As a conduit for implementing portions of the 2003 Department of Justice (DOJ) National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) and Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative?s (Global), several states in 2005 have established ?Intelligence Fusion Centers,? and many more are considering doing so. Additionally, the Homeland Security Advisory Council?s (HSAC) Intelligence and Information Sharing Working Group recommended that state-run intelligence fusion centers should also be part of this information sharing effort. These centers are suppose to be an effective and efficient mechanism to share information and intelligence and fight crime and terrorism by merging data from local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. They are being established to process information from the federal government as well as gather threat information from within state and local jurisdictions. ?The concept of the intelligence fusion centers is a real leap forward,? said Jeff Vining, a former DOJ employee and current Vice President for Gartner, Inc. ?Intelligence fusion centers are red hot for state and local governments, which are becoming not just consumers of intelligence but also collectors of it,” he said in a February 2005 Washington Technology article (source).
Also in February 2005, The Police Chief Magazine supported the implementation of the NCISP and forming fusion centers, ?the plan embraces intelligence-led policing, community policing, and collaboration. The recent proliferation of fusion centers is viewed as a possible conduit for implementing portions of the NCISP, while maximizing resources, streamlining operations, and improving law enforcement?s ability to fight crime and terrorism.? The article noted that there were various versions of fusion centers, and no specific guidance or information was available to help law enforcement agencies with forming them. Some of the driving forces for states establishing fusion centers was a lack of intelligence local law enforcement officers receive from state and federal counter-parts and the need to instill in law enforcement officers an understanding of how information becomes intelligence along with the value of sharing and collaboration.
In August 2005, DOJ released guidelines of general advice on conforming to the NCISP by setting up memorandums of understanding and creating a representative governing structure. The 125-page document also recommends the intelligence fusion centers take necessary steps to prepare for future connectivity with other local, state, and federal systems. Many of the formed state intelligence fusion centers currently use the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). This network is a Department of Homeland Security communications network for sharing information on terrorist threats and suspicious activities that is expected to be fully operational in 2007.
Law enforcement anticipates that these intelligence fusion centers will become the ?nerve centers? for collaborating efforts among investigative support and intelligence information sharing.
However, civil libertarians are alarmed by this secretive operation and have been critical of the intelligence fusion centers because they fear a lack of government accountability about the protection of privacy and civil rights. They are especially concerned about the use of personal data and surveillance images. The American Civil Liberties Union filed a Freedom of Information Act request in May 2005, wanting Massachusetts?s Intelligence Fusion Center policies. ?We need to have transparency,? stated Carol Rose of the Massachusetts?s ACLU in a September 2005 Boston Globe article, ?There?s all sorts of questions about whether this is good from a civil-liberties perspective or public-policy perspective.?
One of the problems with these state intelligence fusion centers is that they view information and develop intelligence based upon criminal activity. Having learned from the disrupted millennium bomb plot , all of the 9/11 hijackers entered the US using genuine travel documents, they used money wire transfers or credit cards to finance their stay and training, only two arrived with a past terrorist record. Their only brush with law enforcement were speeding tickets issued to two members; in short, they stayed within the law before their attack, they did not resort to criminal activities to support their operations, and they would not have been noted by a law enforcement intelligence fusion center. By having these centers staffed, in almost all cases with only local, state, and federal law enforcement officers, they rely upon the techniques and procedures they used as law enforcement officers working in intelligence centers to combat drugs, gangs, and organized crime. In viewing information with only a criminal nexus, these centers miss valuable input from the public health area, fire and emergency medical services, and the private sector.
Secretary Tom Ridge visited Los Angeles in April 2003; while there he toured and was briefed on the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW). He stated that the TEW concept was a model that should be used nationally. In 2004, Department of Homeland Security sponsored the national expansion of the TEW concept to the 50 Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) cities. The TEW concept is founded upon the precept that local and regional public safety agencies are producers as well as users of intelligence and it is not solely a top-down, federally driven process. Actionable intelligence must move top-down, bottom-up, and laterally, and local public safety and health agencies may be the first to observe indicators of a terrorist attack. They need a system that will allow them to report the information and have it analyzed and disseminated if required to warn the community of the threat. The TEW concept meets that goal. Additionally, it will be the entire local police, fire, and health community, working with the private businesses, that will be responsible to craft the effective response to the terrorist attack as expected by the public.
John Sullivan, the founder of the original TEW in Los Angeles, has written and lectured extensively about the concept and stated in a recent publication: ?TEW Groups bridge the gap between criminal and operational intelligence with a networked approach that integrates law enforcement, fire, health, and emergency management agencies and allows it to monitor trends and assess potential threats or indicators of a terrorist attack. It relies on the sharing of information across multiple disciplines and levels of government, including criminal leads, investigative information, and open source information and classified intelligence to identify threats credible enough to warrant a response and to determine what level of response is required.? The TEW is a scaleable integrating concept that is not designed to replace the state intelligence fusion centers or the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, but rather is complimentary. Many TEW Groups start with one or two staff members working as additional duty and can be increased or scaled back based upon the threat. Currently, the Los Angeles TEW is staffed with 30 full time and part time employees drawn for the Los Angles area law enforcement, fire, health, academic, and private business community.
At the close of 2005, over 50 UASI cities have received an orientation and information about forming a TEW Group in their jurisdictions. TEW groups are operational in Los Angeles, Riverside/San Bernardino, Orange County (CA), San Diego, Sacramento, Pierce County (WA), Tulsa, Cincinnati, Albuquerque, and others are beginning to emerge in Miami, New Orleans, Kansas City, Oakland, Las Vegas, Guam, Snohomish County (WA), and the National Capital Region.
In 2006, Department of Homeland Security?s Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) needs to continue to encourage state and local jurisdictions to form TEW Groups as a means to fulfill the intelligence requirements in Homeland Security Directive 8: National Preparedness Goal. In addition, ODP should persuade states to form TEW-like entities in their law enforcement fusion centers, to preclude the production of criminal-only based intelligence. ODP also must assist jurisdictions with the TEW formation process by providing grant opportunities that will allow them to hire full-time employees as analysts. Additionally, with ODP assistance, local jurisdictions must be assisted with training efforts for TEW analysts from public health, fire service, and emergency management. The US military, federal law enforcement, and many state police agencies have excellent intelligence analyst courses, which would provide a good foundation for course development. ODP, working cooperatively with the existing operational TEW Groups, needs to develop an intelligence analyst course of instruction for training TEW analyst in the skills required for the TEW missions in: indications and warnings, operational net assessment and the development of intelligence preparations for operations. Without these kinds of multi-discipline, multi-jurisdictional intelligence development efforts, public safety agencies will continue to develop stovepipe intelligence products that will miss connecting the dots, before the next terrorist attack.
