Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001 , al Qaeda the organization has evolved into a global jihadist movement from the more discrete terrorist vanguard network and operational and support corps of al Qaeda?s earlier years. Reports of al Qaeda-associated terrorist operations indicate that this evolution, and the attendant attacks from the al Qaeda network, are likely to continue apace. While al Qaeda seems to retain a core leadership and veteran operative nucleus, the modern day al Qaeda network has expanded around the world with viral dynamics, energized and carried by its pathogens of radicalization?the purchase and allure of its strain of militant and jihadist Islamist ideology practiced by ?missionary? militant Islamist leadership figures and jihadist/mujihedeen veterans. These pathogens exploit and ride the sinews of globalization?increasingly global and unbounded information streams and virtual community mediums including the Internet, rapid transnational travel, and multiculturalism?that seem to have compressed time and space while increasing ethnic, nationalist, and religious intimacy. As a result, the al Qaeda ideology is able to transcend many of the societal and ethno-nationalist barriers and insularity long anchored to state-centric geographic space to reach pocketed communities around the world susceptible to the call to arms of jihadist militancy. The result has been, and is likely to continue in the near term, the viral cultivation, emergence, expansion, and consolidation of a globally atomized, operationally amoebic and adaptive constellation of al Qaeda-inspired and affiliated cells. At the leading edge of this transformation seems to be a push into new geographic fronts by establishing cells and networks led by jihadist veterans of the Afghan and Iraqi battlefields and by rallying largely autonomous ?vanguard outpost? cells within nations deemed enemies by the al Qaeda jihadist philosophy. The ?vanguard outpost? cells are comprised of indigenous or ?homegrown? militants inspired to the agenda of al Qaeda and similar Islamist ideologies.
These ?vanguard outpost? cells and groupings seem to conduct rather autonomous and entrepreneurial operations in the service of al Qaeda?s professed general strategic goals and against targets identified by the al Qaeda leadership. While al Qaeda?s core nucleus reportedly continues to plan and facilitate specific operations, its role seems to have evolved into one centered on inciting jihadist action, issuing general strategic and targeting guidance through global communiqu?s, and providing operational guidance and financial, logistical, and/or materiel support for a global movement of like-minded Islamist and jihadist cells, all operating generally toward al Qaeda?s and similar Islamist goals.
Media reports have also indicated that al Qaeda-associated and Iraq-based terrorist mastermind Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi and his terrorist network may be ascending as one of the most notorious and operationally active on the global stage, rivaling by default or design Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda leadership and operational coterie. With this ascendance comes fears from counter-terrorism observers that Zarqawi may pivot his terrorist networks to conduct attacks globally, possibly using Iraq as a base of operations. The recent bombings of hotels in Amman, Jordan , attributed to Zarqawi?s network may represent an opening salvo of Zarqawi?s global operations in the coming years.
Of additional concern is that battle-hardened veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan jihadist insurgencies, and particularly those of Zarqawi?s Iraq legions, may proliferate globally and serve to establish, lead, or otherwise offer their expertise to groups and cells within the wider militant Islamist global network. This infusion of jihadist veterans into the al Qaeda network will likely serve to enhance overall operational capabilities with the ?state-of-the-art? terrorist tradecraft expertise these veterans have honed in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Overall, it is likely that the al Qaeda network and movement will continue to expand virally into an atomized and globally diffuse constellation of Islamist militant cells and groups rallying to and conducting entrepreneurial attacks in the service of the ?al Qaeda? and wider militant Islamist strategic agendas, guided by leadership communiqu?s. Thus, the world is likely to see an increase in smaller-scale and/or more ?amateur??yet highly dangerous?attacks globally by a diffuse array of regional or ?homegrown? vanguard outpost cells, particularly in Europe and the greater Middle East.
