The above article serves as a slight, but useful, update to the October 27, 2004 WAR Report article on the new complexion of the Iraq insurgency in that it notes that the core and most entrenched element within the Iraq insurgency are Sunni Arab rejectionists and former regime elements?largely comprised of ?onetime military officers and intelligence agents? from within the Hussein regime?who are believed to have organized and continue to facilitate insurgent cells and operations. These elements? insurgent modus operandi features dynamics and societal intimidation powers similar to local mafias. The article also notes that the US military and Iraqi government are now focusing their counterinsurgency strategy on enticing these two elements?ousted from privileged rule and status under the Hussein regime?to disarm and demobilize in return for the opening up of avenues for enfranchisement and power within the new Iraqi political process and landscape.

A newly articulated Pentagon-Iraqi government counterinsurgency strategy?identified and analyzed in these pages beginning some weeks ago and most recently in the October 27 edition?is a differentiated carrot-and-stick approach to cleaving and isolating the foreign mujihideen and terrorists from the Sunni rejectionists and former regime elements, seeking to destroy the foreign fighters, and as noted, draw the Sunni extremist elements into a new Iraqi political process.