The New York Times report offers promising evidence of possible conflict between Iraqi Sunni nationalist insurgents and foreign jihadist insurgents and attendant efforts by the US to leverage this schism to enlist Sunni insurgent knowledge against al-Qaeda -associated elements in Iraq and to entice Sunni insurgents to demobilize in return for a political voice. These issues have been central themes of TRC analyses on the Iraq insurgency for many months (WAR Report). This report seems to indicate that the potential conflict between the two insurgent communities and the advantageous counterinsurgency initiatives being applied are gaining traction.
The possible schism between some elements of Sunni nationalist and political insurgents and foreign jihadists seems to have grown in 2005 and is borne of fundamental differences in each community?s ultimate strategic goals. While both seek the near-term goal of ousting foreign troops, the jihadists? long-term goal of establishing a Caliphate and strict system of Islamic law is dissonant to Sunni political and nationalist insurgent goals, which range from Iraqi national sovereignty and independence from foreign occupation to the more extremist political goal of restoring the Hussein-era Sunni minority rule. These divergent goals?one largely compelled and sanctified by religious extremism and the other energized by nationalist and political interests?have translated into certain insurgent actions that have provided the catalysts of conflict. The jihadists? extremist religious motivations have compelled and allowed larger, more deadly, and more indiscriminant attacks that are perceived to kill many of the Sunni’s perceived constituency. In some townships, jihadist insurgent control has resulted in the imposition of austere Islamic law, grating against Sunni insurgents and their societal constituency. The bristling of Sunni insurgents is exacerbated by what seems to be a nationalist resentment that these abuses are at the hands of foreign interlopers. An illuminating example can be found in the New York Times quoting of Abu Omar, the nom de guerre of a member of the Islamic Army in Abu Ghraib, who says ?We are Iraqis, and Al Qaeda came from outside our borders.? He continued: ?[Al Qaeda insurgents] defame the name of the noble resistance inside Iraq.?
The high level of voter turnout among Sunnis in the recent national elections (WAR Report), the reports that some Sunni insurgents provided unofficial security for polling stations in Sunni regions against potential jihadist insurgent threats and admonitions that the vote was illegitimate, and other reports of Sunni political insurgents entering into informal talks with the Iraqi government regarding potential demobilization, all serve as indicators suggesting that some segments of the Sunni community and its insurgent groups may be swinging their support and energies more toward the political process and possibly away from insurgent activity.
The Sunni community and political/nationalist insurgents may be realizing that the most advantageous path toward pursuing and securing their interests lies largely within the political arena. For the Sunni community, this means a commitment to participating as a minority bloc within Iraq?s political system. For Sunni political insurgents, this means translating insurgent martial power and activity into political voice and clout via demobilization or, though less desirable in counterinsurgency terms, the establishment of political parties with attached insurgent cadres held in reserve as coercive insurgent reminders and backing for political interests and pursuits.
These early stages of a possible shift in the Sunni community and insurgency to the Iraqi political arena are highly promising developments in counterinsurgency terms. As noted in the TRC 2006 Projections:
The linchpin of [the degradation of the insurgency] is the commitment of the Sunni community and the more moderate and politically oriented Sunni insurgents to the political structures and mechanisms in Iraq. In particular, it is the level to which Sunnis regard the political arena as a viable and durable avenue of pursuing and safeguarding Sunni interests and rights. This decision, if sweetened with enticements by the government for Sunni political insurgents to lay down their weapons, should prove advantageous in both sapping the insurgency of what seemingly is its core ranks, and in isolating the politically implacable foreign jihadist elements from Sunni insurgent and societal operational support.
Further, Sunni insurgents may serve in some instances as a highly advantageous de facto operational or intelligence ally for US and Iraqi counterinsurgency efforts in combating the foreign jihadist and al-Qaeda-associated elements because of their likely more intimate knowledge and understanding of the jihadist insurgency.
With these developments and ramifications in mind, the potential shift of the Sunni community and insurgents to politics has likely stoked anxiety among jihadist insurgents. This may explain the recent upsurge in attacks in Iraq (Terrorist Incident and Terrorist Incident) that seem aimed at provoking sectarian conflict and at sabotaging political negotiations. Further, in an audiotape posted to the Internet on January 8, the leader of al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers , Abu Mussab al Zarqawi, condemned Sunnis, particularly the largest Sunni political party, the Islamic Party, for participating in the elections and, by extension, it would seem, the political process. Zarqawi also issued a renewed call to arms, possibly concerned that the Sunni shift will isolate his jihadist cadres from Sunni insurgent and societal operational support.
Thus, US and Iraq government liaisons with Sunni political and nationalist insurgents on demobilization and assistance in combating jihadists would seem to be a highly advantageous tact for landing a body blow against the insurgency and isolating jihadist elements. Some of the critical factors that will determine the success of these efforts are the ability of purported insurgent leaders and interlocutors to represent faithfully and accurately elements of the Sunni political and nationalist insurgency, and, importantly, their ability to deliver insurgent action on their promises. If confidence-building actions are pursued on both sides, this strategy of liaisoning with Sunni insurgents may serve as a powerful counterinsurgency weapon.
