The title of the article above is, in fact, already outdated. Al-Qaeda long ago established itself in sub-Saharan Africa, and the region is a likely location for future significant al-Qaeda attacks. As alluded to in the April 27, 2005 WAR Report, the continent has been divided roughly into two theaters of operations by the group. The Horn of Africa appears to provide the beachhead for support of both Arab and African jihadists alike. Whereas the capture of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani in Pakistan last August represents the penultimate chapter in the book on the African Embassy bombings of 1998 (Terrorist Incident and Terrorist Incident), the final chapter remains to be written since Ghailani’s planning colleague, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed , remains at large. Mohammed (aka Abdul Karim), is also deeply involved in the subsequent Kenya attacks in November 2002 (Terrorist Incident and Terrorist Incident) and is known to have been living and married in a remote village on the coast of Kenya in 2003. He was last spotted late that year in Mogadishu, Somalia .

Keys to Al-Qaeda’s success in the 1990s were the fact that Osama bin Laden took an active interest in keeping veteran militants linked to a network, which was capable of hosting and training forces that, under normal circumstances, should have been demobilized. This Western failure to demobilize thousands of angry, young, armed men after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan left bin Laden with a significant pool of disenfranchised, technically savvy, and world-wise militants. Al-Qaeda adopted this latent army and logistically supported and trained it ? first poorly in Saudi Arabia until the early 1990s, but then it markedly improved during bin Laden’s tenure in Sudan , and ultimately perfected under the sanctuary provided the Taliban in Afghanistan. The current parallel across Africa is that tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of militants across the continent ? many of whom are already divided along religious lines in conflicts in Sudan, Somalia , Nigeria , and elsewhere ? have inadequately been disarmed, demobilized, or reintegrated into society. If, then, lingering ethnic, linguistic, and/or ideological groups find even temporary common cause with the jihadist militants, the strategic effects could be staggering.

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