Recent incursions by UN peacekeeping forces directed at local Haitian gangs may do more to jeopardize upcoming Haitian elections than to secure the fist elections since the removal of Jean-Bertrand Aristide . Disarming local populaces has long been a problem for peacekeeping forces, and historically such ventures have been bumbled. Current failures are eerily similar of those failures that marked the UNOSOM II peacekeeping missions in Somalia during the mid 1990s. A reevaluation of those failures and the successes of the initial UNITAF Somalia peacekeeping mission may be beneficial for the United Nations community. Both peacekeeping missions, Somalia and Haiti, were and are fraught with danger due to the general lawlessness that exists and rival clans that continue to seek different agendas.

The UNITAF peacekeeping mission was successful in its initial endeavors for several reasons. Caught in the middle of feuding warlords, UN peacekeepers were careful to avoid the perception of taking sides in the dispute. Key in this pursuit was the need to meet challenges directed at UN forces with force and to continuously demonstrate willingness to use force when challenge by armed combatants. After forcefully meeting these challenges, UN commanders must confer with the aggressor and notify them of why they were targeted. In so doing, the actors will be warned that any acts of future aggression will be met in the same manner and will establish a political dialogue with the factions, conferring a certain legitimacy onto them. However, avoiding any displays of favoritism is essential in this endeavor. Dealing with armed gangs and former military personnel in Haiti must proceed along this line.