The recent efforts by the Philippine government to enter negotiations with longstanding politically-minded insurgencies as well as the increased operational tempo against Islamist terrorist groups with significant US and international support in the wake of September 11 has had the effect of sharpening the distinction between the two threats to Philippine security and even regional security. On the one hand, authorities have had some success in securing ceasefires of varying lengths with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and New People?s Army (NPA) . Formally, the MILF and Philippine government have adhered to a ceasefire for over 17 months, and an international team of monitors from Islamic countries lead by Malaysia have bolstered the prospects for slow but steady negotiated success. In parallel, on December 16, 2004, Philippine President Gloria Arroyo pledged a unilateral three-week ceasefire with the CPP-NPA (Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army) to extend through the holiday season until January 5, 2005. This announcement came despite a recent NPA police station raid in the town of Caranglan a day earlier in which five M-16 rifles and police cell phones were stolen, the breakdown of negotiations in August 2004, and the potential for an attack on the CPP?s 36th anniversary (December 26). Nonetheless, this confidence-building measure echoes similar steps made by CPP-NPA in years past when they announced temporary unilateral truces of holiday seasons. Disappointingly, on December 19, 2004, Fidel Agcaoili of the group?s political wing, the National Democratic Front (NDF), released a statement rejecting the government?s offer, complaining about the lack of progress in the negotiations, which were disrupted in August. The movement?s leadership, much of whom live in the Netherlands in exile, is hoping to leverage Philippine government pressure on the United States to take the NPA off its list of foreign terrorist organizations despite assassinating an American military adviser and several US soldiers in the late 1980s. The NPA was added to the blacklist after the September 11, 2001 attacks.

However, the picture gets darker when examining progress against the militant jihadist groups: the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) of the Philippines and the regional menace, Jemaah Islamiya (JI) . The Philippine military and police have, indeed, scored significant successes in arresting ASG leaders, breaking up urban cells, and thwarting attacks (see October 20, 2003 WAR Report ?Philippine Forces Kill Terror Suspect? and December 15, 2003 ?Abu Sayyaf commander held?), the group appears to have been able to survive (see April 26, 2004 WAR Report ?al-Qaida-Linked Abu Sayyaf Revives?) and has even taken responsibility for sinking a ferry that resulted in over 100 deaths in February 2004. Additionally, press reports and court testimony in Indonesia against JI spiritual leader Abu Bakar Ba’asyir highlight continued logistical and training support among Muslim extremists in Southeast Asia. As such, Philippine government actions have certainly improved security across the disparate islands of the archipelago nation especially from the secular threats of communist rebels and the moderate leadership of the 30-year old Muslim separatist movement MILF, but those moves have also aggravated a young cadre of Islamic militants who look to the al-Qaeda model for inspiration.

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