This example of Iraqi citizens violently confronting armed insurgents , in conjunction with recent popular protests against insurgent activity and the stunning turnout in the face of insurgent threats on Election Day, are remarkable indicators that a large segment of Iraqi society is increasingly turning against the insurgents in both word and deed. Such a trend would represent a significantly positive development in counter-insurgency terms, as it may indicate that insurgent groups are being shorn of political and operational support?active or tacit?from segments of Iraqi society. Further, these episodes may indicate that intolerance and resentment of insurgent activity is building to the point of the community no longer being cowed by insurgent intimidation.

However, as the article notes, it is the Shia community that is turning against the insurgency; they braved insurgent threats and turned out in large numbers on Election Day. The Shia have come to dominate the Iraqi government and security forces. However, they also have the potential to find themselves fighting a largely Sunni insurgency?composed of Sunni religious extremists, former Baathist and Hussein regime loyalists, and Sunni nationalists?with a least some level of support from the disempowered minority Sunni community. Further, part of the insurgent strategy, as articulated in an intercepted document by al-Qaeda field commander in Iraq Abu Mussab al Zarqawi is to stoke sectarian conflict by attacking the Shia community. Thus, the subtle sectarianism in Iraqi society turning against the insurgents, in the composition of Iraq?s security forces, and within the still delicate process of building a representative government that could still alienate the Sunni community if not handled correctly, provides fertile ground for sectarian conflict, namely if the Sunni community perceives socio-political alienation and, in turn, supports the insurgency?s rejectionist violence.