Highlights
− Kurdish and Arab parliamentarians oppose al-Maliki’s policies and leadership
− Kurdistan President Barzani threatened to declare Kurdish independence
− All parties maneuvering for support ahead of January 31st provincial elections
− Al-Maliki list to win additional seats in election and remain in office despite the strength of his opponents
Tension between Iraq’s Kurdish leaders and the Dawa party has intensified in recent months ahead of Iraq’s January 31, 2009 provincial elections. The deterioration of relations between the ruling government and Kurdish leaders is rooted in growing Kurdish displeasure with the policies of Iraq Prime Minister (PM) Nouri al-Maliki. Kurdish leaders view recent measures by the al-Maliki government, such as declaring Kurdish oil contracts illegal, plans to establish provincial support councils, calls for strengthening the central government and decision to refer to Kurdistan in all Shia newspapers as “northern Iraq” or “Kurdish areas,” as evidence that PM al-Maliki is overreaching his authority and attempting to rewrite the Iraqi constitution.
Despite these and Arab Iraqi fears that al-Maliki is growing into an authoritarian figure, al-Maliki is likely to retain power. He is backed by widespread popular support and the knowledge amongst Iraqi leaders that no suitable replacement exists.
Offensive Policies
Once allies in the fight against the Saddam Hussein regime, the love affair between the Dawa party and Kurdish leaders became stressed following the December 2007 postponement of a Kurdish referendum to determine the future status of Kirkuk (Previous Report). In a January 11, 2009 interview, Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani said he was surprised when Prime Minister al-Maliki allied himself with Arab nationalists and began to promote the centralization of power in the hands of the central government. “I never expected that he would be opposing the rights of the Kurdish people, or he would be opposing the existence of…peshmerga or Kurds within the Iraqi army and he would be marginalizing them, he said, adding, “Unfortunately, this is what is happening and we are disappointed by that.” In light of the Dawa party’s, “betrayal” of its alliance with Kurdish leaders, Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani is threatening to declare an independent Kurdish state.
In this and previous interviews, President Barzani accused the prime minister of loosing his way in the course of his tenure as prime minister. In reality, Kurdish leaders are weary of government policies that could result in a loss of Kurdish autonomy. Such policies include, but are not limited to, the establishment of support councils—which are designed to increase security in provinces throughout Iraq, the proposed centralization of authority over regional oil contracts in Baghdad and attempts to disband or limit the role of the Kurdish military—the peshmerga. Kurdish leaders have exercised autonomous rule over Kurdistan since 1992 and are not eager to loose their autonomy in favor of what Barzani has described as a “new Iraqi dictator.” As a result, Kurdish leaders will not accept the presence of support councils or the centralization of authority over oil contracts in Baghdad.
Al-Maliki Gaining Popular Support, Losing Allies
Interviews conducted by the Washington Post of over 100 Iraqis across Iraq indicated unfettered Arab support for the Iraqi prime minister. Shia and Sunni Iraqis alike expressed an appreciation for al-Maliki’s seeming ability to put the future of Iraq ahead of sectarian agendas. He is described as a nationalist by some and “the only man working for Iraqi interests” by others. As a result, al-Maliki’s list is expected to win by a large margin in January 31, 2009 provincial elections (Previous Report). While good news for those running in al-Maliki’s coalition, opposition is growing within the parliament among those who view the Iraqi leader as attempting to solidify a one-party rule in Iraq’s governing bodies.
According to an unnamed, senior US official, there are at least 142 lawmakers, four more than necessary, that would support a no-confidence vote to remove al-Maliki from office. Arab opposition to al-Maliki’s leadership is driven by several factors, including al-Maliki’s targeting of Shia militias in Basra, plans to establish support councils—armed groups similar to those employed by Saddam Hussein to enforce his political authority, and al-Maliki’s growing occult following. A parliamentary coup against the al-Maliki regime is unlikely, however, given that it would be unpopular among the Iraqi public and there is no suitable replacement.
Outlook: Kurdistan Flexes Its Muscles
Iraq’s Kurdish leaders will not accept a centralization of power in Baghdad in the mid to long-term. The only viable option for a unified Iraq, as far as the Kurds are concerned, is a federated state governed by a weak central government. With the amelioration of Kurdish-Turkish relations in the past year, an independent Kurdistan would be more accepted regionally than ever before. That said, an independent Kurdistan with oil-rich Kirkuk as its capital will never be tolerated by the Iraqi government. Any Kurdish attempt to declare independence would therefore result in an Iraqi civil war. Because all parties realize the risk entailed in settling these delicate issues, the Kurdish government is unlikely to universally declare its independence and the Iraqi government will not lead an attempt to seize control over the north’s oil rich territories.
Instead, the Iraqi government and Kurdistan will remain in negotiations over the settlement of disputes surrounding the establishment of support councils, national hydrocarbon legislation (Previous Report) and the future of the Kurdish peshmerga. These negotiations will be at times riddled with bellicose statements by leaders on all sides of the political divide and require years to settle, but they will be confined to the political realm. Al-Maliki will likely be forced to postpone his plans to establish support councils, but will not relent in his insistence that oil contracts fall under the authority of an independent ministerial council of the central government. The political dance will continue and the players will remain unchanged in the near to mid-term, but civil war will ultimately be averted.
