As the above article describes, evidence turned up so far by officials investigating the London bombing cells (Terrorist Incident and Terrorist Incident) seems to suggest that that the cells may have operated in a more independent, entrepreneurial manner than was previously hypothesized. Investigators have not revealed evidence of organizing or commanding foreign groups or masterminds or of a common mastermind in general that might connect the two bombings as part of a larger campaign; though, they continue to explore connections and communications by some of the bombers to terrorist elements in Pakistan and in Saudi Arabia .

Similar modus operandi, targeting, and explosives used by both cells may indicate a common commanding mastermind. However, these elements may also suggest a common operational inspiration and weapon acquisition source for unassociated, disparate cells. The use of common sources might have come in the form of online Islamist extremist militant sermons, operational manifestos, and/or explosives engineering guides. Alternatively, the 7/21 failed bombing may have been an attempted copycat attack. The attack operations seem relatively simple to plan and conduct?attacking an inherently open, vulnerable, and crowded subway system with explosives manufactured with relatively little technical expertise and skill and easily hidden. The second operation was punctuated by the ill-engineered explosives, suggesting a level of amateurism that would be indicative of a local autonomous entrepreneurial cell without substantial operational guidance or technical and materiel assistance from an al-Qaeda terrorist group, affiliate, or support network.