Highlights
− Rapprochement between Jordan and Islamist groups motivated by domestic security concerns and limited in nature
− Peaceful demonstrations provide an outlet for public anger
− Will not sever diplomatic ties with Israel
As a result of Israel’s two and a half week offensive in the Gaza Strip, pro-Palestinian sentiment in Egypt and Jordan is leading to calls for the governments to severe diplomatic ties with Israel. For Jordan, the pressure is particularly acute as a result of its large Palestinian population (approximately 60 percent of residents) and the integration of Palestinians into Jordanian society and tribes. Consequentially, Jordan has witnessed its largest pro-Palestinian marches in the past two weeks since Jordanian King Abdullah took power in February 1999.
In a country where the government regulates acts of civil disobedience, the occurrence of daily and large-scale demonstrations calling for an Israeli ceasefire should be interpreted as an act of government allowance as much as it is an expression of public displeasure. In fact, in June 2008 there were signs of Jordanian rapprochement with Hamas in anticipation of a Hamas victory in the Palestinian Territories. In these instances, the government’s appeasement of the pro-Hamas Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist and pan-Arab sentiments among its population is motivated by a will to survive. It will allow for public expression of disdain for the Israeli government actions but will stop short of altering its foreign policy toward Israel and its western allies.
Limited Rapprochement
Following Israel’s June 2008 ceasefire agreement with Hamas officials, the Jordanian monarch opened direct talks with Hamas leadership (Previous Report). Jordan’s motivation for softening its stance toward the radical Islamist, Palestinian movement is clear. The decision to open dialogue was a direct result of the ceasefire, which many Arab leaders viewed as an implicit Israeli recognition of Hamas’ right to govern the Gaza Strip, and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm, the Islamic Action Front’s (IAF), election of a hardline, pro-Hamas president. The Jordanian government surmised that Hamas’ return to political negotiations would lead to a repeat Hamas victory in 2009 Palestinian elections. In which case, the Jordanian government was uncertain if Israel would allow Hamas to lead the Palestinian Authority in light of its clear military advantage and public backing. Therefore, its decision to enter into dialogue with Hamas was an attempt to establish a baseline understanding between the parties in preparation for Hamas governance of the bordering territory.
Similarly, the Jordanian government recognized the growing strength and radicalism of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood could develop into a powerful opposition force following a Hamas victory. The Jordanian government was accused of tampering in 2008 municipal and parliamentary in order to prevent the IAF from gaining seats on the governing bodies. The IAF’s subsequently poor showing in the elections led to a snap IAF presidential election and the accession of a radical, pro-Hamas candidate (Previous Report). With the IAF positioning itself to be a Hamas ally, the government acted to soften its relationship in order to avoid a shift of popular support toward the movement, as well as a repeat of the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s interference in Jordanian governance in the 1970s.
Outlook: Jordan-Palestinian relations post-Gaza offensive
Despite fervent calls for a ceasefire by King Abdullah II and Queen Rania and daily public demonstrations demanding Jordan e diplomatic ties with the Jewish nation, the Jordanian government will not cut off diplomatic ties with Israel in the near to mid-term. In fact, the king’s removal of the head of general intelligence, Mohammad al-Thabi, though likely rooted in multiple motivations, is interpreted by some as an attempt to reverse the government’s rapprochement with Hamas—al-Thabi initiated talks with Hamas and permitted parliamentary ministers to burn an Israeli flag during session. Jordanian leaders will continue to allow the public to vent their frustration and anger in peaceful, public protests, but will not head their calls and risk damaging its relations with western donor nations. Instead, King Abdullah II will link Jordan’s role as a conduit for foreign aid to the Palestinian Territories to its diplomatic relations with western nations and Israel, relations that not only provide Jordan the opportunity to aid Palestinians but also funding for nuclear energy and development programs.
