A key variable determining to what degree these recent high-level insurgent arrests will be exploited by counter-insurgent forces to dismantle the insurgency is the level to which the insurgency–and in particular the elite leadership of al-Qaeda?s terrorist network in Iraq , headed by Abu Mussab al Zarqawi–and that of former Baathist and regime elements in the insurgency has cellularized itself, its movements, and its plans from fellow leaders and aids who have been arrested.

The constellation and operational interaction of the majority of militant groups within the insurgency is that of a broad-based, nebulous, and atomized network in constant flux, and the groups themselves are relatively cellularized?with the more sophisticated insurgent groups imposing cellularization and robust operational security to protect key leaders, structures, and operations?thus making it unlikely that captured low- to mid-level insurgents will have significant knowledge of the overall landscape of insurgent groups outside their immediate cell. As a result, these insurgent operatives are unlikely to be able to provide relevant information to counter-insurgency forces to trace the insurgent organizational, operational, and social networks. However, there is likely some degree of structure within the leadership echelon of the more sophisticated groups, including the terrorist network headed by Zarqawi and the former Baathist and regime elements directing and financing much of the insurgency, many of the latter being ex-military and intelligence operatives who have likely transferred a modified version of those institutional structures to the insurgency’s leadership and operations.