Highlights
– Lashkar-e-Taiba has decentralized and adopted a more al-Qaeda-style organization
– Command structure of the LeT allows for local commanders and cells to operate with a degree of independence
– Due to increased pressure from the Pakistani government and international community, the LeT’s top leadership is likely to remain underground for the near to mid-term
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), active since 1993, recently regained the international spotlight over its alleged role in the November 26, 2008 Mumbai attacks . While the group has yet to claim responsibility for the terrorist attack, India has provided evidence indicating the group likely is responsible for the attack.
Due to increased pressure from India, the international community, and to some extent Pakistan, several of the LeT’s top leaders have been either arrested or placed under surveillance. The group is likely to escape a full crackdown from Islamabad in the near to mid-term because the organization likely continues to serve Pakistan’s foreign policy aims.
The LeT presently maintains high-level contacts with individuals with Pakistani intelligence and military. However, a bolder LeT organization will inevitably result in a more aggressive Pakistani government crackdown, and ultimately a decrease in support. In the near-term, the government would likely maintain the appearance capturing and arresting the organization’s top leadership, as well as targeting its structure and funding activities.
Leadership
Hafiz Muhammad Saeed is the Amir (Chief) of the LeT, which he has reportedly been involved with since the early 1990’s. However, Saeed has stated on numerous occasions that he has no links with the LeT but rather leads the Jamaat-ud Dawa (JuD), the alleged front group for the LeT. While Indian leaders claim that the LeT and JuD are interchangeable, Saeed and other officials working within the JuD deny the link. However, the LeT and JuD are ultimately serve as a parallel support network. Since the Pakistani government issued the ban on the LeT in 2002, many of the offices were shut down and converted into JuD offices. The JuD, widely believed to be another name for the LeT, is not only vital in serving funding purposes for the LeT, but also instrumental in enhancing membership.
Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri is one of the most senior leaders of the LeT and considered by some as head of the LeT. Some reports suggest that following the arrest of Saeed in December 2001, he relinquished control of the organization to Kashmiri and that the group would be moving its headquarters to Pakistani-ruled Kashmir. Since his appointment as military commander of the organization, Kashmiri has never appeared in public and has never issued a public statement.
Yusuf Muzammil is allegedly the leader of the LeT’s operations in India. According to testimony from the lone terrorist apprehended by India Ajmal Qasab, Muzammil was the mastermind behind the Mumbai attacks and is presently among five senior officials’ names found on a satellite phone recovered from the Thai trawler the terrorists used to launch their attacks.
Another leader’s name who was reportedly on the satellite phone and at the center of the Mumbai attacks investigation is Zarir Shah. Shah, the LeT’s communications chief and allegedly one of the primary liaisons to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, was recently taken into custody by Pakistani authorities. On December 31, 2008, Pakistani officials indicated that Shah had confessed to LeT’s involvement in the attacks, as well as his own central role in the attack.
Command Structure
While the LeT’s leaders remain influential and wield considerable power in running the organization, the command structure of the LeT allows for local commanders and cells to operate with a degree of independence. The decentralization of the LeT has proven beneficial for the group in light of recent arrests of top-level leaders and increased international scrutiny.
The LeT’s cadres are organized at local levels with district commanders in charge. While at the field level, district commanders are below both Chief Commanders and Division Commanders, individual district commanders retain considerable independence in regards to running training camps, branch offices, funding activities, and recruitment. Local groups come mostly from Pakistan and Afghanistan, though an increased number of militants come from Sudan, Bahrain, Central Asia, Turkey, and Libya.
While the LeT is still governed in a hierarchal sense where top leaders remain in control, the decentralization of the group over the past several years places the LeT in line with most modern terrorist organizations that allow local commanders and cell leaders a considerable amount of autonomy.
Future Outlook
In regards to organizational structure, we believe in the mid to long-term the group will continue its path of decentralization and adopt the more al-Qaeda-style command structure of individual cells and commanders retaining considerable autonomy. While the arrests of top leaders such as Saeed and Shah hurts the LeT, it will not represent a defining blow to the organization because of the increased decentralization and autonomy wielded by local commanders.
However, in the mid to long-term, top leadership will maintain a vital role in the continuation of the organization, primarily in recruitment and funding. Large-scale terrorist attacks, such as that which occurred in Mumbai on November 26, 2008, will continue to be orchestrated and planned by high-level leadership. Small-scale attacks, primarily concentrated in the Kashmir region, will likely be at the discretion of local commanders.
Increased pressure from the international community and Pakistani government will force many of the LeT’s top leadership to operate underground for the near to mid-term. While this may hamper the group’s ability to perpetuate large-scale attacks against India in the near-term, the LeT has proven its ability to adapt to changing environments. As a result, the group will continue to remain a major national security threat to India.
