

# Security and Political Awareness Report

10 March to 16 March 2014

## Overview

The week saw continuing violence throughout. The AMISOM and SNA offensive recaptured more key towns, there are however indications Al-Shabaab is far from defeated, with a continuation of violence in Mogadishu and other key urban centres.

Politically the reporting period saw governance and security as the most prominent areas of concern.

## Security Developments within the reporting period

Security Incidents-Somalia		
Date	Details	Situational Map
10.03	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Faafax Dhuun.</b> Build-up of AMISOM forces.</li> <li><b>Kismayo.</b> AMISOM base attacked by Al-Shabaab.</li> <li><b>Kismayo.</b> Civilian assassinated.</li> <li><b>Danow.</b> AMISOM captures town.</li> <li><b>Shalaambood.</b> Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM patrol.</li> <li><b>Qoryooley.</b> AMISOM attacks Al-Shabaab positions.</li> <li><b>Buulo Mareer.</b> AMISOM attacks Al-Shabaab positions.</li> <li><b>Gol-Weyn.</b> AMISOM captures town.</li> <li><b>Buulo Sheekh.</b> AMISOM captures town.</li> </ol>	
11.03	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Dhuusamarreeb.</b> Military forces advance towards Ceel Buur.</li> <li><b>Bardera.</b> KDF airstrike on Al-Shabaab base. 32 killed 10 wounded.</li> <li><b>Taraka.</b> AMISOM attack Al-Shabaab positions.</li> <li><b>Buurdhuubo.</b> Al-Shabaab ambushes military convoy.</li> </ol>	
12.03	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Buurdhuubo.</b> Al-Shabaab mortar attack on military base.</li> <li><b>Bulo Burto.</b> AMISOM forces attack Al-Shabaab positions.</li> <li><b>Halgan.</b> AMISOM forces attack Al-Shabaab position.</li> </ol>	
13.03	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Qansax Dheere.</b> Al-Shabaab IED attack on SNP HQ prevented.</li> <li><b>Ceel Buur.</b> AMISOM attacks Al-Shabaab positions.</li> <li><b>Buurdhuubo.</b> Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM base.</li> <li><b>Buqcagable.</b> AMISOM captures town.</li> <li><b>Rangaabo.</b> AMISOM attacks Al-Shabaab positions.</li> <li><b>Bulo Burto.</b> AMISOM captures town.</li> <li><b>Kismayo.</b> Al-Shabaab attacks IJA convoy.</li> <li><b>Shalaambood.</b> Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM convoy.</li> </ol>	
14.03	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Baardheere.</b> Military forces attack Al-Shabaab positions.</li> <li><b>Jalalaqsi.</b> Al-Shabaab preparing strike on Bulo Burto to recapture town.</li> <li><b>Bulo Burto.</b> Al-Shabaab attacks military forces. 19 killed.</li> <li><b>Buurdhuubo.</b> Al-Shabaab attacks military base.</li> </ol>	
15.03	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Buurdhuubo.</b> Al-Shabaab ambushes military convoy.</li> <li><b>Cadale.</b> Military forces capture town.</li> <li><b>Warshiikh.</b> Military forces capture town.</li> <li><b>Ceel Raage.</b> Military forces capture town.</li> </ol>	
16.03	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Belet Weyne.</b> Al-Shabaab attacks military base.</li> <li><b>Leego.</b> Al-Shabaab ambushes military convoy.</li> </ol>	

Security Incidents Mogadishu		
Date	Details	Situational Map
10.03	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Yaaqshiid.</b> AMISOM disarms a large IED near IVO Suuq-Bacad.</li> <li><b>Xamar Jaabjab.</b> Al-Shabaab mortar attack. Casualties unknown</li> <li><b>Hawl Wadaag.</b> Al-Shabaab mortar attack on Maka Al Mukarama road. Casualties unknown</li> <li><b>Hodan.</b> Al-Shabaab mortar attack. Casualties unknown</li> <li><b>Waaberi.</b> Al-Shabaab mortar attack. Casualties unknown</li> <li><b>Wadajir.</b> Prominent Al-Shabaab critic Abu Yasir Al Maqdisa arrested.</li> <li><b>Wadajir.</b> SFG official assassinated. Gunmen escape</li> </ol>	
11.03	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Daynile.</b> SNA conduct patrols in Mogadishu. 2 killed.</li> </ol>	
12.03	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Heliwa.</b> Build-up of Al-Shabaab forces.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Hodan.</b> Al-Shabaab attacks AMISOM base. 2 killed 5 wounded.</li> <li><b>Yaaqshiid.</b> NGO worker assassinated by IED.</li> </ol>
13.03	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Daynile.</b> Build-up of Al-Shabaab forces.</li> <li><b>Daynile.</b> 2 civilians assassinated by unknown gunmen.</li> <li><b>Daynile.</b> SNA conduct patrols in Mogadishu. Large numbers of arrests.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Hawl Wadaag.</b> Clan Elder injured in IED assassination attempt.</li> <li><b>Yaaqshiid.</b> SNA base attacked by AS. Casualties unknown.</li> <li><b>Daynile.</b> Fighting between Al-Shabaab and military forces. 2 killed 2 wounded.</li> <li><b>Heliwa.</b> Al-Shabaab attacks military forces. Casualties unknown.</li> </ol>
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Hodan.</b> Al-Shabaab conducts IED attack on Hotel Maka Al-Murakamaa. 5 injured.</li> </ol>
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Hodan.</b> Court official assassinated in Digfeer area. Gunmen escaped</li> </ol>
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Heliwa.</b> SNA base attacked by AS. Casualties unknown.</li> </ol>

### Security Analysis

The week saw yet more changes to the security environment in Somalia with the continuation of the SNA and AMISOM offensives. Broadly speaking we are looking at 2 main trends.

- AMISOM and SNA offensive action, continuing the trend of the period 03.03 to 09.03 which saw the capture of Rab Dhuure; Waajid; Xudur; Buurdhuubo and Birta Dheer. The period 10.03 to 16.03 saw yet more offensive activity on the part of AMISOM and the SNA.
  - AMISOM forces advancing from Belet Weyne surprisingly seized the Al-Shabaab stronghold of Bulo Burto on 13.02. This event was a surprise as it was expected Al-Shabaab would fight to hold Bulo Burto at all costs.
  - AMISOM forces in Dhusamareeb commenced their advance on Ceel Buur, with Al-Shabaab withdrawing as opposed to remaining to fight.
  - A new AMISOM advance commenced in the West, originating from Faafax Dhuun and pushing on Baardheere from the West.
- Yet in Mogadishu we saw the recent trend of rising violence continue, with numerous attacks on security forces; assassinations and yet another wave of mortar attacks.
  - The highlight of the week, if you can call it that, was an IED attack on the Hotel Maka Al-Mukarama. Although the attack failed in its intended aim- it was placed to target government officials meeting at the Hotel- it again demonstrated Al-Shabaab's abilities and the weak security situation in Mogadishu. The Hotel Maka Al-Mukarama has been attacked before and that yet another VBIED was prepared and placed is itself noteworthy.

- Mogadishu also saw Al-Shabaab moving more forces into Heliwa and Daynile districts, though we have indications that Al-Shabaab is planning on moving personnel into the Karaan district.

## Political Developments within Reporting Period

Politically the week saw worrying signs that despite the loss of towns, Al-Shabaab is far from defeated and indeed is operating to its own plan. We also saw indication that tensions between Puntland and Somaliland are again growing with the potential risk for a destabilisation in the north.

### Security

The question that has been asked several times over the last 2 weeks is what is Al-Shabaab doing? They have effectively surrendered several of their strongholds without any real resistance, although they are now conducting hit and run attacks on those same towns.

The loss to AMISOM and the SNA of Buurdhuubo; Xudur; Waajid; Bulo Burto; Rab Dhuure and Birta Dheere has been viewed as a significant blow to Al-Shabaab as all 6 were key Al-Shabaab controlled locations. Conventional wisdom is that their loss should cripple Al-Shabaab. In Somalia the cities are important; they house population; government and commercial services and revenue generation infrastructure, but with approximately 60% of the population living outside of towns their significance as prizes to be seized is reduced.

Al-Shabaab has over the last 2 years, since the loss of Kismayo, conducted a change in perception. It has evolved from a shadow government that fights openly to an insurgency, capable of conducting a guerrilla war against the Federal Government. By retaining control of cities, Al-Shabaab had access to concentrated population and revenue generation, but had to concentrate its forces. As a result Al-Shabaab suffered from having its locations known and targeted by Federal Government forces.

By giving up control of cities Al-Shabaab has regained the flexibility it had lost and its forces can operate in the manner of a traditional insurgency without having to fight to control urban areas. Indeed Al-Shabaab has merely followed traditional Al-Qaeda guidance issued by Abu Yahya al-Libi, who instructed not to fight in urban areas, but to strike and evade.

Indeed if AMISOM and the SNA are tied to urban areas, seeing these as the objectives, prior counter-insurgency campaigns would seem to suggest the war will be long and costly. Counter-insurgency theory relates that in the campaign the people are the prize, holding territory- be it rural or urban areas- merely to hold territory is meaningless, instead a counter-insurgency force should aim to go where the people are.

In Somalia the people are in the rural areas and not in the urban environment, Al-Shabaab has given up urban areas without incurring significant loss, thus preserving their ability to operate. The rural areas in fact remain under Al-Shabaab control, even in areas that are nominally under SFG control, as an illustration of this we should consider areas such as Gedo; Lower Juba or Bakool. There are Al-Shabaab camps in close proximity to major SFG or AMISOM controlled towns in all these regions, for example Birta Dheer lies less than 3km from Garbahaarey; in Lower Juba there are Al-Shabaab training camps close to several key AMISOM bases, such as Afmadow and Kismayo and finally Bakool where Baidoa sits in a web of Al-Shabaab controlled bases and minor villages.

While the military offensive against Al-Shabaab has thus far been successful in liberating urban areas, there is little effort in spreading SFG control into the rural areas. Despite some efforts by AMISOM, much of the military effort remains consigned to roads and urban areas, with main roads being secured and patrolled, yet Al-Shabaab free to operate even 2 or 3 km away from the road.

Additionally even in urban areas the current offensives against Al-Shabaab lack key elements of a successful counter-insurgency strategy. President Hassan and PM Ahmed have both spoken of the need to stabilise areas and there are reports of government officials visiting the newly liberated urban centres to start planning for reconstruction and development. However, stabilisation also requires security and not just from Al-Shabaab attacks, but from all threats, including crime. Indeed one of the reasons why Al-Shabaab enjoyed so much support for so long was the existence of the Hizb, their own police force. In a country with a distinct lack of effective policing and justice, Al-Shabaab was able to offer a policing and justice system, undeniably harsh by anyone's standards it was at least a little fairer than the situation that existed before, where possession of a gun or the support of a militia allowed warlords to dispense their own justice according to their own moral and ethical standards. Yet at present unless combat forces are used to secure the towns, the SNP is unable to secure these areas. There is also the issue of using combat forces to police and secure civilian areas, as has been seen in other counter-insurgency campaigns combat troops tend to hamper the establishment of security. Troops used to war fighting seek to apply the same methods to securing civilian populations, thus leading to incidents where force is over applied. Combat forces can be used initially to create a buffer around civilian populations, but that

brings with it the risk of the insurgents attacking the said combat forces, thus bringing increased danger to the populace and weakening their support for the government and security forces.

Mogadishu for example provides an example of the challenges ahead across Somalia. A recent report by the United Nations states that it is more dangerous now for NGOs- and by extension the civilian populace- since the Federal Government took control of the entire city, primarily because Al-Shabaab can attack anywhere, as we have recently seen. Combat forces are used to secure areas of Mogadishu, yet attacks have increased, often security forces are the target and yet civilians end up as victims as well. We also see how Al-Shabaab moves freely in and out of Mogadishu and is able to amass forces to strike at targets when needed. We also see the logical result of combat forces, who are- by the very nature of their role- trained to be aggressive, applying that training to urban policing. For example following the VBIED on 15.03 over 500 suspected Al-Shabaab supporters were arrested, of these over 470 were released without charge, some commentators report that over 1500 people, mostly young men, were arrested in the week before. The risk of these detentions, often based on supposition as opposed to evidence is that they incite anger and resistance, thus contributing possible supporters to Al-Shabaab.

This situation extends across all Somalia under Federal Government control and as the Federal Government recaptures more territory, the range of targets for Al-Shabaab to attack can only increase. Thus stabilisation requires real security to be in place. The presence of large numbers of military forces in cities presents a false sense of security as these will remain prone to attack. To generate a real security bubble around populated areas the presence of security forces needs to be extended into rural areas and not concentrated in the urban environment. Until such time as this happens attacks in Somalia will continue and potentially increase.

## **Somaliland and Puntland**

The situation between Somaliland and Puntland remains tense, the border is ill defined and both sides claim Sanaag; Sool and Cayn and conflicts in 2007 and 2010 have never resolved the issue over the 3 disputed regions. The roots of the conflict are deep;

- Somaliland sees itself as the successor to British Somaliland and as such claims all the territory the protectorate included.
- Puntland's perception on the other hand;
  - Sanaag is claimed by Puntland, due to the presence of Darod clan and the incorporation of Maakhir State into Puntland in 2009.
  - Sool is claimed by Puntland as it formed until the mid 1980's part of the Nugaal region;
  - Cayn is claimed by Puntland as it was incorporated into Puntland's original 1998 charter.
- To the historical territorial claims we must also add the possible presence of oil in the disputed territory, whoever controls the territory will also control oil revenues.

The situation is also slightly complicated by the existence of Khatumo state, who also claim Sanaag; Sool and Cayn, but as a separate state to both Somaliland and Puntland and are trying under the Federal Constitution to incorporate a Federal state.

The Somaliland; Puntland and now Khatumo State claims on the Sanaag; Sool and Cayn regions actually illustrate the problems with Federalism in Somalia, in a similar fashion to the 6 region; 3 region and Shabelle State issue in the south. For example Sanaag, some inhabitants want to be part of Puntland; some want to be part of Somaliland and others want to be part of Khatumo state. The Federal Constitution requires that 2 or more regions must agree to form a state; vote on a constitution and hold elections among delegates to elect leaders. It does not require that the inhabitants of a region vote for whether they want to become part of a state or not, nor does it require that the inhabitants of a region to elect who represents their interests at meetings to develop a state.

The Puntland and Somaliland dispute had been quiet for several months; tensions however were increased dramatically on 16.03. when President Silanyo of Somaliland visited Las Qoray in Sanaag. From the Somaliland perspective the visit was nothing unusual as they claim Sanaag, however from the Puntland perspective the visit was inflammatory to say the least. A number of respected leaders in Puntland have called upon the Government to take action and even the Puntland Government issued a strongly worded statement, prior to dispatching troops to Las Qoray late on 16.03, after President Silanyo had departed.

While the Puntland and Somaliland issue will remain, it is unlikely to escalate too much. While tensions may result in border skirmishes in a similar manner to those of 2007 and 2010, the mismatch between Puntland and Somaliland make a full blown war unlikely. However, the situation is useful as an example of the tensions that may explode in the south over the various claims to regional membership of different states.

## Political Situation Forecast

### Political Related Forecast

- The development of the security situation is a concern, affecting all other potential growth in Somali; indeed PM Ahmed has stated that security is his number one priority.
  - The security situation in Mogadishu will continue to be the focal point in Somalia and any setbacks in security in Mogadishu will undermine confidence in the government.
  - There are reports that a major reshuffle of those responsible for security in the Government is being planned. It is suggested that at the least Abdikarim Hussein Guled, a close ally of President Hassan, may lose his position as Minister of Security.
  - The Mayor of Mogadishu is fighting to take direct control of all security infrastructure in Mogadishu. If he does it would be in contravention of the documented duties of his role and is opposed by senior security officials. However, given the current level of insecurity in Mogadishu, the move has been seen as a good idea in some quarters.
- Federalism and the current raft of meetings debating the growth of Federal states look set to continue as a topic of interest in the next few weeks.
  - The argument over a semi-autonomous region in the South-west comprising of either 3 or 6 regions continues. The 6 region conference is formalising arrangements in line with the Federal constitution, despite moves by the Federal Government to stop it.
  - It is likely that the 6 region conference will finalise its cabinet in the next 2 weeks, with the 3 region following suite shortly after. Election of a government is in itself meaningless unless that government has the power to rule, as yet both the 3 and 6 region conferences seemingly lack that power and given the Federal Government's opposition to the 6 region conference and its potential for destabilising relationships with the Juba Administration, it is unlikely that the 6 region conference will ever be in the position to govern its purported territory.
  - The proposed central region comprising Galmudug and Himan and Heeb continues, with Ahlu Sunna meeting administration representatives to ensure cooperation from all sides. The future of Mudug, claimed by both Galmudug and Puntland remains an unanswered question and until resolved could undermine any progress made.

## Security Situation Forecast

The situation in Somalia remains highly dynamic and we cannot see any end to this in sight. During the previous 2 weeks there have been notable success for the SFG and AMISOM and Al-Shabaab have lost key towns. However, Al-Shabaab remains a threat and the loss of towns has not hindered the operational capacity.

### AMISOM and Somali National Army Forecast


- The inclusion of Ethiopian forces under AMISOM's mandate in January seems to have not only unified all non-SNA forces in country, but is facilitating AMISOM returning to the offensive.
- AMISOM and the SFG are conducting, or preparing to conduct, campaigns aimed at several Al-Shabaab strongholds;
  - The offensives launched from Ceel Barde; Garbahaarey and Belet Weyne have achieved their initial objectives with the capture of Buurdhuubo; Xudur and Bulo Burto. The Ceel Barde offensive also liberated Rab Dhuure and Waajid.
  - **Diinsoor**- an AMISOM force in Qansax Dheere is ideally placed to advance on Diinsoor from the north.
    - Qansax Dheere was reinforced on 17.02 with an AMISOM contingent. With the capture of Buurdhuubo from Al-Shabaab on 08.03 it is probable that further Ethiopian forces will reinforce the contingent in Qansax Dheere.
  - **Jalaqsi** with AMISOM forces advancing from Bulo Burto.
    - Following the capture of Bulo Burto on 13.02 the Belet Weyne objective has achieved its initial objective. Once the area around Bulo Burto has been stabilised it is likely that the force will then proceed onto Jalaqsi, then possibly Jowhar, trapping the bulk of Al-Shabaab's forces in the south of the country.

- **Ceel-Buur** with AMISOM forces advancing from Dhusamareeb.
  - The Ceel Buur offensive commenced on 11.03 and reached Ceel Buur on 13.02.
  - Al-Shabaab holds some positions in Ceel Buur, though the bulk of their forces have withdrawn.
- **Baardheere** is likely to come under pressure from AMISOM forces advancing from Buurdhuubo from the north and a strike from Faafux Dhuun to the west.
  - The capture of Buurdhuubo on 08.03 was made following fighting along the road from Garbahaarey. It is probable that the AMISOM contingent will advance from Buurdhuubo towards Baardheere and also support a thrust from Qansax Dheere on Diinsoor.
  - A second thrust from Faafux Dhuun to the west of Baardheere is developing, with fighting along the road connecting the 2 towns.
- **Baraawe** with AMISOM forces advancing from Marka.
  - The offensive is reported to have commenced on 10.03 with AMISOM forces advancing to Qoryooley and Buulo Mareer and Al-Shabaab withdrawing from several towns in Lower Shabelle.
  - The offensive was delayed by fighting in the Qoryooley area, though it is expected for the offensive to recommence in the week ahead.
  - Should Diinsoor fall it would be possible for AMISOM to advance on Baraawe from the north. This is increasingly likely and with Baraawe intended as a permanent base for AMISOMs Ethiopian contingent it is logical for the Ethiopian's to capture the town.


### Al-Shabaab Related Forecast

- The last week has seen notable losses in terms of strategic towns for Al-Shabaab; however there has not been a concurrent loss of personnel. Al-Shabaab has emerged from the fighting having lost territory, but not personnel.
  - Concurrently with the fighting in the Gedo and Bakool regions we have seen Al-Shabaab moving more assets north-east into Galgaduud.
    - There are also reports of Al-Shabaab links to the Governor of Galmudug Qeybdiid, who has apparently obtained fighters; vehicles and supplies from Al-Shabaab.
  - Al-Shabaab continues to hold several key cities; Baraawe; Diinsoor and Qoryooley in particular and has over the last few weeks consolidated a proportion of their militia forces in these locations.
  - Al-Shabaab has demonstrated a willingness to surrender territory in order to retain their ability to operate and not get bogged down into fighting AMISOM forces head on.
  - We believe that when faced with AMISOM offensives, Al-Shabaab will continue to avoid open conflict and will continue to disperse. The benefit of this is that Al-Shabaab will be able to continue its struggle and avoid a major loss of personnel.
- Al-Shabaab will continue its offensive campaigns, though it is becoming clear that these will involve more clandestine activity as opposed to open fighting.
  - Al-Shabaab has spent the last 2 months training at least 200 Amniyat personnel at key training camps, often using experienced foreign jihadists as instructors. These Amniyat operatives are being positioned to conduct further targeted killings and IED attacks.
  - Al-Shabaab is conducting offensive action against;
    - **Kismayo** with Al-Shabaab forces advancing from positions increasingly close to Kismayo.
      - Al-Shabaab has considerable forces in Badhaadhe; Buulo Xaaji; Jana Cabdale and Turdho. These forces are positioned to interdict and harass vehicle traffic moving to and from Kismayo.
    - **Mogadishu** was again the scene of a number of attacks and this will continue for the foreseeable future. Al-Shabaab cannot take the city as it stands, however they can continue to harass and prevent the Federal Government from improving its position.

- Al-Shabaab operates openly in Daynile; Heliwa and Yaaqshiid with forces there and in several villages to the north-west of Mogadishu AMISOM and SNA traffic is coming under increasing attack travelling in and around Mogadishu.
- Assassinations; IED attacks and hit and run attacks on AMISOM; SNA and SNP bases have all been seen and are likely to remain tactics used by Al-Shabaab.
- **Jowhar** remains under threat, with Al-Shabaab continuing to occupy towns in close proximity.
  - Although Jowhar remains under pressure, there is indication that Al-Shabaab is withdrawing troops and moving these to Jalaqsi (to replace the fighters sent to Bakool) and Ceel Dheer to prepare for the future.
- Al-Shabaab retains significant troop concentrations in strategically key areas that were originally intended to launch offensives on Baidoa; Marka and Bulo Burto as objectives. With the AMISOM breakthroughs of the last week offensive action by these forces is highly improbable. Al-Shabaab retains strong forces in key areas;
  - Baidoa remains virtually surrounded with the frontline edging closer to the city.
    - Al-Shabaab remains in control of key positions around Baidoa. Now that they control Xudur and Waajid AMISOM will strike towards Baidoa to relieve pressure on the city.
    - The Al-Shabaab has defensive positions at Abal and Totiyas and a stronger line from Jilibey to Labaatan Jirow.
      - A relief force was marshalled in Bulo-Burto and was sent to the Bakool region. It is believed they arrived too late to reinforce Waajid and Xudur. But may be in place to conduct counter attacks.
  - Marka is going to come under attack by Al-Shabaab forces, but these attacks are aimed at disrupting any SNA and AMISOM build-up.
    - Al-Shabaab holds strong defensive positions on a line from Buulo-Mareer to Qoryooley, as well as a defensive pocket around Gandershe and Jilib-Marka putting pressure on the road between Marka and Mogadishu.
  - Bulo Burto will come under attack aimed at liberating the town and to prevent AMISOM advancing on Jalaqsi.

Key		Al-Shabaab and AMISOM Offensives		
Objectives		Al-Shabaab		
	<b>AMISOM</b>	<b>Mogadishu</b> , forces in Mogadishu;		
	<b>Al-Shabaab</b>	<b>Kismayo</b> , forces from; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Turdho;</li> <li>• Jamaame;</li> </ul> <b>Jowhar</b> , forces from; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mahadaay;</li> <li>• Jalaqsi;</li> <li>• Raage Ceele</li> </ul> <b>Baidoa</b> , forces from; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Idale;</li> <li>• Jalaqsi.</li> </ul>		
Offensives		AMISOM		
	<b>AMISOM</b>	<b>Ethiopian forces attacking;</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Bulo Burto</b>, imminent;</li> <li>• <b>Bardheere</b>, imminent;</li> <li>• <b>Diinsoor</b>, imminent</li> </ul>		
	<b>Al-Shabaab</b>	<b>Kenyan forces;</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No clear plans;</li> </ul> <b>Ugandan forces;</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No clear plans;</li> </ul>		

- With the AMISOM and SFG offensives finally commencing, Al-Shabaab has also fortified several key locations- other than those mentioned above- in order to block potential offensives;
  - Diinsoor is being used as an assembly point for Al-Shabaab's mobile forces, whether these openly engage AMISOM and SNA forces or are used in ongoing hit and run tactics is unknown.
- Reports indicate that Al-Shabaab is relocating personnel and assets towards Puntland.
  - We have seen an increase in fighting between Al-Shabaab and the Puntland government in the Galgala Mountain range and along the highway to Bossaso.
  - There are indications of a significant Al-Shabaab infrastructure within the Galgala Mountains. It has been suggested that the Galgala Mountains are considered to be Al-Shabaab's final stronghold and the recent expansion of facilities seems to confirm this theory.



- The Al-Shabaab targeted killing program run by the Amniyat branch is probably the biggest threat to future peace and stability in Somalia at present.
  - In recent weeks this program has carried out a number of high profile assassinations or attempted these, including the President of Somalia and various security and government officials.
  - We predict that even should Al-Shabaab's ability to hold large swathes of Somalia be defeated a continuation of the targeted killings will allow Al-Shabaab to influence Somalia.
  - Indeed there are reports that Al-Shabaab is secreting supply caches in the Diinsoor Mountains in preparation for the loss of major cities in preparation for an ongoing long-term guerrilla war.
- Al-Shabaab has repeatedly demonstrated its ability and resolve to look outside Somalia.
  - Al-Shabaab is likely to carry out further attacks outside of Kenya and it is reported that there are Al-Shabaab personnel in Nairobi; Addis Ababa and Kampala. Targets are most likely to be high profile in nature, such as embassies; government buildings and even public places- such as shopping malls.
  - Al-Shabaab has also seen an increased influx of Kenyan recruits in recent months, incidents such as the storming of a Mombasa Mosque, even with overwhelming evidence of Al-Shabaab supporters being present, does nothing to win the hearts and minds battle.
  - Kampala is according to reports under imminent threat of terrorist attacks, with the US Embassy publicly warning US Citizens to avoid certain locations.
- Strategically we predict that;
  - Should the AMISOM / SNA offensives be successful Al-Shabaab will lose considerable territory, potentially their core locations throughout South Central Somalia could be lost within the next year;
    - However, the potential for Al-Shabaab to retain control of rural areas and give up urban population centres should not be ignored.
  - Al-Shabaab will continue to surrender territory and withdraw fighting forces to avoid loss of personnel. This will allow Al-Shabaab to continue fighting into the future.
  - Al-Shabaab is transforming its fighting forces from militia engaging in open fighting to an insurgent force that acts covertly.
  - It is our estimation that Somalia could continue as a long term counter insurgency fight and while loath to use comparisons, there are considerable similarities with Afghanistan or Iraq.

## Threat Forecast

There remains a specific threat against foreign nationals and organisations operating inside Somalia from both criminal and terrorist forces.

- Puntland remains at a high risk of violence in the vicinity of major population centres and roads, even though current levels of violence remain lower than in South Central. Specifically;
  - Caution is advised in the vicinity of Gaalkacyo; Garowe; Bossaso and Qardho.
- In South Central there remains a high level of fighting throughout.
  - Caution is advised in the vicinity of all major cities and along all major roads.
- We would also advise all organisations operating in Somalia to exercise the highest levels of security.
  - All facilities should be hardened to resist terrorist attack, with perimeter security and safe areas in place, measures should also include an adequate guard force and hardening of the buildings structure to resist explosive attacks;;
  - Movement in country should be limited to necessary travel only and should be risk assessed to ensure it is necessary. Movement where possible should be with armed protection and in adequately protected vehicles.
    - If possible movement by air is considered preferable to road movements;
  - Meetings should be conducted in secure facilities only and never in places accessible to the public. Al-Shabaab has demonstrated its ability to conduct strikes targeted at security and international personnel in public areas.
  - In the wake of a recent Al-Shabaab threat we would also recommend international organisations to apply these same security measures to local staff
- While Al-Shabaab is the highest profile threat, it should also be remembered that even in areas outside of Al-Shabaab's control, the threat of clan related violence as well as criminal activity should not be underestimated.
- The lack of government control over large swathes of Somalia allows criminal gangs free reign. Criminal activity ranges from illegal tolls on roads to the kidnap of staff.
- The non-payment of government employees and military personnel by both the Federal Government and the autonomous administrations directly affects the security situation. Unpaid SNA personnel have been directly linked to criminal acts including setting up illegal checkpoints on roads; robbery and kidnapping.