Highlights
– Steep rise in violence in April raises concern among Iraqi government and US forces over a return to sectarian violence
– Al-Qaeda in Iraq tactics seen in recent suicide attacks
– Ongoing violence may delay June 30 deadline for US withdrawal from Iraqi cities
– Sectarian conflict could destabilize Iraqi government and threaten Sunni support of al-Maliki
The April death toll is the largest thus far this year, with 355 Iraqis and 18 United States soldiers killed (source). On April 6, a rash of car bombings across Baghdad killed roughly 30 people. These were followed by four suicide bombings, bringing back grim memories of Iraq’s worst days in 2006 and 2007 when such attacks occurred daily. More concerning is the blatant provocation from Sunni militants, part of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), who may be exploiting the US troop decrease and growing role of Iraqis in security operations. AQI may also be targeting Shiites and other religious infrastructure to incite further conflict with the Sunni community.
Despite the 40 percent rise in death figures since March, the recent bombings do not yet demonstrate a sustained trend signaling a fundamental reversal of the security situation. April’s figures may be the highest so far this year, but remain below 10 percent of the worst months in 2006-07, when over 3,000 Iraqis were killed in a single month.
Nonetheless, the AQI tactics in the attacks is reason for concern, as ongoing violence may stir up tension between Sunnis and Shiites. A return to sectarian violence would devastate the political situation in Iraq – destabilizing the government and adding additional strain to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s small Sunni support base. Should violence continue to increase, US forces may resort to changing withdrawal strategies to keep forces in troubled cities, such as Mosul and Baquba, at the Iraqi authorities’ request.
Provoking Attacks Sound Alarm
A number of attacks last month have brought back dark memories of tragic deaths during the peak of sectarian violence in Iraq in 2006-07:
• May 1: A double suicide bombing killed more than 60 worshippers and pilgrims at Kadhemiya, the most venerated Shia site in Baghdad.
• April 30: A suicide bomber detonated himself in a roadside restaurant on the pilgrim route from the Iranian border, killing 50 people – mostly Iranian pilgrims. Another suicide bomber detonated explosives the same day among a crowd of displaced people receiving food from Iraqi police, killing 30 people including 10 policemen.
• April 29: Three car bombs exploded in the Shia district of Sadr City, Baghdad, killing at least 41 people and wounding 70 others.
With over 180 people killed in a span of three days this week, Iraqi and US officials are concerned that the latest attacks may usher in a return to mass violence. The attacks last month exposed gaps in security that AQI exploited and will continue to exploit in the near-term. We expect AQI atempt a resurgence in Mosul, as it is the second largest city with a mixed population of Sunnis, Kurds, and Christians, as well as the last remaining urban stronghold of al-Qaeda.
Violence May Delay US Withdrawal and Decrease Sunni Support for Al-Maliki
According to the Status of Forces Agreement concluded between Iraq and the US in November, US troops could potentially stay in Mosul beyond the June 30 deadline if Baghdad makes such a requests. Al-Maliki has not yet officially proposed the idea, but we expect increased sectarian violence to push him in that director for multiple cities, including Baghdad, if the attacks do not subside soon.
During her visit to Iraq this weekend, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed concern for the rise in violence and stated that a troop drawdown would be carried out “responsibly and carefully.” Clinton stressed the US remained committed to having its troops out of Iraq by 2011, but the withdrawal tactics would be flexible to ensure no dangerous vacuum is left, and that the Iraqi forces were ready for the task.
Of particular concern is the lack of Sunni support for al-Maliki’s government should the increased violence in Baghdad continue. Armed Sunni groups, known as the Awakening, would be hesitant to support al-Maliki in a politically unstable environment. The Awakening appears resentful at the way it has been sidelined by the country’s Shiite-led government.
The Awakening’s slate of candidates won first place in January’s provincial elections. Now the movement is shifting its focus from fighting AQI to increasing its participation in political and economic arguments about the future direction of the country. Yet, a delicate balance of power between the prominently Shiite-led government and the much needed Sunni armed groups must be found in order to keep the Awakening allied against AQI. The need to integrate Iraq’s Sunni community fully into political life and the security forces is imperative, as a Sunni exclusion could strike a revival of the insurgency.