Editor’s note: This report constitutes an overview and analysis of the Lashkar al-Zil group, al-Qaeda’s elite paramilitary army operating in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Highlights
– Capture of Abu Sufyan al-Yemeni represents a major blow to Lashkar al-Zil
– Training and facilitating militants to various battlefields are primary goals of the organization
-Planning of large-scale, world-wide attacks likely to be put on hold for near to medium-term
Lashkar al Zil, also known as the Shadow Army, is al Qaeda’s elite paramilitary Army. The unit has its roots in the 055 Brigade, which at the outset of the United States (US) invasion of Afghanistan fought conventional battles against the Northern Alliance and American forces in the country.
Based in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Shadow Army contains fighters from a wide-range of regional terrorist groups, including the Taliban, al Qaeda, Haqqani Network, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
The operational strategy outlined by Lashkar al Zil leader Abdullah Sa’id is ambitious and multidimensional, including the planning of large-scale attacks in Europe and the US. The group’s near-term strategy is to maintain its presence in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region conducting guerrilla-style attacks against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan and Pakistani security forces in Pakistan.
Lashkar al Zil’s history of conducting conventional battles against US forces in Afghanistan is unlikely to be replicated in the near to medium-term. The Afghan Taliban’s focus on patience and organized guerrilla warfare is likely to be adopted and utilized by the Lashkar al Zil, in both northwest Pakistan and Afghanistan. The shift is advocated by the organization’s central leadership and evidence of the group’s ability to adapt to changing environments in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Leadership Targeted
The organization’s central leadership has recently been spread out and saw its influence weakened due to US and Pakistani military operations on both sides of the border. Pakistani Commandos from the Special Services Group recently stormed an al Qaeda safe house in Quetta and captured chief logistical and facilitation officer Abu Sufyan al-Yemeni.
Abu Sufyan kept close contact with al Qaeda cells worldwide and was involved in facilitating terrorists into Pakistani Taliban-controlled tribal areas. Sufyan was a conduit for communications between al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and active cells in East Africa, Iran, and Yemen. Working under Lashkar al Zil leader Abdullah Sa’id, Abu Sufyan has facilitated hundreds of fighters in and out of Pakistan’s tribal regions to fight in Afghanistan, Europe, and around the world.
The capture of Abu Sufyan in Pakistan may be a direct result of the US Predator campaign targeting al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban’s networks in northwest Pakistan. It is likely Sufyan and other terrorist leaders escaped to Quetta to avoid Predator strikes. Unlike in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistani security forces maintain more of a presence in Baluchistan province and can more easily intercept high-level leaders.
Abu Sufyan is the second Lashkar al Zil leader to be either captured or killed within the year. Khalid Habib, former leader of the Shadow Army, was killed by a US Predator strike in South Waziristan. The death of Habib was a major blow to the organization and raised questions over the group’s ability to continue fighting.
Future of Lashkar al Zil
The capture of Abu Sufyan represents a blow to Lashkar al Zil, but by no means is the organization about to collapse. The Shadow Army’s diversity and decentralized military command structure allows the organization to remain a viable and capable force, despite the recent loss of top leaders. The organization’s closeness to the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban in a command and control perspective will also empower Lashkar al Zil for the medium to long-term.
Similar to the death of Khalid Habib, the capture of Abu Sufyan will not distract or deter the Shadow Army from achieving its long-term goals. Maintaining a significant presence in Pakistan’s northwest and training fighters to continue their struggle in different parts of the world are the organization’s prime goals. Due to the US Predator campaign targeting al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, more and more Shadow Army and other extremist leaders are likely to move to either Baluchistan or southern Afghanistan. By moving operations, their ability to operate freely will likely decrease, potentially affecting the ability to conduct large-scale attacks.
The planning of large-scale operations will likely be put on hold for the near to medium-term, as Lashkar al Zil will primarily focus on training, facilitating, and conducting guerrilla-style attacks against NATO, Afghan, and Pakistan forces. Countering Pakistan’s military offensives in the northwest and participating in the Taliban’s annual offensive are two campaigns likely to command most of the Shadow Army’s time, commitment, and resources throughout 2009.
