Highlights
• Intense violence in the southern Thai provinces of Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani
• Government response critical in shaping the future of the Muslim insurgency
•Continuation of insurgency likely to result in collaboration with pan-regional jihadism
On June 8, 2009, five gunmen opened fire in a mosque in Narathiwat, the southern most province in Thailand, killing 10 and injuring 13. The event was followed by a major escalation of violence, resulting in a total of 31 dead, and 50 injured, in 11 days. Although the government has claimed success in quelling the violence in the Muslim-dominated southern provinces, the renewed violence has demonstrated that the insurgency is not abating.
Thai Muslims, who identify themselves with the Malay race, constitute a mere 5 percent of Thailand’s population. They are concentrated in the southern provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat, which were annexed by the Thai government in 1902. The political and economic marginalization of the Muslim minority is the major cause behind the ethno-religious insurgency, which became prominent in the 1950s. The failure of Thai policies to integrate the Muslim minority and institution of brutal security measures has further fueled the insurgency and separatist demands.
Recent moves by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva are aimed at providing greater autonomy to the provinces, namely the possible imposition of Shariah law in the region’s education system. Despite the modest efforts, however, we anticipate continued inter-ethnic violence in the near to medium term as animosity between Buddhists and Muslims in the region runs deeper than the government may acknowledge.
The Shadowy Insurgency
From 1960 to 1998, a number of militant separatist movements operated in the south, with varied ideological goals and tactics. During this time, the three principle groups were the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the New PULO. The uniting factor of these groups was the pursuit of a low intensity conflict pattern limited to the south, in order to pressure the government into acceding to their demands.
The unrest lessened during the late 1990s, only to increase after Thaksin Shinawatra was elected Prime Minister in 2001. Shinawatra transferred the responsibility of internal security in the south from the army to the police, a more heavy-handed force in Thailand. Militant violence sharply rose in 2004 following three key incidents – coordinated militant attacks in January, the battle between the police and militants at the Krue Se mosque in April, and the death of 85 Muslims after the Tak Bai protest.
The distinguishing factor in this resurgence of violence is the absence of an organizational nucleus. With no group claiming responsibility for the attacks or demanding specific concessions, the government has been unable to extend any negotiations with the separatists. However, we note the militants have not exported the violence to the north, reinforcing the limited separatist goals of a Malay-Muslim state. As the violence continues, Muslims and Buddhists will remain the target of militants due to suspicions of collaboration with the government’s ongoing security measures.
Foreign Influence Remains Indirect
Foreign support, through weapons or funding, is difficult to assess due to the lack in clarity over the groups behind the attacks.
There are unconfirmed reports that funds from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have been used to build mosques and local Muslim schools that focus on hard-line Salafist and Wahhabist teachings. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Indonesian-based Al Qaeda affiliate, has used Thailand as a venue for logistical support to hold key meetings, launder funds and as a transit point for members,. We note, however, that JI appears to have no direct influence on the operations in the southern insurgency. A Thai military intelligence assessment, released in 2004, confirmed that jihad recruitment and training was present in at least 50 educational establishments in Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani.
While there is a significant religious element in the Thai insurgency in the south, the militants have not explicitly connected their war to pan-regional jihadism. Instead, the strong Muslim-Malay identity has focused on creating a wedge between Muslims and Buddhists, with the purpose of making the southern provinces ungovernable.
Malaysia’s Role
Malaysia has a historic association with Muslim separatism in the southern Thai provinces. Most Thai Muslims are ethnically Malay, which has prompted demands of accession to Malaysia and consequently, a movement of insurgents across the border. In the past, diplomatic relations between Thailand and Malaysia were strained, due to suspicion that insurgents were being trained in Malaysia.
Kuala Lumpur has since denied these allegations and publicly condemned the insurgency, offering to cooperate with Thailand on ending the insurgency. A recent meeting between the premiers of both countries focused on extending educational opportunities in southern Thailand, as a significant step towards peace. Overall, we believe Malaysia plays a significant role in ensuring the insurgency is not assisted by Muslim-Malay sympathizers across the border. However, Malaysia’s impact in addressing the specific rebel violence in the southern provinces is limited.
The Future of the Insurgency
The resurgence of violence in the southern provinces represents a failure of existing efforts of the government to end the separatist movements. Ethnic marginalization, a long-standing grievance of Thai Muslims, is still prominent in Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani, constituting a major source of anti-government sentiment.
Government policies in the south have been highlighted by human rights agencies for their brutality and treatment of all residents as suspected rebels. As such, we view ongoing violence as a reaction to government policies, rather than a war to achieve the original separatist cause.
The government is considering extending Shariah Law in the southern provinces in response to demands for ethno-religious recognition and rights. If Shariah Law is implemented uniformly in all the southern provinces, allowing political space for cultural and religious identity, the government could gain significant support from the local populace in the south. But, if this policy is implemented without simultaneously cracking down on the militancy, the rebels will likely manipulate the religious law to fuel their insurgency.
The southern insurgency has maintained its local goals without adopting a front of pan-regional jihadism. However, the presence of Jemaah Islamiya in Thailand, although not directly involved with the insurgency, suggests that foreign terrorist influence is feasible. Therefore, if the insurgency is unable to successfully counteract government security measures, cooperation with Islamic jihad groups in the future is increasingly likely.
