The recent decision by Iraq?s government to back Kurdish and Shia ethno-religious sectarian militias operating in Iraq is baffling in its seemingly Faustian recklessness and mis-appreciation of its likely exacerbating effects on building sectarian tensions and conflict; its corruption of efforts to entice Sunni elements of the insurgency into abandonment of insurgent activities; and its potential entrenchment of rogue militant elements in Iraq.

As a recent WAR Report has discussed, sectarian tensions and apparent conflict have become increasingly pronounced in past months. Insurgent attacks specifically targeting ethno-religious communities in an apparent bid to stoke sectarian conflict, coupled with a Shia-Kurd-dominated Iraqi government and security forces conducting increasingly invasive counter-insurgency operations within Sunni regions against a Sunni-dominated insurgency have exposed raw sectarian animosity. Sunni communities, many already maintaining sympathy and support for the insurgency because of their disempowered and minority status and their perceptions of exclusion and persecution by a Shia-Kurd government?and thus literal ?insurgent? (anti-government) motivations?in addition to some Sunni insurgents, have straddled the divide between insurgent activities and joining the mainstream of Iraq?s political and societal landscape. As noted in a recent WAR Report, Iraqi government counter-insurgency efforts to entice the Sunni communities and insurgents to abandon activities in return for political empowerment had begun to gain traction, with some elements entering into talks with the government. However, talks between Iraqi government leaders and Sunni politicians on the latter?s allocation of political power within the government have stumbled as of late.