The assessment of US counter-insurgency strategies in Iraq by US Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, Lt. Gen. William Boykin, that ?We?re going to spend a lot more time in the future finding an enemy?determining who he?s connected to, how he?s trained, how he?s financed, how he?s supported?than we are maneuvering in the battle space? nicely characterizes the daunting imperatives facing counter-terrorism agencies in general in their efforts to gain an understanding of and combat the nebulous, fluid, and intensely human elements of modern terrorism, as compared to the straightforward intelligence and operations attendant to conventional warfighting.

Due to the shadowy, lurking, and inherently invasive nature of the terrorist threat, counter-terrorism intelligence is often rightly cited as the first line of defense and the most powerful weapon in the War against Terrorism. Gathering intelligence on terrorist groups and networks?elements largely oriented around, guided, and energized by human and group dynamics and structures rather than traditional warfighting elements?requires a reorientation in intelligence gathering strategies and tradecrafts appropriate to discerning, understanding, and engaging those inherent human mindsets and group dynamics. As a result, the US intelligence community (IC)?as illustrated in microcosm by the above article?s examination of the evolution of military intelligence to combat the insurgency in Iraq (Country Profile)?has in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks (Terrorist Incident ) been compelled to transform its Cold War-era intelligence operations and posture, which featured a massive and static fixation on the Soviet Union, to a more agile and dynamic posture to identify and combat diffuse and amorphous transnational terrorist threats.