In a follow up to last week?s WAR Report analysis on the CIA air strike in Pakistan targeting al-Qaeda leadership operatives, and, it was thought, Ayman al Zawahiri, Pakistani officials have said that a number of al-Qaeda regional leaders were, in fact, killed in the strike. Included in those possibly killed are the chief operational commander of al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan , the chief of propaganda for the region, and a poisons and explosives expert and trainer. If these and other operatives were, indeed, killed, the development would seem to land a heavier blow against the operational capabilities of al-Qaeda in the region than originally thought. However, as noted in last week?s WAR Report, the potential near-term tactical, operational advantages of launching such a strike in Pakistan must be balanced with the potential deleterious effects on long-term counterterrorism strategies and operations. Such a strike?s potential to inflame popular sentiment, political pressure, and possibly militancy within Pakistan against arguably the most important ally in the Global War on Terrorism?the Musharraf regime?must be counterbalanced. The strike may have served an important secondary purpose of demonstrating to al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders that counterterrorism agencies are, to a certain degree, able to track and train weapons on them, in turn, possibly provoking operational security anxiety that might run operatives to ground or animate them to take defensive actions??flush? them into hasty, exposed escapes or provoke insecure communication, etc.?that might allow them to be identified and engaged by counterterrorism intelligence capabilities.

The New York Times report indicates a significant Islamist militant presence in the Afghanistan-Pakistan tribal borderlands region and a degree of operational collaboration and strategizing between an array of militant actors (also covered in earlier WAR Reports) in the region, including Taliban, foreign jihadists, and local warlords. The New York Times reported, ?The Afghan border police say they learned of a meeting in a mosque in Bajaur six months ago between members of the Afghan Taliban, a group led by the renegade mujahedeen commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar from Afghanistan and the Arabs, during which they are said to have divided up responsibility for insurgent operations in Afghanistan.? Such collaboration would suggest a potential for enhanced operational competencies among the militant actors as tactics are shared, refined, and synergized in operations between the groups.