Highlights
– Strikes far afield are meant to deter suppliers
– Hamas stops militants in attempt to maintain ceasefire in Gaza
– New Israeli leadership to conduct increased military action if smuggling continues
Summary
Israel’s Shin Bet security service head, Yuval Diskin, announced Sunday over 70 tons of weapons were smuggled to Gaza since the cessation of Operation Cast Lead. These arms arrived in spite of increased Egyptian monitoring of border smuggling tunnels, the presumed Israeli bombing of a weapons convoy in Sudan, and an agreement by some NATO countries to monitor the sea-lanes for ships thought to be transporting arms to Gaza. Hamas has so far kept a relatively tight clamp on extremist militants intent on launching more rockets into Israel in order to keep the ceasefire, for now. Time is running out to stop arms smuggling to Hamas before Israel’s new right-wing government decides to restart military operations.
Halting Hardware
The arrival of explosives, rockets, and mortar rounds into the Gaza strip demonstrates the failure of Israeli, Egyptian, and international efforts to cut Hamas off from its arms suppliers, particularly Iran. Israel has sealed the borders of Gaza from all shipments except strictly controlled humanitarian aid. Egypt, according to Mr. Diskin, has improved measures to halt illegal smuggling into Gaza with more border patrols and efforts to seal tunnel entrances. The United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, Germany, France, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and Denmark are now conducting non-coercive naval patrols – any vessel whose captain refuses to allow the ship to be boarded for an inspection will not be forced to submit to the procedure – to interdict sea-borne weapons shipments to Hamas. An international conference on preventing arms smuggling to Gaza is due to be held in Canada in May. Together these efforts are slowing the flow of weapons to Gaza, but have not halted the increasing capability of Hamas to attack Israel.
Deterrence
Inside Gaza, Hamas is using its authority to stop disparate internal terrorist organizations from launching attacks against Israel; a sign Hamas has the ability to control rocket fire into southern Israel and is not seeking to restart a fight at this time. Mr. Diskin noted the stark decline in rocket attacks against Israel from Gaza and believes this is due to Hamas’s failure to secure a new cease-fire agreement with Israel, reconcile with Fatah, and rehabilitate the Gaza economy. Hamas is intent on rebuilding Gaza and restarting its rocket manufacturing industry; two goals unachievable if hostilities restart in the near-term.
Realizing the futility of trying to stem the flow of weapons directly at the borders of Gaza, the Israeli government is believed to have conducted an air strike against an alleged weapons convoy in the Sudan. This strike, if indeed launched by Israel, could well serve as a two-pointed deterrent against Iran. The first point demonstrates Israel’s ability to use intelligence to target shipments, attempting to compel Iran to halt its support and arms supplies to Hamas. Second, and possibly more important to Israel, is the demonstration of Israel’s ability to strike into the heart of Iran. The Sudan attack took place over 900 miles from Israel and included at least one airborne refueling of the attack aircraft. A 900-mile radius from Israel puts most of Iran, including its suspected nuclear facilities, within striking distance. If the Israelis did conduct the Sudan attack, the statement is pretty clear: The IAF has shown it can hit Iran.
Iran is the lynchpin for Hamas and Israel’s overall security vulnerability. Without Iranian largesse, Hamas would lack weapons, funding, and the material support to maintain adversarial relations with Israel. Iran uses Hamas and Hezbollah to keep Israel in a constant state of pseudo, and occasionally hot, war. Even after acquiring the capability to hit Israel with missile-delivered weapons itself, Iran will continue funding and arming Hamas to threaten Israel on multiple fronts.
Outlook
Israel’s new political leadership will be coming to office just as we can start measuring the deterrent effect of the presumed Sudan strikes. Led by Binyamin Netanyahu of Likud, Avigdor Lieberman of the extreme nationalist Yisrael Beitneu, and Ehud Barak of the Labor, this heavily hawkish coalition is not likely to sit on its hands to wait for Iran to be deterred from supporting Hamas and developing nuclear weapons. Ehud Barak, who pushed for and led Operation Cast Lead, is the moderate and third voice in this group. Mr. Lieberman, the incoming foreign minister, is not known for his international niceties. Mr. Netanyahu will need to bring the security he promised to Israel quickly if he is to retain his electoral support. Therefore, the willingness of the Israeli government to allow Hamas the ability to rebuild and fortify, while Iran acquires the potential to destroy Israel, will be short-lived.
