Highlights
– Despite ASEAN member states’ success in decreasing JI operational capabilities in the region, the group’s propaganda work has not been diminished
– Although a number of high-profile arrests have weakened JI, the group still poses a long-term threat to Southeast Asia
– The group’s international debut clearly indicated JI propensity to attack Western targets
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), “Islamic Congregation,” is a Southeast Asian Islamic terrorist organization dedicated to the establishment of an Islamic State in the region. JI was created by a small number of Indonesian extremists exiled in Malaysia in 1993. The group’s stated goal is to create an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia and impose Sharia law. In the late 1990s, JI was actively recruiting, as well as training operatives for terrorist attacks. By 2000, JI became fully operational and began launching terrorist attacks with deadly effectiveness against targets in Southeast Asia, as well as Western interests.
JI, which is active in Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, southern Thailand and Malaysia, poses the main regional terrorist threat to security in Southeast Asia. In the long-term, JI’s operational capabilities and aptitude to connect militants in Southeast Asia will likely remain a viable security threat in the region.
Founding Members
The group’s founders, Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar, were radical Muslim clerics that participated in the Darul Islam movement. Both men were arrested in Indonesia for their radical positions and upon their release migrated to Johor, Malaysia. While living among the Indonesian expatriate community in Malaysia, the two men formally founded JI on January 1, 1993.
• Following positions in the Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement and the Indonesian Student Da’wah Organization in Indonesia, Abu Bakar Bashir co-founded Al-Mukmin boarding school in 1972. Bashir was in an out of prison for various charges from the late 1970s to 1982. In 1985, Bashir fled to Malaysia but returned to Indonesia in 1999. In 2004, Abu Bakar Bashir, was arrested for terror related charges, but was released in 2006. Currently Bashir is out of prison and has become a leading cleric in Indonesia.
• Abdullah Sungkar worked as a preacher in Indonesia giving lectures until December 1971. After opening an Islamic Boarding School, Al-Mukmin, Sungkar established a radical Islamic radio station, Radio Da’wah Islamiyaah Surakarta. Sungkar entered and left jail several times in the late 1970s until he finally escaped Indonesia in 1982. He lived in exile in Malaysia until the resignation of Indonesian President Suharto. When Sungkar returned to Indonesia he resumed teaching Islam. Abdullah Sungkar died in his sleep on October 23, 1999.
A succession of high profile JI arrests led by the Associate of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states has led to a significant decrease in the group’s capabilities in the region. Although a number of JI members have been incarcerated, many of the group’s other leadership figures remain at large:
• Noordin Mohammed Top is one of the most wanted men in Asia. Noordin is alleged to be one of the key bomb makers for JI. Additionally, Noordin recruited militants into becoming suicide bombers and collected funs for militant activities. Noordin Mohammed Top has been on the run since 2006.
• Mas Selamat Kastari is the alleged head of the Singapore branch of JI. Kastari escaped from prison on February 27,2008 and remains at large today.
Noordin Mohammed Top and Mas Selamat Kastari, as well as other JI leaders that have evaded capture continue to recruit and train members; we believe their continued operations indicate a dangerous continuing threat to Southeast Asia.
Jemaah Islamiyah’s Organizational Structure
JI currently has cells in Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and southern Thailand. We believe believe JI operates in the same-networked manner as al Qaeda. The group’s structure involves the following: a central command, which is an element of a wider governing council, a core of dedicated members, and a broader associate base that is comprised of established insurgent organizations and lone wolf radicals based in Southeast Asia. Additionally, the members are divided further into territorial cells, with four major areas of operation:
• Cell 1: Singapore, Malaysia and southern Thailand
• Cell 2: Indonesia (with the exception of Kalimantan and Sulawesi
• Cell 3: Sabah, Sulawesi, Kalimantan and the Bangsamoro region of the Philippines
• Cell 4: Australia and the province of Papua
Authorities in Australia have estimated that there are between 3,000 and 5,000 active members of JI, however only around 300 are operational. A number of Southeast Asian countries have weak central governments, lax law enforcement and open maritime borders which have likely facilitated JI‘s ability to operate throughout the region. Though JI is on the decline, we do not anticipate JI to disappear in the near-term until nations in Southeast Asia seriously implement counterterrorism policies designed to pursue active JI members and prevent continued JI propaganda and recruitment efforts.
Jemaah Islamiyah’s International Debut
JI made its international debut in December 3, 2001 when a major terrorist plot was uncovered in Singapore involving the simultaneous bombings of: United States Navy vessels docked at Changi Naval Base, the British and Australian High Commissions, US and Israeli embassies, commercial housing complexes, the Ministry of Defense and a shuttle bus serving Sembawang Wharves and Yishun subway . Officers of Singapore’s Internal Security Department (ISD) uncovered the JI plot while monitoring members of the group’s Singapore cell. Authorities believe the plan took two years of planning and that JI members Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, a bomb maker, and Mohammed Jabara were responsible for the failed attack. The two JI members coordinated the local cell of militants, helping them select appropriate targets, as well as assisting in the logistic matters for the bombings.
The failed December 3, 2001 plot served as a clear indicator of JI targeting of Western interests in Southeast Asia. However, although the failed plot targeted Western interests, the US did not put the organization on its terror list. In hindsight, had the US immediately designated JI a foreign terrorist organization, the likelihood of future JI terrorist attacks against Western targets in Southeast Asia would most likely have decreased.
