Highlights
– Numerous insurgent groups dominated by al-Shabaab and elements of the Islamic Courts Union continue attacks against Somali and Ethiopian troops
– Differing objectives cause periodic disagreement between groups, yet violence remains high
– Somalia has become increasingly unstable as many insurgent groups rejected recent peace deal
Somalia’s insurgency was established in January 2007 when Ethiopian forces defeated the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an organization of Muslim courts, which governed much of central and southern Somalia. Removed from their seat of power in Mogadishu in December 2006, ICU members rapidly developed into insurgent groups intent on removing Ethiopian forces from Somalia, deposing the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and establishing an Islamic state.
Weakening confidence in the TFG and anger over civilian deaths caused by Ethiopian troops allowed the ICU to recruit many new fighters to its cause but also led to the rise of numerous other groups. We expect these insurgent groups to continue to adversely impact the aspect of peace within Somalia for the near to mid-term.
Makeup of the Insurgency
The strongest group that has emerged from the ICU is al-Shabaab (“The Youth”), which originated as a militant wing of the ICU that protected its leaders before the Ethiopian invasion. The group split from the ICU following the invasion in order to pursue more radical Islamic goals, including aiding the global jihadist movement and striking out against “all foreign influence” in Somalia, such as African Union (AU) peacekeepers and foreign aid workers. Much of the group’s core leadership trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and represents the most extreme element of Somalia’s insurgency (Previous Report).
The ICU also represents various different groups who operate independent of each other. The organization is split into two sides; a moderate faction led by Sheihk Sharif Ahmed and a hard-line faction led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. Ahmed is the chairman of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), a coalition of moderate opposition groups who oppose Ethiopia’s presence in Somalia, but have actively engaged in peace talks with them. Aweys’ faction refuses to negotiate with Ethiopia and pledges to continue fighting Ethiopia until it withdraws from the country. A few smaller groups are also actively engaged in the insurgency, such as Harakat Ras Kamboni and the Khalid bin Walid Brigades, though both are believed to be reliant on ICU funding and support.
Effects of the Insurgency
Tactics employed by both insurgents and Ethiopian forces has resulted in high civilian deaths, an enormous humanitarian crisis, and growing support for insurgent groups fighting Ethiopian and Somali government forces.
• Aid agencies estimate at least 10,000 civilians have been killed as a result of fighting since the insurgency began in January 2007.
• Hundreds of thousands of Somalis have been displaced because of fighting and over three million (43 percent of the population) require humanitarian assistance
With the exception of al-Shabaab, Somali insurgents mainly target Ethiopian and Somali government forces; however, their attacks have caused considerable collateral damage and sparked heavy-handed responses from Ethiopian forces. Insurgents based in Mogadishu, where most attacks occur, launch mortar strikes and ambushes against troops within heavily populated areas. Mortar attacks often miss their target killing civilians and also prompt shelling from Ethiopian units, which often have the same effect.
The high civilian casualty rate has weakened support for the TFG and its Ethiopian backers and has allowed several insurgent groups to replenish their ranks and find support among the local populace. Growing popular support for the insurgency will increase these groups’ confidence in their ability to gain control over Somalia in the future.
Differing Goals and Escalating Violence
Most Somali insurgent groups shared the common objective of removing Ethiopian troops from Somalia, however they differ over a few key issues including the authority of the TFG, the United Nations (UN) and other foreign presences, and the governing of Somalia.
The ARS, including Ahmed’s ICU faction, agreed to a ceasefire with Ethiopian and Somali forces in June 2008 and signed a peace deal in October 2008 committing to establishing a joint-security force with the TFG following an Ethiopian withdrawal. However, Awey’s ICU faction and al-Shabaab rejected the peace deal saying negotiations cannot be made with Ethiopia or the TFG. If Ethiopia withdraws, the violence is unlikely to subside as both insurgent groups will continue to target the TFG, furthering attempts to turn Somalia into an Islamist state.
Even Aweys’ hardline faction and al-Shabaab leadership disagree on foreign presences within Somalia. Both reject the United States’ support for Ethiopia and the TFG, but disagree on the threat posed by foreign aid agencies. While Aweys’ supports the aid group’s presence and assistance to the Somali people, al-Shabaab has condemned their presence, targeting many workers for assassination.
• On November 9, 2008, a Somali aid worker was shot dead while leaving a mosque in Jamame raising the number of aid workers’ killed to 25 since January 2008.
Al-Shabaab and other hard-line insurgent groups will likely see an Ethiopian withdrawal as a sign of success and an opportunity to consolidate power. We believe instability and violence is likely to increase in the coming months, as Ethiopian forces withdraw, allowing insurgent groups to focus attacks against the TFG and their rivals.
