Highlights
-Zainuddin’s death likely to fracture and weaken tribal opposition
-Baitullah Mehsud in firm control of TTP organization
-Pakistani military offensive expected to continue as planned
In recent months, evidence of cracks within the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) organization have emerged, specifically in regards to opposition toward its leader Baitullah Mehsud. None were more evident than the emergence of Qari Zainuddin Mehsud.
The emergence of Zainuddin was short-lived, as he was killed on June 23, 2009. According to Zainuddin’s chief aide, Baz Mohammad, a guard barged into a room at the leader’s compound following morning prayers and opened fire. Zainuddin’s death represents a major blow to the tribal elements seeking to weaken Baitullah Mehsud, as well as creating new obstacles for the government as it prepares its offensive in South Waziristan to eliminate the TTP leader.
Describing himself as the “real” Taliban, Zainuddin and his deputy Haji Turkistani Bhittani gathered nearly 3,000-armed followers preparing to battle Baitullah Mehsud. Zainuddin was the first militia or tribal leader to openly challenge Baitullah, especially unique because the revolt occurred within the Mehsud tribe. Zainuddin’s death is likely to create divisions within tribal elements opposing Baitullah. It will now be up to Bhittani and Baz Mohammad to lead the revolt against Mehsud. However, replacing Zainuddin will not be an easy task, as his leadership skills and ability to unite the opposition are largely irreplaceable. Without Zainuddin, tribal opposition is unlikely to pose a serious threat to Baitullah Mehsud for the near to medium-term.
Divisions with Baitullah
Over the past several weeks, Qari Zainuddin was active in giving interviews regarding his conflict with Baitullah and divisions within the TTP leadership. In his last interview, Zainuddin vowed to eliminate Baitullah and rescue Pakistan from the TTP leader’s “reign of terror.”
Zainuddin accused Baitullah of betraying Islam and the Mehsud tribe by conducting terrorist attacks throughout Pakistan. Zainuddin’s principal issue with Baitullah was the decision to wage war against the Pakistani government and his choice of targets, which included hospitals, markets, mosques, and other civilian infrastructure. Zainuddin was a strong advocate for the war in Afghanistan and vowed to redirect focus to the country once Mehsud was defeated. Zainuddin and his deputies further blamed Baitullah Mehsud for hampering the Taliban’s primary goal of defeating the coalition in Afghanistan because of preoccupation with waging war against tribal leaders and security forces in Pakistan.
In addition to ideological, strategic, and operational differences, Qari Zainuddin also had a personal vendetta against Baitullah Mehsud. The feud between the two developed following the death of Abdullah Mehsud in 2007, Baitullah’s supposed brother, and has translated into multiple tit-for-tat killings:
•Baitullah Mehsud killed Masoodur Rehman Mehsud, Zainuddin’s father, using a remote controlled bomb in South Waziristan in 2008.
•Qari Zainuddin responded by killing Baitullah’s younger brother Yahya on October 27, 2008 in Bannu district.
•Baitullah retaliated by killing Zainuddin’s close aid, Muhammad Yousuf, on October 29, 2008 in Tank.
•Qari Zainuddin ultimately killed by Mehsud gunman in Dera Ismail Khan on June 23, 2009.
The death of Zainuddin by a TTP gunman has taken the feud to a new level within the Mehsud tribe. Baz Mohammad has already vowed revenge for Zainuddin’s death. However, Mohammad and the anti-Mehsud coalition’s capabilities are now in question without Zainuddin’s leadership. The group’s ability to conduct large-scale, well-orchestrated attacks against TTP strongholds will likely be limited in the near to medium-term.
Losing Qari Zainuddin
The loss of Qari Zainuddin will have near and long-term effects for tribal opposition to Baitullah Mehsud. However, we believe Zainuddin often inflated or overplayed his influence and power. Efforts to gain widespread support among tribal leaders mostly failed, largely because Zainuddin was seen as an instrument of the Pakistani government. Several key tribal leaders refused to openly endorse Zainuddin against Mehsud due to a deep suspicion of the Pakistani government and army, which has previously made secret deals with Baitullah. Zainuddin and Bhittani’s influence was further questioned when they were excluded from a recent meeting between senior Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda leaders to discuss the government’s military operation in South Waziristan, as well as to urge Mehsud to move his operations into Afghanistan.
Zainuddin’s death is likely to have the greatest impact on the Pakistani military, as it prepares a major offensive in South Waziristan targeting Mehsud. The Pakistani government was supporting Zainuddin in his bid to oust Mehsud, providing weapons and other support. The level of cooperation between Bhittani and the Pakistani military remains unseen, but unlikely to be at the levels that they were with Zainuddin.
The assassination of Zainuddin demonstrates Baitullah Mehsud’s hold on the tribal areas amid splits within the TTP and Mehsud’s own tribe. The assassination is indicative that Baitullah remains firmly in control of South Waziristan and maintains the capabilities to eliminate rivals. Zainuddin’s death is evidence that Mehsud’s power and maneuverability has not been reduced by the initiation of military operations in South Waziristan and the surrounding districts.
The assassination of Qari Zainuddin is likely to strengthen the resolve of the Pakistani Army and dissuade the government from relying too heavily on local elements to defeat Mehsud. The TTP leader has shown he has the ability to overcome tribal dynamics and maintain the funding, resources, and capability to attack targets anywhere in Pakistan. The events that occurred over the past 24 hours is further evidence that Baitullah Mehsud remains firmly in control of the TTP organization and is prepared to use force against anyone who opposes his rule.
