Counter-terrorism forces have sparked fissures in the insurgency , including al-Qaeda’s network , in Iraq . These rival groups seem now to be competing for safe havens and operational resources. As a result, ethnic tensions between these entities seem to be rising. Consequently, the al-Qaeda network and its insurgent allies may not be as operationally and strategically cohesive as conventionally thought. This fracturing may represent strategic and operational opportunities for counter-terrorism forces. As fracturing continues among the groups, counter-terrorism forces would be well served to continue to exploit the fundamental differences between the groups. These efforts are likely to stoke paranoia between and within the groups targeted by the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and thus succeed in stoking internecine conflict, destabilizing internal group operations, and exploiting the resulting organizational tumult for intelligence gathering.

To this end, counter-terrorism agencies may seek to employ integrated multi-tactic counter-terrorism operations that are driven by in-depth intelligence gathering and analysis on individual and group psychologies, motivations, and social and organization relationships and dynamics and that include covert direct action, synergized with intelligence and information and psychological operations to manipulate such conflict. It may be possible to mount these operations with sustained reach in cases where target groups and individuals must be approached from afar or covertly due to strategic, tactical, or political considerations or constraints or when individuals and groups are difficult to target precisely.

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