A survey of recent WAR Reports on Pakistan may leave one with the impression that the pursuit of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda , and the remnants of the Taliban along the border with Afghanistan is the primary security concern (Advisory) in Pakistan (see, for example, January 18, 2006 WAR Report, January 25, 2006 WAR Report, and February 1, 2006 WAR Report). Unfortunately, the events in the South Asia Muslim country over the past two weeks have served to remind observers that political violence plaguing the nation runs far wider and deeper. Bombings against civilians and pipelines (Terrorist Incident and Terrorist Incident) last week in the province of Baluchistan are symptoms that a decades-old ethnic conflict still simmers. A deadly suicide bombing by a Sunni extremist against a Shiite procession in observance of the Ashoura memorial holiday continues a trend in recent years of similar intra-Muslim attacks in 2004 and 2005 . Reports of imminent US medical team withdrawals from Pakistan-held Kashmir in the wake of the fall 2005 earthquake relief efforts recalls the decades-old intractable struggle between Pakistan and India . In fact, that Kashmir conflict has bred networks of militants who have established links overseas. Last week an Australian judge cleared the last pre-trial motions and set March 3, 2006 as the date for the trail against Izhar Ul-Haque who is charged with training with Kashmir-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and plotting attacks beyond Pakistan’s borders. All told, there is a wide range of grudges, disputes, feuds, banditry, organized crime, ethnic violence, religious conflicts, and worldwide jihads originating from South Asia which have significant impact domestically, regionally, and globally. To focus only on one aspect neglects the proliferation of dangers facing the country that in 1988 was optimistic and appeared to be on the verge of a full-fledged transition to democracy.

The death of General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, chief of the army staff (COAS), and leader (and arguably dictator) of Pakistan on August 17 of that year in a mysterious aircraft crash, and the subsequent free, fair, and open election of future Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party gave hope to the belief that perhaps the country that had struggled with conflicting identities and political claims might finally be able to address issues with the ballot rather than a weapon. However, to tighten control over a territory of ethnically and culturally diverse people, Zia moved away from the earlier path of secular politics and initiated a process of Islamization in the early 80s as a policy to unify the four provinces under a common religious heritage. The shallow roots of secular democracy could not withstand the political instability that quickly followed in the wake of corruption scandals as both Bhutto and her rival Nawaz Sharif were swept out and back into office until General Pervez Musharraf ousted Sharif in a bloodless coup in 1999. If the government couldn’t protect itself from the people without use of firearms, then surely neither could minority ethnic and religious groups. Additionally, the traditionally quasi-autonomous Pakistan army had been training and funding militants for operations in neighboring Afghanistan and India for decades, so problems associated with “blowback”?the return of previously trained militants to attack the trainers and its society?was to be expected.

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