The reports this week on banditry in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan shed light on a dimension of violence plaguing President Pervez Musharraf . The tribal regions of North and South Waziristan are two of seven territories officially designated as “Federally Administered Tribal Areas” (often described as “semi-autonomous” regions) as a simple, yet public, acknowledgment by Musharraf and most of his predecessors that even the heavily-militarized government of Islamabad cannot exert effective control over the lands bordering Afghanistan and the Pushtun communities residing astride the boundary. Despite the deployment of 70,000 regular Pakistan army troops throughout North and South Waziristan, violence across a spectrum of banditry, organized crime, tribal feuds, ethnic rebellion as well as a significant presence by regional terrorist groups, such as the Taliban and global al-Qaeda , continues apace. After a cursory examination of recent open source media, it is indeed impossible to take Musharraf at his word when he stated at a news conference in Mecca, Saudi Arabia last week: “Whatever is happening in North Waziristan or South Waziristan, there is no problem. We are in control.”

The bandits of the Northwest Frontier Province are not unlike the criminal gangs of India led by Phoolan Devi and popularized in the film “Bandit Queen,” which received international acclaim upon its release in 1995. However, whereas Devi later gained a Robin Hood-like reputation in her home province and eventually was elected a Member of Parliament ? a seat she held until her assassination in 2001 (Terrorist Incident forthcoming), the Waziristani bandits assault and extort travelers and hijack trucks for goods. Therefore, attacks against bandits have, indeed, gained sympathy and even support by shouts of “long live the Taliban” for the jihadis who killed the criminals, strung up their bodies, and even beheaded suspected leaders. Although the suspected Taliban militants seem particularly brutal to Western sensibilities, the prospects of safe passage through the region and overall improved security have engendered popular support and, thereby, have further alienated the Musharraf government, which is seen increasingly as ineffective. Even government officials acknowledge that they are reluctant to intervene in such vigilantism, noting remarkably: “It would be inappropriate to take action against militants at a time when they have done something that people might be supporting.”