

Security and Political Awareness Report

17 March to 23 March 2014

Overview

The week saw continuing violence throughout the region. The AMISOM and SNA offensive recaptured additional Al-Shabaab territory. Al-Shabaab demonstrated its threat to its neighbours with a spike in threats outside of Somalia. Politically, the reporting period saw a taste of future trouble between Federal states and Clans.

Security Developments within the reporting period

Security Incidents-Somalia		
Date	Details	Situational Map
17.03	<div><div>1.</div><div>Laag. Al-Shabaab IED attack on convoy kills Commander of Puntland Armed Forces in Golis Mountains.</div><div>2.</div><div>Buur Heybo. AMISOM forces capture town.</div><div>3.</div><div>Buurdhuubo. Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM base.</div><div>4.</div><div>Jaamacada-Beeraha. Al-Shabaab IED attack on AMISOM convoy. 10 killed.</div><div>5.</div><div>Mombasa. Kenya police detain 2 Al-Shabaab members with IEDs. (Not shown)</div></div>	
18.03	<div><div>1.</div><div>Ted. Al-Shabaab ambushes AMISOM convoy.</div><div>2.</div><div>Qansax Dheere. Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM base.</div><div>3.</div><div>Bulo Burto. Al-Shabaab VBIED attack on AMISOM and SNA meeting. 25 killed, including Senior SFG and SNA Officials.</div><div>4.</div><div>Kolbiyow. Al-Shabaab ambushes AMISOM convoy.</div></div>	
19.03	<div><div>1.</div><div>Buqcgable. Al-Shabaab recaptures town.</div><div>2.</div><div>Bulo Burto. Al-Shabaab attack AMISOM base.</div><div>3.</div><div>Kamsuuma. Build-up of Al-Shabaab forces.</div><div>4.</div><div>Mombasa. Additional IEDs found and disarmed (Not shown).</div></div>	
20.03	<div><div>1.</div><div>Xudur. Security forces kill Al-Shabaab Commander Ali Dhagaqey and 6 bodyguards.</div><div>2.</div><div>Buurdhuubo. Al-Shabaab IED attack cafe used by AMISOM and SNA.</div><div>3.</div><div>Coomaad. AMISOM captures town.</div><div>4.</div><div>Eelaaley. Build-up of Al-Shabaab forces, regrouped from Bulo-Burto.</div><div>5.</div><div>Bulo Burto. Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM forces.</div><div>6.</div><div>Qoryooley. AMISOM attacks Al-Shabaab positions.</div><div>7.</div><div>Jowhar. Protests over conduct of SNA forces.</div></div>	
21.03	<div><div>1.</div><div>Bulo Burto. Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM forces.</div><div>2.</div><div>Bilis Qooqaani. Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM base. Casualties unknown.</div><div>3.</div><div>Mandera. 2 Kenyan Officials assassinated by Al-Shabaab.</div></div>	
22.03	<div><div>1.</div><div>Bulacle. AMISOM captures town, Al-Shabaab withdraws. Casualties unknown.</div><div>2.</div><div>Qoryooley. AMISOM captures town, Al-Shabaab withdraws. Casualties unknown.</div><div>3.</div><div>Janaale. Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM base. Casualties unknown.</div><div>4.</div><div>Qorvooley. Al-Shabaab attack AMISOM forces.</div></div>	<div><div>23.03</div><div><div>1.</div><div>Baidoa. Fighting between SW6 and SW3 supporters. 1 killed 2 injured.</div><div>2.</div><div>Buur Hakaba. 8 Biyomaal clan elders travelling from SW6 Conference in Baidoa to Mogadishu executed.</div><div>3.</div><div>Maxaas. AMISOM forces attack Al-Shabaab positions.</div><div>4.</div><div>Kismayo. IJA militia kill businessman.</div><div>5.</div><div>Qoryooley. Heavy fighting between AMISOM and Al-Shabaab.</div><div>6.</div><div>Bulo Mareer. Fighting between AMISOM and AL-Shabaab.</div><div>7.</div><div>Shalaambood. Al-Shabaab ambushes AMISOM convoy.</div><div>8.</div><div>Mombasa. Suspected Al-Shabaab attack on a church. 3 killed 17 injured. (Not shown)</div></div></div>

Security Incidents Mogadishu		
Date	Details	Situational Map
17.03	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Shibis. Al-Shabaab assassinate Government official near the Maana Boolyo market. 2. Hodan. Al-Shabaab IED attack on SNP patrol on Maka Al-Mukarama road. 1 police officer injured. 	
18.03	1. Hodan. SNP arresting drivers of 3 wheel taxis on suspicion of links to Al-Shabaab.	
19.03	1. Hodan. Security sweep by AMISOM and SNA, hundreds arrested.	
20.03	1. Daynile. Security sweep by AMISOM and SNA, hundreds arrested.	
21.03	1. Hawl Wadaag. Businessman assassinated by gunmen.	
22.03	No incidents reported	
23.03	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hodan. Al-Shabaab mortar attack on SNA base. Casualties unknown. 2. Daynile. Al-Shabaab attacks SNA base. Casualties unknown. 	

Security Analysis

The week saw yet more changes to the security environment in Somalia with the continuation of the SNA and AMISOM offensives. Broadly speaking, there are 2 main trends.

- AMISOM and SNA offensive action, continuing the trend of the period 03.03 to 09.03 which saw the capture of Rab Dhuure; Waajid; Xudur; Buurdhuubo and Birta Dheer. The period 10.03 to 16.03 saw yet more offensive activity on the part of AMISOM and the SNA.
 - AMISOM forces advancing from Belet Weyne surprisingly seized the Al-Shabaab stronghold of Bulo Burto on 13.02. This event was a surprise as it was expected Al-Shabaab would fight to hold Bulo Burto at all costs.
 - AMISOM forces in Dhusamareeb commenced their advance on Ceel Buur, with Al-Shabaab withdrawing as opposed to remaining to fight.
 - A new AMISOM advance commenced in the West, originating from Faafax Dhuun and pushing on Baardheere from the West.
- In Mogadishu, however, the recent trend of rising violence continued, with numerous attacks on security forces, assassinations, and yet another wave of mortar attacks.
 - The highlight of the week, if you can call it that, was an IED attack on the Hotel Maka Al-Mukarama. Although the attack failed in its intended aim - it was placed to target government officials meeting at the Hotel - it again demonstrated Al-Shabaab's abilities and the weak security situation in Mogadishu. The Hotel Maka Al-Mukarama has been attacked before and that yet another VBIED was prepared and placed is itself noteworthy.
 - Mogadishu also saw Al-Shabaab moving more forces into Heliwa and Daynile districts, though there are indications that Al-Shabaab is planning on moving personnel into the Karaan district.

Political Developments within Reporting Period

Politically the week saw worrying signs that tensions that have been ignored during the fighting against al-Shabaab are re-emerging and that there exists significant risk of violence throughout South-Central, even should Al-Shabaab be defeated.

Federalism and Clans

The creation of Federal States in Somalia was intended to create a democratic form of regional government that represented all Somalis in a region as opposed to clan based mini-states. There are indications that Constitutional process regarding the creation of Federal States is being used to create clan based state organisations.

We previously reported the arguments and potential for conflict in South Central Somalia with 4 Administrations in existence; Independent Juba Administration; South-West 3; South-West 6 and Shabelle State. Additionally, looking outside the South-Central portion of Somalia to the north there is also conflict between Somaliland; Puntland; Khatumo State and Galgaduud over control of regions. These disputes are presented as a political issue, but in reality politics is a veil and behind the scenes, like many things in Somalia clan tensions exist.

All the competing Federal State and semi-autonomous regions are clan dominated, as is- to a certain degree- Al-Shabaab. As an organisation, Al-Shabaab is a vehicle for minor, unrepresented clans to gain power, while Al-Shabaab has members of major clans, the bulk of the Jabhan and Fursan militias are Rahanweyn and Jarerweyn, religion is for many of Al-Shabaab's fighters merely a convenient excuse.

As an overview, the following Clan links to proposed or existing States exist;

- Somaliland- Issaq;
- Khatumo State- Dhulbahante sub-clan of Darod clan;
- Puntland- Majerten sub-clan of Darod clan;
- Galmudug- Habr Gedir sub-clan of Hawiye;
- Himan and Heeb- Habr Gedir sub-clan of Hawiye;
- Jubaland- Ogaden sub-clan of Darod clan;
- South-West 3- Digil-Mirifle clan;
- South-West 6- Digil-Mirifle; Biyomaal sub-clan of Dir clan; Marehan sub-clan of Darod clan;
- Shabelle State- Abgaal sub-clan of Hawiye clan and Digil-Mirifle clan;
- South West State
 - The South-West 3 and South-West 6 groups are the creation of Digil-Mirifle clan leaders; the argument over the exact make-up of the South-West State is more of an internal clan debate as opposed to a political issue.
 - The South-West 6 Digil-Mirifle leaders gained support from the Dir clan, especially the Biyomaal Elders in the Marka District of Lower Shabelle.
 - The Biyomaal Dir support the South-West 6 State as a means of ensuring that they form part of a State that is not dominated by Hawiye Clan elements.
 - The enmity between the Biyomaal Dir was again brought into focus earlier in the week on 18.03 when Biyomaal Dir Clan Elders met with AMISOM and requested that they support the

AMISOM offensive in Lower Shabelle and not the SNA 3rd Brigade stationed in Marka, Lower Shabelle. The 3rd Brigade of the SNA is a Habr Gedir dominated unit and its members were responsible for much of the Clan based fighting in Lower Shabelle in December and January. There are reports of ongoing Clan based fighting for much of 2013 and the UNSEMG reported on the Clan makeup of the 3rd Brigade in its 2013 report.

- The Biyomaal Dir are in an awkward position, they have to support the South-West 6 to ensure their territories are under the Digil-Mirifle dominated Administration, as opposed to supporting the South-West 3, which would leave them to be part of the Hawiye dominated Shabelle State.
- Even the South-West 6 claims on Gedo and Lower and Middle Juba are Clan linked, with mostly Marehan Darod elements opposed to the Ogaden sub-clan that dominates Jubaland.
- The South-West 3 initiative, on the other hand, wants to keep their state under Digil-Mirifle dominance and has thus avoided soliciting the support of other Clans.
- The Shabelle State is a joint Digil-Mirifle and Hawiye clan initiative.
 - Middle Shabelle is dominated by Hawiye Clan, particularly the Abgaal sub-clan;
 - Lower Shabelle is dominated by the Biyomaal Dir, though there is a significant Digil-Mirifle population;
 - The Digil-Mirifle in Lower Shabelle linked to the creation of a Shabelle State are opposed to Lower Shabelle being part of both the South-West 3 or 6 States and have thus allied with the Abgaal leaders of Middle Shabelle.
- Puntland; Jubaland; Somaliland and the proposed Central State are not free from Clan domination.
 - Puntland and Jubaland don't make a great show of it, but they are both Darod-dominated administrations, though Jubaland was set up with external influences as well.
 - Somaliland is dominated by the Issaq Clan;
 - The proposed Central state, which will consist of Galgaduud and Himan and Heeb, is another Hawiye Clan dominated administration.

The problem with Clan domination of Federal States is that it will bring the relations and perceptions of the Clan to a governing administration and will lead to conflicts between States. Even within Clan dominated Federal States the politics and government is non-inclusive. There is never overt discrimination, but far too often the dominant Clan forms the entirety of the administration, from cabinet to public services. To an extent this is unsurprising, considering as even the Federal Government is not wholly inclusive due to the 4.5 formula that is applied.

As a foretaste of the potential disaster that could be facing Somalia if all the Clan - and by extension State - rivalries were to develop, the last week has seen a ratcheting up of tensions in both the north, between Puntland and Somaliland, and the south, between the South-West 3 and South-West 6 administrations.

Tensions between Puntland and Somaliland have existed for as long as the 2 states have. The source of the tension, the disputed provinces of Sanaag; Sool and Cayn, are home to Darod and Issaq Clan members as well as considerable natural resources. As we reported, President Silanyo visited Las Qoray, a town claimed by Puntland, on 16.03. This visit was condemned by the Puntland Government as an inflammatory move. The Somaliland Government responded with threats and comments in state controlled media that Puntland provides a safe haven for pirates and criminal elements, misquoting comments from respected piracy experts. The tit for tat between the two was further escalated on 23.03 when Somaliland moved troops into the Sanaag region deliberately threatening Puntland's control of Sanaag.

The South-West 3 and South-West 6 dispute has already seen deaths and further fighting between them is increasingly likely. On 23.03 former Somali parliament Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden the leader of the

South-West 3 conference visited Baidoa; his arrival was met by demonstrations from supporters of the South-West 6 Administration. These demonstrations turned violent and fighting between armed supporters of both sides claimed at least 2 lives. At the same time a group of Biyomaal Dir Elders travelling from Baidoa to Mogadishu were executed in Buur Hakaba. While some have blamed Al-Shabaab, they were swift to deny responsibility, even the families of the deceased Elders denied Al-Shabaab was involved. Indeed there are suspicions that the murders were conducted either by other Clans in direct confrontation with the Biyomaal Dir or by parties linked to politics, which is likely to mean South-West 3 or Shabelle State supporters. The suspicion that Elders have been murdered by the Biyomaal Clan's rivals may just be enough to cause an outbreak of fighting in Lower Shabelle and surrounding regions and while it is unlikely that those responsible will be found and Al-Shabaab cannot be ruled out, the Biyomaal Dir are unlikely to hold back from what they will see as necessary revenge.

Political Situation Forecast

Politically Related Forecast

- The development of the security situation is a concern, affecting all other potential growth in Somali; indeed PM Ahmed has stated that security is his number one priority.
 - The security situation in Mogadishu will continue to be the focal point in Somalia and any setbacks in security in Mogadishu will undermine confidence in the government.
 - The Mayor of Mogadishu is fighting to take direct control of all security infrastructure in Mogadishu. If he does it would be in contravention of the documented duties of his role and is opposed by senior security officials. However, given the current level of insecurity in Mogadishu, the move has been seen as a good idea in some quarters.
- Federalism and relations between Clans look to be the source of tensions ahead. We have already seen in the last week that Clan violence remains a high threat and there are signs that the growth of Federalism is being subverted by Clan interests and will lead to violence.
 - The argument over who governs the south-west regions will continue for the foreseeable future, until such time as the Federal Government does what it should have done and establish guidelines on the size of the Administrative area.
 - The tensions between South-West 3; South-West 6; the Shabelle State and the Independent Juba Administration are only set to grow, especially after the fighting between the supporters of South-West 3 and South-West 6 in Baidoa and the execution of 8 Biyomaal Clan elders in Buur Hakaba.
 - The various Administrations are all Clan dominated; South-West 6 is a combination of Biyomaal Dir; Digil-Mirifle and Marehan Darod; the Independent Juba Administration is Ogaden Darod dominated; the South-West 3 is another Digil-Mirifle initiative and the Shabelle State is a combined Digil-Mirifle and Abgaal Hawiye initiative.
 - Clan tensions between the Biyomaal sub-clan of the Dir and the Habr Gedir sub-clan of the Hawiye have been exposed recently and it is likely that these tensions will increase. Potentially we could see a major outbreak of fighting in Lower Shabelle and surrounding regions.
 - The proposed central region comprising Galmudug and Himan and Heeb continues, with Ahlu Sunna meeting administration representatives to ensure cooperation from all sides.
 - The future of Mudug, claimed by both Galmudug and Puntland remains an unanswered question and until resolved could undermine any progress made.
 - What is certain is that the region is very likely to be dominated by the Hawiye clan and as such could pose a threat to the Majerten Darod dominated Puntland to the North, as well as Dir Clan territories to the south.

Security Situation Forecast

The situation in Somalia remains highly dynamic and we cannot see any end to this in sight. During the previous 3 weeks there have been notable success for the SFG and AMISOM and Al-Shabaab have lost key towns. However, Al-Shabaab remains a threat and the loss of towns has not hindered the operational capacity.

AMISOM and Somali National Army Forecast








- The inclusion of Ethiopian forces under AMISOM's mandate in January seems to have not only unified all non-SNA forces in country, but is facilitating AMISOM returning to the offensive.
- AMISOM and the SFG are conducting, or preparing to conduct, campaigns aimed at several Al-Shabaab strongholds;
 - The offensives launched from Ceel Barde; Garbahaarey and Belet Weyne have achieved their initial objectives with the capture of Buurdhuubo; Xudur and Bulo Burto. The Ceel Barde offensive also liberated Rab Dhuure and Waajid.
 - **Diinsoor**- an AMISOM force in Qansax Dheere is ideally placed to advance on Diinsoor from the north.
 - Qansax Dheere was reinforced on 17.02 with an AMISOM contingent. With the capture of Buurdhuubo from Al-Shabaab on 08.03 it is probable that further Ethiopian forces will reinforce the contingent in Qansax Dheere.
 - **Jalalaqsi** with AMISOM forces advancing from Bulo Burto.
 - Following the capture of Bulo Burto on 13.02 the Belet Weyne offensive has achieved its initial objective. Once the area around Bulo Burto has been stabilised it is likely that the force will then proceed onto Jalaqsi, then possibly Jowhar, trapping the bulk of Al-Shabaab's forces in the south of the country.
 - **Ceel-Buur** with AMISOM forces advancing from Dhusamareeb.
 - The Ceel Buur offensive commenced on 11.03 and reached Ceel Buur on 13.02.
 - Al-Shabaab holds some positions in Ceel Buur, though the bulk of their forces have withdrawn.
 - **Baardheere** is likely to come under pressure from AMISOM forces advancing from Buurdhuubo from the north and a strike from Faafux Dhuun to the west.
 - The capture of Buurdhuubo on 08.03 was made following fighting along the road from Garbahaarey. It is probable that the AMISOM contingent will advance from Buurdhuubo towards Baardheere and also support a thrust from Qansax Dheere on Diinsoor.
 - A second thrust from Faafux Dhuun to the west of Baardheere is developing, with fighting along the road connecting the 2 towns.
 - **Baraawe** with AMISOM forces advancing from Marka.
 - The offensive is reported to have commenced on 10.03 with AMISOM forces advancing to Qoryooley and Buulo Mareer and Al-Shabaab withdrawing from several towns in Lower Shabelle.
 - The offensive was delayed by fighting in the Qoryooley area until its capture on 20.03. Once the area surround Qoryooley has been stabilised it is expected that offensive will push onto Baraawe in the week ahead.
 - Should Diinsoor fall it would be possible for AMISOM to advance on Baraawe from the north. This is increasingly likely and with Baraawe intended as a permanent base for AMISOMs Ethiopian contingent it is logical for the Ethiopian's to capture the town.

Al-Shabaab Related Forecast

- The last week has seen the continuing loss of strategic towns for Al-Shabaab. However, there has not been a concurrent loss of personnel, Al-Shabaab often choosing to withdraw from population centres in the face of AMISOM offensive action, as opposed to standing and fighting and thus losing personnel.
 - Concurrently with the fighting in the Gedo and Bakool regions we have seen Al-Shabaab redistributing its forces.

- Galgaduud- There are reports that Al-Shabaab has moved personnel and equipment north-east into Galgaduud, where it is reported that Al-Shabaab has links to the Governor of Galmudug Qeybdiid and has supplied him with fighters; vehicles and supplies from Al-Shabaab.
- Puntland- There are indications, including reports from AMISOM and within Al-Shabaab that a number of fighters and possibly leaders have moved to the Golis Mountains.
- Middle Juba- Al-Shabaab has strongholds at Jilib; Bu'aale and Jamaame and the senior leadership of Al-Shabaab has located much of their Command and Control structures in Jilib.
- Al-Shabaab continues to hold several key cities; Baraawe; Diinsoor; Jalalaqsi and Jilib in particular and has over the last few weeks consolidated a proportion of their militia forces in these locations.
- Al-Shabaab has demonstrated a willingness to surrender territory in order to retain their ability to operate and not get bogged down into fighting AMISOM forces head on.
- We believe that when faced with AMISOM offensives, Al-Shabaab will continue to avoid open conflict and will continue to disperse. The benefit of this is that Al-Shabaab will be able to continue its struggle and avoid a major loss of personnel.
 - What we have seen though is that following capture of a town or city by AMISOM, Al-Shabaab conducts aggressive and audacious hit and run attacks against military personnel. They look to exploit the unfamiliarity of the AMISOM forces with the location and attack strategic locations, such as supplies; transport routes and Headquarters facilities.
 - As Al-Shabaab withdraws we are also seeing a poison earth tactic emerging, as they withdraw from an area they remove or destroy vital infrastructure, such as power generation or even water sources, thus complicating AMISOM's task in securing the area.
- Al-Shabaab will continue its offensive campaigns, though it is becoming clear that these will involve more clandestine activity as opposed to open fighting.
 - Al-Shabaab has spent the last 2 months training at least 200 Amniyat personnel at key training camps, often using experienced foreign jihadists as instructors. These Amniyat operatives are being positioned to conduct further targeted killings and IED attacks.
 - Al-Shabaab is conducting offensive action against;
 - **Kismayo** with Al-Shabaab forces advancing from positions increasingly close to Kismayo.
 - Al-Shabaab has considerable forces in Badhaadhe; Buulo Xaaji; Jana Cabdale and Turdho. These forces are positioned to interdict and harass vehicle traffic moving to and from Kismayo.
 - **Mogadishu** was again the scene of a number of attacks and this will continue for the foreseeable future. Al-Shabaab cannot take the city as it stands, however they can continue to harass and prevent the Federal Government from improving its position.
 - Al-Shabaab operates openly in Daynile; Heliwa and Yaaqshiid with forces there and in several villages to the north-west of Mogadishu AMISOM and SNA traffic is coming under increasing attack travelling in and around Mogadishu.
 - Assassinations; IED attacks and hit and run attacks on AMISOM; SNA and SNP bases have all been seen and are likely to remain tactics used by Al-Shabaab.
 - Al-Shabaab retains significant troop concentrations in strategically key areas that were originally intended to launch offensives on Baidoa; Marka and Bulo Burto as objectives. With the AMISOM breakthroughs of the last week offensive action by these forces is highly improbable. Al-Shabaab retains strong forces in key areas;
 - Baidoa remains virtually surrounded with the frontline edging closer to the city.
 - Al-Shabaab remains in control of key positions around Baidoa. Now that they control Xudur and Waajid AMISOM will strike towards Baidoa to relieve pressure on the city.
 - The Al-Shabaab has defensive positions at Abal and Totiyas and a stronger line from Jilibey to Labaatan Jirow.
 - A relief force was marshalled in Bulo-Burto and was sent to the Bakool region. It is believed they arrived too late to reinforce Waajid and Xudur. But may be in place to conduct counter attacks.

- Qoryooley and Marka are going to come under attack by Al-Shabaab forces, but these attacks are aimed at disrupting any SNA and AMISOM build-up and movement towards Baraawe.
- Bulo Burto will come under attack aimed at liberating the town and to prevent AMISOM advancing on Jalalaqsi.
- Jowhar remains under threat, however Al-Shabaab have cancelled plans for an attack aimed at capturing the city, content to carry on hit and run attacks.
- Xudur remains at risk, although AMISOM holds the city, Al-Shabaab maintains control of the surrounding area.

Key		Al-Shabaab and AMISOM Offensives	
Objectives		Al-Shabaab	
	AMISOM	Mogadishu , forces in <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mogadishu; 	
	Al-Shabaab	Bulo Burto , forces from; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Turdho; • Jamaame; 	
	Al-Shabaab	Bulo Burto , forces from; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jalalaqsi; 	
Offensives		AMISOM	
	AMISOM	Ethiopian forces; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diinsoor, imminent; • Ceel Buur, imminent; 	
	Al-Shabaab	Kenyan forces; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bardheere, imminent; 	
	Al-Shabaab	Ugandan and Burundian forces; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baraawe, imminent; 	

- With the AMISOM and SFG offensives finally commencing, Al-Shabaab has also fortified several key locations- other than those mentioned above- in order to block potential offensives;
 - Diinsoor is being used as an assembly point for Al-Shabaab's mobile forces, whether these openly engage AMISOM and SNA forces or are used in ongoing hit and run tactics is unknown.
- Reports indicate that Al-Shabaab is relocating personnel and assets towards Puntland.
 - We have seen an increase in fighting between Al-Shabaab and the Puntland government in the Galgala Mountain range and along the highway to Bossaso.
 - There are indications of a significant Al-Shabaab infrastructure within the Galgala Mountains. It has been suggested that the Galgala Mountains are considered to be Al-Shabaab's final stronghold and the recent expansion of facilities seems to confirm this theory.



- The Al-Shabaab targeted killing program run by the Amniyat branch is probably the biggest threat to future peace and stability in Somalia at present.
 - In recent weeks this program has carried out a number of high profile assassinations or attempted these, including the President of Somalia and various security and government officials.
 - We predict that even should Al-Shabaab's ability to hold large swathes of Somalia be defeated a continuation of the targeted killings will allow Al-Shabaab to influence Somalia.
 - Indeed there are reports that Al-Shabaab is secreting supply caches in the Diinsoor Mountains in preparation for the loss of major cities in preparation for an ongoing long-term guerrilla war.
- Al-Shabaab has repeatedly demonstrated its ability and resolve to look outside Somalia.
 - Al-Shabaab is likely to carry out further attacks outside of Kenya and it is reported that there are Al-Shabaab personnel in Nairobi; Addis Ababa and Kampala. Targets are most likely to be high profile in nature, such as embassies; government buildings and even public places- such as shopping malls.
 - In Kenya there is a large Al-Shabaab presence in the Hagadera Refugee Camp that is used to support operations throughout Kenya.
 - It is believed that as well as providing material support to attacks, Al-Shabaab is believed to recruit members from within Hagadera.
 - Al-Shabaab has also seen an increase of Kenyan recruits in recent months, incidents such as the storming of a Mombasa Mosque, even with overwhelming evidence of Al-Shabaab supporters being present, does nothing to win the hearts and minds battle.
 - In the reporting period reports of Al-Shabaab Amniyat linked operations in Mombasa emerged. 2 Al-Shabaab personnel were detained in possession of multiple IEDs and another VBIED was deactivated by Kenyan Police and the FBI. There are reports of imminent Al-Shabaab attacks against Mombasa airport and other Government facilities in the port city.
 - There is a high risk of attacks in Uganda. The Government in Kampala issued public warnings of Al-Shabaab plots to attack the energy infrastructure and perhaps use fuel tankers as large VBIEDs in attacks. This follows on from recent warnings by the Ugandan Government and the US Embassy of the threat of terror attacks on certain high profile locations.
- Strategically we predict that;
 - Should the AMISOM / SNA offensives be successful Al-Shabaab will lose considerable territory, potentially their core locations throughout South Central Somalia could be lost within the next year;
 - However, the potential for Al-Shabaab to retain control of rural areas and give up urban population centres should not be ignored.
 - Al-Shabaab will continue to surrender territory and withdraw fighting forces to avoid loss of personnel. This will allow Al-Shabaab to continue fighting into the future.
 - Al-Shabaab is transforming its fighting forces from militia engaging in open fighting to an insurgent force that acts covertly.
 - It is our estimation that Somalia could continue as a long term counter insurgency fight and while loath to use comparisons, there are considerable similarities with Afghanistan or Iraq.

Threat Forecast

There remains a specific threat against foreign nationals and organisations operating inside Somalia from both criminal and terrorist forces.

- Puntland remains at a high risk of violence in the vicinity of major population centres and roads, even though current levels of violence remain lower than in South Central. Specifically;
 - Caution is advised in the vicinity of Gaalkacyo; Garowe; Bossaso and Qardho.
- In South Central there remains a high level of fighting throughout.
 - Caution is advised in the vicinity of all major cities and along all major roads.
- We would also advise all organisations operating in Somalia to exercise the highest levels of security.

- All facilities should be hardened to resist terrorist attack, with perimeter security and safe areas in place, measures should also include an adequate guard force and hardening of the buildings structure to resist explosive attacks;;
- Movement in country should be limited to necessary travel only and should be risk assessed to ensure it is necessary. Movement where possible should be with armed protection and in adequately protected vehicles.
 - If possible movement by air is considered preferable to road movements;
- Meetings should be conducted in secure facilities only and never in places accessible to the public. Al-Shabaab has demonstrated its ability to conduct strikes targeted at security and international personnel in public areas.
- In the wake of a recent Al-Shabaab threat we would also recommend international organisations to apply these same security measures to local staff
- While Al-Shabaab is the highest profile threat, it should also be remembered that even in areas outside of Al-Shabaab's control, the threat of clan related violence as well as criminal activity should not be underestimated.
- The lack of government control over large swathes of Somalia allows criminal gangs free reign. Criminal activity ranges from illegal tolls on roads to the kidnap of staff.
- The non-payment of government employees and military personnel by both the Federal Government and the autonomous administrations directly affects the security situation. Unpaid SNA personnel have been directly linked to criminal acts including setting up illegal checkpoints on roads; robbery and kidnapping.