his life, from here he turns his eyes to al-Qaeda to work with the republics of the Umma, to return to them in order to explain and to clarify [Islam] to them, God willing.

It happened that Abu Musaab and his friends ran into problems with the security apparatus in Pakistan, because of matters concerning his residency [visa]. They agreed to release him on the condition that he would leave Pakistan. Abu Musaab and his friends were left with no choice but to enter Afghanistan.

Struggles for Abu Musaab

The news reached me that a group of Jordanians had arrived in Kandahar. I was busy then with matters relating to my work outside of the region, but I returned to Kandahar after Abu Musaab's arrival by about two weeks. After that I met with him in a guest house reserved for new arrivals. Abu Musaab and Abu Mohammed al-Maqdese did not need to catch us up on what had happened to them, as the proceedings of the court case and the news about them had been passed on by Abu Qatada and one of the Jordanian Sheikhs of Jihad.

I must mention here that I met with the brother responsible for following Abu Musaab and his friends, to take a picture of what happened between the brothers and Abu Musaab, and the result of what happened is the following: Abu Musaab had extremists views on some matters and some things, and the other brothers did not exactly agree with him. This matter had an effect on me, and also opened a wide door for me upon some of my personal memories that made me consider some of the most important parts of my history and my relationships, things that happened after God granted me a good and true understanding of Islam in the beginning of the [nineteen] eighties.

These memories allowed me to justify and excuse Abu Musaab before I met him. I arrived at the place where he was staying right after evening prayers ended. Accompanying me was one of the Egyptians who had his roots in the Jemaa'a Islamiyya in Egypt. He was one of the students of Sheikh Abd al-Akher, who also did not completely agree with some of the other brother Sheikhs.

We entered the guest house and found the brother Abu Musaab and his friends at the door. They greeted us. We hugged the brothers and welcomed them and entered the guest house.

At first, it was just like sitting with any ordinary people, discussing simple matters and topics. We introduced ourselves in a preliminary way, and were talking. I found myself sitting with a man who shared a lot of my own personal characteristics – a solid man who was not very skilled in the art of talking, but who did not back down on anything if he was convinced of it. He was not calm but he was not excitable. He had a clear goal and he was going to achieve it. This was the return of Islam to the daily life of mankind. He did not have a lot of details on the way or the style of the means to achieve this, except to achieve "Tawhid," and a true belief, and to wage Jihad against the enemies of the Umma.

His personal experiences in life and work were not broad, but his ambition was large, and his goals were clear. I wanted to hear from him on the situation in Jordan and Palestine. His information on Jordan was positive, but his information on Palestine was weak.

After that the talk turned to the subject of the points of difference with the brothers. We heard from him on the matter, and our goal was to get him on our side from the beginning. Our time sitting together



lasted around five hours. We listened to everything he said and left him promising to meet with us again after two days.

During the next day I had arranged a meeting with the two Sheikhs, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri (God keep them). We had a work schedule that we had agreed to discuss. After we finished what was scheduled for the meeting, I brought up the topic of the brother Abu Musaab to discuss it with them. The brothers had a preformed picture of the situation; the points of difference with Abu Musaab were not new to them, and he was not the only one. Hundreds of brothers who came to us from various regions of the world differed with them on some matters. They all had had different [religious] sources derived from various paths of belief, especially in matters relating to "loving what God loves and hating what God hates," and matters relating to Takfir [excommunication], and different styles of work, and other things which were related to where they originally came from. The most important point of difference with Abu Musaab was the position on the Saudi government and cooperating with them.

I presented a suggestion to the brothers, to negotiate to cooperate under these circumstances, in the case of Abu Musaab and those who are similar to him, because it was the just thing to do in terms of jurisprudence, and it was better than not working with any brother or group that disagreed with us on limited issues or small details.

Negotiations with Bin Laden and Zawahiri

The information that we possessed reflected that there was no al-Qaeda or idea of it in Palestine and Jordan. It was our plan, as agreed upon by the brothers, to put some emphasis on establishing a presence and spreading to Jordan and Palestine. The Palestinian case was at the heart of the Umma; it was close to the feelings of the Umma. Striking the Israelis and stopping their state was connected to changing and liberating the Umma. If Israel could not be weakened and stopped, the Umma would not be changed and liberated. The existing system was drawn up to be dependant on the persistence and existence of the state of Israel and was in place to serve Israel's goals and to pave the way for it to spread and expand. The connection between the current Arab regimes and the existence of the Israeli state is a controversial one. We have agreed in these circumstances that [Palestine] will not be liberated unless [other Muslim countries] change, and other Muslim countries will not change unless Israel can be weakened. And Israel cannot be weakened if the Arab regimes that serve it are not weakened, and also if Israel and those regimes continue to receive western support. For this reason, the logical conclusion was that we must establish a presence everywhere. How could we seize the opportunity to establish a presence in Palestine and Jordan? And how could we lose the opportunity to work with Abu Musaab and his brothers and others like him from other countries? The brothers [Bin Laden and Zawahiri] agreed after two hours of discussion to negotiate to cooperate [with Zarqawi] on this topic.

Praise God for this compromise. The issue had kept me up at night for more than ten years, as it was the only way we were going to get along [with all the other Mujahideen], especially with respect to those who disagreed on tactical and strategic matters. This problem had been around since I first was arrested in Egypt on 6/5/1987 for trying to rebuild a Jihad organization and for preparing an attempt to overthrow the government. This was recorded as Jihad case (401). Nearly 6 thousand brothers were also arrested in circumstances connected to this case and in a related case of an assassination attempt on the former Egyptian Interior Minister, Hassan Abu Basha, and the news reporter Mukram Mohammed Ahmed. At that time, I was an officer in the Egyptian Special Forces with a high salary. With me in the Special Forces and the Special Guard was the brother Ra'ed Mohammed Al-Berm, may God keep him.

I am saying that I found that the brothers in the Jihad organization [Egyptian Islamic Jihad] and the Jemaa'a Islamiyya did not possess expertise in [conducting] operations, and could not change this situation as they desired. That led to great zeal, in my opinion and that of some of the other brothers, which always motivated them to take great haste, and sometimes pushed them to recklessness. They did not possess the needed skills for this work, and they also did not plan for the short and long term. They did not have a vision for how to utilize the energies of the Umma and to raise its people to their most effective level. Change would require thought and people and materials and experienced, loyal, clear-



sighted leadership which possessed a vision and a specific plan for its goals and its means of achieving them. This vision would have to be clear and sound.

The reasons that motivated me to leave Egypt after the end of the case very much resembled the reasons that prompted Abu Musaab to leave Jordan. They were the following:

- 1_The security apparatuses in Egypt and Jordan were so focused on the Islamic universities and Islamist work that, to change the situation, a total revolution would be required – at the political, economic, social, and ideological levels. Islamist [activities] were watched day and night. They also tried to attack the ideology that [the Islamists] were trying to build up.
- 2_The security apparatuses in both of these countries were trying to recruit collaborators and informers from among the ranks of Islamist groups. They had succeeded to an extent – we do not have the time to mention those instances here. But this created within us feelings that it was necessary to have a leadership for this task that was located far away from the attacks, so it would be able to plan and execute [operations] well.
- 3_The domestic financial resources in these countries were not sufficient to produce the desired change, and so we had to find ways to open doors to the outside and secure large amounts of financing.
- 4_Communicating and uniting with individuals in other Islamic groups could not happen as long as we were at the mercy of domestic security apparatuses and within their reach within these countries. We had to leave.
- 5_[We wanted to] help out in the Islamic areas [where Jihad was being fought]. True freedom will not tolerate the humiliation of any of the people of the Umma.

For these reasons both the brother Abu Musaab and I were motivated to leave our countries and head to the open fields of Jihad in the Islamic world. After I secured the agreement of the two Sheikhs to cooperate with the brother Abu Musaab and those like him, I contacted some of the brothers who were solid thinkers and had wide educational backgrounds, and I got them to agree to meet together shortly. We discussed the topic from all of its aspects, and we made some important decisions. Our meeting lasted around nine hours. We stopped only for prayer and food.

I had developed a clear and complete picture of a new, big plan. Its preliminary success depended upon the brother Abu Musaab agreeing to it. I prayed that God would help me convince Any Musaab and his friends of this plan, which was very important to the greater plan for Islam which we working to achieve...[continued next week]

[end translation]

Links: Jordan ([Country Profile](#)), Egypt ([Country Profile](#)), Afghanistan ([Country Profile](#)), Pakistan ([Country Profile](#)), Israel ([Country Profile](#)), Egyptian Islamic Jihad ([Group Profile](#)), Jemaa'a Islamiyya ([Group Profile](#)), Al-Tawhid ([Group Profile](#))

Item 3: Death by PowerPoint?

The Terror Web Watch, May 13 edition ([Intel Report](#)) described detailed PowerPoint presentations instructing on



the manufacture of IEDs and car bombs. A new presentation describes a method for compressing explosive material inside of IEDs. The method specifically calls for the use of Cordite inside of a missile shell.

This illustrated presentation describes a sophisticated method for compressing the material that calls for building a stone frame and using a jack to pack the material into the missile shell (see picture). The technique greatly increases the explosive power of a given amount of material, making IEDs much more powerful and effective.

The circulation of manuals and materials describing the destructive methods of terrorists in active "fields of Jihad" over the Internet suggests a desire to export such violence to peaceful countries.

Item 4: Jihadist Training Material Distributors Using US Government Materials to Encourage English-Speaking Jihadists

A popular cache of training materials was found online, carrying an odd array of English language materials, including alleged "CIA" manuals and US Patent Office instructions for the construction of destructive materials. The "CIA Improvised Sabotage Devices" manual, published by Desert Publications, was among the materials posted to the site. The manual contains an impressive and creative variety of improvised explosive devices made from basic items.

Another manual was called "Kitchen Improvised Plastic Explosives," by Tim Lewis. Its recipes allegedly describe ways to make plastic explosives from materials like bleach, anti-freeze, and pool chlorinating compound.

The site also contained the patent obtained from the US Patent Office for ricin. The patent is from 1962 and explains exactly how the toxin is made. Other Patents posted on the site were for a "liquid explosive with initiator" and a "linear shaped charge," both of which describe how to construct those two inventions.

Posting these English materials on the Arabic language training Web site is meant to inspire English-speaking, would-be Jihadists in the US ([Country Profile](#)), Britain ([Country Profile](#)), or other countries. Also, the language barrier is no issue for many terrorists or would-be terrorists, especially those residing in immigrant communities in the Americas or Europe, and these training materials can (and perhaps already have) been translated into other languages to be accessible to anyone.

These materials are available to Premium Content and Terror Web Watch subscribers upon request (for counter-terrorism research purposes only).

Item 5: Radical Sheikh Abu Busira al-Tartousi Directs a Warning to US Embassy in London

Sheikh al-Tartousi's letter (trans. below) does not sound like a direct threat, probably because the Sheikh wants to avoid imprisonment. However, the letter is ominous because it sets up the theological justification, quoting from the Koran, for attacking the United States by comparing it to the vanished, ancient nation of 'Aad, which, according to the Koran, God destroyed for its oppression and excesses. It also fulfills the Jihadists' religious obligation to warn an enemy before he is attacked. This letter achieves just that. Speaking in terms of radical Islam, if the warning went ignored, the Sheikh or his followers would be "justified" in acting violently to punish the US in the instance of any future desecration of the Koran.

The warning has been circulating in Arabic on the Internet, and the document claims that it was also handed over to the American Embassy in London.

[begin translation]

The text of a letter given to the American Embassy in London

To the Ambassador at the US Embassy, representative of the American government in Britain:

There is no doubt you have heard in the media how your soldiers and interrogators in the prison at Guantanamo desecrated the Noble Koran and underestimated the devotion of the Muslims by attacking their faith and the things they hold sacred. Unless you can prove otherwise, we will believe that this took place with the green light from Washington, unless you would like to try and convince us that the American administration in Washington does not have authority over its soldiers and institutions outside the country.



Therefore, the American administration in Washington and the government of George Bush bears full responsibility for the crimes committed against the faith of the Muslims in the Guantanamo prison, the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, and in other prisons. This cannot be denied, even though the American administration does not believe in consequences. However, we warn you that such behavior and refusal to accept responsibility will only widen the gap and the divide and increase the hatred between the Islamic street and the American administration with its oppressive policies towards Muslims and Islam, even if this does not have an effect upon the governments of Muslim countries. This will worsen even beyond what it is today, and the chasm will expand between the peoples.

Understand that the survival of nations depends upon justice and not upon their [ability to] oppress. If you are tyrannical and oppressive in the world, and arrogant and destructive, then no matter what your strength, God will hand down his judgment upon you. [As the Koran reads,]: "And how many a city have we destroyed that was insolent in its way of living, and those are their dwellings that have not been inhabited after them, except but briefly. And it is we who were the inheritors. And never would your Lord have destroyed the cities until he had sent their originators a Messenger reciting to them our verses. And we would not destroy the cities except while their people were wrongdoers [28: 58-59].

And [the Koran] reads: "And those cities we destroyed when their (inhabitants) wronged, and we made for their destruction an appointed time [18:59]

It is God's plan that oppression and transgression and tyranny always lead to destruction. And this year is a year of God like any other years of God out of creation, and no one is exempt from God's plan.

If you say "We are stronger than God," than we say that you cannot hide from or escape God's revenge. He is not defeated by tyranny and oppression, and so do not let your power blind you.

You have as your example the nation of 'Aad. When its people were oppressive and despotic and tyrannical, as it is said of you today, it says [in the Koran] that: "As for the people of Aad, they were arrogant upon the earth without any right and said: "Who is greater than us in strength?" Did they not consider that God who created them was greater than them in strength? But they rejected the signs" [41:114].

Do not be deceived that God has been forbearing with you and do not feel safe from his plans. [The Koran] says: "Then did they feel secure from the plan of God. But no one feels secure from the plan of God except for those who lose" [7:99].

In conclusion, understand that what we have put before you is necessary for you. Do not allow this kind of thing hostility and transgression to happen again. It grips the chest, it increases hatred and enmity between our peoples, and the next generations will be the inheritors of this enmity.

The organizers of the protests:

The Islamic Observatory Center in London

[end translation]

Item 6: Zarqawi's Network Posts Pictures of Dead US Soldier, Asks That Family be Notified

Zarqawi's network has posted pictures that it says were found on the body of a US Army soldier, who was killed when the group attacked his convoy. The statement asked that the pictures be circulated on the Internet so that the man's family and the families of the others who were killed with him might learn of their deaths.

This is sarcasm. The statement and the pictures are actually meant to show off the fact that the Army was unable to recover the bodies of the men killed in action. Zarqawi's group likely realizes recovery of the dead is extremely important to the US military. As difficult as it must be for a family to learn of the death of a loved one, the



additional knowledge that his body remains in the hands of terrorists that killed him makes the loss even harder on the family and is also further detriment to the morale of his fellow soldiers.

The statement says that the Army was unable to recover bodies, equipment, weapons, and their ruined vehicles. The group says it has confiscated all of these things. If this is true, in addition to the loss of the soldiers, the loss of US military uniforms, ID badges, and equipment presents a future security hazard. Terrorists have used stolen IDs and uniforms to disguise themselves and get close to victims in other countries. This is also a danger in Iraq.

Item 7: Items Available: The Mujahideen Explosives Handbook and the Mujahideen Poisons Handbook

These are English-language, Jihadist training materials. Although not new, these manuals are available from TRC. They resemble Arabic-language manuals on the same subjects and give good insight into the type of material circulating on the "Terror Web."

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Email: Jennifer@terrorism.com
Online: www.terrorism.com

Toll free: 1-877-635-0816
Fax: 1-703-935-2666

