The rather surprising news that Iran has withdrawn a large compliment of its troops?namely its elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)?from Lebanon should be tempered with the knowledge that Iran and the IRGC likely have clandestine networks and conduits to engage, support, and influence not only Hizballah but also Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad , Shia militias and other insurgent groups in Iraq , and certain elements of the al-Qaeda network . They?Iran and the IRGC–remain poised to aid emergent Shia fundamentalist or other ?revolutionary,? guerrilla, and terrorist groups they deem worthy and of strategic import.

The overt troop withdrawal is likely borne of compelling practical and strategic interests for Iran. At the practical level, though the IRGC was critically instrumental in helping to found and actively train and support the group over the last two decades, Hizballah, as the article notes, has become largely self-sufficient in its political and terrorist capabilities. Thus, Iran can afford to assume a less intense supportive posture with the group, while continuing to benefit strategically from Hizballah’s activities. At the strategic level, Iran likely appreciated that the hard line taken by the US against Syria?s military and intelligence presence in Lebanon would likely carry over to Iran as well. In response, the politically and strategically shrewd Iran likely elected to avoid a confrontation with the US over the issue. This could have compelled the US to take a more activist posture against Iran in other global contexts, such as Iran?s long-standing support for international terrorism, its involvement in the Iraq insurgency, and its nuclear weapons development activities and ambitions.

<