The plot against the US Embassy broken up as early as October 2004 described in the Manila Times article has been attributed variously to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) , Moro Islamic Liberation Front , and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) by the Philippine government as well as the local and international press. Piecing together data from reports throughout 2004, three trends can be identified. First, the Philippine government, as well as the majority mainstream MILF, continue to pin hopes on a negotiated peace process since the ceasefire agreement in 2002. To emphasize their good will, MILF continues to disavow publicly responsibility for recent terror attacks and has even invited security forces to tour one of its camps on Mt. Cararao, which has often been mentioned as a JI training facility. Second, although strong evidence suggests JI had cordial and robust links with MILF and ASG in the mid-1990s, the relationship with MILF has declined since 9/11 while contact with ASG has at least been maintained and possibly even increased. Third, despite significant captures and deaths of ASG leadership, the group continues to claim responsibility for a variety of recent attacks including its more traditional modus operandi such as kidnapping westerners for ransom in November 2004 and small bombings in August 2004 as well as building far bigger bombs for spectacular effect. For example, evidence and uncoerced confessions now suggest ASG was behind the fire and subsequent sinking of a ferry in Manila Bay in February 2004 that killed more than 100 people. Read together, it appears that radicalized elements of MILF have split to join ASG, drawing on previous (and perhaps continuing) JI training and contacts to operationalize and expand their jihadist campaign against Philippine civilians and security forces.

To meet the increasing security challenge, on December 22, 2004, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) raised the country?s security level to red alert. The move was designed to increase the military presence to preempt the radicalization of protests expected at the mourning services and funeral of late presidential candidate and movie icon Fernando Poe Jr. Additionally, the security leadership was moving to thwart the recurrence of the Rizal Day bombings on Dec. 30, 2000 that killed 22 people . Over 3,000 security forces were deployed along the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) around Manila as well as to other rail, bus, and air facilities. Nonetheless, militants were able to trigger a bomb successfully in another metropolitan area: the Cubao commercial district in Quezon City on New Year’s Eve. On January 3, 2005, Metro Manila police Director Avelino Razon Jr. revealed at the Camp Crame national police headquarters that the bombing was similar to past attacks by the ASG. “The Abu Sayyaf has done this in the past but it is not conclusive,” Razon stated, further noting that, “We are looking at two or three groups.” In sum, although the names attributed to recent attacks appear to be interchangeable, the expertise derived from JI trainers and operatives in the mid-1990s continues to pose a significant threat to Philippine and Western interests alike.

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