Highlights
-Pakistani government offers to act as broker between US and Taliban
-Lack of compromise from each side diminishes hopes of serious dialogue
-Escalating violence in near-term lowers likelihood of peace talks
The Pakistani military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency publicly acknowledged that both remained in contact with top Taliban leaders, including Mullah Muhammad Omar. The acknowledgement was made by Major Athar Abbas, director-general for Pakistani Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), in which he stated the Pakistani government was capable of bringing Mullah Omar and other top Taliban commanders to the negotiating table.
Statements by Abbas and other Pakistani government officials increase the prospect of peace talks between the United States (US) and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries with the Afghan Taliban. However, despite the Pakistani government’s offer to act as a broker and insistence that Omar is prepared to talk, we believe the likelihood of high-level negotiations between the sides are low for the near to medium-term.
Given the stalemate in key areas in Afghanistan and growing strength of the Taliban, Omar is unlikely to give into US demands or concede any of his power. Lower level peace talks between the US and Taliban commanders from within Afghanistan may occur, but are unlikely to alter the current state of relations between the two.
The ‘Moderate’ Taliban
For the past four to five years, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has attempted to negotiate and reconcile with so-called ‘moderate’ elements of the Taliban. The goals were to resolve the insurgency, convince moderate Taliban members to join the ranks of government, and establish long-term peace in Afghanistan. Given that violence levels are at an all-time high, it is evident that Karzai’s approach failed to achieve the desired results.
President Barack Obama recently suggested opening dialogue with moderate Taliban members, replicating General David Petraeus’s counter-insurgency policy in Iraq where the military negotiated with Sunni fighters. At the outset, the Taliban rejected President Obama’s proposal claiming that there are no extremist or moderate groups within their ranks. Prior to the latest claims by Abbas that Mullah Omar is willing to negotiate with coalition forces, Taliban leadership have not been willing to conduct serious dialogue with the US.
Due to the formal, hierarchal nature of the Taliban, serious negotiations cannot take place without the consent of Mullah Omar. There are likely to be future instances where lower level commanders strike deals with NATO forces outside of the Taliban hierarchy. The effects will likely be minimal – mostly exhibited by the establishment of uneasy ceasefires.
Demands – Forces Out, Sharia In
One of the primary reasons that serious negotiations with Mullah Omar are unlikely to occur is due to his demands and preconditions for talks. Specifically, Omar demands the departure of all foreign forces from Afghanistan and the implementation of Sharia law. Only when these two demands are met, will the Taliban begin to negotiate with the Afghan government, and potentially the US and NATO.
With the US and NATO fully embedded in Afghanistan and committed to supporting the central government, the withdrawal of forces from the country is unlikely. The Taliban remains steadfast in its insistence on withdrawal, resulting in diminishing prospects for peace talks. Conversely the US’ demand for the Taliban to cease its attacks is unlikely to be adopted. Since compromise on both sides is an improbable scenario, the likelihood of Pakistani intervention to broker dialogue and foster a long-term peace deal is low.
Prospects for Peace
Over the past several months, Omar has consolidated his grip over various powerful resistance groups throughout Afghanistan and the tribal regions of Pakistan. However, Omar’s primary objective has been the ousting of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan, a goal he is unlikely to achieve through peace talks.
Recent successes by the Taliban during the latest annual spring offensive also diminish the possibility of near-term peace talks. The Taliban believe that they are now in a position of strength, and are thus unlikely to concede to demands made by Washington or Kabul. While Washington may be open to negotiations with some members of the Taliban, the military’s current offensive in Helmand province indicates that the US is committed to combating the Taliban with force. Only after stability has been achieved in Afghanistan’s most violent provinces, can serious peace talks occur.
While director-general Abbas’s offer for the Pakistani government to act as a broker represents a movement towards the kind of diplomacy promoted by the Obama administration, divisions remain within the Pakistani government over acting as a broker. Some top Pakistani intelligence and military officials immediately disputed the remarks made by Abbas, claiming that there has been no contact with Mullah Omar. The public denial was likely an attempt to save face, but contacts between Omar and Pakistani intelligence are almost certain.
Inconsistencies within the Pakistani government over contacts with the Taliban, as well as escalating NATO-Taliban violence throughout Afghanistan, lowers the likelihood of peace talks in the near to medium-term. When violence subsides in the winter months, peace talks are still unlikely to ensue unless either side believes they are on the verge of defeat, an unlikely scenario for either.
