In the current Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the United States has felt an urgent necessity to cooperate with rogue agents and nations and to utilize questionable tactics, all in an effort to counter the perceived threat against the US. Whereas the human rights questions surrounding the use of torture, the internment of foreign militants at Camp X-Ray Guantanamo Bay, Cuba , and the imprisonment of individuals in the US court system without trial are all significant, they pale in comparison to the gravity and outrage expressed vis-a-vis the Bush administration’s close collaboration with a regime recently accused of genocide. A simple cost/benefit analysis would question seriously whether it is justifiable to chase, capture, and/or kill a few dozen international terrorists with the aid of a government alleged to be negligent of — and perhaps directly responsible for — the deaths of nearly 200,000 and dislocation of two million more in the Darfur region (WAR Report). Regrettably, a case could only be made that the trade-off might be worthwhile if evidence surfaces that terrorists were deeply involved in WMD acquisition and utilization, both of which, of course, could not be learned until after such cooperation. By working so closely with the Sudan regime, the US risks recruiting Sudanese President Omar al Bashir (see photo on following page) to join the ranks of other despotic rulers who, for a time, support American endeavors but later turn against us, including among others, Manuel Noriega of Panama and Saddam Hussein of Iraq ? both of whom are known to have authorized the deaths of hundreds of their own citizens. Yet, the question in Sudan remains: has the Bashir government truly reformed or are they merely buying time and good will?

When Bashir took power in 1989, he announced that Sudan would provide safe haven for all Muslims and that they were free to seek refuge in the country without passports or visas. This move obviously attracted thousands of Muslims who provided security risks elsewhere, including Osama bin Laden and significant numbers of al-Qaeda in 1991 as they were pressured to move out of Saudi Arabia . The regime at least ignored if not actively supported the terrorist training camps bin Laden founded and is thought by the intelligence community to have at least experimented in the development of chemical and biological weapons. Yet, feeling international isolation and pressure, the Bashir government encouraged bin Laden to depart, and by 1996 al-Qaeda’s leader and hundreds of militants had relocated to Afghanistan . Khartoum subsequently took numerous steps to distance itself from its terrorist past by cooperating with Western allies in denouncing terrorist acts. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks , Sudan quickly joined the diplomatic coalition against terrorists and actively supported efforts to break up known al-Qaeda cells, despite continuing its repression of the south and its brutal repression of a second insurrection in the western region of Darfur in 2004. In early 2005, the Muslim Khartoum government finally signed an agreement with southern Christian rebel factions, set forth plans for immediate power-sharing in the government, and established a process for nationwide elections (see February 2, 2005 and April 20, 2005 WAR Reports). At present, it is clear the Bashir government supported the creation of the Janjaweed ? Arab militia used to harass, raid, and kill non-Arab ethnic groups in Darfur ? at times with Sudanese military aircraft. However, it is entirely feasible that the Janjaweed are no longer controlled or even perhaps controllable from the capital city, despite the moderating effect a coalition government may seek.

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