Highlights
– Mas Selamat bin Kastari arrested in Malaysia
– Jemaah Islamiya media arm mirrors Al-Qaeda’s As Sahab
– Leadership dealt major blows, but recruitment likely ongoing
Malaysian police arrested Mas Selamat bin Kastari, alleged head of the Singapore cell of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) on 1 April 2009. The arrest was kept under wraps for several weeks out of concern for then-ongoing operations. Selamat’s capture raises the question of just how alive the JI group really is in the region, and just as importantly, what remains of the group’s connection to Al-Qaeda.
The group has been dealt a number of heavy blows over the past year, mostly high-profile arrests and interruptions to its ability to raise funds, but remains a serious threat throughout Southeast Asia. JI is slowly but steadily attempting to increase its recruitment via new publishing and media efforts, and its support base appears to remain both large and loyal, particularly in Malaysia.
Following Selamat’s arrest, we expect JI to devote greater focus to rejuvenating its operational capacity with recruitment drives and petitioning other terrorist groups, namely Al-Qaeda, for additional funding. Plans to launch new attacks in the region will likely be put on hold as the group works to restructure its defenses and avoid further debilitating arrests in its higher echelons of leadership.
Down But Not Out
JI has suffered a number of blows at its highest level prior to Selamat’s recent arrest. The most devastating came in 2003 when a joint operation between Thai police and the Central Intelligence Agency arrested Riduan Isamuddin, better known as Hambali, considered the Osama bin Laden of Southeast Asia. Hambali’s arrest, occurring less than a year following the Bali bombings, was a coup for regional security agencies and greatly diminished JI’s operational capabilities and connections to other international terrorist organizations.
In January 2008, Malaysian police arrested Agus Idrus, also known as Agus Purwantoro, and Abddurrahim, also known as Abu Husna, two high-ranking members of JI. According to authorities, both men had been involved in religious violence in Indonesia between 2000 and 2001 that claimed more than 2,000 lives and displaced 100,000 civilians.
Before the arrest of Purwantoro and Abu Husna, police arrested Selamat in Indonesia in 2006 for his alleged plot to hijack an airliner in Thailand and crash it into Singapore’s Changi Airport. Selamat, however, escaped from the Whitley Road Detention Center and found fourteen months of refuge in Malaysia’s Johor state, suggesting that sympathies to JI likely remain high in the area.
Publishing and Media
Despite the arrests, efforts are regularly made to groom future JI leaders. According to some reports, the Ar-Rahmah media company, chaired by Muhammad Jibriel Abdul Rahman, a former member of JI’s Al-Guraba cell, has been tasked with the goal of developing leaders and raising funds.
The Ar-Rahmah media company began as both a channel for celebrating terrorist victories and for spreading material from Al-Qaeda and JI. The company now is allegedly sending young recruits to train with groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba during their school vacations. Others have also allegedly been sent to Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan to receive training in weapons handling and explosives.
The group also allegedly sells videos from Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to foster anti-American, and anti-West sentiment. Additionally, last year, the company launched a new high-gloss magazine, Jihad Magz, to further disseminate information of militant acts across the world. The magazine’s online edition was created in July 2007 and is based out of Jakarta.
Ar-Rahmah, like As Sahab – Al-Qaeda’s media production company – illustrates the group’s willingness to take advantage of modern media capabilities in an attempt to reach a wider audience.
Masking recruitment efforts and anti-American rhetoric over the Internet has become increasingly more common as security operations in the region have made it more difficult for groups like JI to operate in the open. Efforts will continue to improve the quality and content of these sites and publications and will have a concerning impact over the ease and ability JI has to recruit new generations of fighters.
Current Standing
Despite a number of high-profile arrests and claims that the group’s connection with Al-Qaeda may have been severed, it appears JI remains a major threat to Southeast Asia, and possibly beyond. Selamat’s ability to remain undetected in Malaysia for over a year – despite a nation-wide manhunt that plastered his photo throughout the country – suggests safe havens for JI and other terrorists organizations remain a concern.
The State Department’s 2008 Country Report on Terrorism further noted that the Sulawesi Sea and Sulu Archipelago, between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, remain increasingly difficult to control. This area serves as a safe haven for regional terrorist groups.
The group’s numbers still remain difficult to determine, with some estimates ranging from several hundred to several thousand. We assess that the number of operational fighters is likely near the low end and the number of potential recruits and supporters is closer to the high end.
While little evidence has surfaced regarding the group’s connection to Al-Qaeda, we note that the trial of Purwantoro and Abu Husna revealed that the two had been planning on visiting Iraq prior to their arrest to seek funds from Al-Qaeda leaders. A laptop seized during their arrest allegedly had detailed funding proposals for explosives and operating expenses. We expect other attempts to raise funds from Al-Qaeda while JI also continues to raise funds through Islamic charities and threats.
