Highlights
– Pay dispute may have been cover for a power grab
– Islamic influence in Bangladesh may be far greater than initially suspected
– Talibanization a growing threat to democracy and security in the region
The mutiny began early on February 25 when rank-and-file Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) soldiers took up arms against their superiors. Allegedly motivated by low wages and the harsh treatment BDR officers had shown their subordinates, many people are beginning to ask how a dispute over pay could escalate into city-wide gun battles, the killing of over 75 officers, and mass graves strewn throughout Dhaka.
With other, more traditional means of airing grievances, namely through the standard trade union tactic of absenteeism or ignoring orders issued from officers, we are concerned that the true rationale for the uprising was something far more sinister than a wage dispute. We assess that this event was a coordinated offensive planned and executed under the guidance of individuals within Bangladesh’s political/military establishment.
Elements Opposed to Hasina’s Government
The BDR is Bangladesh’s oldest military organization. Originally begun by the British in 1795, the paramilitary force’s principal responsibility is to guard the country’s 4,000-mile border. The organization is composed of roughly 70,000 troops – current estimates are that 3,000 to 4,000 troops took part in the mutiny.
The justification currently being disseminated regarding the mutiny is that the rebels were demanding better pay, clearance to participate in lucrative United Nations peacekeeping missions and a change in the command and control structure of the force. All legitimate concerns, particularly in one of the world’s poorest countries.
Several questions arise upon closer examination of the uprising. First, why go to such violent extremes, especially after Prime Minister Hasina allegedly offered to address the troops’ demands? Additionally, what of the significance of staging a revolt less than two months after a newly elected, secular government is voted into office? Was it the success of Prime Minister Hasina’s Awami League over the more pro-Islamic Nationalist Party headed by Khaleda Zia that drove the mutineers to attack? The answer to the questions remains unknown, but religious fundamentalism may play a far larger role than is currently recognized.
Talibanization?
In mid-February, Pakistan permitted the institution of Sharia law in the Swat valley. In order to stop what at the time appeared to be a perpetual campaign of barbarity, the government in Islamabad begrudgingly agreed to permit the existence of religious decree as the guiding legal framework of the region. Shortly thereafter, President Sheikh Ahmed of Somalia agreed to permit the same throughout the entirety of Somalia (the decision still needs the approval of Somalia’s central government.) These decisions were essentially last-ditch efforts by each country’s central government to do whatever it takes to stop the bloodshed and violence each region is experiencing. Whether the concession in Pakistan influenced the concession in Somalia is not immediately clear. We note that the concessions are a clear signal to terrorist groups across the Muslim-world that resiliency in their campaigns may result in major concessions from central governments plagued by incessant violence.
That factions within Bangladesh’s military would hope to institute similar measures in Bangladesh is not beyond belief, particularly with the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) political parties operating with little restraint in the country.
That either group may be quietly pushing to see a greater role for Islamic rule throughout the country is not beyond question. Even more concerning, however, is that the groups may be attempting to foment further dissent in the country in the coming months – perhaps even using the events of February 25 as a veiled attempt to ascertain public support for another coup, a reasonable scenario given Bangladesh’s coup-ridden history. Although the concessions made in both Somalia and Pakistan may be disparate actions on the part of governments attempting to reduce the level of violence in their respective countries, these events create an ominous trend for Islamic-majority countries.
Outlook
That ‘pro-Islam’ elements are freely operating within Bangladesh is common knowledge, both internally and abroad. What remains in question are those groups motivations, willingness to commit violence, and extant capabilities. Rumors continue to circulate that the BDR mutiny enjoyed the secret backing of some Bangladesh army officers who had been sidelined by Army Chief Moeen Ahmed during the purges he instituted while heading Bangladesh’s caretaker government for two years. Those groups, likely affiliated with both JI and JMB, may be attempting to marshal support, both in the army and with common Bangladeshis, to follow along the same path as Pakistan and Somalia. Whether that is in fact the case is not entirely clear, but should another central government in the Muslim world make a similar concession in the near-term, terrorist groups from Algeria to Indonesia could exploit what they perceive as a trend affecting the entirety of the Muslim world.
We expect Army Chief Ahmed to hunt down and capture most of the BDR troops involved in the mutiny in the coming weeks.
