TRC TWW Report
Terror Web Watch Report

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Graphic: Iraqi Insurgents pose for their cameraman on a video released by the Islamic Army in Iraq.

Orientation/Introduction:
Please review the introduction to the Terror Web Watch at <u>Intel Report</u>.

<u>Item 1</u>: "Relying on Violence," chapter four of al-Qaeda (<u>Group Profile</u>)'s new book *Managing Savagery.*

The following is another chapter from the new al-Qaeda book *Managing Savagery*, published in March by a veteran of al-Qaeda's branch in the Arabian Peninsula (<u>Group Profile</u>), Abu Bakr al-Naji (For more on this book, see last week's <u>Terror Web Watch, edition #11</u>).

In this chapter, al-Naji discusses the importance of terrorist violence and ruthlessness and also lays out a policy of vengeful violence as a deterrent for western policies in the Muslim world, called the "Pay-the-Price" policy.

[begin translation]

Chapter 4: Relying on Violence

Those who understand Jihad politically or understand Jihad on paper only will not comprehend this point well. Unfortunately the young men of our Umma, for ages now, have had their access to weapons blocked and do not know the nature of warfare.

Those who have carried out Jihad previously know that Jihad comes down to violence and ruthlessness and expelling and wearing down the enemy. I am talking now about Jihad and fighting, not about weapons, so do not mix them up.

It is not possible to continue fighting and to move from one stage to the next, unless the beginning stage is a stage of wearing down the enemy and expelling him with violence. Also, this kind of violence will be needed in some circumstances at subsequent stages.

It is not possible for Jihad to continue if softness and mercy continues - unless the softness is for the sake of Dawa [proselytizing] or to allow the enemy to come around to our side. The element of softness is one of the elements of failure in any Jihad activity. Those who have had this softness have preferred to sit at home, and failure will be their fate.

Anyone who honestly wants to understand what I mean by this must read the biography of the Prophet and the books of history, and then look at what is happening in modern Jihad movements. Whether or not we employ violence or gentleness, we must not show mercy to our enemy. We want them to reconsider a thousand times before ever attacking us.

The use of violence and ruthlessness toward the infidels in both the actual battle and the media battle lies in the fact that most of the infidels do not understand violence because they have never been in a war in their entire lives. The phase of taming the Muslims has had an effect; at this stage it is necessary to distinguish the young men who truly want to wage Jihad. The Arabs will be distinguished in this time of awakening because they are a warrior people and know the nature of warfare.

If we are not violent in our Jihad and adopt softness, this will be the main factor in the loss of fortitude, which is one of the pillars of the nation of the Message. The nation that has fortitude is the nation that can preserve its position, the nation that can plunge into war, the nation that can persevere like the mountains. We have lots of this in this current age.

The history books demonstrate that the differences between the reformist Jihad movements of the Talibs like al-Nafs al-Zaki and others and between the Abassid movement, in which the Abassids were successful and the others failed, was the use of violence by the Abassids and a softness and reluctance to spill blood by the others, to the point where al-Nafs al-Zaki used to request from the leadership of his army – and they could have been

victorious – not to spill blood where possible. The leadership of the army was shocked at how a king could request this of them, how could this be his style? Al-Nafs al-Zaki and others of the reformers could have understood that fighting Muslims and fighting others is different. Now, and praise God we confront the people of the cross and their helpers from among the apostates and their soldiers, we have no objection to spilling their blood, rather, we see this as one of our most crucial obligations, alongside praying daily and paying alms and making all of religion for Allah.

The Sahaba [the early Muslims] understood the mandate for violence. They understood it in the years after the Prophets. Al-Sadiq and Ali bin Abi Talib practiced burning with fire, in spite of the hatred it generated, because they understood the usefulness of ruthless violence under some circumstances. So they would undertake this, and would release their leadership and their solders from the gate of blood lust with the ruthlessness that gushed in their hearts. This is merciful for mankind, in the time after the Prophets.

The point is that understanding the nature of the infidels and when to employ gentleness and when to employ ruthlessness is the lesson that we learned from the time of the Ridda [Apostasy] wars, when the people returned to the ways of ignorance and stopped practicing what Islamic law commanded – such as the giving of alms, despite that they had pledged to the Prophet and to Abu Bakr. Those weak in belief felt that the sword of Islam would rest after the passing of the Prophet, and so they seized the opportunity to leave the religion, and apostasy reigned over the Arabian Peninsula, and nothing was left to Islam except the cities of Mecca and Taif and Jawtha in Bahrain and Medina. Apostasy took over the tribes and villages, and so the companions of the Prophet did what was within their rights, and undertook to hunt apostasy and to purge it, and to raise the head of seriousness and Jihad. Abu Bakr did not learn of it, not until the messenger arrived with the bad news, which horrified the men, and this compelled the order to increase both warfare and fire...

[More on the Ridda Wars follows]

As for the circumstances today, these resemble the situation after the passing of the Prophet, the instances of apostasy, and what faced the believers in the beginning of the Jihad. It required wearing down the enemy and events like that, which was undertaken toward the Qureiza tribe [tr. note: tribe whose adult male members were beheaded, females and children enslaved, on an order from the Prophet]...

The policy of "Paying the Price":
There cannot be transgressions upon the Umma or upon us without [making the enemy] pay the price. In the stage of violence to avenge offenses and to wear down the enemy, following the Pay-the-Price strategy will send despair into the souls of the enemy. Any offending action by any group of any kind requires a reaction to make the enemy pay the price of his crimes and to reconsider one thousand times over before undertaking to attack us.

[Making the enemy] pay the price is absolutely necessary, even after a long period of time, even after years. It is also necessary to remind the enemy of this by issuing statements, which justify any Pay-the-Price operation. It will psychologically influence the leadership of the enemy because it comes with the hostile actions committed toward Islam and its people and toward the Mujahideen. And so he and his helpers learn they will pay the price of any action, with [attacks on] their interests. From that, the feelings of despair will begin to set in, and the enemy will begin to think about leaving the field because of his love of worldly things. As for the generations of Mujahideen, they desire only to continue the battle. They are not defeated by individual events but are rather motivated to respond.

In the "Managing Savagery" phase, we will face the problem of attacks by the enemy, the Crusader and the apostate both – from the air upon our training camps and the places in which we live and the different areas we control. In addition to taking defensive measures and digging trenches to combat this problem, we must follow a Pay-the-Price policy in response to the crimes of the enemy. The Pay-the-Price policy in these circumstances forces the enemy back and makes him think one thousand times before attacking the areas that are governed by the "Managing Savagery" regime.

The enemy will come to understand that he will have to pay the price for his crimes, even if it is not until some time has passed. He will, therefore, stop attacking the regions where savagery reigns, allowing us to strengthen

and establish ourselves there. The enemy will just stop attacking, without any agreements or commitments. We do not sign hudnas [Muslims al-Qaeda targets] with apostates, though it might be possible to do that with the infidels [non-Muslims].

Here there is an important point. That it is preferable for other groups to carry out Pay-the-Price operations in regions other [than that in which the enemy committed some offense], regions that have not yet seen this enmity. We should expand into them this special kind of violence, with its purpose being to show the enemy that he is surrounded and his interests are exposed and vulnerable. If the enemy undertakes hostile action in the Arabian Peninsula or in Iraq for instance, the retaliation should be in Morocco or Nigeria or Indonesia. This will help confound the enemy, especially the place in which a Pay-the-Price operation occurs is ruled by an infidel or apostate regime because there will not be a good place upon which they can retaliate. They will understand that it was [our enemies' crimes] that brought the attack upon them. The operation will also send a message to the Muslims in every place that the Umma is united and that borders do not divide it.

"Paying the Price" is not limited to the Crusader [Christian] enemy, but it is necessary for us to provide an example, for instance, if the apostate Egyptian government undertakes to kill or arrest a group of Mujahideen, then the young men of Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula or Morocco should attack the Egyptian embassy, and provide a statement of justification. Or, they should kidnap Egyptian diplomats and take them hostage until the group of Mujahideen is freed, or, following the policy of ruthlessness, if the Mujahideen are not freed the diplomats should be disposed of in some terrifying way in order to strike fear into the hearts of the enemy and his helpers [end chapter].

[End translation]

Links: Iraq (Country Profile), Morocco (Country Profile), Nigeria (Country Profile), Indonesia (Country Profile)

Item 2: Global Islamic Media reports on clashes with Saudi security forces that killed crucial leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

One major focal point this week was "the Battle of al-Rass," the lengthy gun battle between militants and Saudi security forces that left at least 14 terrorists dead. "News reports" issued by Global Islamic Media have confirmed that major al-Qaeda leaders Abdulkareem al-Mojati and Saud al-Otaibi are dead, along with Saleh al-Oufi, who was believed to have been killed in November, but then reappeared in March in the form of audio recorded statements posted on the Internet that were allegedly his recent speeches. (WAR Report)

One of the "news reports" offered an explanation as to why such important leaders had vouched to stay and fight the Saudi security forces rather than try to escape. According to the report, Saleh al-Oufi was crippled, an amputee, and could not have managed a fast escape with the rest of the leadership and fighters. The others with him did not want to leave him because, should he be captured, he may prove an extensive source of information for the Saudi government about the al-Qaeda group in the Kingdom. Should he be left behind and killed, the media would exploit the situation to make it look like the other fighters had run off like cowards and left their crippled leader behind. According to the report, the men decided on this basis to all stay and fight to the death.

It is clear that the group considers the losses of the leaders a major setback; there is an uncharacteristically pessimistic tone to the statements that puts weight on the losses rather than glorifying the martyrdom, as is the norm when foot soldiers are killed. "This Umma forgives but never sleeps, it sickens but never dies. Do not despair; for we will return your dignity to you, with God's permission," ends the latest statement on the event.

Of the three main leaders killed, al-Mojati was perhaps the most valuable. A chief strategist who had had direct contact with Bin Laden until at least 2002, al-Mojati had returned to the kingdom after a stay in Morocco, where he is believed to have masterminded the Casablanca attacks (Terrorist Incident). A "martyr's biography" published about Mojati and posted on the Saudi-focused Jihadist website www.Islahi.net begins by explaining how Mojati dodged the American, European, and Arab security services that were pursuing him by "constantly

moving between three continents: Asia (Saudi Arabia) ([Country Profile](#)), Africa (Morocco), and Europe (Spain)([Country Profile](#))."

The report provided a number of alleged details about Mojati's life that paint him as a very useful operative to al-Qaeda, not only for his military skills but for the ease in which he could travel between different countries. According to the report, al-Mojati had worked with operatives from the Moroccan-based group Salafi Jihad ([Group Profile](#)) to carry out the Casablanca attacks, and he was also in Spain days before the Madrid attacks ([Terrorist Incident](#)) and may have participated in those. He also is said to have visited the United States in 1997 and 2000, and Moroccan intelligence reports say that he may have had an American wife. He repeatedly visited Saudi Arabia under the guise of going on pilgrimage. Mojati's mother was French, his father was Moroccan, and he grew up speaking Arabic, French, and English. He was trained in manufacturing explosives and in planning operations in both Afghanistan ([Country Profile](#)) and Kashmir. He led groups of Mujahideen against the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina ([Country Profile](#)). He helped set up al-Qaeda cells in North Africa, Europe, and other countries. He recruited and sent new members to al-Qaeda "and helped set up the next generation of sympathizers and al-Qaeda operatives." The report also said that al-Mojati "was one of the individuals in the narrow ring close to Osama Bin Laden, and went to Afghanistan immediately after America threatened to attack the Taliban." The document also stated that "it was believed before his death that al-Mojati might be chosen Osama Bin Laden's successor for the central al-Qaeda organization."

Even if some of the assertions of this report have not been confirmed, al-Mojati was clearly the biggest loss to the organization in recent months, perhaps even more so than the deadly former Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader Abdulaziz al-Muqrin. Al-Mojati's presence in Saudi Arabia is highly suggestive, he may have been sent to the group to take over planning after the group's last two attacks in the Kingdom were largely busts.

The loss of Otaibi, al-Oufi (though unconfirmed at this time), and the other fighters who were in their company suggests a gaping hole in the leadership of the organization's already beleaguered branch in the Arabian Peninsula. An audio tape released on www.tajdeed.net, another prominent Jihadist Web site where Global Islamic Media posts also appear, suggests that Sheikh Hamad al-Hamid escaped the country and is now functioning as leader, although this has not been confirmed in the form of an official statement under the group's *Sawt al-Jihad* or Global Islamic Media mouthpieces or by Saudi intelligence.

Saudi Arabia can be expected to be relatively quiet as the group attempts to restore its ranks and deals with the leadership vacancy. A revenge attack – probably by a few operatives and by gunfire rather than explosives – on Saudi security forces is possible, but the group is in not currently in a position for larger operations. Perhaps even worse for the group than its fighters who were killed are those who were captured, as Saudi security services have proved adept at extracting intelligence from captured terrorists in the past. The remaining members at large can be expected to go into hiding or flee the Kingdom for neighboring peninsular states.

Item 3: Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers ([Group Profile](#)) announces the "Abu Anas Al-Shemi Expedition," a country-wide offensive.

On April 2, Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers issued a statement announcing that "the Abu Anas al-Shemi expedition has been activated across Iraq." The statement did not give details but suggested an offensive across the country. The first attacks in the "Abu Anas" series were the assaults on April 2, 2005 ([Terrorist Incident](#)) and April 4, 2005 ([Terrorist Incident](#)) on the Abu Ghraib prison.

It is not clear if this will translate into an intense spate of attacks, as the document suggests. Al-Qaeda has promised as much before – in the weeks leading up to the Iraqi elections, without delivering much on Election Day.

The "expedition" may signal a certain kind of attack rather than an increase in frequency. Its namesake, Abu Anas al-Shemi, was killed by a US missile attack this fall, the expedition named in his honor might symbolize that it is conducted in revenge for his death. The attack on the Abu Ghraib prison was carried out on a symbolic

target, also signaling revenge – for American crimes there. The targets of this offensive may thus be selected based upon the themes of revenge and for their symbolism.

The Abu Ghraib attacks were also noteworthy in that they entailed a larger assault force than usual – about 40 militants – with multiple bombers. This may also become the hallmark of attack *modus operandi* in this new offensive.

<u>Item 4</u>: A rough week for the "Electronic Jihad."

This week, the three Jihadist websites used most by militant groups have been down, probably taken out by hackers or by service providers refusing to continue to host them. These sites, *al-Ma'sada*, *al-Ekhlaas*, and *al-Mjlah*, have typically demonstrated the greatest level of reliability in terms of authenticity of statements. Material has shifted for now to sites like *al-Qal3ah* and *al-Tajdeed*, but it is more difficult for Terror Web Watch to determine the authenticity of statements on these sites. As of April 8, these were still down, but typically, a site shut-down rarely lasts longer than a week.

The managers of those three sites have posted messages on other pages stating that they are working on the problem and will resume operations shortly. Shutting down individual sites does very little to stop the dissemination of these messages because there is redundancy and a very determined community of thousands of supporters who can aid in finding free space on servers. Generally, it is preferable to allow these sites to run and to monitor them, especially the ones that have been determined to have the most serious, reliable material on them. (WAR Report)

While administrators are working on resurrecting the sites, some material has shifted to another form of dissemination: a Yahoo group called "Tanthem Al-Qa3edah", or "the Al-Qaeda Organization (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Tanthem-alqa3edah/). Messages, news reports, and a series of pictures and documents on different Jihad subjects are posted on the site. Links to complete archives of al-Qaeda publications *al-Battar* training manual and *Sawt al-Jihad* are also available. From the nature of the material, however, the site administrator does not appear to have any real links to al-Qaeda branches yet; he posts material gleaned from other Web sites or al-Qaeda relevant news reports, but groups do not appear to yet be using this forum to directly post their messages. This could change soon; however, as the group has received an endorsement from "al-Khattab al-Iraqi," who used to be the liaison between the *al-Ekhlaas* site and Zarqawi's network in Iraq and was responsible for posting all of Zarqawi's group's statements.

With the modern Internet, these communities are always going to find a way. They are proving themselves to be increasingly computer savvy, and there have already been efforts online to recruit cadres of "Hacker Mujahideen." The dissemination of hate and terror on the Internet can only be stopped by fighting it in the real world, where freedom of movement, the transmission of information, and anonymity are much harder to obtain than in cyberspace.

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