

SOMALIA Security and Political Awareness Report

16 June to 22 June 2014


Overview

The week saw continuing violence throughout. Al-Shabaab continued its campaign of achieved notable successes with their asymmetric tactics with Al-Shabaab striking again in Mogadishu against a range of figures.

Politically the reporting period saw reconciliation between the competing South-West Administration initiatives, with the Federal Government brokering a solution that will see the South-West 3 initiative becoming the South-West State. In addition there was a new round to the argument over who controls the resources of Somalia, ironically both the Semi-autonomous regions and the Federal Government base their argument on the Constitution- which in turn doesn't set out clear guidance.

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NORTHERN REGION

Security Analysis

The northern region saw incidents occurring in Puntland during the week, following recent tensions in Somaliland, the region remained quiet.

In Puntland the Police were targeted in at least 2 attacks, with the assassination of a senior police officer in Rako on 18.06 and an attack on the Garsoor Police Station in Gaalkacyo on 19.06.

The attack on the Garsoor Police Station has been identified as an Al-Shabaab attack, conducted by Amniyat personnel. The area has seen a recent increase in attacks on Puntland Forces by Al-Shabaab as part of their effort to cement their control on the northern half of Gaalkacyo city.

Elsewhere the Puntland Armed Forces continued to attack Al-Shabaab position in the Golis Mountains. While the PAF lacks the strength and ability to drive Al-Shabaab out, at present they are able to ensure Al-Shabaab remains bottled up.


Security Forecast

While this week saw no further fighting between Somaliland and Puntland, it is worth noting that Somaliland still controls the city of Taleex and other towns seized by its forces in the period 09.06 – 15.06.

Puntland has already stated that it intends to respond to what it sees as an act of aggression by Somaliland. At present the Puntland military is overstretched with its forces being pulled in 3 different directions; facing Somaliland; securing the Southern border and containing the Golis Mountains. This overstretch limits the forces Puntland could deploy to capture Taleex from Somaliland, however there are indications that Puntland may be taking action to rectify this, including attempting to recruit additional personnel and purchase additional equipment.


However, for Puntland, responding to Somaliland is just one of its priorities; the other is continuing to face Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab remains moving personnel into the Central Region and the Northern Region, with the Golis Mountains remaining an Al-Shabaab stronghold. It is notable that the Emir of Al-Shabaab in the North- "Yabo" remains in the Southern Region aiding Al-Shabaab there.

We predict that within the next few weeks we could see Puntland open its offensive against Somaliland, driving on Taleex and attempting to push Somaliland away from Puntland's borders.



Incident Map 1, Northern Region

1. **Golis Mountains.** 16.06 PAF attack Al-Shabaab positions.
2. **Rako.** 18.06 Police officer assassinated by gunmen.
3. **Gaalkacyo.** 19.06 Gunmen assassinate civilian businessman.
4. **Gaalkacyo.** 19.06 IED attack on Police Station. 5 killed.



Forecast Map 1, Northern Region

CENTRAL REGION


Security Analysis

The Central Region saw a significantly lower level of violence this week, with only 3 major incidents reported.

The week saw a return of Al-Shabaab to Belet Weyne, which had been quiet for several weeks. A successful ambush using a large IED destroyed 1 vehicle and killed 3 Ethiopian Soldiers. The IED itself had been emplaced below the road surface and was hidden by the general disrepair of the road.

The strategy of blockading and conducting attacks against recently liberated towns is linked to the incident in Ceel Buur. The town remains blockaded by Al-Shabaab and there continues to be a significant Al-Shabaab presence in the surrounding area, a presence that- despite repeated attempts- AMISOM have been unable to clear.

The Clan fighting in the vicinity of Huurshe is similar to recent fighting elsewhere in Somalia, but notably comes between 2 pastoral clans that had previously cooperated.



Incident Map 2, Central Region


1. **Belet Weyne.** 18.06 Al-Shabaab ambushes AMISOM convoy. 3 killed 2 injured.
2. **Huurshe.** 18.06 Rival clans fight over waterhole.
3. **Ceel Buur.** 21.06 Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM base.

Security Forecast

The Central Region remains dominated by Al-Shabaab, with significant presence in Jalalaqsi and areas of Middle Shabelle and Galgaduud to the east. Continued control of the Region is an Al-Shabaab priority, loss of control would inhibit movement north and south and also the collection of "taxes" from the populace.

With control of the Central Region being a priority to Al-Shabaab, further fighting is a certainty. Although AMISOM and the SNA are attempting to expand their control, the rural areas remain under Al-Shabaab control with a resulting loss of flexibility and freedom of movement to AMISOM.

- In order to stabilise the region and break the blockade of Bulo Burto, AMISOM must capture Jalalaqsi and clear the road to Jowhar, this would allow clear routes from Mogadishu and the South all the way to Belet Weyne.
- Al-Shabaab is in no position to conduct a significant offensive. Although strikes on AMISOM and SNA forces and bases are to be expected, the majority of Al-Shabaab activity in the Central Region will be in support of the blockades of Bulo Burto and Ceel Buur.



Forecast Map 2, Central Region

SOUTHERN REGION

At the current time the campaign to drive Al-Shabaab out of the Southern Region has stalled in the face of environmental and logistical concerns, which are exacerbated by their inability to dominate rural areas. In the Southern Region are several key Al-Shabaab strongholds which AMISOM needs to liberate. Identified as AMISOM targets are;

- **Jilib** is now the most important Al-Shabaab stronghold and provides a home to their command and control structure and several training camps. A number of senior Al-Shabaab leaders are present in the town.
 - Jilib has been harassed by KDF airstrikes, but until AMISOM has captured Diinsoor; Baardheere or Saakow there is no clear route towards Jilib.
- **Diinsoor** is another Al-Shabaab stronghold and hosts key logistics facilities.
 - AMISOM has a significant presence in Qansax Dheere and may use these to threaten Diinsoor, provided supply routes between Qansax Dheere; Buurdhuubo and Baidoa are secured.
- **Baardheere** continues to be threatened by AMISOM forces in Buurdhuubo to the north and Faafux Dhuun to the west.
 - The AMISOM contingent in Faafax Dhuun to the west of Baardheere remains under pressure from Al-Shabaab and has been unable to advance.
- **Baraawe** is the last port in the Southern region under Al-Shabaab control and also provides a home to training and logistics facilities.
 - AMISOM forces in Qoryooley and Marka are positioned to strike towards Baraawe, but are impeded by Al-Shabaab defensive operations in Lower Shabelle.
 - Should Diinsoor fall it would be possible for AMISOM to advance on Baraawe from the north.
- **Kurtunwaarey** east of Qoryooley is another growing Al-Shabaab stronghold. Facilities in the town have been used to support attacks within Lower Shabelle and prepare operations to strike Mogadishu.
 - The expected AMISOM offensive towards Baraawe will in all likelihood take Kurtunwaarey first in order to ensure flank security.

Al-Shabaab on the other hand is also continuing to conduct operations in the Southern Region, though these tend to be small scale local operations as opposed to large offensives.

The main targets for Al-Shabaab offensive activity, aside from continuing strikes in those areas recently liberated by AMISOM are;

- **Kismayo** with Al-Shabaab forces drawn from the Amniyat in place and conducting strikes against the IJA.
- **Baidoa** with strong Al-Shabaab positions in Abal; Totiyas and on a line stretching from Jilibey to Labaatan Jirow.
 - Al-Shabaab forces are also positioned in and around Idale and Goof-Gaduud and are positioned to interdict movement of vehicles to and from Baidoa.

Operations in and around other Al-Shabaab strongholds, including Jilib; Bu'aale and Jamaame in Middle Juba and Kurtunwaarey in Lower Shabelle are to be expected to counter AMISOM offensive operations.

Security Analysis

Fighting in the Southern region was dominated by fighting in both the north of the region and the south. Fighting continued in;


- Bakool in the vicinity of the Xudur region- with Al-Shabaab fighting against Liyuu Militia; AMISOM and SNA Forces;
- In the Lower Shabelle Region- with Biyomaal Dir fighting the Abgaal and Habr Gedir Hawiye Clan;
- In the area around Kismayo- with Al-Shabaab engaging the IJA and AMISOM forces in the city;
- This week fighting expanded with the KDF conducting airstrikes on Al-Shabaab positions in Lower Juba and Gedo on 22.06.
 - There was another airstrike in Lower Juba on 21.06 but this has as yet not been claimed by the KDF and was possibly a drone strike.

The continuing fighting against Al-Shabaab in the Bakool region follows on from last week. Al-Shabaab is resurgent in the region in the last few weeks, striking against AMISOM and allied militias at will and seeing repeated successes. The Liyuu militia had notable success and discovered an Al-Shabaab supply cache, recovering over 180 weapons and fuel drums.

The fighting in the Lower Shabelle region between the Biyomaal Dir and the Abgaal Hawiye continued in Marka and KM50. The continued presence of the Habr Gedir dominated SNA 3rd Brigade only exacerbated the regional tensions witnesses reporting SNA soldiers acting in support of the Abgaal militia attacking the Biyomaal Dir. Fighting spread to rival units within the SNA.

If the situation wasn't bad enough on 17.06 the violence took on a political aspect when troops loyal to the nascent Shabelle State Administration moved to occupy the town.

Violence elsewhere in the region was caused by clan tensions, with IJA militia attacking rivals in Kismayo. The Marehan versus Majerten violence forms a violent undercurrent to life in Kismayo and provides an ominous sign of future clan tensions in the region and indeed demonstrates that between warring clans reconciliation is not only difficult, but improbable.



Incident Map 3, Southern Region

1. **Kismayo.** 16.06 IJA Militia attack rival clan militia. 10 killed 40 injured
2. **Xudur.** 16.06 Al-Shabaab attacks Liyuu militia.
3. **Kismayo.** 17.06 Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM base.
4. **Marka.** 17.06 Gunmen attack District Commissioners residence
5. **Ceel Gadde.** 17.06 Al-Shabaab ambushes AMISOM convoy. 1 vehicle destroyed.
6. **Marka.** 17.06 Militia belonging to Shabelle State occupy town.
7. **Lafoole.** 18.06 Al-Shabaab attacks SNA base. 1 killed 2 injured
8. **Marka.** 18.06 IED attack on SNP patrol.
9. **Ceel Gadde.** 19.06 Government official assassinated.
10. **Marka.** 20.06 Al-Shabaab attacks SNA positions.
11. **Kismayo.** 20.06 IJA soldier murders colleague.
12. **Warfaynle.** 21.06 Airstrike on Al-Shabaab positions.
13. **Lagaley.** 21.06 Liyuu militia seizes 2 Al-Shabaab supply caches containing over 180 weapons and fuel.
14. **Waajid.** 21.06 Al-Shabaab attacks SNA bases.
15. **Hoosingo.** 22.06 Al-Shabaab ambushes Khat transporter and destroys vehicle.
16. **Marka.** 22.06 Fighting between rival Clan militias in SNA.
17. **Koday.** 22.06 KDF airstrike on Al-Shabaab base.
18. **Aanole.** 22.06 KDF airstrike on Al-Shabaab base.
19. **Balad-Aamin.** 22.06 illegal roadblocks preventing movement towards Mogadishu.
20. **KM50.** 22.06 Rival clan militias fight.

Security Forecast


There is no sign that fighting in the Southern Region will finish in the near future. There are several key threats at present;

- Continued presence of Al-Shabaab;
- Tensions between rival clans in Lower Shabelle;
- Tensions over the new Federal states.

In recent weeks these tensions have led to significant fighting across the entire southern region. While the most significant short-term threat is the continued Al-Shabaab presence, the tensions between clans and- by extension Federal States- are significant long term threats and will undermine future post Al-Shabaab stability in the region.

The most significant long term threat is the resurgence of clan based fighting in Lower Shabelle. The current fighting in the vicinity of Marka weakens the Federal Government's hold on Lower Shabelle; it may also drive certain clans back to support Al-Shabaab. Additionally it threatens future offensive operations on Kurtunwaarey and Baraawe; AMISOM will not willingly advance if their supply lines are threatened by clan fighting.

Additionally the continuing political impasse over the Federalism issue- in itself also clan linked, though less overtly violent- has the potential to lead to additional clan related violence in areas that have thus far seen mainly fighting against Al-Shabaab.



MOGADISHU

Security Analysis


Fighting this week in Mogadishu saw Al-Shabaab's campaign continuing. The assassination campaign continued, with Al-Shabaab Amniyat teams assassinating a number of targets;

- A senior NISA official was killed by gunmen on 17.06;
- A VBIED killed a Doctor at a hospital in Karaan on 18.06
- Another VBIED that killed a journalist who worked for Radio Mustaqbal on 20.06 in Xamarweyne.

In addition to the assassinations that were conducted, Al-Shabaab again demonstrated its ability and willingness to operate openly in Mogadishu with militia attacks on SNA forces in the Heliwa District.

Al-Shabaab spent the week consolidating its hold on certain areas of Mogadishu and- according to sources- putting the finishing touches to its plans for offensive action during Ramadan.

The Security Forces are also preparing for an Al-Shabaab Ramadan offensive and the capital is on high alert with an increase in checkpoints, patrols and arrests. Unfortunately the positive approach by the security forces was slightly undermined by what can only be termed incompetence, as well as the usual corruption that is present wherever the security forces are;



- On 21.06 to much fanfare the spokesman for the SNP in Mogadishu released a list of 10 men accused of being in Mogadishu and ready to conduct suicide attacks, rather helpfully the spokesman also released a list of phone numbers. Several journalists investigated and unfortunately not only do a number of the phone numbers not work, several of the men are not even in Mogadishu and of those that are, at least 1 has been previously investigated and cleared of Al-Shabaab membership by NISA. One can but wonder what the SNP as attempting to achieve with the publication of the list, but whatever their aim it backfired.
- The other disadvantage of an increased security presence in Mogadishu is an increased number of security personnel. As we have seen before more security personnel means more corruption and bribes need paying and this latest increase follows the pattern.

Security Forecast

Mogadishu will continue to endure assassinations and attacks. While Al-Shabaab cannot take the city as it stands they can continue to harass and prevent improvements to the security situation.

Al-Shabaab operates openly in Daynile; Heliwa and Yaaqshiid. They have positioned considerable forces within these districts and in villages surrounding Mogadishu.

Al-Shabaab forces within Mogadishu are embedded within the populace and sheltered from SFG security forces.

In and around Mogadishu AMISOM and SNA traffic is coming under increasing attack, with ambushes and attacks on checkpoints increasing in frequency.

Assassinations; IED attacks and hit and run attacks on AMISOM; SNA and SNP bases have all been seen and are likely to remain tactics used by Al-Shabaab.



AL-SHABAAB TACTICS AND THREAT GUIDANCE

Al-Shabaab Inside Somalia

Al-Shabaab has in the last few months demonstrated a tactical maturity and sophistication that was previously missing.

In the face of overwhelming AMISOM forces, Al-Shabaab has given up territory and traded space for time. Though they have not completely run away from areas liberated by AMISOM.

It is clear Al-Shabaab planned to withdraw from these areas and spent time preparing a stay behind presence with undercover fighters and pre-planted IEDs. Their tactical sophistication reached its peak in Qoryooley where they flooded farming areas around the city in order to trap AMISOM within the city and limit their movement out.

A significant IED threat has been reported in Waajid; Xudur; Rab Dhuure; Ceel Buur and Bulo Burto.

Al-Shabaab are working to limit the supplies entering towns recently liberated, they have imposed several blockades to supplies forcing AMISOM and the SNA to either give up supplies to support civilians or risk losing the hearts and minds campaign.

Al-Shabaab Outside Somalia

Al-Shabaab has repeatedly demonstrated its ability and resolve to look outside Somalia and given the success of their attacks outside Somalia in recent weeks this trend will continue.

This week saw Al-Shabaab continue its wave of attacks in Kenya, with a strike on Poromako- a town near Mpeketoni that was struck on 15.06. In an attack lasting several hours killed at least 10 Kenyans, including police officers.

Following Britain closing its consulate in Mombasa, the US Embassy this week announced that it would be withdrawing non-essential personnel due to the threat of attack.

There is known to be a significant Al-Shabaab presence in countries neighbouring Somalia, just this week Uganda arrested an Al-Shabaab suspect in Kampala. Targets are most likely to be high profile in nature, such as embassies; government buildings and even public places- such as shopping malls and churches.

There is also emerging chatter that Amniyat teams are being prepared to target Western nationals throughout East Africa with further strikes in Djibouti being a priority.

THREAT FORECAST AND GUIDANCE

There remains a specific threat against foreign nationals and organisations operating inside Somalia from both criminal and terrorist forces. Somalia remains at high risk of violence in the vicinity of major population centres and roads. Specifically;

- Northern Region-
 - Caution is advised in the vicinity of Gaalkacyo; Garowe; Bossaso and Hargeysa;
- Central Region-
 - Caution is advised in the vicinity of Belet Weyne and Jowhar.
 - Avoid all travel to Ceel Buur; Bulo Burto and Jalalaqsi;
- Southern Region-
 - Caution is advised in the vicinity of Baidoa; Kismayo and other population centres;
 - Avoid all travel to cities under Al-Shabaab control, as well as Waajid; Belet Xaawo; Marka and Afgooye.

We would also advise all organisations operating in Somalia to exercise the highest levels of security.

- All facilities should be hardened to resist terrorist attack, with perimeter security and safe areas in place, measures should also include an adequate guard force and hardening of the buildings structure to resist explosive attacks.
- Movement in country should be limited to necessary travel only and should be risk assessed to ensure it is necessary. Movement where possible should be with armed protection and in adequately protected vehicles.
- If possible movement by air is considered preferable to road movements;
- Meetings should be conducted in secure facilities only and never in places accessible to the public. Al-Shabaab has demonstrated its ability to conduct strikes targeted at security and international personnel in public areas.
- In the wake of a recent Al-Shabaab threat we would also recommend international organisations to apply these same security measures to local staff.

While Al-Shabaab is the highest profile threat, it should also be remembered that even in areas outside of Al-Shabaab's control, the threat of clan related violence as well as criminal activity should not be underestimated. The lack of government control over large swathes of Somalia allows criminal gangs free reign. Criminal activity ranges from illegal tolls on roads to the kidnap of staff. Crime is also perpetrated by unpaid SNA and SNP personnel, including running illegal checkpoints; robbery and kidnapping.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Federalism

In a surprise development at a meeting on 22.06 the Federal Government brokered a solution to the South-West 3 versus South-West 6 Federalism argument. The deal ended several months of increasingly acrimonious debate and tension in the Southern Region; that included protests in Baidoa and the threat of fighting with the Independent Juba Administration.

The Federal Government had the advantage that the leaders of the SW3 and SW6 were Digil-Mirifle and thus had common clan links, but nonetheless considering that both the SW3 and SW6 regions had considerable support, the achievement of reconciliation and a solution to the argument is notable.

In a surprising move the solution is the removal of the SW6 and that SW3 will be the Federal State going forward. The acceptance of the reality- that SW6 was an unachievable aim- solves several problems for the Federal Government;

- It reduces tensions between SW3 and SW6 leaders, healing a rift that was developing in the Digil-Mirifle clan;
- It potentially provides a solution to the violence in Lower Shabelle taking place between the Hawiye and Biyomaal Dir clans. Rather than a Shabelle State which would ally Hawiye clan members in Middle and Lower Shabelle and thus outnumbering the Biyomaal Dir, the SW3 is led by Digil-Mirifle who are a neutral party in the conflict.
- It certainly reduces tensions with the Independent Juba Administration, which had expressed its anger at the SW6 region laying claim to Gedo; Lower and Middle Juba.

However, every silver lining has its cloud and the reconciliation deal also creates a number of problems for the Federal Government.

- The end of the SW6 initiative, which for all intents and purposes was very well supported, especially among the regions under the Independent Juba Administration undermines what value was left in the Federalism process of the Constitution;
- The deal does nothing to stop fighting in Lower Shabelle, although Lower Shabelle is now part of the SW3 as opposed to Shabelle State, the belligerents in Lower Shabelle don't recognise SW3's claim on the region. The Hawiye support the Shabelle State- which in its favour has troops and thus a certain ability to act and impose its will- whereas the Biyomaal Dir were supporters of the SW6 and not SW3. Of course in an effort to survive, the Biyomaal Dir might just accept reality and throw their support behind SW3, rather than end up exposed to Hawiye predations;

The reconciliation deal has also demonstrated the Federal Government's inability to be proactive and resolve situations before they become crises. The SW6 initiative started in late 2013 and the Federal Government did nothing to prevent it, the SW6 progressed through all necessary stages of the Federalism process and the Federal Government only stepped in when the Independent Juba Administration started protesting. Even when it stepped in to resolve the issue the Federal Government made no attempt at reconciling both sides, instead supporting the SW3 and criticising and-to an extent- harassing the SW6. Even now it negotiates a solution that will leave large swathes of the Southern Region disappointed and exposed to further tensions. We can hardly foresee an end to clan fighting in Gedo- which is linked to clans that are pro-SW6 and against the Independent Juba Administration- and Lower Shabelle.

Federal States and Resources

The ongoing argument over who controls the resources of Somalia again came to light during the week. The debate between Puntland; Somaliland; the Independent Juba Administration and the Federal Government about whether the state administrations or the Federal Government control the resources that generate revenue.

This week saw the Federal Government sign a deal with Royal Dutch Shell authorising Shell to conduct exploration activities in and offshore of Puntland. In the wake of the announcement, Isse Mohamud Farah, the Director-General of Puntland's Petroleum and Minerals Agency rejected the deal. Puntland- as well as Somaliland and the Independent Juba Administration- claim that the Federal Constitution ensures that a Federal State has full control of its territory- and by extension, natural resources.

The Federal Constitution indeed states that the Federal Government cannot exert authority over a functioning Federal State, constituted in accordance with the Federal Constitution. Puntland and the other semi-autonomous regions claim that they are Federal Member States- the Federal Government would disagree, except in the case of the Independent Juba Administration and as Federal Member States they have full control over their territory. The Federal Government's position is that this does not include natural resources; however the Federal Constitution does not explicitly refer to natural resources.

Yet again the Constitution is at the root of the issue or rather the omissions from the Federal Constitution are. The irony is that the President of Puntland was one of the authors of the Federal Constitution. It is hoped that the Constitutional Review Committee- which in separate news was approved this week by the Federal Parliament- will resolve a lot of the anomalies and omissions.

Discussions about the Federal Constitution however do not resolve the immediate issue, which is the control of natural resources. Unfortunately at the present it is unlikely that Puntland will back down and allow the Shell deal to go ahead, unless Shell strikes a separate deal with Puntland or the Federal Government offers some concessions.

POLITICAL FORECAST

Parliament and the Federal Government

At present the crisis over the impeachment of the President seems to have gone quiet, President Hassan addressed Parliament on 16.06 and appealed for Parliament to work with the Government and in a surprise move admitted the Government had made mistakes. Whether this will prove a successful move remains to be seen, it is likely that the reconciliation between the SW3 and SW6 will see President Hassan gain support from the Digil-Mirifle and Biyomaal Dir MPs, while equally costing him some Hawiye support. Whether this changes the numbers of MPs opposing him and expressing a lack of confidence remains to be seen.

While there is no overt change, that the Constitutional Review Committee was approved by a large margin might be seen as progress- equally it could be a sign that enough MPs realise how deeply flawed the Constitution is and that real change is needed urgently.

Federalism and Clans

Federalism and relations between clans look to be a source of further tensions ahead. In recent weeks we have seen indications that the growth of Federalism is being subverted by clan interests and will lead to further clan linked violence.

The reconciliation deal between South-West 3 and South-West 6 is a development in the right direction and consolidating support behind the South-West 3 banner solves a number of problems. But it also creates problems and despite the Federal Government's support for South-West 3 it remains to be seen how much value this support will have, especially in Lower Shabelle. In addition we could see an increase in tensions in the Independent Juba Administration area as those who believed they part of South-West 6 and were waiting for rescue from Madobe's supporters now realise they have been abandoned to the Independent Juba Administration's control.

The proposed central region comprising Galmudug and Himan and Heeb continues, with Ahlu Sunna meeting administration representatives to ensure cooperation from all sides.

The tensions between Somaliland and Puntland will, we predict, remain tense, although armed conflict is unlikely, other than local skirmishes, provided Somaliland acts to secure its side of the disputed borders from Al-Shabaab. While both sides believe there is *casus belli*, open conflict will benefit neither side and would indeed set back the progress Somaliland and Puntland have made.