Highlights
– Al Qaeda undergoes significant structural changes since September 11th, 2001
– Network has grown increasingly close to Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud
– Al Qaeda’s global affiliates’ power and influence likely to grow at the expense of the organization’s central leadership
When United States (US) President Barack Obama outlined the country’s new strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the President invoked the threat still posed by al Qaeda. Shifting attention away from Iraq and defeating al Qaeda on the Afghan battlefield has become the centerpiece to the President’s new strategy for Afghanistan.
President Obama is using similar rhetoric that was repeatedly expressed by the previous administration of George W. Bush, that al Qaeda continues to plan and organize attacks against the US and its allies. The head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Leon Panetta, recently stated that al Qaeda remains the most serious security threat facing the US at home and abroad.
Despite consistent statements made by top US officials that the terrorist network remains a major threat, there is debate over whether al Qaeda remains a viable and capable force. Al Qaeda’s apparent defeat in Iraq, funding constraints, and the targeting of its top leaders by Predator and Reaper drones in northwest Pakistan, have weakened the organization. Current assessments range from suggesting al Qaeda is as strong as ever while others claim the organization is on the verge of collapse.
The group has undergone structural changes and no longer resembles what it was prior to September 11th. We believe that while the group has been weakened and suffered setbacks, al Qaeda remains influential to various movements throughout the world and active in the tribal regions along the Afghan-Pakistan border.
Operating Under a New Flag
Since September 11th, al Qaeda ha re-established itself along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Top US officials claim the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are where top al Qaeda and Taliban leaders reside and plan attacks. Specifically, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader Baitullah Mehsud, Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar, and Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri are all suspected of residing in northwest Pakistan and Baluchistan province.
Al Qaeda has been able to restructure its safe haven along the border regions by effectively relying on both its traditional alliance with the Afghan Taliban and new alliance with the Pakistani Taliban. The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and its campaign against the organization weakened al Qaeda and disrupted activities, but it appears the al Qaeda network is now reasserting itself in an uncharacteristic way.
In Pakistan and Afghanistan, al Qaeda has not been at the forefront of violence, making it difficult to ascertain the organization’s strength and capabilities. A majority of the attacks in the region are perpetuated by the TTP, Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s organization, all organizations in which al Qaeda has financial and operational connections. Al Qaeda’s role in the region has largely become secondary in the local context. The network is not operating under its own flag, possibly due to a lesson learned from its experience in Iraq where many people turned against al Qaeda in Iraq’s brutal tactics and foreign nature.
The organization’s tactics over the last several years are indications that al Qaeda is lowering its public profile while supporting other groups in a bid to remain relevant and active. However, al Qaeda’s influence is far greater than its increasingly shadowed profile suggests. The network continues to finance suicide bombings, train foreign volunteers, offer experience and strategy to Afghan and Pakistani insurgents while maintaining its ties to global affiliates.
We believe al Qaeda remains incredibly influential in regards to its relationship with TTP chief Baitullah Mehsud. We further believe that al Qaeda’s central leadership has chosen Mehsud as its chief ally, helping him consolidate power in FATA and wage war against the Pakistani government and other tribal elements in the border regions. Most alarmingly, we note Al Qaeda supports war against the Pakistani government – evidenced in the recent propaganda booklet released by Abu Yahya al Libi claiming the Pakistani Army should be treated as an occupying infidel force waging war on a Muslim population.
The Future of al Qaeda
Despite several setbacks and the organization lowering its public profile, we believe al Qaeda remains a viable and influential force. Al Qaeda’s central leadership and mid-level leaders are largely held up in northwest Pakistan, offering strategic and operational guidance to Pakistani and Afghan insurgents. In the near to medium-term, we believe al Qaeda’s central leadership will continue conducting attacks through regional terror movements, primarily the TTP and Afghan Taliban.
However, in the long-term, we believe al Qaeda’s central leadership will become weaker from an operational sense at the expense of local and regional affiliates that have already sworn allegiance to the al Qaeda ideology. These affiliates include al Qaeda in Iraq, al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al Qaeda in Yemen (AQY), among others. In the end, these organizations are local groups, largely operating on their own, but remaining loyal to the al Qaeda idea. It is these types of organizations that will grow increasingly deadly and pose major threats to governments. From an operational standpoint, al Qaeda’s affiliates are likely to be strongest in Algeria, Somalia, and Yemen, and potentially gaining a foothold in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.
Al Qaeda’s affiliates are likely to remain independent in their goals and tendencies, having limited or no contact with bin Laden, Zawahiri, or other top al Qaeda leaders. We believe the trend of decentralization on a global scale will continue. Al Qaeda will remain influential from an operational and financial standpoint in the tribal regions, especially regarding the TTP and Afghan Taliban, but will provide little more than moral and ideological support to the multiple affiliates that operate independently throughout the world.
