Initial reports on the composition and modus operandi of the terrorist cell that conducted the October 1 suicide bombings in Bali suggest that it is representative of the leading edge of the evolution of the al-Qaeda network. As has been discussed at length in the WAR Report for over a year, al-Qaeda is evolving into a global movement of like-minded Islamist militant cells, conducting swarming attacks oriented toward the strategic goals of the al-Qaeda ideology. At the leading edge of this evolution are ?vanguard outpost? cells: local cells comprised of homegrown operatives with little to no record of Islamist militancy and with no direct connection to higher profile al-Qaeda operatives that might draw the scrutiny of local counter-terrorism agencies. These vanguard outposts are inspired to conduct entrepreneurial attacks in the service of al-Qaeda?s strategic goals but have little to no direct operational support from the network’s core leadership. Examples of these ?vanguard outpost? cells include those that conducted the Madrid , those that conducted the London subway bombings , and those who failed two weeks later in London .

This evolution of the al-Qaeda network is driven by both the viral, inspirational dynamics of al-Qaeda?s militant Islamist ideology and by organizational and operational adaptive agility on the part of al-Qaeda and its associated groups. As hierarchical organizational structures within al-Qaeda, and others, are eroded, the remaining operatives take on a more atomized, networked form, with surviving splinter cells operating more autonomously in attacks that would serve al-Qaeda?s common strategic goals.