In the immediate aftermath of the bombing of the London Underground and a double-decker bus on July 7, 2005 , British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw declared that the attacks bore the ?hallmarks of an Al Qaida [Group Profile] related attack.? In an effort to investigate Straw?s assertion, the following analysis will seek to highlight the strategic and tactical similarities between 9/11 (Terrorist Attack) and 3/11 (Terrorist Attack) — two known al-Qaida planned and al-Qaida inspired attacks — and the London bombings.

At the strategic level, all three attacks targeted major components of critical infrastructure. In particular, the attacks focused specifically on transportation networks ? airways, railways, subways, and buses ? as both a delivery vehicle and a target. Due to their requirement to deliver a large volume of passengers in a timely manner, it is readily apparent that these transportation networks are extremely vulnerable. It should also come as no surprise that al-Qaeda, and its ideologically inspired offspring, have migrated their target of choice, as evidenced by 3/11 and London, from airways to railways. Railways and underground subways are exponentially more difficult to secure because there is no single entry chokepoint in the system. Not only does a railway have many stops along its routes, but passengers must also board and depart in a timely manner to ensure the train or subway stays on its schedule and thus meets the objectives of an efficient transit system. In contrast, airways have a single entry chokepoint; thus, they are relatively easier to secure than railways and subways. It will be no great surprise if al-Qaeda and its offspring continue to target railway, subway, and bus networks.